Endogenous Specialisation and Endogenous Principal-agent Relationship

The paper develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous principal-agent relationship within a framework of consumer-producer, economies of specialisation, and transaction costs. It is shown that if transaction efficiency is low, then autarky is chosen as the general equilibrium where no market and principal-agent relationship exists. As transaction efficiency is improved, the equilibrium level of division of labour increases, comparative advantage between ex ante identical individuals emerges from the division of labour, and the number of principal-agent relationships increases. The following features of the model distinguish it from other principal-agent models in the literature. The principal-agent relationships are not only endogenous, but also reciprocal between different specialists. In a general equilibrium environment, choice between pure pricing and contingent pricing is endogenised. In the paper, the implications of endogenous transaction costs caused by moral hazard for the equilibrium extent of the market and related degrees of market integration, production concentration, trade dependence, diversity of economic structure, and productivity are explored. The model predicts two interesting phenomena: a man might work harder for the market with moral hazard than working for himself in the absence of moral hazard; a market with moral hazard might be Pareto superior to autarky with no moral hazard.     

Reputation for quality and adverse selection

We analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one-time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets. The potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller׳s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade. The market faces two types of inefficiency: the ex-ante inefficiency, i.e., the seller׳s moral hazard problem, and the ex-post inefficiency, i.e., inefficient ex-post allocations due to the adverse selection problem. We analyze how the observability of information by future buyers, through which the seller builds a reputation, affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them.     

WEALTH EFFECT OF PUBLIC FUND INJECTIONS TO AILING BANKS: DO DEFERRED TAX ASSETS AND AUDITING FIRMS MATTER?*

This paper examines the wealth effect on other banks by the public fund injection into Resona Bank. This paper finds that the injection initially conveyed the auditing firms' strict stance towards deferred tax assets. More importantly, the procedure that the government employed was regarded by market participants as a too‐big‐to‐fail policy. Therefore, although the Resona injection was effective in obviating a financial crisis, the policy was inevitably accompanied with the moral hazard problem.     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

The relationship banking paradox: No pain no gain versus raison d'être

Relationship banking paradox refers to the case that credit market competition may threaten relationship banking practice, but it may stimulate it as well because of differentiation. Using a mixed model of adverse selection and double moral hazard, this paper shows that for some parameter values, relationship banking arises even when the banks compete à la Bertrand, hence supporting the no pain no gain hypothesis. This is due to multilayer nature of the information asymmetry by double moral hazard where an outside bank that does not have the borrower's proprietary information is unable to exert optimal levels of effort in the continuation game.     

违约风险与贷款定价:一个基于期权方法和软预算约束的新模型

由于忽视了软预算约束导致的"优先原则"不成立以及由此产生的还贷道德风险等现实问题,贷款定价传统期权方法在中国的适用性受到了影响。通过引入信贷合同效率,本文构造了二维违约风险,并据此建立了贷款定价的新模型。新模型解决了上述问题,得到以下结论:第一类与第二类违约风险的联动对贷款定价的影响是不确定的,第一类与第二类违约风险相关度越高则贷款定价越低,贷款期限与贷款定价之间的关系受违约风险构成的影响等。     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

Welfare‐improving adverse selection in credit markets*

A model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral‐hazard‐only case. Adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model, high‐quality borrowers cross subsidize low‐quality borrowers. The cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects, and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices. The analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria.     

Efficient allocations with moral hazard and hidden borrowing and lending: A recursive formulation

We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and effort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have secret access to the credit market or to storage. The recursive structure is based on a generalized first-order approach, whose validity must be verified ex post. Thanks to the recursive formulation of the optimal contract, the verification procedure turns out to be numerically parsimonious as it can be performed using standard dynamic programming techniques with only one endogenous state variable: The agent's level of assets. We study the performance of our ex post verification test in practice by solving numerically three representative infinite horizon examples.     

Taxation of uncertain business profits,private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk

In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital market is incomplete due to non-observability of effort and moral hazard. If the external equity investors can enforce exclusive contracts with the entrepreneurs, the risk relief through a profit tax will lead to too much insurance and too low effort as compared with a second best optimal solution. Bond and Devereux [Bond, S.R. and Devereux, M.P. (1995). On the design of a neutral business tax under uncertainty. Journal of Public economics, 58, 57–71.] show that a proportional profit tax would be neutral in the absence of moral hazard. In the presence of moral hazard we demonstrate that the tax may affect the risk shifting through the market, in which case the premise for the neutrality result will no longer hold.     

信息披露、存款保险制度与银行系统性风险

文章基于不完全信息动态博弈模型,对信息披露、存款保险制度与系统性风险之间的作用机制进行了理论分析,并使用2006-2014年24个国家137家上市商业银行的面板数据进行了实证考察。研究发现,提高银行的信息披露程度,有助于降低融资成本和存款保险缴费费率,引导其减小银行间资产的相关性,从而降低系统性风险;存款保险的金融稳定效应不明显,提高信息披露程度有效缓解了存款保险制度的道德风险,两者在降低银行系统性风险方面存在协同效应。设计合理的存款保险制度、经验丰富的监管当局和严格的监管体系有助于发挥市场约束作用,限制存款保险的道德风险,从而维护金融体系的稳定。因此,在我国正式实施存款保险制度的背景下,监管部门应加强银行信息披露和优化存款保险设计,以更好地防范我国金融体系的系统性风险。     

An agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence

This article explains trade credit policy based on the agency theory. According to this theory, we have developed an agency model based on the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena arising from the relation between sellers and buyers. This model has been estimated by using panel data methodology applied to UK companies. Our findings strongly support the model proposed. We find that smaller firms, those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets, and those that are less profitable extend more trade credit, whereas firms with a high proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less.     

银行资产证券化的风险自留监管：作用机制和福利效果

本文首先建立了一个两期模型的理论框架,分析当银行将信息不透明的资产通过证券化卖给连续统个市场投资者时,风险自留监管的效果。基本模型的分析发现:首先,单一风险自留比例不具有普适性;最优风险自留比例与基础资产的风险收益特征、交易双方的风险态度都密切相关。其次,风险自留监管会降低差资产证券化数量的有效信息含量,从而加剧逆向选择程度;而对于好资产,又存在发信号成本。本文进而从道德风险的角度证明,银行的风险态度会影响单一风险自留要求是否能够提高银行监督贷款的激励。因此,在实施风险自留监管时,政府应当结合银行和投资者的风险规避程度等具体情况有针对性地进行,从而比单一风险自留监管更好地提高社会福利。     

经理人市场失灵与家族管理转型的制度困境

由家族企业向现代经理式企业演变是企业发展的一般规律,也是家族企业规模扩张的必然要求.但是在我国经理人市场失灵的现实条件下,引入外部经理人将使家族企业面对经理人的选择风险和经理人的道德风险.本文通过一个博弈模型证明,家族化管理因家族成员的高度信任具有情境的合理性.     

Asset bubbles,banking stability and economic growth

This paper examines the relationships between the asset bubble and the banking stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the moral hazard caused by the deposit insurance and limited liability might facilitate the banks to hold bubble assets for the purpose of risk premium. Meanwhile the supervisory intensity, leverage ratio and credit spread provide the conditions for banks to hold bubble assets through their effects on risk premium. Once the banks hold the bubble assets, their stability will deteriorate because of four types of effects, namely internal leverage, cash withdrawal, credit friction and network effects. This paper also utilizes the BMA-PVAR model to test the theoretical findings by employing the data from 26 representative economies for a period between 2000 and 2014. The empirical evidences are consistent with the theoretical findings that the equity bubbles will lower the banking stability. The empirical evidences also suggest that the banking instability will be detrimental to the economic growth.     

Moral hazard,Bertrand competition and natural monopoly

In the traditional model of Bertrand price competition among symmetric firms, there is no restriction on the number of firms that are active in equilibrium. A symmetric equilibrium exists with the different firms sharing the market. I show that this does not hold if we preserve the symmetry between firms but introduce moral hazard with a customer-sensitive probability of exposure; competition necessarily results in a natural monopoly with only one active firm. Sequential price announcements and early adoption are some equilibrium selection mechanisms that help to pin down the identity of the natural monopolist. The insights of the basic model are robust to many extensions.     

Economic Volatility and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Countries

Economic volatility has increased drastically in the age of financial liberalization. The tendency among mainstream economists has been to explain this trend by government misdeeds and various market imperfections. For instance, government overspending was the main culprit in the first generation models of currency crises. Following the Asian crisis the emphasis shifted onto capital flow reversals, and arguments based on the ‘moral hazard’ problems began to replace the emphasis on the monetized government deficits. This paper outlines an explanation of economic volatility that is not based on moral hazard problems or other market distortions. Two stylized facts associated with the aftermath of financial and capital account liberalization are singled out for emphasis and brought together in the context of a macroeconomic framework that draws from Keynes’ Treatise. These are: (i) liquidity preference becomes intertwined with currency substitution, producing a macroeconomic destabilizer that explains procyclical changes in bank credit independently of moral hazard problems; and (ii) asset prices become fairly easy to predict, stimulating destabilizing ‘trend’ speculation by foreign investors, which means that profit seeking and market rationality might lie behind erratic shifts in capital flows.     

Moral Hazards,Bankruptcy Costs,and International Financial Capital Mobility*

Using a model with moral hazard and bankruptcy costs, we show that the direction of intertemporal trade between countries depends on differences in their autarkic distributions of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies and bail‐out policies in this framework. We show that, in the presence of bankruptcy cost and capital market imperfections due to moral hazard, the very rich and the very poor do not undertake any risk and choose to be passive lenders. Only individuals whose wealth lies within an intermediate range choose to become entrepreneurs. Redistributive policies influence the supply of entrepreneurship and autarkic interest rates.     

Financial constraints and occupational choice in Thai villages

Financial constraints and entrepreneurship are key factors affecting economic performance in developing countries. I formulate and solve a model of occupational choice with moral hazard under three alternative financial market environments: savings only, borrowing and lending with default and moral hazard constrained insurance. I use computationally efficient techniques based on mechanism design, genetic algorithms and maximum likelihood to estimate and statistically test these models of financial constraints. Using occupational choice data from Thai villages I find evidence that the saving only regime is rejected in favor of regimes allowing for borrowing and/or insurance, especially in higher-wealth data stratifications. A direct test between the borrowing and insurance regimes reveals that neither can be rejected in favor of the other. Allowing ex-ante lotteries over wealth improves the explanatory power of the model. I also find evidence for differences in the best fitting regimes by region, wealth, and access to formal credit.     

医疗保险支付方式的经济分析

本文在对医疗保险市场道德风险分析的基础上,运用经济学原理对医疗保险市场支付方式的作用机制进行了深入研究.结果表明,医疗保险支付方式不仅是一种医疗消耗的补偿手段,而且还是有效控制医疗费用,保障患者健康,正确引导供需双方行为,抑制道德风险的关键.因此,为了抑制供需双方的道德风险,控制医疗费用的不合理增长,医疗保险支付方式成为保险机构的首选工具.