对我国行政性垄断现象的认识

行政性垄断是凭借政府行政权力形成的垄断。我国在建立社会主义市场经济的过程中,如何更好地规制计划经济体制所特有的垄断行为尤其是行政垄断,以更好地适应市场经济发展的要求,已经成为当前经济领域中一个重要的问题。结合当前我国正在进行的反垄断立法工作,本文试对行政垄断的现状、危害及对策等问题阐述了一些粗浅看法。     

论竞争、垄断与规制的动态均衡

通过对以往竞争、垄断和规制理论的系统梳理与批判,提出了竞争与垄断之间存在着内在转化趋势的假说,详细阐释了二者相互转化机制,并把规制作为二者转化过程中的外生因素来处理,界定了规制有效的条件,主要结论如下:其一,竞争与垄断客观上存在着互相转化的趋势,市场结构总是处于二者的中间状态;其二,规制对竞争与垄断间的相互转化起着调节或制约作用;其三,在竞争-垄断-规制动态均衡中,竞争的激励作用和潜在进入者打破垄断的强烈动机会促进技术进步和生产效率的提高,从而使得市场经济效率在长期中螺旋式上升。     

Monopolization through endogenous vertical mergers

While endogenous merger analysis has been applied to horizontal mergers, the thrust of vertical merger analysis has been based on exogenous mergers. The goal of this paper is to analyze endogenous vertical mergers. I consider a market structure with a downstream monopolist and an oligopolistic upstream industry. The downstream monopolist chooses to buy a certain number of the upstream firms. Mergers are endogenous, in the sense that the bids made by the downstream firm must be accepted by each of the integrated upstream firms, and must not exceed the increase in the profits of the downstream firm. It is shown that the unique equilibrium is complete monopolization: the buyer buys all the firms in the upstream industry. This result is consistent with the result that vertical mergers are profitable. However, it is in contrast with horizontal endogenous mergers, where complete monopolization is generally not an equilibrium.     

Characterization of the existence of maximal elements of acyclic relations

Summary. We obtain a sufficient condition for the existence of maximal elements of irreflexive binary relations that generalizes the theorem of Bergstrom and Walker by relaxing the compactness condition to a weaker one that is naturally related to the relation. We then prove that the sufficient conditions used both in the Bergstrom-Walker Theorem and in our generalization provide a characterization of the existence of maximal elements of acyclic binary relations. Other sufficient conditions for the existence of maximal elements obtained by Mehta, by Peris and Subiza and by Campbell and Walker are shown to be necessary too. Received: May 28, 1997; revised version: October 5, 2000     

The political economy of nature ∗

Suggestions are made for the development of a specific theory of mining by addressing the role of landed property, cartelization and monopolization. Each of these is seen as having a historically contigent relationship to the others and to the growth of mining capital. The spatial expansion of mining is examined as potentially leading to restructuring of, and conflict over, property relations, and cartelization of markets as tending to precede monopolization of production. The argument is illustrated by reference to the UK coal industry, the South African diamond industry and the US oil industry.     

HOW TO RECTIFY UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE SUPPLY CHAINS AND BETTER BUSINESS CULTURE UNDER THE GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMY

Banning unfair trade practices stands alongside private monopolization and the unjust restraint of trade as a key theme in competition policy. However, it poses much greater difficulties to deal with the matter than either private monopolization or unjust restraint of trade. In recent years, ongoing economic globalization, advances in information communication technology and other factors have wrought major changes in the traditional supply chain: for example, in subcontracting structure. Given the role of small and medium enterprises in underpinning economic growth, lifting the basic quality and performance level of these firms and improving business conditions for them have emerged as key policy themes. New efforts are needed to establish fair trade as a business practice and to create a new business culture in corporation with competition policy, small and medium enterprise policy and business ethics, such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices.     

政府管制与房价持续上升

本文认为房价持续上升的原因是政府对房地产市场的资本进入限制。消费者对住房的需求旺盛。拉高了房价，房地产公司的利润丰厚。问题是房地产公司为什么能一直保持丰厚的利润？其原因就是政府对房地产市场的资本进入限制所造成的房地产市场的垄断。本文比较了都存在信息不对称性的家庭装修市场和房地产市场不同的市场结构，不同的发展结果。最终得出结论：只有房地产市场的激励竞争才能解决房价持续上涨的根本问题．所以在强化政府这只看得见的手的作用的同时，不要抑制了市场这只看不见的手的作用。     

Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Summary. We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deterrence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence occurs (Proposition 2). Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: November 21, 1997     

Translation homotheticity

Summary. The concept of translation homotheticity is introduced and defined. It is demonstrated that translation homotheticity is necessary and sufficient for: disposable surplus to be independent of the reference utility, Luenberger's compensating and equivalent benefits to be independent of the reference utility and always equal to one another, the risk premium to be independent of reference-level utility, absolute indexes of income inequality to be reference free, and social-welfare functionals to satisfy invariance with respect to the choice of a common origin. Translation homotheticity is also sufficient for Hicks' many-market consumer surplus measure to be a second-order approximation to disposable surplus, compensating benefit, and equivalent benefit. If preferences are translation homothetic and appropriately quadratic, Hicks, many-market consumer surplus measure is exact for these welfare measures. Received: October 24, 1996; revised version: March 3, 1997     

On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria

Summary. This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria (rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper (DeMarzo and Skiadas (1996)) we show that equilibrium prices for the larger class of quasi-complete economies can be characterized as rn-REE. Examples of quasi-complete economies include the type of economies for which demand aggregation in the sense of Gorman is possible (with or without asymmetric information), the setting of the Milgrom and Stokey no-trade theorem, an economy giving rise to the CAPM with asymmetric information but no normality assumptions, the simple exponential-normal model of Grossman (1976), and a case of no aggregate endowment risk. In the common-knowledge context, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a common knowledge posterior estimate, given common priors, to coincide with the full communication posterior estimate. Received: May 29, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997     

我国电信产业中的垄断经营和政府管制分析

许多经济学家认为,产业壁垒形成的主要原因是规模经济,沉没成本,差别化经营等。对中国电信产业分析得出的基本结论是：中国电信的主要产业壁垒不是来自市场,而是来自不合理的政府管制,政府管制使得电信价格在电信成本不断下降的情况下仍然保持刚性。分析中国电信垄断经营和政府管制的市场绩效,探讨了不合理管制背后的原因,提出一些促进电信改革,矫正政府管制行为的实现建议。     

我国移动通信产业的市场结构与规制改革

双寡头垄断是我国当前移动通信市场的格局。在移动通信行业打破独家垄断、促进竞争的规制改革初期,为争夺市场份额,中国联通有进行价格竞争的动机,价格竞争可以带动其他方面业务竞争,这样的市场格局能够增进社会福利。但随着中国联通和中国移动在市场份额上逐渐接近,价格竞争的动机不再明显,进行"默契串谋"的动机增强。同时,技术的进步和市场需求量的增加也使得双寡头的市场竞争格局不再是最有效的,构建一个三寡头有效竞争的市场格局应成为我国移动通信市场规制改革的取向。     

A unified treatment of finite and infinite economies: limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium and the core

Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14]. Received: August 4, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997     

Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indifferent among all the allocations in it. Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997     

Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

Summary. With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, this paper studies a model in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. This approach produces a simple and intuitive set of equilibrium behaviors and generates clear predictions about when these different outcomes are likely to arise. Our model also departs substantially from the existing literature in concluding that sunkness of capacity costs is neither necessary nor sufficient for capacity to have precommitment value. Received: August 25, 1999; revised version: October 15, 1999     

Duality of welfare and profit maximization

Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey–Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained maximization programs by proving the following “folk theorem”:      

制度经济学视角的国有商业银行弱势群体分析

国家所有的独特的产权制度安排以及由此而形成的对国有金融机构的行政干预,导致了国有商业银行在竞争中的强垄断地位,阻碍了体制外因素对国有商业银行竞争压力的释放,进而导致了国有商业银行市场行为的低效,成为渐进式改革中独特的弱势群体.因而,从体制上破除"父爱主义"的产权制度和国家主导下的超强垄断地位,引入公平的竞争机制成为提高国有商业银行竞争力、改变目前弱势地位的关键和前提.     

The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments

The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments is addressed. It is demonstrated that the conditions given in the literature are not sufficient to guarantee concavity of agents' objective functions. Additional conditions are provided that ensure validity of the first-order approach.     

中国农村金融发展状况分析

反思中国农村金融改革时首先要求对农村金融发展状况有一个透彻的了解。依照现代金融发展理论所提供的一套比较完善的指标体系,文章对我国农村金融发展状况进行了系统的概括和分析。我国农村金融发展状况的基本特征表现为:农村货币化程度加深;金融机构财务状况不佳;农村信用社在农村金融市场上处于垄断地位;金融中介功能弱化,并且正规金融体系在中介功能上正逐渐被非正规金融所替代。     

Technology transfer with commitment

Summary. This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending on whether one or both firms commit. Under strategic incentive delegation, the possibility of technology transfer is minimal when both firms use the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are negligible. If both firms choose the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are significant then the possibility of technology transfer rises compared to a situation with no pre-commitment. In case of commitment to a capacity level before production, the possibility of technology transfer does not change when both firms simultaneously commit to their capacity levels. Different sets of results arise when only one firm can pre-commit. Received: February 10, 1997; revised version: December 16, 1999