外国技术授权策略与本国关税政策之探讨

本文将以一个拥有技术优势，且将其产品输往本国寡占市场中的外国厂商为对象，探讨其对本国厂商的最适技术授权策略，以及该策略是否受关税保护贸易政策之影响。在本文的研究结论中，我们可以发现下列三点：（1）在自由贸易条件下，当外国企业可授权国内二家厂商时，其最适授权策略，会选择同时授权于国内二家技术劣势厂商。当外国厂商仅可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时，若市场规模相对较小，国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金订定为存在内部解，且会受市场规模的影响，市场规模值愈大，权利金愈高。当市场规模相对较大时，则国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金恰等于其技术创新所能节省的成本幅度。（2）在关税政策条件下，国外技术优势厂商可同时授权国内二家厂商时，其授权策略不受关税政策影响。在可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时，若市场规模相对较大，其授权策略不受关税政策影响。若市场规模相对较小，在自由贸易条件下外国厂商的授权权利金将高于采取关税政策条件下的水准。（3）在本国政府的最适关税政策下，不论是当外国厂商可授权本国二家厂商之Nash均衡或可授权本国一家厂商之Nash均衡，皆有助于本国福利水准的提升。     

外国技术授权策略与本国关税政策之探讨

该文将以一个拥有技术优势,且将其产品输往本国寡占市场中的外国厂商为对象,探讨其对本国厂商的最适技术授权策略,以及该策略是否受关税保护贸易政策之影响.在该文的研究结论中,我们可以发现下列三点:(1)在自由贸易条件下,当外国企业可授权国内二家厂商时,其最适授权策略,会选择同时授权于国内二家技术劣势厂商.当外国厂商仅可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时,若市场规模相对较小,国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金订定为存在内部解,且会受市场规模的影响,市场规模值愈大,权利金愈高.当市场规模相对较大时,则国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金恰等于其技术创新所能节省的成本幅度.(2)在关税政策条件下,国外技术优势厂商可同时授权国内二家厂商时,其授权策略不受关税政策影响.在可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时,若市场规模相对较大,其授权策略不受关税政策影响.若市场规模相对较小,在自由贸易条件下外国厂商的授权权利金将高于采取关税政策条件下的水准.(3)在本国政府的最适关税政策下,不论是当外国厂商可授权本国二家厂商之 Nash 均衡或可授权本国一家厂商之 Nash 均衡,皆有助于本国福利水准的提升.     

歧视价格市场的专利授权策略研究

假定线段城市上的两个厂商执行歧视价格,分析了外部专利权人和内部专利权人的专利授权策略。对于外部专利权人,通过可变费方式授权与通过固定费方式授权获得相同的收益。对内部专利权人,当专利是激烈的,不授权最优,当专利是非激烈的,通过可变费方式授权最优。     

跨国多期技术授权方式选择及社会福利分析--基于空间数量歧视竞争的框架

跨国技术授权作为企业获得竞争优势的重要途径已经受到理论界的关注。与以往的内部技术授权研究不同,文章构建了一个外国拥有技术的企业与东道国企业的空间数量歧视竞争模型,考察多期技术授权存在技术泄露、关税内生及空间竞争对外国拥有技术的企业的最优授权策略选择以及东道国社会福利的影响。研究表明：(1)外国拥有技术的企业偏好双重收费方式,且固定收费方式优于特许权收费方式;(2)双重收费方式不能同时实现拥有技术的企业和社会福利的最优,但可以实现社会福利的次优;(3)外国企业应该通过双重收费方式或固定收费方式进行技术授权,而东道国政府不应一味地提高关税水平,适当地降低进口关税有利于跨国技术授权的实现。文章的结论对于发展中国家的技术引进以及技术出口政策的制定具有一定的现实意义。     

Stackelberg竞争结构中质量提高型创新技术授权和企业兼并

本文基于Stackelberg双头垄断竞争模型,分析比较了质量提高型创新技术拥有企业的技术授权策略和企业兼并。研究结果表明:不论技术拥有企业是市场先行者还是跟随者,其总是偏向于企业兼并,而不会选择固定费用授权方式;如果政府禁止企业的兼并行为,那么当技术拥有企业在市场中是产量跟随者时,其愿意以提成许可方式进行技术授权;从社会福利角度考虑,技术授权可提高社会福利,而企业兼并一般不利于社会福利的提高,只有当创新技术拥有企业是Stackelberg竞争结构中的产量跟随者且其创新规模较大时,企业兼并才可提高社会福利。     

浅谈技术政策和美国竞争

<正>冷战时期面临军备竞赛时,美国在科技方面的领先技术对其防御战略发挥了无法估量的作用;海湾战争就充分证明了这点。当前面对日益增强的国际竞争,美国在世界技术领域的领袖地位同样起着决定性的作用。但是,美国的技术领先正在日趋衰落。 一、工业市场概况。八十年代以来,美国科技的影响相对减小;以相对论和量子力学为核心的20世纪的科学技术产生的“科学惯性”开始减弱,以综合科学和高新技术为特征的新的科技发展体系正在形成。目前,这些变化正对美国工业和企业提出了挑战:产品销售市场国际化,美国不再拥有由本国工业控制的国内市场,代之而起的,则是国内市场国际化。这些表明,当今美国企业正以持续变化,日趋复杂,竞争日浓的方式运行着。同时与昔日相比,美国竞争很少由国有资源、廉价劳动力和其它与之相当的优势所支配:产生影响的是企业本身的创新能力、评估能力和应用新知识的能力。     

企业研发与专利保护——基于企业间策略性竞争的分析视角杨

本文使用空间价格歧视模型,分析了企业研发决策与政府专利保护之间的关系。结果不仅证明了企业在专利保护程度较高、研发环境较好时会进行研发,研发数量与政府的专利保护呈倒U型关系,而且发现,企业研发后,在专利保护程度极低和极高时,企业会采用特许权方式对外专利授权,中间状态下企业不对外授权。从社会福利和社会创新的角度来看,专利保护不是越多越好,而是存在一个临界的拐点。该拐点随着社会研发环境和行业交易费用的增加而递增。     

专利私掠行为的动机与反竞争效应分析

专利主张实体盈利模式日渐成熟,衍变而来的专利私掠在帮助企业遏制侵权行为的同时,被质疑是企业滥用知识产权和打击竞争对手的新手段。为避免将专利私掠简单污名化,本文通过构建多阶段动态博弈模型,研究当面对竞争对手涉嫌侵权时,企业实施专利私掠行为的动机及其对社会福利的影响,以探求产生反竞争效应的可能原因及政策含义。研究结果表明：第一,企业是否实施专利私掠行为主要取决于赔偿金和胜诉率的高低,法院对于专利侵权赔偿金的设置在很大程度上影响企业的诉讼决策,专利诉讼经验匮乏的企业更倾向于实施专利私掠行为。第二,专利私掠行为不会损害消费者福利,但如果企业对潜在的强劲对手实施专利私掠行为,则会损害社会福利,产生反竞争效应。第三,专利私掠行为更易导致拒绝专利许可,不利于技术传播,这是因为企业需要权衡许可收益和竞争优势来决定是否进行专利许可。本文既丰富了专利诉讼和专利私掠方面的研究,也为政府优化反垄断执法提供了理论依据。     

Vertically Related Markets,Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.     

Optimal Licensing Policy under Vertical Product Differentiation

This paper explores a vertical product differentiation model with a licensing arrangement between a multinational firm with superior technology and a domestic firm with obsolete technology. We find that a subsidy provided by the domestic country's government to the domestic firm to assist with the licensing arrangement is welfare enhancing for the domestic country. Furthermore, both the multinational firm and the domestic country are better off under royalty than under fixed fee licensing. These findings stand in contrast to earlier results in the literature.     

Mixed Competition and Patent Licensing

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

Optimal Trade Policy under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition*

In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re‐examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.     

外资准入政策与资源优化配置

改革开放40多年以来,外商投资是中国经济发展的主要动力之一,同时也对资源优化配置产生多方面影响。以2002年《外商投资产业指导目录》的调整作为准自然实验,具体分析外资准入政策放松对资源优化配置的影响。研究表明:外资准入政策显著地增大了城市-行业层面生产率的离散度,不利于资源的优化配置;但是,从企业层面来看,外资准入政策提高了规制放松行业中企业的平均生产率;除此之外,外资准入政策在地区、企业性质和创新能力等方面的影响存在显著差异,政策效力主要体现在东部地区、非国有企业和创新能力较强的行业。因此,中国进一步扩大外资开放程度和改革外资准入政策时,应考虑到外资准入政策放松对企业生产率和资源优化配置的双重影响。     

Market Size,Local Sourcing and Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment

This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign‐owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.