The Brexit Dynamics: British and EU27 Challenges After the EU Referendum

Prior to the Brexit referendum, the UK government sent an information brochure to households across the country. Surprisingly, key findings of a study by the UK Treasury — including an expected per capita income loss of £1800 — were not included in the brochure. Calculations indicate that if this information had been included, the outcome of the referendum would have been 52.1% for Remain. Instead, the pro-Brexit campaign utilised anti-immigrant rhetoric to create a scapegoat for the under-provision of local public services, when actually this was due to massive cuts in budget transfers to local communities after the financial crisis. Looking ahead, major reforms are now necessary if the EU is not to disintegrate. Given the fresh support in the UK and US for banking deregulation, the EU must stand firm in support of prudential supervision and banking regulation to prevent a new international banking crisis.     

EU vor der Zerreißprobe – wie sieht die gemeinsame Zukunft aus?

In the midst of the EU’s current “polycrisis “, several serious dangers threaten the future of Europe’s unity. The looming Brexit vote as well as the refugee crisis and–above all–the rise of nationalistic, right-wing extremist parties demonstrate the fragility of the EU. One of the EU’s fundamental problems is its institutional design in general. In particular the role of the European Central Bank is not fit for the challenges of the time. Moreover, the EU is facing disintegrative pressures while simultaneously pursuing moves towards deepening the Union as a reaction to the multiple crises. Against this background, it is highly likely that differentiation within the EU will increase. Deeper cooperation among small groups of member states will likely increase efficiency but may also reduce transparency, accountability and cohesion within the EU. If handled well, differentiation may also open new pathways for cooperation with the EU’s neighbours and accession countries. The foundation for a fresh start in Europe is the Franco-German relationship, as only these two Member States together can prevent Euroscepticism from spreading even further and the new radical right from taking control of Europe.     

Financial Instruments and Promotional Banking in the EU are Growing — But is this Justified?

Institutions and the European Investment Bank are at the forefront of EU investment policy. Their role is expanding and it is now a widely-held position that an improvement in the economy will not eliminate the need for their intervention. The proposals for the 2021–2027 MFF launch more financial instruments and present ‘InvestEU’ as a larger more powerful version of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). However, promotional banking is often misunderstood and so is the actual size of promotional banking in Europe in which InvestEU will operate.     

Banking regulation in the European union: Some issues and concerns

Banking regulation and supervision in the EU today has to be conducted in accordance with the Single Market legislation promulgated by the European Commission. The creation of a European Single Market in financial services, which was provided for in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and in the Single European Act of July 1987 which revised it, was originally planned for completion by the end of 1992, although the final pieces of the jigsaw were not in place until the beginning of 1996. This article explains what the European Single Market in financial services represents, the rationale for it, and the measures, including the use of legally binding Directives, adopted to deliver it on the banking front. It concludes with a discussion and analysis of some of the issues and concerns which implementation of the Single Market program for banking services has given rise to, with special emphasis being placed on the evolution of minimum capital standards for banks.     

Wie geht es mit dem Brexit weiter?

The UK’s 2016 EU referendum may account for great income losses in the UK. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. use a “new” quantitative trade model to assess various Brexit scenarios. The results broadly show that all EU member states lose, and the relative losses in the UK are about five times those of the average remaining EU country. These findings have important implications for the EU’s negotiation strategy. The outcome depends largely on the decisions about trade relations. Michael Hüther thinks that the UK is heading for an extremely hard Brexit and that it already shows. Therefore, the UK government should work out a consistent industrial policy and make up its mind about its preferences on its future economic relationship with its neighbours. In light of the currently very close and mutually welfare-enhancing business relations between the EU27 and the UK, one of the central tasks and challenges of the Brexit negotiations is undoubtedly the creation of a new supportive post-supranational legal framework governing these economic transactions in the future. Andreas Grimmel argues that the EU’s crises are largely the result of a certain mode of integration that is based on actors’ interests rather than on a comprehensive constitutional framework.     

Brexit Poker — Wer hat die besseren Karten in den Austrittsverhandlungen?

The political, economic and legal situation of Great Britain vis-à-vis European Union in the aftermath of the membership referendum and awaiting the commencement of withdrawal negotiations is interesting. The authors summarise the legal controversy in the UK over the powers and procedures needed to be complied with in order to duly trigger the Brexit. They then sketch the legal framework as provided by the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to reconstruct the decision-making architecture under which parties to the upcoming negotiations will have to make their choices. After outlining the opportunity cost for Great Britain associated with leaving the Union, in particular those regarding the financial institutions and foreign direct investments, they conclude that decision-making architecture governing the upcoming withdrawal negotiations puts Brussels in pole position vis-à-vis London. It is likely that Britain will have to accept transfer payments to the EU similar to, if not higher than the net transfers that have been due so far. Some degree of the compliance with the acquis communautaire, at least with regard to the treaty’s fundamental freedoms (goods, workers, services, establishment and capital) will most likely also be expected from London, if it wants to benefit from access to the European market after the termination of its EU membership.     

The economic effects of the UK government's proposed Brexit deal

The focus of our analysis is on how the UK government's proposed Brexit deal is likely to affect the economy. First, we assess how trade, migration, foreign direct investment, productivity and contributions to the EU budget might change by reviewing current proposals against historical evidence. Second, we use the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) to analyse the macroeconomic effects. Our assessment is that trade with the EU, especially in services, would be more costly after Brexit. This would be likely to have adverse effects on living standards in the UK. Our central estimate is that if the government's proposed Brexit deal is implemented, then GDP in the longer term will be around 3% lower per head than it would have been had the UK stayed in the EU. If the UK were to stay in a customs union with the EU, or if the Irish backstop position was to be invoked, there would still be a hit to GDP per capita of 2%. These estimates represent our considered view of the economic impact of the government's proposed Brexit deal, but they are themselves uncertain as there is no historical precedent of a country leaving a major trading block such as the EU.     

Designing a European restructuring mechanism without taxpayers’ money

The European Commission’s approach to the supervision and restructuring of the EU banking system has numerous shortcomings. As an alternative, this article proposes a European Resolution Authority and a European Restructuring Fund for systemically important banks and the implementation of a levy paid by banks in accordance with their systemic relevance. This levy should be designed to reduce the risk of future bailouts and the moral hazard inherent in implicit government guarantees.     

加入WTO后中国银行业的对策选择

中国加入WTO后 ,外资银行的进入将使中国银行业面临更为严峻的挑战 ,同时 ,也为其创造了发展的机遇。中国银行业应充分利用本土优势 ,扬长避短 ,加快自身改造 ,加强金融监管 ,建立存款保险制度等 ,以提高其竞争能力。     

The Impact of the Recession on Competition Policy: Amending the Economic Constitution?

The strengths of the European competition regime are outlined before identifying challenges presented by the financial crisis. The argument moves from enforcement to systemic threats to the credibility of the economic models on which modern competition policy is based. It then turns from banking failures to the crisis in the European motor industry. It suggests that competition policy comprises an ‘economic constitution’ for the EU which is under threat, but registers the relative complacency of the competition agencies, and argues for a redefinition of policy. The conclusion suggests that the regulatory relationship between the state and the private sector will reflect scepticism about the market and that political changes in the UK and Europe offer radical choices between a reinforced or a marginalised competition policy which the competition policy ‘community’ needs to confront.     

Visegrad economies’ active implication in a “new” EU: A new regional economic approach

The EU faces maybe to the greatest challenges in its history. The paper deals with the idea of analysing the sub‐regional organisation Visegrad Group Visegrad 4 (V4) and its role in the new EU‐27 before and after Brexit. For realisation of this scope, six representative economic indicators are taken into consideration. The data analysis procedure covers latest 10 years meaning 2010–19. In order to support the analysis in the paper, first objective has the building a hypothetic optimal database which has to cover the above six indicators related to EU‐28 and V4. Second objective is relate to the performances quantification of each EU and V4’s economy based on a separately analyse. Final and the major objective is that V4 is able to face to the new global and regional challenges. The analysis in the paper is based on two new models. First of them is a regional development radiography model based on a hexagon diagram. The second is a regional evolution model based on a matrix approach. Both proposed models have distinct hypotheses, which are finally valid by the analysis. The paper puts into discussion five objectives and succeeds in achieving them. The main conclusion of the paper is that V4 is and will continue to be a growth pole for the EU economy. It would be supported by the EU in order to implement policies able to manage better employment.     

Making Social Investment Happen for the Eurozone

Half a decade after the euro crisis, the European Union is in dire need of a growth strategy that is economically viable, politically legitimate and seen as socially fair. The United Kingdom’s fateful choice for Brexit has given new urgency to this imperative. While it is deplorable to lose a strong political force behind the internal market, Britain’s decision to leave the EU does create a window of opportunity for taking the Union’s “social market economy” ambitions, as laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, more seriously than before.     

EU Financial Market Access After Brexit

Brexit means Brexit, or out means out — and that includes the UK’s exit from the single financial market. With financial services accounting for about eight per cent of the country’s GDP, it is understandable why the UK attaches immense importance to retaining access to the EU’s single market. But putting a mutually acceptable regime in place will take years of negotiations, and the final agreement will clearly allow much less access than UK-licensed firms enjoy today.     

Insights for a post-Brexit era: marketing the UK as a study destination – an analysis of Arab,Chinese, and Indian student choices

ABSTRACT

Britain’s scheduled exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) has long-term ramifications for strategic marketing. Faced with new challenges and uncertainty, UK universities are increasingly looking beyond EU borders to recruit international students. In this context, we draw upon country-of-origin theory to categorise the factors that influence non-EU international student decisions to select an overseas study destination and institution. Based on the results of a survey with 317 Arab, Chinese, and Indian students attending UK universities, we identify eight factors that influence international student decisions to study in the UK (social safety, education quality, entry obstacles, environment, recommendations, knowledge of host country, work and immigration, and meeting new cultures). The results address gaps in the literature, offering new insights that will help practitioners and academics to better understand how international students select a country and university as a study location.     

Which manufacturing industries and sectors are most vulnerable to Brexit?

When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change. Most of the options for future UK‐EU relationships currently under discussion imply increased trade barriers, which will reduce trade and also have effects on output and prices. In this paper, we use a multi‐market partial equilibrium model to analyse the vulnerability of 122 manufacturing industries to Brexit. In all five Brexit scenarios we model, there is an overall reduction in UK manufacturing output. Output grows in some industries but at the expense of higher consumer and intermediate goods prices. High tech and medium–high tech sectors are more at risk of a decline in domestic production than lower tech sectors. In most areas of the country, demand for high‐skilled workers falls more than for medium and low‐skilled workers.     

境外影子银行监管制度的新进展及其启示

目前,境外主要经济体如美英欧和以FSB为代表的国际金融组织出台的金融监管改革方案,都把加强影子银行体系的监管作为其不可缺少的有机组成部分,这是金融全球化条件下防控金融系统性风险积聚和监管套利的需要和必然反映。借鉴境外加强影子银行监管的最新制度安排和变革经验,我国应在结合影子银行体系自身运营特征的基础上,从影子银行的区分、宏观审慎监管框架的构建、微观审慎监管安排的细化与相关监管法律法规的立法完善等方面,加强我国影子银行的监管,使之与传统银行共生互补,更好地服务于我国的实体经济。     

Trade and foreign direct investment-related impacts of Brexit

We offer a general-equilibrium analysis of Brexit incorporating the state-of-the-art differences in productivity and firms' selection within manufacturing sectors à la Melitz (Econometrica, 2003, 71 , 1695) and multinationals in services. Our results suggest that trade, output and average productivity diminish across most sectors in the UK and the Rest of the European Union (REU), as well as GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration. However, the UK loses more due to the missing preferential access to the huge EU market. Significant welfare losses along the extensive margin occur in the UK due to the lost imported varieties produced by highly productive European firms. These cannot be compensated by the new varieties of less productive domestic firms that enter the British market due to increased protectionism and reduced import competition. In addition, the emergence of barriers against multinationals, which is often ignored in previous studies, explains approximately one third of the negative effect in both the UK and REU. Furthermore, we show that the Brexit impact is about only half if we do not include both foreign direct investment barriers and Melitz structure. Thus, previous studies without these important model features would underestimate the Brexit impact significantly.     

The nexus between competition and efficiency: The European banking industries experience

In this paper, we investigate competition in banking systems in the EU27 as a whole for the period 2004–2010, but also for old members’ banking systems compared with new members’ banking systems and for banking systems from countries member of euro zone compares with banking systems from countries non-member of euro zone. In order to investigate this issue, we estimate a non-structural indicator of banking competition, using the H-statistic indicator that is estimated using bank-level data. Also, we apply two tests of convergence, β- and σ-convergence, for assessing competition evolution during the specified period. We want to fill the gap in the banking literature testing the validity of the Competition–Efficiency Hypothesis, analysing the impact of the banking competition measures on two alternative measures of efficiency, cost and profit efficiency, in the European banking systems in a Granger-causality manner. The results confirm us that in the EU the convergence process occur from the banking systems with higher competition level than the mean score of all countries. The evidence for all groups of countries, except non-euro zone group, where results are not statistically significant, confirm the Competition–Efficiency Hypothesis in terms of cost and profit efficiency.     

A computable general equilibrium analysis of Brexit: Barriers to trade and immigration restrictions

This paper estimates the economic effects of different types of restrictions on trade and immigration in the United Kingdom after Brexit. Regarding trade restrictions, we focus on UK–EU increases in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. We also analyse the removal of all tariffs in the UK to all its trading partners. Concerning immigration, we run a 5-year cumulative annual reduction in net migrants by 87,000 workers following OECD estimations, which looks realistic even if there is a hard Brexit. The study is conducted using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which allows us to estimate the impact on GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration, together with the evolution of aggregate and sectoral output, exports and imports. We obtain a more sizeable negative impact on the UK than other previous influential studies. Trade restrictions would generate welfare reductions between −0.38% and −1.94% for the UK, while they would be between −0.03% and −0.14% in the EU. This is because the EU is a crucial trade partner for the UK, which cannot be easily substituted through trade with other regions in the world. We simulate the impact of both reductions in net inflows and in the stock of EU migrants, accumulated through 5 years. Migration is compatible with wage increases but puts downward pressure on GDPpc. However, migration restrictions would not compensate the overall GDPpc contractions arising from a hard Brexit.