Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion

The paper provides a psychological explanation of uncertainty aversion based on the fear of regret. We capture an agent’s regret using a reference-dependent utility function in which the agent’s utility depends on the performance of his chosen option relative to the performance of the option that would have been best ex post. An uncertain option is represented as a compound lottery. The basic idea is that selecting a compound lottery reveals information, which alters the ex post assessment of what the best choice would have been, inducing regret. We provide sufficient conditions under which regret implies uncertainty aversion in the sense of quasi-concave preferences over compound lotteries.     

Model Uncertainty, Optimal Monetary Policy and the Preferences of the Fed

Monetary policy in the US is characterized by a substantial degree of inertia. While in principle this may well be the outcome of an optimizing central bank behaviour, the ability of any derived policy rule to match the data relies on so large weights for interest rate smoothing into policy makers' preferences as to be theoretically flawed. In this paper we investigate whether such a puzzle can be interpreted as resulting from the concern of monetary authorities for potential misspecifications of the macroeconomic dynamics. Accordingly, we propose a novel thick modelling approach that incorporates model uncertainty into the identification of central bank's preferences. The thick robust policy rule shows the kind of smoothness observed in the data without resorting to implausible values for the preference parameters.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Robust monetary policy under model uncertainty and inflation persistence

In this paper, we examine the inflation persistence puzzle by applying the robust control approach of Hansen and Sargent (2008). In line with the literature suggesting that inflation persistence may be affected by the monetary policy design and its institutional characteristics, we find that inflation persistence is positively related to the central bank's preference for model robustness. In effect, model uncertainty and robust decision making may be considered as a mechanism generating inflation persistence, for a given non-zero degree of autocorrelation in supply-side shocks. Further, the policy implication is that the central bank's monetary policy under model uncertainty renders, in terms of the sacrifice ratio, the output-cost of inflation stabilization more important.     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

IDEAL AND REAL JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL POLICY MEASURES*

This paper discusses the successes and failures of Japanese monetary policy by evaluating policies from January 1980 to May 2003 in the light of optimal policy rules. First, we quantitatively conceptualize the Bank of Japan (BOJ)'s policy decisions by employing Bernanke and Mihov's (1998 ) econometric methodology for developing monetary policy measures and term the resulting policy measure the ‘actual policy measure’. Next, assuming that the BOJ is committed to optimal policy rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, which we term ‘optimal policy measures’. We evaluate Japanese monetary policy historically by comparing actual and optimal policy measures.     

Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy

Economic evaluation of climate policy traditionally treats uncertainty by appealing to expected utility theory. Yet our knowledge of the impacts of climate policy may not be of sufficient quality to be described by unique probabilistic beliefs. In such circumstances, it has been argued that the axioms of expected utility theory may not be the correct standard of rationality. By contrast, several axiomatic frameworks have recently been proposed that account for ambiguous knowledge. In this paper, we apply static and dynamic versions of a smooth ambiguity model to climate mitigation policy. We obtain a general result on the comparative statics of optimal abatement and ambiguity aversion, and then extend our analysis to a more realistic, dynamic setting, where we introduce scientific ambiguity into the well-known DICE model of the climate-economy system. For policy-relevant exogenous mitigation policies, we show that the value of emissions abatement increases as ambiguity aversion increases, and that this ‘ambiguity premium’ can in some plausible cases be very large. In these cases the effect of ambiguity aversion on welfare is comparable to that of other much studied welfare parameters. Thus ambiguity aversion may be an important neglected aspect of climate change economics, and seems likely to provide another argument for strong abatement policy.     

Probability models and robust policy rules

We consider Sims's (2008) argument that robust policy making requires that policy models be treated as “probability models”. In a welfare-based setting, we estimate by Bayesian methods a number of variants of a New Keynesian macroeconomic model and use both the model odds and posterior densities to design robust interest rate rules consisting of an inflation-forecast-based rule and a wage-targeting one. Each are shown to have distinct robustness qualities and distinct implications for the probability-models approach. To ensure feasible policy, we further impose that rules are stable, determinate and lower-bound compatible. Our results have important implications for the design, evaluation and analysis of the probability models approach to robust monetary policy making.     

Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining

Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedback. This paper experimentally investigates which effect is stronger with the use of a rating system: buyers’ inflated inequity acceptance or sellers’ disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information condition on the buyers’ side. Our experiment shows that in a setup where the size of the pie is common knowledge for both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not display greater acceptance of inequity. By contrast, when only sellers are aware of the size of the pie, sellers behave aggressively to exploit buyers and their behavior does not change in the presence of a rating system; however, buyers display greater acceptance of inequity when a rating system is present. We discuss how these results can be explained by a theoretical model that includes sellers’ social disapproval aversion and buyers’ disappointment aversion in addition to the players’ inequality aversion.     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.     

中国货币政策规则稳健性研究——基于不确定性视角

通过中国货币政策规则的统计特征和调整模式研究中国货币政策规则的稳健性以及不确定性,结论表明:中国货币政策调整规则基本符合调整频率低、每次调整幅度小、反转调整次数少且在长时间静止之后再进行反转调整的稳健性特征,除此之外,声誉不确定性也是导致中国货币政策规则稳健性特征的主要原因之一.     

The implicit objective function of Italian macroeconomic policy: 1963:1–1980:4

Econometric estimates of policy makers' preferences can be an important source of information for ex post macroeconomic policy analysis. This paper first discusses the econometric methodology to obtain consistent estimates of the policy maker's objective function. Properties of the estimation process are derived by appropriately solving an inverse control problem. Then, Italian macroeconomic data are used to estimate the policy maker's preferences under different specifications of his objective function. The major finding is that the balance of payments equilibrium was the main target of Italian macroeconomic policy.     

Value,Distribution and Capital: A review essay

This article identifies two possible alternative approaches to questions of exchange rate policy within a broadly keynesian frame work. One argument is that the implementation of keynesian’ policies in single jurisdiction requires a ‘managed’ or ‘dirty’ float, while the other would stress the benefits of a greater degree of nominal exchange rate stability as a means of reducing uncertainty and the volatility of expectations. We argue in favour of the former, on the grounds that it will not be possible to pursue a lsquo;cheap money’ policy to reduce real interest rates in a single jurisdiction unless there is some room to manoeuvre on exchange rates. A ‘fixed but adjustable’ exchange rate regime is less attractive because of the potential for deflationary bias in a hegemonic system with fixed exchange rates. Also, the politicization of exchange rate policy in such an environment makes necessary adjustments, particularly in a reflationary direction, more difficult than they otherwise would be. The recent history of the ERM in Europe provides examples of both phenomena.     

Inflation, Price Level and Hybrid Rules under Inflation Uncertainty

The performance and robustness of optimised interest rate rules are analysed in a New Keynesian model estimated for the euro area economy. In particular, we examine the properties of rules responding to inflation, the price level, or a combination of the two (a hybrid rule). All the rules also respond to the output gap. The optimal hybrid rule is only marginally superior when there is no model uncertainty. When there is uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence, the inflation rule is the most robust rule and the performance of the other two rules deteriorates. However, all the rules perform well if the true degree of inflation persistence turns out to be less than policymakers’ estimate.     

How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates

Monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and US Fed can be characterized by ‘Taylor rules’, that is both central banks seem to be setting rates by taking into account the ‘output gap’ and inflation. We also set up and tested Taylor rules which incorporate money growth and the euro–dollar exchange rate, thereby improving the ‘fit’ between actual and Taylor rule based rates. In general, Taylor rules appear to be a much better way of describing Fed policy than ECB policy. Simulations suggest that the ECB's short-term interest rates have been at a much lower level in the last 2 years compared with what a Taylor rule would suggest.     

PRICE-BASED MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION: A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY OF INTEREST RATE PARITY

Abstract.   We characterize the relationship between ex post exchange rate depreciation and the interest differential for both developed and emerging market economies. The measured ex post uncovered interest differentials in terms of both levels and absolute values are then related to a set of variables that capture macroeconomic and policy conditions. We find that a wide diversity in the coefficient relating depreciations and interest differentials can be attributed to differences in inflation volatility, financial development, capital account openness, legal development and the nature of the exchange rate regimes. The robust results are mainly found in the emerging market country grouping.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

MISPERCEPTIONS AND MONETARY POLICY IN A NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper studies the consequences for the monetary policy design of information shortages on the part of the private sector. We model these shortages as exogenous shocks to expected income, which through an IS curve, disturb aggregate demand. We constrain policymakers to follow Taylor‐like rules but allow them to optimise coefficients: we find that the presence of misperceptions makes the optimised Taylor rule respond more aggressively to inflation and the output gap. We also find that if the policymaker is uncertain about misperceptions, then it is less costly to assume they are pervasive when they are not than the reverse. In other words, setting policy on the basis that the private sector is subject to misperceptions is a ‘robust’ policy.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting under model uncertainty

It has recently been suggested that price‐level targeting (PLT) may be a superior approach to monetary policy than inflation targeting (IT) due to its ability to automatically influence inflation expectations to stabilize the economy. In this paper, I analyze whether PLT dominates IT if the ability of the central bank to influence expectations is limited by model uncertainty. Specifically, I analyze how the characterization and performance of PLT and IT rules are impacted if private agents form expectations according to a model that deviates from the policy‐maker's reference model. Using robust control to derive robust rules in such a situation, I find that the performance of PLT rules deteriorate faster than that of IT rules as the degree of misspecification increases. Nevertheless, the absolute decline in performance of the PLT rules is relatively small across alternative models that are statistically plausible.