商业银行集团客户授信风险防范浅析

随着我国银行体系市场化改革的逐步深入,银行风险管控能力明显提高.与此同时银行贷款集中度不断提高,集团客户成为新型的贷款模式.本文首先对集团客户进行了界定,并分析了集团客户授信风险产生原因:信息虚假或不完整,影响授信风险判断;集团内部调度资金,挪用贷款;集团客户过度融资,介入民间借贷;集团内部关联互保,担保流于形式等.最后针对以上原因,提出了集团客户授信风险防范对策.     

对基层国有商业银行大额客户授信风险成因分析与防范

防范与化解大额客户授信风险是当前基层国有商业银行信贷风险管理工作的重心。但近年来基层国有商业银行在信贷营销中,大额客户贷款授信与投放“扎堆”、“垒大户”现象普遍,贷款授信过度集中引发的信贷资金风险问题较为突出。对此本文从企业客户方面、银行授信管理及社会信用三个方面分析国有商业银行大额授信风险的形成原因,提出国有商业银行要广泛开展大额客户授信风险调查分析;做好风险排查工作,加强信贷资金用途管理,防止贷款被挪用;积极推广银团贷款,强化大额客户授信统一管理;加强信用环境建设,完善企业法人治理等防范授信风险的措施与建议。     

集团性客户管理任重道远

有关统计数据显示，截至2005年6月末，17家银行（包括4家国有商业银行、国家开发银行、12家股份制商业银行）亿元以上大客户16416户，占其全部贷款客户数不足0．5％，而大客户贷款余额却占其全部贷款余额近50％，平均单个大客户贷款余额4．46亿元。不难看出，单个大客户的贷款集中度在继续提高，特别是集团客户，银行贷款在集中的同时，风险日益突出。2003年10月，银监会颁布了《商业银行集团客户授信业务风险管理指引》，集团客户的风险问题纳入银行监管当局的视线。     

商业银行大额客户授信集中度管理相关问题探究

大客户蕴含的授信集中度风险成为商业银行信用风险管理的重中之重。近年来,一方面部分商业银行热衷于“垒大户”,大额授信客户集中度正逐步提高;另一方面金融市场屡屡出现大额授信客户“暴雷”,多家商业银行为此产生巨额不良贷款,对自身经营及市场声誉带来重大负面影响。建议商业银行引起高度重视,正视自身面临的大额授信客户风险,深入分析其中的原因,采取完善统一授信体系及配套系统建设、运用集中度限额管理工具等措施强化风险管控。     

基于内审视角的对公客户贷后管理研究

贷后管理是指银行业金融机构在客户获得信用后对贷款资金流向和借款人生产经营进行连续、动态、全面的监督和风险控制,直至贷款安全收回的过程管理。贷后管理的范围涵盖客户的所有表内外授信业务,是授信业务全过程中的重要阶段。     

集团客户授信风险评估的经济学理论研究

集团授信业务能带来增量收益,也隐含着一系列特殊资产损失风险发生的可能。从银行的经营原则来讲,发展集团客户授信业务、保持授信一定的集中度并无不妥,关键是权衡收益与风险,控制授信额度,加强和规范客户风险管理。     

个人信贷客户应实行统一授信管理

个人信贷业务是农业银行信贷业务的重要组成部分,也是同业竞争较为激烈的信贷业务。但是,农业银行至今仍未建立起一套系统的个人信贷客户统一授信管理制度,这在一定程度上制约了个人信贷业务特别是个人贷款业务的发展和个人贷款质量,效益的提高。本文拟就如何实行个人信贷客户统一授信管理制度谈点粗浅的看法。总体要求1.实行个人信贷客户统一授信管理必须坚持对象特定、动态调整、按序运作、权限管理。     

贷款集中风险分析和集团客户授信风险管理

本文从贷款集中风险量化分析入手,说明了贷款集中加大了贷款组合风险及信用损失,本文认为,集团客户授信也是贷款集中的一种形式,具有较高的风险性。本文还着重描述了集团客户授信风险具体表现形式,并提出,商业银行应立足自身,加强风险管理、建立健全有效的内控机制,防范集团客户授信风险。同时,建议监管部门以及银行业协会从宏观层面建立和完善企业征信系统,帮助商业银行不断优化风险控制体系,提高风险管理水平。     

对防范集团客户信贷风险的几点思考

随着我国经济的持续高速发展，企业经营的集团化趋势越来越明显，集团客户股权结构错综复杂，关联交易越来越隐蔽，多头授信、过度授信问题突出，随之而来的是贷款银行对集团客户的信贷风险识别、防范、控制难度越来越大。笔者就如何解决集团客户信贷风险防范的问题提出几点建议。     

如何对集团客户和关联企业实施统一授信

集团客户和关联企业实施统一授信是当前授信实践中的前沿课题。实施集团客户授信关键是防止“商业银行对集团客户多头授信、过度授信和不适当分配授信额度，或集团客户经营不善以及集团客户通过关联交易、资产重组等手段在内部关联方之间不按公允价格原则转移资产或利润等情况，导致商业银行不能按时收回由于授信产生的贷款本金及利息，或给商业银行带来其他损失的可能性”。     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

手机分期消费贷款信用风险研究——基于RF-Logistic模型的实证分析

识别手机分期消费贷款违约因子是防范手机消费贷款业务信用风险的关键所在。为此,基于融合随机森林（RF）和逻辑回归（Logistics）两阶段模型,通过数据挖掘揭示风险特征重要性含义,并结合经济计量方法诠释异质性客户信用违约的基准逻辑。结果表明：入网时长、终端个数、客户月流量、终端时长是影响手机分期消费贷款客户信用风险的重要性特征变量,且边际影响分别为-0.039%、3.18%、-0.01%、-1.06%,模型泛化能力强,准确率达到74%。所以,要完善手机分期消费贷款信用风险管理应从交叉数据获取、社交网络、兴趣热点和消费习惯等方面着手。     

浅析农户个人信贷业务拓展中的障碍和对策建议

中国经济长期以来呈现出“重城轻乡”的二元制结构特点,在这种经济结构背景下的城乡个人信贷政策却没有实行差别化,这是造成我国农村个人信贷业务难以推进的主要障碍。目前银行在针对个人办理贷款时都有一些硬性条件,包括面临风险时贷款利率会适当上浮,个人贷款期限以年为单位,要求借款人一定时间内支出与收入比不得超过50％,这些政策和限制性条件对农户贷款并不适用,在为农户办理贷款时应适用新的信贷政策,使其更贴近农户的实际信贷需求。     

农户联保贷款不良率高的成因分析——以吉林省德惠市农村信用社为例

农户联保贷款是农村金融产品的一个创新,为农户贷款难开辟了一条新途径,然而实际运营过程中,由于管理不到位及一些客观原因,致使农户贷款中出现大量的不良。本文通过对德惠市农村信用社农户联保贷款的调查,深入分析农户联保贷款的成因。     

Credit derivatives and loan pricing

This paper examines the relation between the new markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to US corporates. We find that changes in CDS spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000–2005. Moreover, when compared to traditional explanatory factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that CDS prices contain, beyond general credit risk, to a substantial extent information relevant for bank lending. We also find that, over time, new information from CDS markets is faster incorporated into loans, but information from other markets is not. Overall, our results indicate that the markets for CDS have gained an important role for banks.     

定向降准、贷款可得性与小微企业商业信用——基于断点回归的经验证据

小微企业在我国经济发展中起到了重要作用,但由于长期面临融资约束问题,使其不得不诉诸非正式制度(如商业信用)来缓解融资困难。党的十九届五中全会明确提出,支持小微企业成长为创新重要发源地,完善促进小微企业发展的政策体系。其中,实施“精准滴灌”式的货币政策,对小微企业成长尤为重要,是金融服务实体经济的必然要求。我国央行的定向降准政策激励银行向小微企业提供贷款,有利于疏通小微企业通过正式制度(如银行贷款)进行融资的渠道。本文基于定向降准这一自然实验,采用断点回归设计,评估贷款可得性对小微企业商业信用的影响。研究发现:第一,正式制度对于非正式制度存在明显的替代效应,即小微企业贷款可得性上升以后,对商业信用的需求显著下降。第二,不同的模型设定与稳健性检验,均得到一致的结论。第三,贷款可得性提高对小微企业商业信用的影响因企业异质性而有所差异。本文研究为银行贷款与商业信用之间的替代关系提供了来自中国小微企业的证据,有助于理解定向降准政策对小微企业融资决策的影响,为扶持小微企业发展的政策制定提供参考。     

资本计量方法改革、商业银行风险偏好与信贷配置

为提高银行业风险管理水平与信贷配置效率,监管部门于2014年开展了资本管理高级方法的试点工作。本文基于上市银行2010至2016年的微观数据,与银监会公布的行业信贷风险进行匹配,采用双重差分和三重差分法,实证分析前述改革如何影响试点银行的风险偏好和信贷调配。研究发现,在资本管理高级方法实施后:(1)试点银行显著降低了风险加权资产的规模;(2)试点银行风险偏好的变化存在非线性的特征,在调减高风险行业贷款的同时,并未显著增加最安全行业的贷款,而是增加了风险略高行业的贷款,体现出试点银行对风险与收益的权衡;(3)进一步将行业划分为“虚”与“实”,研究发现试点银行减少了房地产业(“虚”)、制造业(“实”)和建筑业(“实”)贷款,显著增加了金融业(“虚”)贷款。本文研究不仅丰富了资本监管方面的文献,也对金融支持供给侧结构性改革具有启示意义。     

Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks

Although credit risk is an important factor that financial institutions must cope with, the determinants of bank problem loans have been little studied. Using panel data, we compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks in the period 1985–1997, taking into account both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power are variables that explain credit risk. However, there are significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the relevance of the institutional form in the management of credit risk. Our findings raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators, the advantages of bank mergers from different regions, and the role of banking competition and ownership in determining credit risk.     

续贷限制与企业技术创新

本文以2007年的银行续贷政策改革作为“准自然实验”,采用双重差分模型探讨了续贷限制对企业技术创新的影响。研究发现,续贷限制显著抑制了企业的技术创新,且经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,该政策的作用效果因专利类型的不同而存在较大差异,具体表现为,在续贷限制之后,相较于低质量非发明专利,企业高质量发明专利下降幅度更大,进而企业创新质量降低。作用机制检验发现,续贷限制会降低企业信贷规模、缩短企业信贷期限以及增加企业融资成本,进而抑制企业技术创新。上述结果表明,“一刀切”式地收紧续贷标准会强化企业的融资约束,限制信贷资金对企业技术创新的支持作用,最终不利于企业的转型升级。本文研究为当前的续贷政策提供了来自企业创新视角的理论依据和实践参考。     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.