Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions

This paper attempts to provide a probable answer to a longstanding resource curse puzzle; i.e., why resource-rich nations grow at a slower rate compared with less fortunate ones. Using an innovative threshold estimation technique, the empirical results reveal that there is a threshold effect in the natural resources–economic growth relationship. We find that the impact of natural resources is meaningful to economic growth only after a certain threshold point of institutional quality has been attained. The results also shed light on the fact that the nations that have low institutional quality depend heavily on natural resources while countries with high quality institutions are relatively less dependent on natural resources to generate growth.     

Reinforcement-Based Adaptive Learning in Asymmetric Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information

The sealed bidk-double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. This mechanism is tested in two experiments in which subjects are asked to bargain repeatedly for 50 rounds with the same partner under conditions of information disparity favoring either the buyer (Condition BA) or seller (Condition SA). Qualitatively, the observed bid and offer functions are in agreement with the Bayesian linear equilibrium solution (LES) constructed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). A trader favored by the information disparity, whether buyer or seller, receives a larger share of the realized gain from trade than the other trader. Comparison with previous results reported by Daniel, Seale, and Rapoport (1998), who used randomly matched rather than fixed pairs, shows that when reputation effects are present this advantage is significantly enhanced. A reinforcement-based learning model captures the major features of the offer and bid functions, accounting for most of the variability in the round-to-round individual decisions.     

资源诅咒:一个新兴古典经济学框架

本文从分工这一角度出发,在一个包含偷抢的新兴古典经济学框架下分析自然资源对经济增长的效应,内生化了资源诅咒假说.分析表明,丰富的人均资源本身会提高分工的门槛,使得人们难以形成有效的分工结构,从而抑制经济增长.另外,由于资源丰富国家往往伴随高的偷抢水平,这也降低了分工合作的可能性及其经济绩效.本文的政策含义是,为了避免资源诅咒效应,必须打破现存的资源依赖格局,构建良好的制度基础,实现分工深化以促进经济增长.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

三种国债拍卖方式的拍卖收入比较研究

国债拍卖主要有美国式拍卖、荷兰式拍卖与混合式拍卖三种,但究竟哪一种拍卖方式的拍卖收入最大?学术界迄今尚无定论。文章对W-Z模型进行扩展,并在此基础上通过结合不同市场利率环境下投标者的不同风险偏好进行比较研究。结果表明:(1)当市场利率趋升时,若非竞争性投标量较大,则混合式拍卖收入最大;若非竞争性投标量较小,但竞争性投标者较少,且市场利率上升趋势极强,则同样是混合式拍卖收入最大,反之则荷兰式拍卖收入最大。(2)当市场利率趋降时,美国式拍卖收入最大。(3)当市场利率平稳时,何种拍卖方式收入最大无法确定。     

"资源诅咒"视角下的资源型产业集群动力演变及其评价

丰富的自然资源并不意味着经济的快速增长,许多国家的发展经验也证明了自然资源有时也会成为经济发展的障碍,被称之为资源诅咒现象。在全球资源供给紧张的前提下,在资源区域培育资源型产业集群,成为各国关注的焦点。然而,在资源诅咒作用下,资源型产业集群的动力机制不能很好的发挥作用,甚至成为集群发展的障碍。文章结合资源型产业集群动力机制及其演变,分析了资源诅咒作用下资源型产业集群的动力机制,揭示了资源诅咒对资源型产业集群的影响。     

Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.     

房地产市场高空置率现象及其博弈解释

中国的房地产市场存在着高隐性空置率的现象,本文利用博弈工具,依据双方叫价拍卖模型,构建房地产市场交易的不完全信息博弈模型。通过分析提出隐性空置率的产生和持续上涨主要是由于房地产开发商和房地产投资者即炒房者乐观供给预期过度,而消费者乐观消费预期不足所造成。并据此提出了相关的政策建议。     

Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity

We examine the ‘resource curse’ using new data on historic resource stocks and an improved econometric methodology. The paper distinguishes between resource abundance (stocks) and extractive intensity (flows), focusing on relationships between resources and rule of law. Previously unavailable information on past resource stocks is estimated. We find that economically large initial natural resource stocks are associated with subsequent lower levels of rule of law and do not directly affect growth, while raw resource exports do not have a significant effect on rule of law when stocks are included in the analysis but do affect average growth rates. Sample size is maximized through the use of an EMis (expectation maximization with importance sampling) algorithm to replace missing data, minimizing the bias and inefficiency associated with listwise deletion, which commonly eliminates half or more of the available data in this setting. An earlier version of this work appeared as part of my doctoral dissertation in economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Thanks are due to my dissertation committee: Robert T. Deacon, Stephen J. DeCanio and Carol McAusland; as well as Okan Kavuncu, Henning Bohn, Kelly Bedard, Olivier Deschennes, Doug Steigerwald and numerous seminar participants as well as two anonymous referees.     

基于“资源诅咒”学说的能源输出型城市R&D行为研究——理论解释及其实证检验

文章在RDiner的R&D增长模型基础上,将一个纯资本密集型的能源开发部门引入其中,并在最终产品生产函数中加入了能源生产要素,建立了能源输出型城市的四部门内生增长模型,对能源开发与R&D行为之间的关系进行了市场竞争动态均衡分析及平衡增长路径的比较静态分析,为我国能源输出型城市遭受的"资源诅咒"现象提出了一种理论解释,即能源开发对R&D行为的挤出效应.文章还利用36座中国典型的能源输出型城市的面板数据样本对上述理论推断进行了有效验证.最后给出了我国能源输出型城市经济发展的政策建议.     

基于不完全信息静态分析模型的西部区域旅游合作机制研究

区域旅游合作是区域旅游发展到一定阶段的产物,运用不完全信息静态博弈理论分析了区域旅游合作的动力机制,得出在不完全信息的状态下,区域旅游合作行为能够产生的条件是低成本（对区域B来讲）和p≥C/δA（对区域A来讲）。西部地区进行区域旅游合作的动力来源于区域成本和收益的比较,作为管理主体的政府,其区域旅游合作动力为政府成本和收益的比较,具体表现为政府如何发挥其高效率,为旅游企业创造一个良好的社会环境,因此政府的主要行为就集中在区域政策的调整、政府的管理创新和区域旅游管理等方面;作为市场主体的旅游企业的动力来源于企业利润最大化,因此区域旅游合作主要包括构建以价值链为基础的资产纽带型旅游企业集团和以网络为基础的旅游企业网络平台。     

供应链的交易成本分析及供产双方的博弈

本文通过传统供应链中供应商和制造商的讨价还价模型分析,论证了交易双方的交易成本不同,造成供应商和制造商之间的相互依赖关系不同,从而双方的机会主义行为倾向也不同.制造商可以通过与高质量的供应商建立长期的诚信的战略合作伙伴关系,以减少为讨价还价消耗的交易成本,同时也减少了双方机会主义行为所造成的损害.     

比较优势和“资源诅咒”悖论与资源富集地区经济增长路径选择——基于对中国地区间经济增长差异原因的扩展分析

中国地区经济增长差距的原因可主要归结为,由于自然地理条件、人口集聚规模、制度因素的地区差异,导致各地区在劳动力、资本、技术等生产要素集聚及要素配置方面出现差剐,"资源诅咒"并非是导致地区经济差距的原因.因此,具备自然资源比较优势的地区应该充分利用自身的资源禀赋,不断推动自然资本优势向物质资本、人力资本优势的转化,通过将资源租金用于教育、基础设施建设和推动城镇化进程,缩小地区间地理区住、人口集聚规模的差异,实现地区经济增长的渐进收敛.     

煤炭资源开发对中国煤炭城市经济增长的影响——基于资源诅咒学说的经验研究

文章针对我国煤炭城市普遍存在的煤炭资源大量开采输出与经济发展水平滞后并存的反差现象,运用资源诅咒学说,通过数理模型的推导讨论了煤炭资源开发对煤炭城市长期经济增长产生的四种不同效应,并利用我国28个地级煤炭城市1997-2007年的面板数据,对煤炭资源开发与煤炭城市经济增长之间的关联效应及其传导机制进行了实证考察。结果显示:煤炭资源的开发确实束缚了煤炭城市的经济增长而产生了资源诅咒效应;固定资产投资和制造业投入对煤城经济增长的促进作用较为显著,科技投入对经济增长也表现出了一定的推动作用,但外资投入和人力资本投入的作用均不显著;煤炭城市经济发展中的要素利用效率偏低,粗放式的增长模式表现明显;煤炭资源开发主要通过削弱制造业投入、外资投入、科技投入和人力资本投入这四种传导途径来制约经济增长,其中制造业投入是作用最强的传导因素。最后文章为我国煤炭城市的经济发展提出了针对性的政策建议。     

Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly

Within an incomplete-information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.     

Community–Industry Contracting over Natural Resource use in a Context of Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia

Decentralization in Indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies. The outcomes of such community–company negotiations vary significantly across communities. What are the conditions that cause this variation, and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third-party actors such as the local government or NGOs? This paper addresses these questions by developing a game-theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies. The model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions. We show that third-party actions to improve the community’s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment. Our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters. In particular, strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost-effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies. The model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights, a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries.     

A decade of natural gas development: The makings of a resource curse?

Many studies find that areas more dependent on natural resources grow more slowly – a relationship known as the resource curse. For counties in the south-central U.S., I find little evidence of an emerging curse from greater natural gas production in the 2000s. Each gas-related mining job created more than one nonmining job, indicating that counties did not become more dependent on mining as measured by employment. Increases in population largely mitigated a rise in earnings per job and crowding out. Furthermore, changes in the adult population by education level reveal that greater production did not lead to a less educated population.     

供应链中信用模式选择的博弈分析

供应链作为一种经营理念和商务运作模式,其跨企业性决定了信用问题是制约其正常运作的主要障碍。企业信用模式选择是供应链市场中交易者之间相互博弈的结果。主要从供应链供需双方的行为角度出发,分析在完全信息条件下供需双方静态博弈和动态博弈的行为选择及其结果。     

危险化学品安全规制中信息不完全问题研究

转型期中国危险化学品存在重大安全隐患，特别是因危险化学品管理不善而引发的安全事故时有发生。规制机构获得有关危险化学品安全事故隐患的信息量与危险化学品的安全程度有一定的相关性。应通过建立危险化学品市场、完善安全监察员队伍等举措降低规制机构获取最优信息的边际成本，通过加大对企业职工安全健康教育培训力度、完善危险化学品工伤保险机制等举措提高规制机构获取最优信息量的边际收益，最终实现减少危险化学品安全事故的目的。     

网络商务声誉博弈新论

当前网络商务欺诈现象日益增多,使得刚刚兴起的网络经济出现发展性障碍.一般的研究中,较为注重信用制度在网络环境下的变革和建立.本文则以一个全新的视角,借助博弈方法,从网络市场销售商行为和动机入手进行研究,试图为我国网络经济的健康发展提供制度设计的理论依据.