The role of diminishing returns in neo-Schumpeterian growth theory

Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997     

Research and development and trade policies for product innovation in the presence of foreign competition

This paper examines two policy instruments — a matching grant and import tariffs — for encouraging research and development (R&D) in product innovation by a domestic firm when it faces foreign competition. We do so by developing a theoretical model of product innovation where R&D effort is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. We examine the effects of a reduction in import tariffs on private expenditure on R&D, on public support for such R&D, and on total R&D expenditure. We find that in response to a reduction in import tariffs, the domestic firm always reduces its private R&D investments, but the total level of R&D expenditure (i.e., including public support) might go up depending on the level of tariffs. In particular, we find that it will go up if the initial level of tariff is higher than a critical level. When tariff is endogenous, we find that the socially optimal level of tariffs is positive. One finding that is of particular interest is that supporting private attempts to product innovate in the form of a matching grant program leads to a socially optimal level of product R&D.     

Optimal growth when environmental quality is a research asset

We advance an original assumption whereby a good state of the environment positively affects labor productivity in R&D such that deteriorating environmental quality negatively impacts R&D. We study the implications of this assumption for the optimal solution in an R&D-based model of growth, where the use of a non-renewable resource generates pollution. We show that in such a case, it is socially optimal to postpone extraction, as opposed to the situation in which the environment has no effect on productivity in R&D. Furthermore, insofar as environmental quality declines and subsequently recovers, we find that it is optimal to re-allocate employment to R&D in line with productivity changes. If environmental quality recovers only partially from pollution, R&D effort optimally begins above its long-run level, then progressively declines to a minimum and eventually increases to its steady-state level.     

Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

In this paper, we analyze whether it is socially desirable that fines for exceeding pollution standards depend not only on the degree of non-compliance but also on technology investment efforts by the polluting firms. For that purpose, we consider a partial equilibrium framework where a representative firm chooses the investment effort and the pollution level in response to an environmental policy composed of a pollution standard, an inspection probability and a fine for non-compliance. We find that the fine should strictly decrease with the investment effort when (i) there are administrative costs of sanctioning; (ii) the optimal policy induces non-compliance; and (iii) either the fine is sufficiently convex in the degree of non-compliance or the investment effort decreases marginal abatement costs significantly.     

Technology diffusion and global welfare effects: Imitative R&D vs. South-bound FDI

A country in question is positioned in the middle of a global technology race. To shorten its technology gap with the forerunner (North), this middle country must invest in imitative R&D. To exploit cheap labor in the technological laggard (South), it also must invest in South-bound FDI. A dynamic general-equilibrium model of three countries (North, Middle, South) is set up to numerically analyze how the Middle’s refraining South-bound FDI affects international technology diffusion, international wage gaps, and international welfare. The Middle always finds a need to socially optimize investing balance between imitative R&D and South-bound FDI, while the South is instead in favor of as much South-bound FDI as possible. Interestingly, the North may, or may not, align with the Middle’s tightening South-bound FDI, depending on how fast the Northern product innovation can proceed over time. Both transitional dynamics and the steady-state equilibrium are computed.     

Research,Innovation And Productivi[Ty: An Econometric Analysis At The Firm Level

This paper studies the links between productivity, innovation and research at the firm level. We introduce three new features: (i) A structural model that explains productivity by innovation output, and innovation output by research investment: (ii) New data on French manufacturing firms, including the number of European patents and the percentage share of innovative sales, as well as firm-level demand pull and technology push indicators; (iii) Econometric methods which correct for selectivity and simultaneity biases and take into account the statistical features of the available data: only a small proportion of firms engage in research activities and/or apply for patents; productivity, innovation and research are endogenously determined; research investment and capital are truncated variables, patents are count data and innovative sales are interval data.

We find that using the more widespread methods, and the more usual data and model specification, may lead to sensibly different estimates. We find in particular that simultaneity tends to interact with selectivity, and that both sources of biases must be taken into account together. However our main results are consistent with many of the stylized facts of the empirical literature. The probability of engaging in research (R&D) for a firm increases with its size (number of employees), its market share and diversification, and with the demand pull and technology push indicators. The research effort (R&D capital intensity) of a firm engaged in research increases with the same variables, except for size (its research capital being strictly proportional to size). The firm innovation output, as measured by patent numbers or innovative sales, rises with its research effort and with the demand pull and technology indicators, either directly or indirectly through their effects on research. Finally, firm productivity correlates positively with a higher innovation output, even when controlling for the skill composition of labor as well as for physical capital intensity.     

R&D Strategy in International Mixed Duopoly with Research Spillovers

This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D).     

Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation

We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resistance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department's effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.     

An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies

R&D subsidies are a common tool of technology policy, but little is known about the effects they have on the behavior of firms. This paper presents evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on the R&D effort of recipients, and on the probability that a firm will participate in a program granting R&D subsidies. The empirical model consists of a system of equations: a participation equation; and an R&D effort equation. Endogeneity of public funding is controlled for. Estimates are obtained with a cross-section sample of Spanish firms. The main findings are that: 1) small firms are more likely to obtain a subsidy than large firms, probably reflecting one of the public agency's goals; 2) overall, public funding induces more private effort, but for some firms (30% of participants) full crowding out effects cannot be ruled out, and 3) firm size remains related to effort, whether or not a firm gets public funding.     

The Non-Trivial Choice between Innovation Indicators

We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of five alternative innovation indicators: R&D, patent applications, total innovation expenditure and shares in sales taken by imitative and by innovative products as they were measured in the 1992 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in the Netherlands. We conclude that the two most commonly used indicators (R&D and patent applications) have more (and more severe) weaknesses than is often assumed. Moreover, our factor analysis suggests that there is little correlation between the various indicators. This underlines the empirical relevance of various sources of bias of innovation indicators as discussed in this paper.     

Optimizing international technology diffusion: A middle-income country's perspective

The paper develops a North–Middle–South model to formulate a middle economy that plays catch-up via imitative R&D to acquire newer technologies from a higher-wage innovative forerunner, while playing “reverse catch-up” via outbound FDI to transfer older technologies to a lower-wage follower. A critical policy dilemma facing the middle economy is how to balance its R&D-driven technology inflows against its FDI-driven technology outflows. Numerical simulations are used for dynamic welfare analysis. This paper finds that tightening FDI permits the middle economy to keep a lower saving rate without weakening its ability to acquire newer technologies in the long run.     

Economic Consequences of Limited Technology Transferability

Because technology is often context-dependent and partly tacit, it is much less transferable than conventional 'innovation and market structure' models have long assumed. Technological know-how is represented in this paper as a combination of formal knowledge and informal practice. The balance of these basic components is viewed as an optimisation of R&D investment structure and level within an oligopolistic framework. We analyse the outcomes of this optimisation in terms of R&D production efficiency and social welfare. With regard to R&D investment structure, we find that the equilibrium outcome is neither efficient nor socially optimal, and the stronger competition is, the larger the divergence from efficiency and social optimum. For R&D investment level, the results are less conclusive, but they imply that competition represents the best conditions for stimulating R&D investment     

Can a larger market foster R&D under monopolistic competition with variable mark-ups?

We study monopolistic competition with symmetric directly additive preferences (generating variable mark-ups) and an endogenous technology choice. Each firm chooses an investment in R&D to decrease its marginal cost. We prove that the equilibrium R&D investment increases with market size (a larger population or trade) only if the price-elasticity of demand is an increasing function. Together with the output levels, such equilibrium investments may be socially excessive or insufficient, depending on whether the elasticity of the subutility is increasing or decreasing. The main implication is that opening up to free trade can foster R&D through variable mark-ups.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

Innovation by Heterogeneous Leaders*

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which leaders and followers conduct research and development (R&D) activities and in which leaders have different‐sized quality leads over their followers, and thus have different profit flows. We show that leaders with larger quality leads make smaller R&D investments; this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms, such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing the R&D of followers can promote the aggregate R&D of leaders, because promotion of followers' R&D decreases (increases) the number of leaders with larger (smaller) quality leads and smaller (larger) R&D investments.     

Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.     

Profit-maximizing R&D in response to a random carbon tax

This paper determines a firm’s profit-maximizing R&D response to an uncertain carbon tax, for two different R&D programs: cost reduction of low carbon energy technologies and emissions reductions of currently economic technologies. We find that optimal R&D does not increase monotonically in a carbon tax. R&D into alternative technologies increases only if the firm is flexible enough; R&D into conventional technologies first increases then decreases in a carbon tax. Firms that are very flexible may increase R&D into alternative technologies when the uncertainty surrounding a carbon tax is increased; otherwise firms will generally decrease R&D investment in uncertainty.     

Internal R&D effort,external imported technology and economic value added: empirical study of Taiwan's electronic industry

Technology innovation is a significant resource in the contemporary knowledge-based economy. The main sources of technology innovation are internal R&D effort and external imported technology. Two primary traditional production factors are physical capital and labour. The theoretical basis for this study is an evolutionary Cobb–Douglas production function explaining the effects of four resources (internal R&D effort, imported technology, physical capital and labour) on a firm's sales and economic value added (EVA). Time-series cross-section panel data from 219 Taiwan electronic manufacturers between 1990 and 2003 were employed for fixed effect model. Major empirical findings were observed in this study: first, Internal R&D effort can positively affect a firm's sales and EVA. Conversely, imported technology is found to have had no significant effect on sales and EVA. Second, although both physical capital and labour affect a firm's sales more than the effects of internal R&D and external imported technology, internal R&D effort contributes to a firm's EVA beyond the effects of imported technology, physical capital and labour. Third, External imported technology has neither a complementary nor a substitutive relationship with internal R&D effort.     

Capacity investment and green R&D in a dynamic oligopoly under the potential shift in environmental damage

We develop a differential oligopoly game to investigate firms’ capacity investment and green R&D efforts in the presence of the potential shift in environmental damage and under the spillover effect of R&D activities among firms. We find that when both the probability of potential shift in environmental damage and the efficacy of R&D activities are high, the spillover effect will discourage the R&D effort but encourage the capacity investment. Otherwise, the spillover effect will encourage the R&D effort but discourage the capacity investment. Moreover, the potential shift in environmental damage can significantly impact the capacity and green R&D decisions as well as the Pigouvian tax, especially in the case of a large number of firms, a high profitability of the product, a high level of interest rate, and a high level of R&D spillover among firms.     

Demand-Creating R&D in a Symmetric Oligopoly

Spillovers with demand-creating research and development (R&D) activities are investigated by revisiting a widely employed market share rivalry demand structure. Positive technological spillovers may inflict positive or negative side effects on rivals and this has important implications for the effects on innovative efforts of loose or tight R&D cooperation in symmetric oligopolies. A comparison with the effects that apply with linear demand structures and implications for empirical research are also touched upon.