Exploring potential R&D collaboration partners through patent analysis based on bibliographic coupling and latent semantic analysis

The aim of the present research is to provide a new systematic methodology to explore potential Research and Development (R&D) collaboration partners using patent information. The potential R&D collaboration partners are visualised as a patent assignee level map based on technological similarity between patents by using the network analysis. The proposed framework utilises two analytic methods to measure technological similarity. The first method, bibliographic coupling analysis, measures technological similarity based on the citation relationship using patent bibliographic information. Second, latent semantic analysis is utilised based on semantic similarity using patent textual information. The fuel cell membrane electrode assembly technology field is selected and applied to illustrate the proposed methodology. The proposed approach allows firms, universities, research institutes and governments to identify potential R&D collaborators as a systematic decision-making support tool.     

A comparative analysis of the change in R&D efficiency: a case of R&D leaders in the technology industry

This paper measures the cumulative change in research and development (R&D) efficiency of globally leading R&D companies in the technology industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis /Malmquist index to analyse 49 such companies. The change in R&D efficiency is analysed by decomposing the Malmquist index into ‘catch-up’ and ‘frontier shift’ indices, and by comparing cumulative indices to those at the starting period. Those cumulative indices are obtained at both a firm and an industry level. Results indicate that the overall R&D efficiency of these globally leading R&D companies declined slightly during the period 2007–2013. At a firm level, this study determines in detail how the trend of each firm in R&D activities differs from other companies.     

Unsuccessful patent application and cooperative R&;D

We show that uncertainty in patent approvals may induce the firms to do cooperative R&D. With an exogenous probability of success in patent application, we show that, if all firms apply for patents under non-cooperative R&D, the firms prefer cooperative R&D than non-cooperative R&D for moderate (high) probabilities of success in patent applications, if the cost of patenting is small (large). We also show the implications of entry of non-innovating firms and endogenous probability of success in patent applications.      

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.     

Identifying R&D partners for dye-sensitized solar cells: a multi-level patent portfolio-based approach

There is a great and urgent necessity for appropriate data and methods to help organisations select appropriate R&D (Research and Development) partners. In response, this study presents a structured framework for identifying and selecting the R&D partners with the greatest potential to meet a given technological need. The formal methods in the framework include systematic information collection, patent portfolio analysis, technological similarity screening, and semantic evaluation that views subject-action-object (SAO) sentence structures as problem-solution patterns. The results of an empirical evaluation, with dye-sensitive solar cells as the case, demonstrate that using this framework can reveal more appropriate R&D partners for technological needs (TNS) in less time and with less cost than methods based solely on one criterion.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

The productivity effects of local R&D outsourcing: the moderating role of subsidiary mandate and internal R&D

This study examined the moderating effects of two kinds of internal R&D (parent R&D and subsidiary R&D) on the relationship between local R&D outsourcing and subsidiary productivity as internal R&D challenges the collaborative relationships in the local environment. Due to the specific feature of a subsidiary mandate, we further investigate whether two distinct kinds of internal R&D have different moderating effects between exploitation-oriented subsidiaries and exploration-oriented subsidiaries, based on a sample of longitudinal data set of 263 Taiwan-based manufacturing subsidiaries over the period 2006–2009. The empirical results show that for exploitation-oriented subsidiaries parent R&D plays a significant and negative moderating role on the impact of local R&D outsourcing based on local collaboration, while a positive moderating role is observed with parent R&D and subsidiary R&D for exploration-oriented subsidiaries.     

R&D and productivity: evidence from large UK establishments with substantial R&D activities

ABSTRACT

We use Office for National Statistics' micro data for large UK establishments in the production industries in the period 1997–2008 to study the relationship between their productivity and the presence of substantial R&D activities, either at the production unit itself, or at other UK reporting units owned by the same enterprise group. We estimate that total factor (revenue) productivity is on average about 14% higher at the establishments which have substantial R&D themselves, compared to those with no R&D. Among the establishments with no R&D themselves, we estimate that productivity is on average about 9% higher at those which belong to enterprise groups which do have substantial R&D elsewhere in the UK in the same sub-sector. For the establishments with substantial R&D themselves, we also estimate a significant positive relationship between current productivity and past R&D expenditure using dynamic specifications which allow for both establishment-specific ‘fixed effects’ and a serially correlated error component.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

The architecture of R&D joint projects: the social network analysis approach

This paper examines the effect of network properties on the performance R&D joint projects. In particular, we examine the impact of network cohesion, diversity and shape on the performance of these of exploration and exploitation R&D projects. We test these measures using data on projects from European R&D networks developed under the framework of Eureka projects. The empirical results indicated some network properties enhance the project’s performance and these differ depending on the kind of technological project developed. Our results suggest a lower heterogeneity, greater cohesion and network centralisation in exploitation than in exploration projects. Our findings show different types of structures depending on the aim of the joint project and that there exist different degrees of cohesion between the partners that comprise the core and the peripheral nodes.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

The R&D system for industrial development in Taiwan

The research and development (R&D) system for industrial development in Taiwan is made up of three parts: industrial firms, government-supported institutes (GSIs), and academic institutes and universities. The Taiwanese experience showed that the effective interaction of the GSIs and the industrial firms has successfully supported the development of its industry. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) played the key role in industrial development during recent decades. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of ITRI and the way in which it fulfills its role through an examination of its major tasks. The implications for developing countries are also discussed.     

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence research joint venture incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally, in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers' welfare, but the firms become worse off.     

Matching public support for private product-innovating R&D: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Location factors of international R&D activities: an econometric approach

A model is developed of the relation between adoption of an innovation by firms and firm size. Decision making is represented as a group assessment of the perceived ratio between expected returns after succesful introduction, and the risk that implementation will fail or will last too long to makc adoption worth while. In view of differences in thc assessment of uncertainty and corresponding demands on the perceived return-to-risk ratio, among influencers of decisions in the firm, decision making is taken as stochastic, with a probability of adoption related to (objective) net benefits, and probability of non-adoption related to risk. The model gives a new way of looking at the fact that small firms lag behind in the adoption of new technology. In contrast with previous models proposed by David and Davies the explanation has nothing to do with there being some critical size below which adoption is not profitable. The present model explains the adoption lag for smaller firms as the result of expected returns being proportional to size while risk of failed implementation is independent of size. The model is tested and estimated empirically on data for the adoption of computers in small scale retailing, in the Netherlands.     

R&D strategy and innovation performance: the role of standardization

Firms now increasingly recognise the important role of R&D strategy in building technological advantage. However, few attempts have linked standardisation with specific R&D strategies in explaining innovation performance. To bridge this gap, this study empirically examines the relationships between R&D strategies, standardisation, and firms’ innovation performance. Based on a sample of 371 firms in China, we use structural equation modelling (SEM) and find that novelty-oriented R&D strategy generates greater accumulation of standardisation knowledge and standards diversity, while R&D openness only positively relates to this standardisation knowledge accumulation. Moreover, standardisation knowledge accumulation is positively related to both administrative and technical innovation performance, while a greater variety of standards only leads to higher administrative innovativeness. More importantly, our results reveal that accumulation of standardisation knowledge mediates the relationships between R&D novelty and administrative and technical innovation performances. Both the theoretical and practical implications that arise from these findings are discussed.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

The impact of public R&D expenditure on business R&D*

This paper attempts to quantify the aggregate net effect of government funding on business R&D in 17 OECD Member countries over the past two decades. Grants, procurement, tax incentives and direct performance of research (in public laboratories or universities) are the major policy tools in the field. The major results of the study are the following: Direct government funding of R&D performed by firms has a positive effect on business financed R&D (except if the funding is targeted towards defence activities). Tax incentives have an immediate and positive effect on business-financed R&D; Direct funding as well as tax incentives are more effective when they are stable over time: firms do not invest in additional R&D if they are uncertain of the durability of the government support; Direct government funding and R&D tax incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on business R&D; The stimulating effect of government funding varies with respect to its generosity: it increases up to a certain threshold (about 10% of business R&D) and then decreases beyond; Defence research performed in public laboratories and universities crowds out private R&D; Civilian public research is neutral for business R&D. * We thank the participants to various seminars, including the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technology Policy and the NBER 2000 Summer Institute on Productivity for helpful comments and suggestions. All opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect necessarily the views of the OECD or Université Libre de Bruxelles.