Endogenous uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money

Summary. We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to monetary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluctuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the exogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Uncertainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory variables of such fluctuations. Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs. Received: January 14, 2002; revised version: April 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Mordecai Kurz for his constant help and support. Most of the ideas developed hereby have been inspired by innumerable and fruitful discussions with him. I have also greatly benefited from helpful comments by Stanley Black, Luigi Campiglio, Carsten Nielsen and Ho-Mou Wu. I also received valuable remarks from participants at the V meeting of “The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory” held in Ischia, Italy, on July 2-8, 2001, where an initial draft of the present work was presented.     

Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.” Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974, and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995. RID="*" ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis     

Anonymity in nonatomic games

This paper purpose is twofold. First, it offers a critical review of the proofs of existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria in nonatomic games. In particular, it focuses on the alternative ways of formalizing the critical assumption of anonymity. Second, the paper proves the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria by relaxing anonymity and allowing instead for “limited anonymity” (i.e. players’ decisions depend on the average strategy of a finite number of players’ subsets and not on the average strategy of the whole set of players). (JEL: C72, C79)     

Markov perfect equilibria in industries with complementarities

Summary.   This paper considers the existence and computation of Markov perfect equilibria in games with a “monotone” structure. Specifically, it provides a constructive proof of the existence of Markov perfect equilibria for a class of games in which a) there is a continuum of players, b) each player has the same per period payoff function and c) these per period payoff functions are supermodular in the player's current and past action and have increasing differences in the player's current action and the entire distribution of actions chosen by other players. The Markov perfect equilibria that are analyzed are symmetric, not in the sense that each player adopts the same action in any period, but rather in the sense that each player uses the same policy function. Since agents are typically distributed across many states they will typically take different actions. The formal environment considered has particular application to models of industries (or economies) in which firms face costs of price adjustment. It is in this context that the results are developed. Received: November 9, 1999; revised version: February 10, 2000     

Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature

During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called “new growth theory”). RID="*" ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker, April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback. Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Mere quibbles: Bagus and Howden’s critique of the theory of free banking

Despite its title, Philipp Bagus and David Howden’s critique of The Theory of Free Banking does more than merely “quibble” with that book’s arguments; their criticisms of those arguments are such as to suggest that the very foundation upon which my defense of free banking rests is deeply flawed. Here, I defend my work against Bagus and Howden’s criticisms, by showing that they rest upon careless or disingenuous readings of my arguments and a poor grasp of basic monetary economics.     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

Agreeing on generalized Darwinism: a response to Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen

I thank Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen for their thought-provoking response to my latest generalization of Darwinism, and welcome their proposal to cooperate, after many years of our independent searches. I agree with them that our searches contain more similarities than both they and I had previously seen, but consider our remaining differences—especially in the terms employed and in the definitions of the terms we both employ, including “information,” “instructions,” “programs,” and “Lamarckism”—more important than they do. Their response also exaggerates or distorts some of my arguments. All this needs to be clarified before our cooperation can start.     

On bubbling dynamics generated by a stochastic model of herd behavior

This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular, there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”: limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding” or “epidemic” features. RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions. Correspondence to: L. Gaio     

An economics for development and peace: With a particular focus on the thought of Ernst F. Schumacher

Ernst F. Schumacher'sSmall is Beautiful seems thoroughly persuasive even at the turn of the century, as reckless material development is increasingly recognized as a threat to peace. This article describes how his thought was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi's and Schumacher's ways of thinking are considered as alternative development theorees, different from any of those stemming from laissez-faire economics or Marxism. The formulation and proliferation of Schumacher's ideas about intermediate technologies are traced in both Indian and global contexts, to evaluate their sufficiency as bases for development. Moreover, their implications for contemporary economics are discussed, with the assistance of Amartya K. Sen's concepts of “capability,” “sympathy” and “commitment,” which are in clear contrast to the conventional concept of “economic man.” Finally, it is concluded that Schumacher's alternative development theories and practices, as well as Sen's economics, may play important roles in development and peace studies in the 21^st century. I am grateful to William Volgor, Michael McPherson, David Schrom and Mark Kurowski for their helpful suggestions on drafts of this article.     

Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers

Summary. I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak” buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high. Received: June 24, 1998; revised version: May 30, 1999     

The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets

Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations. This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes, weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets. Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments. Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino     

Stochastic growth: asymptotic distributions

Summary. This note studies conditions under which sequences of state variables generated by discrete-time stochastic optimal accumulation models have law of large numbers and central limit properties. Productivity shocks with unbounded support are considered. Instead of restrictions on the support of the shock, an “average contraction” property is required on technology. Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"The author thanks John Creedy and Rabee Tourky for helpful comments, and the Economic Theory Center, University of Melbourne for financial support.     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Bargaining and efficiency in networks

We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient, even as players become patient. We investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect, but non-Markovian, equilibria. The analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution, and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain.     

How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?

Distributional politics in modern democracy involves the exploitation of minorities by majorities, and as persons rotate membership, all parties in the “game” lose. This result emerges only becausedifferences in treatment are permissible. If the principle ofgenerality (analogous to that present in an idealized version of the rule of law) could, somehow, be introduced into politics, mutual exploitation could be avoided. The analysis offers support for such policies as (1) flat-rate taxes, (2) equal per head transfers or demogrants and (3) uniform regulation of all industries. The argument here was initially presented as a Liberty Fund Conference talk in July 1992 under the title “Political Ethics as a Criterion for Constitutional Design.” I am indebted to my colleagues Viktor Vanberg, and especially Hartmut Kliemt for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Communication in financial markets with several informed traders

This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.     

Kantian dignity and social economics

Many social economists endorse the ethics of Immanuel Kant, specifically his emphasis on the dignity of humanity and the equal respect due all persons. Based on these tenets, Kant mandates a social outlook in which concern for others, characterized by negative duties of respect and positive duties of beneficence, are broadly required of all rational agents. However, some of the positions that social economists derive from Kantian dignity actually violate it, such as support for a welfare state and opposition to the institution of wage employment. I will show that both of these positions are inconsistent with the traditional understanding of Kantian dignity, suggesting that social economists should either ground their positions on a different concept of dignity, or revise them to remain consistent with Kant's specific sense of dignity. For helpful comments and criticism I thank John Davis, Charles Wilber, David Ellerman, and the rest of the participants in the “Economic Philosophy and Theories of Justice” session at the 2003 meetings of the Association for Social Economics, as well as two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are my own.     

The bargaining set of a large game

We study the equivalence between the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core in the general context of TU games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we first introduce a new class of exact games, which we call thin games. For these games, we show not only that the Mas-Colell bargaining set is equal to the core, but also that it is the unique stable set in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. We then study the relation between thin games, exact non-atomic market games and non-atomic convex games. Finally, by further developing “thinness” related ideas, we prove new equivalence results for a class of non-exact market games as well as a class of non-exact, non-market games.