Do Monetary Policy Announcements Affect Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility of Returns? Some Evidence from High‐Frequency Intra‐Day South African Data

This paper examines the temporal effect of domestic monetary policy surprises on both returns and volatility of returns of the South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate. The analysis in this “event study” proceeds using intra‐day minute‐by‐minute exchange rate data, repo rate data from the South African Reserve Bank's scheduled monetary policy announcements, and market consensus repo rate forecasts. A carefully selected sample over the period August 2003 to November 2017 ensures that the change in monetary policy is exogenous to the exchange rate. We find statistically and economically significant responses in intra‐day high‐frequency South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate returns and volatility of exchange rate returns to domestic interest rate surprises, but anticipated changes have no bearing on exchange rate returns and their volatility. The empirical results also indicate that there is an instantaneous response of the rand/dollar exchange rate to monetary policy surprises and that monetary policy news is an important determinant of the exchange rate until at least 42 minutes after the pronouncement – suggesting a high degree of market “efficiency” in its mechanical sense (although not necessarily in the deeper economic‐informational sense) in processing this information. Essentially, the asymmetric GARCH results exhibit no leverage effects – positive and negative information shocks have symmetric effects on conditional variance.     

China's Foreign Trade: A “New Normal”

Since the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, China's foreign trade has continued to grow faster than international trade, but its drivers are now different from those prevailing before. The participation of the Chinese economy in the global production chains through processing activities is no longer the main driver of its trade performance. The new driving force of change is ordinary trade, based mainly on local inputs and domestic demand. China, which played a major role in the globalization process as an export base for multinational companies, is now shifting to having a “normal” foreign trade system, which is more closely integrated into the domestic economy.     

全球外汇储备、金融控制与我国的金融安全

在金融全球化时代,美国通过金融控制主宰着世界经济。美国凭借美元“中心货币”地位而攫取的国际铸币税成为弥补其经常项目逆差的稳定来源,这是全球经济不平衡的根源;作为世界头号外汇储备大国,我国面临资产价格泡沫膨胀和外汇储备稳定性下降这两大金融安全问题;美元在全球外汇储备中的比重下降将直接导致美国国际铸币税的减少,致使经常项目逆差逐步丧失稳定的弥补途径,使其容易陷入金融危机,导致后布雷顿森林体系的崩溃;我国应通过美元储备的替代来减少国际铸币税剥削,同时推进人民币的国际化以分享国际铸币税收益。     

Why China Should Invest Its Foreign Exchange Reserves in the Major US Banks

The subprime mortgage crisis and the resultant inflationary monetary policy in the USA have left the Chinese economy subject to four risks in particular. First, China＇s exports to the USA might continue to decline. Second in the medium term, the higher US inflation rate will lead to a weak dollar, which will negatively affect China＇s exports. Third in the long term, when the US Federal Reserve decreases money supply to control inflation, the US economy might enter another recession, hurting China ＂s exports further. Fourth, China＇s foreign exchange reserve assets might suffer heavy losses when the US inflation rate rises. Conventional foreign exchange investment strategies are insufficient for dealing with these four risks. Investment by China in the major US banks is suggested in the present paper. This strategy would mitigate if not eliminate all four risks. China could gain considerable financial returns on investments with only moderate risk.     

China＇s Exchange Rate and Financial Repression： The Conflicted Emergence of the RMB as an International Currency

Instability in the worm dollar standard, as most recently manifested in the US Federal Reserve＇s near-zero interest rate policy, has caused consternation in emerging markets with naturally higher interest rates. China has been provoked into speeding RMB ＂internationalization ＂; that is, opening up domestic financial markets to reduce its dependence on the US dollar for invoicing trade and making international payments. However, despite rapid percentage growth in offshore financial markets in RMB, the Chinese authorities are essentially trapped into maintaining exchange controls （reinforced by financial repression in domestic interest rates） to avoid an avalanche of foreign capital inflows that would threaten inflation and asset price bubbles by driving nominal interest rates on RMB assets down further. Because a floating （appreciating） exchange rate could attract even more hot money inflows, the People＇s Bank of China should focus on keeping the yuan/dollar rate stable so as to encourage naturally high wage increases to help balance China ＂s international competitiveness. However, further internationalization of the RMB, as with the proposed Shanghai pilot free trade zone, is best deferred until world interest rates rise to more normal levels.     

美元霸权论与我国的应对策略

霸权稳定论是20世纪70年代兴起的西方国际政治经济学主流经济理论之一,它认为具有霸权地位大国的存在,是世界经济稳定和充分发展的必要条件。在经济金融领域,霸权稳定论产生了深远影响,美国通过多种形式推行美元霸权,如金融外交、汇率安排、制定国际规则等。美元霸权给美国带来巨大收益的同时却使世界为之“付费”。本文对霸权稳定论与美元霸权进行评述,并总结归纳了中国应对美元霸权的对策。     

Effect of exchange rate return on volatility spill-over across trading regions

This paper examines the effect of realized exchange rate returns on the volatility spill-over between the euro–US dollar and US dollar–yen currency pairs across the five trading regions: Asia, Asia–Europe overlap, Europe, Europe–America overlap and America. Modelling the interaction between returns and volatility in an autoregressive five-equation system, we find evidence that depreciation of the US dollar against the yen has a greater impact on the US dollar–yen volatility spill-over than appreciation in the subprime crisis period. Appreciation and depreciation of the US dollar against the euro does not appear to have an asymmetric effect on the euro–US dollar volatility spill-over. Our results support the notion that the yen may have been preferred to the euro as a ‘safe-haven’ currency relative to the US dollar during the subprime crisis period.     

The Yield Curve as a Predictor and Emerging Economies

This paper tests whether the slope of the yield curve in emerging economies predicts inflation and growth. It also investigates whether the USA and euro area curves help to predict. It finds that the yield curve in emerging economies contains information for future inflation and growth, with differences across countries being seemingly linked to market liquidity. The US and euro area yield curves are also found to contain information for future inflation and growth in emerging economies. In particular, for those economies with exchange rates pegged to the US dollar, the US yield curve is often a better predictor than the domestic curves and causes their movements. This suggests that monetary policy changes in the USA are drivers of international financial linkages through base interest pass-through and the low end of the yield curve.     

Yen bloc or koala bloc? Currency relationships after the East Asian crisis

During the 1990s, several studies found evidence for a “yen bloc”, a significant and strengthening relationship between the Japanese yen and East Asian currencies possibly due to regional trade and investment by Japan. It appears that the Australian dollar now plays a similar role in the East Asian region, and the linkages between the Australian dollar and the Asian currencies show as much support for a “koala bloc” as a “yen bloc”. This study concludes that the US dollar appears to have declined in importance in post-1997 crisis East Asia, while Australia and Japan are becoming increasingly important regional influences.     

Are Investors Misled by “Pro Forma” Earnings?*

This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.     

Exchange-rate volatility, trade and “fixing for life” in Thailand

At the outset of the 1997 financial crisis, the quest to find a more suitable exchange-rate policy has become an urgent task facing the East Asian economies. One of the key policies agreed under Thailand’s August 1997 Letter of Intent (LOI) with the IMF was the adoption of a more flexible exchange-rate policy. However, the country re-adopted its pre-1997 crisis rigid exchange-rate policy in early 1999. To grasp this “fixing for your life” phenomenon, we test the impact of the exchange-rate volatilities of Thailand’s baht against the yen and the US dollar on the performance of the country’s bilateral trades with the two key partners.     

Rehabilitating the unloved dollar standard

The international dollar standard is an accident of history that greatly facilitates international trade and exchange. But erratic US monetary and financial policies have upset the American and world economies so as to make foreigners unhappy. A weak and falling dollar led to the great price inflations of the 1970s and to disastrous asset bubbles in the noughties. It aggravated the post‐War World's three great oil shocks. The asymmetrical nature of the dollar standard also makes many Americans unhappy because they cannot control their own exchange rate. Although nobody loves the dollar standard, it is a remarkably robust institution that is too valuable to lose and too difficult to replace. Rehabilitating the unloved dollar standard by ‘internationalising’ American monetary and financial policies to better stabilise the USA and world economies is the only way out of the current impasse.     

“Exports‐at‐Risk”: The Effect of Multimarket Contact in International Trade

Despite a well‐established literature examining possible impacts on competition in oligopolistic markets from multimarket contact (MMC) among diversified firms, only recently have trade theorists considered the possible effects of MMC among exporters in limiting the anticipated procompetitive role of imports. This article presents a first effort to test the empirical importance of a measure of this MMC, called “exports‐at‐risk,” on import prices (unit‐values). Suggestive evidence of anticompetitive impacts of MMC among exporters is obtained for highly traded four‐digit harmonized system (HS) products within the broad category of “fats and oils.” Exporters in fats and oils seem to price higher in markets where they meet rivals with the ability to retaliate against their “exports at risk.”     

The co-movement of stock markets in East Asia: Did the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis really strengthen stock market integration?

This paper examines the integration and causality of interdependencies among seven major East Asian stock exchanges before, during, and after the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. For this purpose, we use daily stock market data from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 2003 in local currency as well as US dollar terms. The data reveal that the relationships among East Asian stock markets are time varying. While stock market interactions are limited before the Asian financial crisis, we find that Hong Kong and Singapore respond significantly to shocks in most other East Asian markets, including Shanghai and Shenzhen, during this crisis. After the crisis, shocks in Hong Kong and Singapore largely affect other East Asian stock markets, except for those in Mainland China. Finally, considering the role of the USA shows that it strongly influences stock returns in East Asia – except for Mainland China – in all periods, while the reverse does not hold true.     

Hot Money Flows,Commodity Price Cycles and Financial Repression in the USA and China： The Consequences of Near-zero US Interest Rates

Under near-zero US interest rates, the international dollar standard malfunctions. Emerging markets with naturally higher interest rates are swamped with hot money inflows. Emerging market central banks intervene to prevent their currencies from rising precipitately. They lose monetary control and domestic prices begin inflating. Primary commodity prices rise worldwide unless interrupted by an international banking crisis＇. This cyclical inflation on the dollar＇s periphery only registers in the US core eonsumer price index with a long lag. The zero interest rate policy also fails to stimulate the US economy as domestic finaneial intermediation by banks and money market mutual funds is repressed. Because China is forced to keep its interest rates below market-clearing levels, it also suffers from finaneial repression, although in a form differing from that in the USA.     

Exchange Rate Regime,Financial Market Bubbles and Long‐term Growth in China: Lessons from Japan

Since 2014, capital inflows into China have turned into capital outflows, reversing the gradual appreciation path of the renminbi against the US dollar into an erratic depreciation path. The paper explains the current capital outflows by comparing China and Japan with respect to the impact of exchange rate expectations on speculative capital flows. It is argued that both in China and Japan, given benign liquidity conditions in the USA, policy‐induced appreciation expectations have generated capital inflows that have contributed to overinvestment and financial market bubbles. The current reversal of capital flows is seen as a signal that the bubble in China has burst. To stabilize growth in China and to discourage speculative capital outflows a fixed exchange rate to the dollar is recommended. Given Japan's experience and given that China's foreign assets remain high, the depreciation pressure on the Chinese renminbi can be expected to abate.     

Estimating time-varying currency betas with contagion: New evidence from developed and emerging financial markets

This paper examines the conditional time-varying currency betas from five developed and six emerging financial markets with contagion and spillover effects. We employ a trivariate asymmetric BEKK-type GARCH-in-Mean (MGARCH-M) approach to estimate the time-varying conditional variance and covariance of returns of stock market index, the world market portfolio and bilateral exchange rate between the US dollar and the local currency. The results show that the world market and currency risks are not only priced in the stock markets, but also time-varying. It is found that currency betas are much more volatile than the world market betas, and currency betas in the emerging markets are more volatile than those in the developed markets. We find empirical evidence of contagion effect and spillovers between stock market and foreign exchange market during the recent global financial crisis, and the effect is stronger in the emerging markets than that in the developed markets. Two applications are provided to illustrate the usefulness of time-varying currency betas.     

Retrospect of the Chinese Exchange Rate Regime after Reform： Stylized Facts during the Period from 2005 to 2010

In the present paper, we estimate the de facto RMB exchange rate regime, the currency basket, the floating band and the foreign exchange market pressure before and after the reform of the Chinese exchange rate regime in 2005. We find the following stylized facts： the value of the RAIB became stable after the reform; the weight of the US dollar remained high in the basket, while other currencies remained statistically significant; and the floating band gradually increased to lO percent during 2005-2008, and then greatly narrowed from the late summer of 2008 under the assumption of a yearly resetting interval. We find that the foreign exchange market pressure increased from 2005 to 2008. A possible reason is that the weight of the US dollar in the basket was slightly lower than the share of the US dollar in total transactions on the Chinese foreign exchange market. Therefore, it is reasonable for China to adopt a dollar peg exchange rate regime.     

PCAOB Inspections: Public Accounting Firms on “Trial”

The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.     

“Post‐Truth,” “Alternative Facts” and “Fakenomics”

South African companies are accused of hoarding profits to accumulate large amounts of “idle” cash, as well as of being the perpetrators of massive illegal capital flight. This paper argues that much of the claimed corporate cash is either offshore or belongs to banks. It reminds that bank deposits increase when companies borrow, not when they retain profits. It shows, too, that measures of massive capital flight actually reflect data errors. Exaggerating, through faulty methodology the extent to which companies have cash or may be involved in illegal capital flight is unhelpful. It exacerbates already‐fraught government‐business relations, and complicates the search for solutions to South Africa's economic problems.