Public capital and patterns of growth in the presence of threshold externalities

This paper studies the relation between public capital accumulation and long-run economic growth. We emphasize three phenomena that may be accompanied by the presence of public capital: increasing returns, rivalry, and threshold externalities. We formulate a simple growth model that captures these features of public capital in a tractable manner. Assuming that investment for public capital financed by income taxation, we show that the threshold externalities may generate multiple equilibria, so that the pattern of growth and the realization of a specific steady-growth equilibrium are quite sensitive to the rate of income tax as well as to expectations of agents.     

Intrafirm human capital externalities and selection bias

This article investigates the existence of intrafirm human capital externalities in the Spanish economy. In doing so, it focusses on two estimation issues. First, a semiparametric methodology is used to estimate externalities in a more flexible way that allows to affect all parameters in the equation. Second, two approaches to control for selection bias are designed for use in cross-section data. Our results show a higher externality effect on wages when using the semi parametric approach as compared to the standard estimation approach. Additionally, the estimations even when controlling for selection bias give evidence of externalities.     

Accounting for human capital externalities with an application to the Nordic countries

Externalities caused by human capital accumulation have taken up considerable space in theoretical work on economic growth. However, less attention has been paid to this externality in traditional growth accounting exercises. This paper takes up the issue of growth accounting, suggesting a framework for quantifying human-capital externalities and illustrating it empirically using data from the five Nordic countries. Four sources of growth are identified, i.e. capital accumulation, labor force growth, and total factor productivity growth (TFP), where the traditional TFP measure is split into a part explained by human-capital formation and an unexplained part. By doing this I am able to attribute between 12 per cent and 33 per cent of growth in the Nordic countries to human capital investment.     

A multi-region model of economic growth with human capital and negative externalities in innovation

We use a multi-region model and provide the first theoretical analysis of the effects of human capital use and a particular kind of innovative activity on economic growth. In each of the N heterogeneous regions in our model, consumers have constant relative risk aversion preferences, there are negative externalities in innovation, and there are three kinds of manufacturing activities involving the production of blueprints for inputs or machines, the inputs or machines themselves, and a single final good for consumption. Our analysis generates four salient findings. First, for each of the N regions, we define a balanced growth path equilibrium, we characterize the market clearing factor prices, and we determine the free entry condition in the R&D sector. Second, we show that without growth in human capital, there is no sustained economic growth in any of the N regions. Third, we show that human capital growth generates sustained economic growth in each of the N regions. Finally, when discussing the above three findings, we shed light on the spatial dimensions of economic growth in our multi-region aggregate economy.     

Duplication externalities in an endogenous growth model with physical capital,human capital,and R&D

This paper devises an endogenous growth model with physical capital, human capital and product variety. Differently to previous works, innovation is subject to externalities associated to the duplication of research effort, as well as to R&D spillovers. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique feasible steady-state equilibrium with positive long-run growth. For appropriate parameter values, the transitional dynamics of the model is represented by a two-dimensional stable manifold. Numerical simulations show that the incorporation of duplication externalities significantly increases the ability of the model to fit the observed data.     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

Optimal product strategies in the presence of network externalities

A network externality exists when a user’s benefit from a product increases with the number of other users in the same network. We examine the possibility that a software firm may exploit network externalities by introducing a limited feature version of its commercially available software into the market. The two versions need not be perfectly compatible and network externalities are allowed to decline as the difference between the versions increases. We obtain conditions under which introducing a limited feature version is optimal.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

Optimal social security in a dynastic model with human capital externalities,fertility and endogenous growth

In this paper we investigate the optimal scale of pay-as-you-go social security in a dynastic family model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth. Human capital externalities reduce the return to human capital investment and hence lead to under-investment in human capital and over-reproduction of the population. If the taste for the number of children is sufficiently weak relative to the taste for the welfare of children, social security can be welfare enhancing by reducing fertility and raising human capital investment per child.     

Market access and regional dispersion of human capital accumulation in Turkey

Building on early advances in development economics, the theoretical construct of new economic geography asserts that geography plays a crucial role in educational human capital accumulation. Based on this expectation, this study investigates the impact of market access on provincial human capital accumulation in Turkey. Results indicate that market access matters for understanding why some regions lag behind others in terms of average years of schooling. Our results are robust to the inclusion of spatial mechanisms, different specifications of the spatial weight matrix, endogeneity and alternative measurements of market access and to a host of other factors that affect regional human capital accumulation.     

Voluntariness and efficiency in the provision of public goods

This paper presents a characterization of Lindahl allocations which makes no reference to personalized prices. Lindahl equilibria are characterized here by two conditions: Pareto efficiency and a voluntariness condition. Voluntariness requires that no consumer may benefit from a reduction in his contribution if this means that the vector of public goods must be reduced in the same proportion. The intersection of the (large) set of voluntary allocations and that of efficient ones turns out to be (under differentiability) the set of Lindahl allocations.     

Human capital,externalities and growth in an overlapping generations model

We consider an overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supplies by young and old and a human capital accumulation process that relies on the interaction of these two types of labor. This interaction is not understood by the market hence we analyze fiscal policies designed to remedy this. We argue that taxes must be acceptable to people alive at the time of planning. This makes many proposed taxes unfeasible. Two distinct paths to growth emerge; one through increased savings and another through increased workforce participation. The long run rate of growth depends entirely on human capital but we find this to be of little relevance. Some simulation results are presented for two stylized economic blocks calibrated on the USA and the EURO-zone.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.     

Dynamic provision of public goods

Summary. This paper deals with implementing the efficient level of public good provision in a dynamic setting. First, we prove that when the good is provided in several stages, no sequence of Groves' mechanisms guarantees that agents will reveal their true valuations as a dominant strategy. The contribution of this paper is the characterization of those mechanisms which guarantee truthful revelation in this environment.Received: 30 December 2001, Revised: 27 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D61, D78, D82, H41.This paper has greatly benefited from the ideas and comments of Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón and Roberto Burguet. I would also like to thank José Alcalde, Luis J. Alías, Javier López-Cuñat, Juan Vicente Llinares, Ashley Piggins, Juan Perote and Antonio Quesada for very helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions aided the quality of exposition in the paper and led me to Proposition 4.     

Favor trading in public good provision

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect behavior, how they interact in various institutional structures, and how they play out over time. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of favor trading in a particular setting: the private provision of a public good. In our experiment, giving subjects the ability to practice targeted reciprocity by making a simple, low-cost change in information provision increases contributions to the public good by 14 %. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. Strategic concerns cannot explain all of this behavior, and it must be at least partly due to direct reciprocity. When someone cannot directly benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good. People thus excluded from the “circle of reciprocity” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.     

On the private provision of public goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ private contributions.     

Market competition,lobbying influence and environmental externalities

In this paper, we contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between lobbying and environmental regulation by explicitly taking into account the role of market competition. We analyse how the number of firms affects both the effectiveness of lobbying in fighting environmental regulation and the individual incentive for firms to switch to green technology. To explore this issue, we present a Cournot oligopoly where firms can choose between abating the environmental externality or lobbying the government to hold a loose regulation. We investigate two alternative government's political objectives. In the first, government aims to only minimise the externality, while in the second, it also cares about the consumers surplus. We find that, in both cases, the higher the number of firms, the higher the incentive to abate. However, while in the first case, either both types of firms coexist or all firms switch to be green, in the other case, there exists a minimum the number of firms below which all firms remain polluting.     

Electric vehicles: Market penetration and positive externalities

In this paper, we develop a methodology for approximating the market penetration potential for electric vehicles (EVs). The model is dynamic in nature and explicitly accounts for the competitive effects of conventional vehicles. Unlike many previous models, it does not require an estimation of the time required to achieve a 50% market share. Instead, the model allows one to endogenously determine the rate of market penetration, as well as the ceiling level. We note that some electric vehicle characteristics limit marketability to consumers unaffected by the disadvantages associated with operating EVs. These characteristics are accounted for in the model by the use of a substitution index. The addition of the substitution index allows one to explicitly account for variations in prices, climate, and geographic contour, all of which affect market potential. Electric vehicles are expected to result in positive social benefits by way of reduced pollution emissions and because of the concomitant decrease in the consumption of gasoline that market adoption would bring about. However, the social benefits will not be captured in the market and will not, therefore, encourage the use of these alternatives to conventional vehicles. This means that the rate of adoption of electric vehicles will be slower than is socially optimal, which is a potential argument for government subsidies for electric vehicles. In this paper, we explore a method for analyzing the benefits associated with the adoption of electric vehicles.