Fed speak on main street: Central bank communication and household expectations

Central banks emphasize the use of communication as a tool of monetary policy. As central banks increasingly recognize that low public informedness limits their ability to communicate with the general public, several have begun to explicitly tailor their communication strategies for a broader audience. Most research focuses on central bank communication with financial markets, but several recent strands of literature address aspects of communication with households. I survey the literature addressing the rationales and efficacy of central bank communication with households, supplementing this with new evidence from an assortment of consumer survey data. I draw from the literature on rational inattention, financial literacy, and political communication to suggest explanations for limited household receptiveness to central bank communications. Finally, I focus on one specific aim of central bank communication, which is to anchor inflation expectations. Previous literature finds that the announcement of an explicit inflation target helps anchor expectations among financial market participants. Using U.S. consumer survey data, I show that consumers’ expectations are imperfectly anchored and that the anchoring of more informed consumers’ expectations increased more than the anchoring of less informed consumers’ expectations following the Fed’s announcement of a 2% inflation target.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

Are speed limit policies robust?

Both price level targeting and speed limit policies have been suggested as alternatives to inflation targeting that may confer benefits when a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss function is specified in terms of inflation volatility. Here we show that price level targeting dominates a speed limit policy under perfect credibility and rational expectations. However, a speed limit policy is more robust than a price level target. Even for small deviations from either rational expectations or perfect credibility, a speed limit policy dominates a price level target.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective

This paper investigates the performances of an inflation targeting regime in a learning economy framed as an Agent-Based Model (ABM). We keep our ABM as close as possible to the original New Keynesian (NK) model, but we model the individual behaviour of the agents under procedural rationality à la Simon. Accordingly, we assume that their behaviour is guided by simple rules of thumb – or heuristics – while a continuous learning process governs the evolution of those rules. Under these assumptions that also allow the emergence of agents heterogeneity, we analyze the dynamics of the economy without assuming rational expectations, and study the role that a central bank, implementing an inflation targeting regime via a monetary policy rule, can play in the orientation of these dynamics. Consequently, our main goal is to analyse the interplay between the learning mechanisms operating at the individual level and the features and performances of the inflation targeting regime. Our results point to the prime importance of the credibility of central bank's inflation target regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, as well as the beneficial role played by that target as an anchoring device for private inflation expectations. We also establish the potential welfare cost of imperfect public information and contribute to the current debate on optimal monetary policy rules under imperfect common knowledge and uncertainty.     

Assessing inflation expectations anchoring for heterogeneous agents: analysts,businesses and trade unions

Forecasts of agents who are actively involved in the setting of prices and wages are less readily available than those of professional analysts but may be more relevant for understanding inflation dynamics. Here we compare inflation expectations anchoring between analysts, businesses and trade unions for one country for which comparable forecasts are available for almost two decades: South Africa. Forecasts are modelled as monotonically diverging from an estimated long-run anchor point, or ‘implicit anchor’, towards actual inflation as the forecast horizon shortens. We find that the estimated inflation anchors of analysts lie within the 3–6 percent inflation target range of the central bank. However, those for businesses and trade unions, which our evidence suggests may be the most relevant for driving the inflation process, have remained above the top end of the official target range. Our results point to challenges for central banks seeking to gain credibility with agents whose decisions directly influence inflation.     

Assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy in Kenya: Evidence from a macroeconomic model

This paper examines the effectiveness of monetary policy in Kenya based on policy simulations from a structural macroeconometric model. The analysis is conducted using the policy rate, i.e. the central bank rate (CBR) and the cash reserve ratio (CRR) with respect to the interest rate and bank lending channels, respectively. The results indicate that whereas a change in the policy rate is effective in influencing short term rates, the long term lending rates respond marginally. Consequently, the transmission to the real economy and the overall impact on inflation is minimal. However, a change in CBR has a comparatively higher impact on inflation while a change in CRR has a relatively larger impact on aggregate demand. Enhancing the effectiveness of the CBR and strengthening of the interest rate channel have the potential of anchoring inflation expectations and boosting the effectiveness of monetary policy in Kenya.     

Trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability objectives

Ten years after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, most advanced economies have recovered and global economic growth has taken hold. However, partly due to accommodative financial conditions, financial risks are on the rise while inflation remains subdued. This revives the debate on the role of monetary policy in containing financial risks. This paper provides a framework to investigate trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability when the central bank has a financial stability objective. Relying on a New Keynesian model with an endogenous financial bubble, our simulations suggest that a central bank attempting to “lean against the wind” may face trade-offs between inflation/output stability and financial stability. We therefore argue that the interest rate should be used for achieving traditional macroeconomic goals, and a second, macroprudential instrument should complement the policy rate to tackle financial risk accumulation.     

Fixed exchange rates,independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are used by governments to achieve stable prices. This article analyzes the mechanisms through which the two monetary institutions could work: Indirectly via a disciplinary effect on money growth rates or via an additional credibility effect on inflation expectations and the cost of capital. I further explain how both discipline and credibility are affected by the distinct flaws of independent central banks and fixed exchange rates: central banks lack transparency and fixed exchange rates take many shapes and are routinely devalued. The argument is tested with quarterly data from postcommunist countries for years 1991 to 2007. The findings show a strong disciplinary effect of monetary institutions on rates of M2 change and an effect on inflation controlling for money growth, but credibility does not extend to lower real short‐term market interest rates. Political institutions do condition the effect of central bank independence, while the types of fixed exchange rates affect money growth rates and inflation to different degrees.     

Effects of transparency,monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations

The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.     

Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia

The literature on expectation disagreements in emerging economies is scarce. This paper examines the disagreements in inflation expectations for the Colombian economy during the 2010–2017 period. We combine empirical tests with an analysis of a monthly survey of expectations of financial analysts in Colombia to obtain valuable evidence to formulate guidelines on the expectations modelling in developing economies. The findings indicate that disagreements present inertia and that inflation volatility increases disagreements. However, the central bank’s stance, as established through a press release, can reduce disagreement. Moreover, if central bank communication is clear and there is a credible inflation target, there tend to be fewer disagreements.     

Reactions of real yields and inflation expectations to forward guidance in the United States

We study the impact of forward policy rate guidance by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on real and breakeven US Treasury yield curves. We find that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements led to a significant reduction in real yields at horizons of 2 to 5 years ahead. By contrast, long-term breakeven inflation rates were little affected, suggesting that inflation expectations have remained well anchored, and that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance has not adversely affected central bank credibility.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.     

Do professional forecasters behave as if they believed in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the euro area?

This paper finds that participants in the European Central Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters have submitted forecasts that are consistent with a (mostly forward-looking) empirical version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the euro area. The estimation technique takes advantage of the panel nature of the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ dataset to exploit both its time series and cross-section dimensions, and to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity across forecasters. The estimation results suggest that euro-area inflation forecasts have reacted less to unemployment forecasts after the start of the financial crisis but another cost measure (energy inflation) remains significant. This finding is consistent with a flatter Phillips Curve in the euro area after 2007. However, the reasons suggested by the International Monetary Fund for this finding, namely a better anchoring of inflation expectations and increases in structural unemployment do not seem to find support in the survey data. Instead, the expectations for compensation per employee submitted by professional forecasters are consistent with the existence of downward real-wage rigidities in euro-area labour markets.     

Assessing the (de-)anchoring of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US

Well-anchored inflation expectations play an important role in the achievement of price stability. The (de-)anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the US has been under debate since the sub-prime crisis. This paper assesses and explains the evolution of the degree of (de-)anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations in the US during the period of 1990 to 2019, in a time-varying framework. We find the long-term inflation expectations to be de-anchored during the entire study period. The de-anchorage was greater in the first half of the 1990s. Subsequently, it has declined but has not yet anchored. An increase in inflation perception reduces the degree of de-anchorage in a (persistently) low-inflation perception period, whereas it causes a rise in the degree of de-anchorage when inflation perception is around its long-term average or is persistently high. Further, a rise in economic policy uncertainty also increases the de-anchorage of households’ long-term inflation expectations. This suggests that the Federal Reserve System (Fed) may find it beneficial to pay more attention to households’ inflation perception.     

Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the fear of floating?

Based on the argument that monetary policy credibility can reduce the fear of floating, we analyze this hypothesis for a set of 47 countries (of which, 32 are developing countries, 26 are Inflation Targeting countries and 16 are Inflation Targeting developing countries). Our study is the first to empirically assess the impact of monetary policy credibility (defined as the central bank's ability to anchor inflation expectations to the target) on the central banks' reaction through the basic interest rate due to exchange rate fluctuations (fear of floating). Based on panel data methodology applied to different samples, the most important result of this paper is that monetary policy credibility is able to mitigate the fear of floating. However, this effect is weaker after the crisis. Our estimates also reveal that Inflation Targeting developing countries present stronger fear of floating, which is justified by the fear of inflation in these countries.     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

后危机时代中国金融条件指数的构建

本文梳理了金融条件指数的构建方法，分析了关于构建中国金融条件指数的研究现状。由于2008年金融危机后我国金融机制变异，传统构建方法存在局限性，本文强调时变权重和引入非金融变量两条改进思路。实证部分首先构建固定权重金融条件指数作为对照，再利用TVP VAR模型构建2008年金融危机后的金融条件指数，检验了时变权重金融条件指数对通货膨胀率的解释和预测能力。结果表明：时变权重金融条件指数优于固定权重情形，能够较好地反映我国的金融状况；信贷可得性的引入优化了金融条件指数；本文构建的金融条件指数先行于通货膨胀约11个月，对通货膨胀率的解释和预测能力很强。构建合理的金融条件指数对于提高危机后货币政策的有效性和预见性、实现经济金融双重稳定具有重要现实意义。     

Monetary policy under a multiple-tool environment

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, central banks have been using a new set of policy tools in addition to conventional tools (such as short-term interest rates) to conduct monetary policy. This paper employs a methodology that captures 25 of these tools with a limited number of factors for Turkey. Due to a set of factors such as the high volatility of inflation, market-friendly financial architecture and its size, Turkey provides a unique environment to capture these factors and their effects on economic performance. The three factors identified here can be categorized as interest rate, central bank foreign exchange position and liquidity. The empirical evidence reveals that these three factors affect all the economic-state variables considered in the paper in different directions and magnitudes.