The Role of Long-Term Finance: Theory and Evidence

Improving the supply of long-term credit to industrial firmsis considered a priority for growth in developing countries.A World Bank multicountry study looks at whether a long-termcredit shortage exists and, if so, whether it has had an impacton investment, productivity, and growth. The study finds thateven after controlling for the characteristics of individualfirms,businesses in developing countries use significantly less long-termdebt than their counterparts in industrial countries. Researchersare able to explain the difference in debt composition betweenindustrial and developing countries by firm characteristics;by macroeconomic factors; and, most importantly, by financialdevelopment, government subsidies, and legal and institutionalfactors. The analysis concludes that long-term finance tends to be associatedwith higher productivity. An active stock market and an abilityto enter into long-term contracts also allow firms to grow atfaster rates than they could attain by relying on internal sourcesof funads and short-term credit alone. Importantly, althoughgovernment-subsidized credit markets have increased the long-termindebtedness of firms, there is no evidence that these subsidiesare associated with the ability of firms to grow faster. Indeed,in some cases subsidies are associated with lower productivity.      

THE MARKET FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: The Nature and Importance of Its Shortcomings

There are two problems in the market for developing countrydebt: one is the immediate crisis. What do we do about the largevolume of outstanding debt? A more subtle but no less importantproblem is that because contracts are un-enforceable and lendershave incomplete information about risk, capital is mis-allocated.This article examines the latter problem and reviews the natureand causes of the unenforceability. It shows that unenforceabilityresults in higher interest rates on smaller and shorter-termloans than would otherwise be available and discourages investmentin developing countries. Similarly, unenforce-ability can explainthe perverse timing of capital flows to developing countries,causing credit to flow into the country when income is high,and out when income is low. The article then analyzes the riskassociated with three types of information asymmetries: informationabout the borrowers' ability to repay, willingness to repay,and use of the loan proceeds. These asymmetries, the authorargues, reinforce the effects of unenforceability. The prospectsfor remedying the immediate crisis are discussed, as is theneed to be certain that the proposed solutions do not aggravatethese problems.      

HOW DO MARKET FAILURES JUSTIFY INTERVENTIONS IN RURAL CREDIT MARKETS?

Understanding of the economic causes and consequences of marketfailure in credit markets has progressed a great deal in recentyears. This article draws on these developments to appraisethe case for government intervention in rural financial marketsin developing countries and to discover whether the theoreticalfindings can be used to identify directives for policy. Before debating the when and how of intervention, the articledefines market failure, emphasizing the need to consider thefull array of constraints that combine to make a market workimperfectly. The various reasons for market failure are discussedand set in the context in which credit markets function in developingcountries. The article then looks at recurrent problems thatmay be cited as failures of the market justifying intervention.Among these problems are enforcement; imperfect information,especially adverse selection and moral hazard; the risk of bankruns; and the need for safeguards against the monopoly powerof some lenders. The review concludes with a discussion of interventions,focusing on the learning process that must take place for financialmarkets to operate effectively.      

MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL INFLOWS: LESSONS FROM RECENT LATIN AMERICAN AND EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Capital inflows to some developing countries have increasedsharply in recent years. Impelled by better economic prospectsin those countries, lower international interest rates, anda slowdown of economic activity in the capital-exporting countries,the inflows have furnished financing much needed to increasethe use of existing capacity and to stimulate investment. Butcapital inflows can bring with them their own problems. Typicalmacroeconomic repercussions have been appreciation of the realexchange rate, expansion of nontradables at the expense of tradables,larger trade deficits, and, in regimes with a fixed exchangerate, higher inflation and an accumulation of foreign reserves. Should government intervene to limit some of these side effects—andif so, how? The question is especially pressing in the wakeof the Mexican crisis of December 1994. This article looks foranswers in the experience of four Latin American and five EastAsian countries between 1986 and 1993, examining the effectsof the capital inflows on the economy and comparing the differentways in which these countries responded to the problem of "toomuch" capital.      

THE ROLE OF GROUPS AND CREDIT COOPERATIVES IN RURAL LENDING

Lending groups and credit cooperatives have the potential toprovide affordable credit to small-scale farmers because theycan reduce transaction costs and lower the risk of default.In developing countries these two kinds of lending arrangementshave a mixed record, although their difficulties reflect shortcomingsin implementation rather than in the lending arrangements themselves. The article indicates that successful group lending schemeswork well with groups that are homogeneous and jointly liablefor defaults. The practice of denying credit to all group membersin case of default is the most effective and least costly wayof enforcing joint liability. Another way to encourage membersto repay is to require mandatory deposits that are reimbursedonly when all borrowers repay their loans. The article points out that credit cooperatives that mobilizesavings deposits are less dependent on external sources andincrease the borrowers' incentive to repay. The success of creditcooperatives requires training of members as well as management.Experience suggests that credit cooperatives should not expandtheir activities beyond financial intermediation until theydevelop strong institutional and managerial capabilities      

INTERPRETING RECENT RESEARCH ON SCHOOLING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Policymakers in developing countries have long been troubledby the undesirable, but apparently unavoidable, choice betweenproviding broad access to education and developing high-qualityschools. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this is a badway to think about human capital development. Grade repetitionand high dropout rates lead to a significant waste of resourcesin many school systems. Students in quality schools, however,respond in ways that reduce such inefficiencies, perhaps evensufficiently to recoup immediately investments in quality. Promoting high-quality schools, however, is more difficult thanmany have thought, in part because research demonstrates thatthe traditional approach to providing quality—simply providingmore inputs—is frequently ineffective. Existing inefficienciesare likely to be alleviated only by the introduction of substantiallystronger performance incentives in schools and by more extensiveexperimentation and evaluation of educational programs and schoolorganizations. Incentives, decentralized decisionmaking, andevaluation are alien terms to education, in both industrialand developing countries, but they hold the key to improvementthat has eluded policymakers pursuing traditional practices.      

INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

Financial liberalization,market structure and credit penetration

This paper shows that the effects of financial liberalization on the credit market of a small and capital constrained economy depend on the market structure of domestic banks prior to liberalization. Specifically, under perfect competition in the domestic credit market prior to liberalization, liberalization leads to lower domestic interest rates, in turn leading to increased credit penetration. However, when the initial market structure is one of imperfect competition, liberalization can lead to the exclusion of less wealthy entrepreneurs from the credit market. This provides a rationale for the mixed empirical evidence concerning the effects of liberalization on access to credit in developing markets. Moreover, the analysis provides new insights into the consequences of foreign lenders’ entry into developing economies.     

利率市场化、信贷资源配置与民营企业增长期权价值——基于贷款利率上、下限放开的准自然实验证据

利率市场化对于提高资金配置效率、推动经济高质量发展具有重要意义,来自企业的经验证据有助于理解利率市场化影响经济发展的微观路径。本文基于我国贷款利率上限与下限的放开,借助双重差分模型检验了利率市场化如何影响民营企业的信贷资源获取、投资灵活性与增长期权价值。研究表明:贷款利率市场化使得银行能够通过调节利率来匹配企业风险,相比于中等风险企业,高风险(低风险)企业在贷款利率上限(下限)放开后以更高(更低)的融资成本获得了更多信贷资源;信贷资源的增加为企业把握投资机会提供了资金支持,贷款利率上限(下限)放开后,高风险(低风险)企业的投资灵活性与增长期权价值显著提升。本文的研究发现有助于理解利率市场化促进经济增长的微观机制,为进一步健全市场化利率体系、推进经济高质量发展提供参考。     

CREDIT POLICIES: LESSONS FROM JAPAN AND KOREA

The success of policy-based credit programs in Japan and theRepublic of Korea suggests that credit policy can be an effectiveinstrument for economic development. Why, then, have creditpolicies failed in so many countries, and what factors explaintheir relative success in Japan and Korea? Both economic and institutional factors appear to be importantin the success or failure of credit policies. Essential economicfactors include a reliance on the private sector, a bias towardindustrialization, an orientation toward export production,the encouragement of domestic competition, and a commitmentto price stability. Crucial institutional factors include extensiveand frequent consultation between government and the privatesector, effective monitoring systems, and, most important, aclear and credible plan for economic development. Although severalcountries have included one or more of these factors in theirprograms, the experience of Japan and Korea suggests that acomprehensive network combining all or most of these factorsmay be necessary for the successful implementation of creditpolicies.      

SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE: Theory, Evidence, and Policy

Recently a number of commentators have argued that trade policyin developing countries should be deployed discriminatorilyto encourage the expansion of trade among southern countries.Such a strategy is seen as being central in the framing of anew international economic order. This article evaluates thearguments in favor of a relative expansion of South-South tradeand reviews the experience of developing countries with discriminatoryregional trading arrangements. It contends that the case forspecific policies to promote South-South trade is not convincingand that experience with discriminatory arrangements is notencouraging. The expansion of South-South trade can be expectedto continue in the context of multilateral trade expansion,and the potential gains are likely to be greater if this processis allowed to evolve freely in a multilateral setting.      

Privatization and bank performance in developing countries

We examine the postprivatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. Our results suggest that: (i) On average, banks chosen for privatization have a lower economic efficiency, and a lower solvency than banks kept under government ownership. (ii) In the postprivatization period, profitability increases but, depending on the type of owner, efficiency, risk exposure and capitalization may worsen or improve. However, (iii) Over time, privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and credit risk exposure. (iv) We also find that newly privatized banks that are controlled by local industrial groups become more exposed to credit risk and interest rate risk after privatization.     

Credit to government and banking sector performance

The impact of credit to government on three aspects of banking sector performance – its deepening over time, profitability, and efficiency – is examined for 142 countries. Country regressions suggest a sizeable negative effect of credit to government on bank deepening in developing countries, but no impact in advanced economies. Bank regressions find that credit to government raises the profitability but reduces the efficiency of banks in developing countries; in advanced economies, there appears to be no impact on profitability but a positive one on efficiency.     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.      

Foreign banks and credit in Mexico

The role that foreign banks play in developing countries has been arduously debated. Foreign banks can improve the efficiency of the banking sector in the host country but they can also undermine local banks by selecting only the most trustworthy borrowers. In this paper, I analyze the period between 2005 and 2014 and compare the differences between foreign and domestic banks in Mexico and Colombia. Analyzing Mexico is of great importance given that foreign banks control more than 80% of the banking assets. Also, given the difference in institutional development between Mexico and Colombia, I can control for regulatory environment. After controlling for size, institutional development, and country of origin, I find that foreign banks have not stimulated growth in Mexico through commercial loans. Previous studies suggest that this lack of credit to companies may be due to a weak enforcement of contracts rather than to foreign ownership. However, Colombia has a weaker enforcement of contracts environments and foreign banks also do not provide as many commercial loans as domestic banks. This paper is of particular interest to regulators in developing countries that need foreign capital and those that want to intensify the allocation of commercial credit.     

Weak Links in the Chain: A Diagnosis of Health Policy in Poor Countries

Recent empirical and theoretical literature sheds light on thedisappointing experience with implementation of primary healthcare programs in developing countries. This article focuseson the evidence showing two weak links in the chain betweengovernment spending for services to improve health and actualimprovements in health status. First, institutional capacityis a vital ingredient in providing effective services. Whenthis capacity is inadequate, health spending, even on the rightservices, may lead to little actual provision of services. Second,the net effect of government health services depends on theseverity of market failures—the more severe the marketfailures, the greater the potential for government servicesto have an impact. Evidence suggests that market failures arethe least severe for relatively inexpensive curative services,which often absorb the bulk of primary health care budgets.A companion paper, available from the authors (seep. 219), offersa perspective on how government funds can best be used to improvehealth and well-being in developing countries. It gives an alternativeview of appropriate public health policy, one that focuses onmitigating the characteristic market failures of the sectorand tailoring public health activities to the government's abilityto deliver various services.      

Government Debt, Reputation and Creditors' Protections: The Tale of San Giorgio

San Giorgio (1407–1805) was a formal association aimed at protecting creditors’ rights and reducing the risk of debt repudiation by the Republic of Genoa. The behavior of this institution is broadly consistent with debt models that predict lending if lenders can impose big penalties on debtors, and models in which lenders can differentiate between excusable and inexcusable defaults. San Giorgio shareholders enjoyed low credit risk but also lower returns on capital than those prevailing on comparable foreign assets for which creditors’ protection mechanisms were lacking. The Republic’s quid pro quo was a low cost of financing. Differences in credit risk were an important explanation of differences in long-term interest rates across countries in 16th and 17th century Europe, a point not sufficiently emphasized by the literature.     

Crises, Cronyism, and Credit

This paper examines the effects of several potential explanatory factors related to the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis. We find that a crisis can improve a poorly functioning credit system by making domestic lending rates more responsive to market-based returns. We report that the responsiveness of short-term lending rates is directly related to the level of transparency in the economy. Thus, countries with greater transparency (less corruption) are more likely to make credit decisions based on market-wide forces rather than succumb to the influence of special interest groups. Nations with greater transparency also experience significantly shorter and less severe economic downturns.     

PREFERENTIAL CREDIT AND INSURANCE AS MEANS TO PROMOTE EXPORTS

Rationales for preferential export credit and export creditinsurance are reviewed and several countries' programs are examinedto determine if these preferential programs are appropriateexport promotion instruments for developing countries. Marketfailure is the most compelling rationale for their introductionbut these arguments have not been well articulated and thereis no systematic analysis of the costs of alternative governmentresponses. Industrial countries' programs have histories ofsubsidy while developing countries' preferential programs havenot been significant factors in stimulating exports.      

Promoting Entrepreneurship at the Base of the Social Pyramid via Pricing Systems: A case Study

Historically, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have played a significant social role by helping people at the base of the socio‐economic pyramid escape from social exclusion through the creation of microenterprises. However, international banks have recently started competing in the microfinance sector. In this adverse environment, MFI management tools should be more innovative and technologically advanced to increase efficiency, solvency and profitability and to compete with commercial banks on equal terms. This study therefore strives to develop a credit‐risk management tool based on a multilayer perceptron (MLP) credit‐scoring model for a Peruvian MFI, and to calculate the capital requirements and microcredit pricing on both internal ratings‐based (IRB) and standardized approaches, analysing the impact of these models on the management of the MFI. Our findings show that the implementation of an IRB approach with default probabilities obtained from an MLP credit‐scoring model produces the best benefit by the MFIs in terms of higher accuracy (reduction of misclassification costs by 13.78%), lower capital requirements (in the range of 8.5–78%) and the best risk‐adjusted interest rates. Furthermore, with the establishment of interest rates adjusted to the real risk of each client, MFIs are fairer and more socially engaged by preventing economically viable low‐risk projects from becoming unviable due to excessive interest rates. This leads to the creation of more small businesses by people from the base of the socio‐economic pyramid and greater economic development and social cohesion. The IRB model should therefore be implemented to improve MFI solvency, profitability, efficiency, survival, management and social performance.