Captive Financing Arrangements and Information Asymmetry: The Case of REITs

For the sample period of 1985 and 1986, captive real estate investments trusts (REITs) have a larger bid-ask spread than noncaptive REITs, after controlling for trading volume, price volatility, insider holdings, institutional holdings and firm size. Based on the bid-ask spread literature, the results suggest that captive firms are subject to a greater degree of information asymmetry. This implies a higher cost of capital for captive firms. The evidence here and the trend toward self-administered REITs imply that information asymmetry and conflicts of interests within REITs are priced.     

Real Estate Investment Trusts, Small Stocks and Bid-ask Spreads

This study examines the liquidity of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as measured by their bid-ask spread. We find that REIT spreads have increased over the period 1986–1990, are inversely related to market capitalization, and are similar in magnitude to spreads on other stocks of comparable size. Analysis of variance tests indicate that REIT spreads are similar across equity, mortgage and hybrid asset types. Multivariate regression results indicate that market capitalization is the primary determinant of REIT bid-ask spreads, and spreads are larger for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) REITs than for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) REITs. The regression results also indicate that spreads are lower for equity REITs than for mortgage or hybrid REITs, and are inversely related to the fraction of the REIT's shares held by institutional investors. The similarity between REIT spreads and those of other common stocks holds in both bull and bear real estate markets and suggests that, from a liquidity perspective, REITs are similar to other common stocks.     

Mean Reversions in GNMA Returns

The random-walk hypothesis is tested in the prices of mortgage-backed securities traded in the secondary market. Using the variance ratio test, the random-walk hypothesis is rejected for the daily GNMA bond return. We identify two components in the return series: a systematic component reflecting the market pricing on the expected information, and a noise term that represents the pricing on the unexpected information. After adjusting for the impact of bid-ask spread and thin trading on the price quotations, the evidence suggests that the short-horizon, weekly realized return, being dominated by the negative serial correlation of the random component, exhibits a mean-reverting process. However, it is also found that the noise term demonstrates significant positive serial correlation for holding periods of over two weeks. Thus, for longer-term returns, the realized return exhibits positive dependence. The implication is that the price of GNMA bonds did not react to unexpected information in a rational fashion in that the adjustment process is not instantaneous.     

Changes in REIT Liquidity 1990–1994: Evidence from Intra-day Transactions

This study uses data on intra-day transactions to analyze whether real estate investment (REIT) liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spread changed from 1990 to 1994, a period during which the industry's market capitalization increased from $8.7 billion to $45 billion. REIT percentage spreads (spread as percentage of share price) narrowed significantly, primarily attributable to higher share prices rather than narrower dollar-value spreads. An empirical model is used to analyze the determinants of percentage spreads. Return variance and share price, not market capitalization are found to be the primary determinants of percentage spreads in both periods. This suggests that the liquidity of REIT securities is similar to that of non-REIT securities with similar prices and return variance. In addition, percentage spreads are wider for REITs trading on the NASDAQ.     

Can antitakeover activity really create wealth? Evidence from Australia

This paper examines management-induced antitakeover activity which occurred in Australia in the late 1980s. The particular event studied is unique in Australia and requires shareholder approval to amend a company's Articles of Association to incorporate an antitakeover clause. The results show that there are strong positive wealth effects surrounding this management-initiated antitakeover activity, and that there is some evidence of a positive relationship between these abnormal returns and institutional holdings.Scott Armstrong is Investment Analyst, Bankers Trust Australia Limited, Sydney, Australia. Helen Lange is Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Li-Anne Woo is Lecturer, School of Banking and Finance, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. We gratefully appreciate the comments on earlier drafts from Tim Brailsford, Malcolm Harris, Gary Twite, Greg Clinch, Julianne Wright, Roger Bowden, Robert Czernkowski, participants at the Inaugural International Conference on Financial Management, Suffolk University, Boston (November 1992), and participants at the Third International Conference on Asian-Pacific Financial Markets, Singapore (September 1993). This research benefited from the financial support provided by a Special Research Grant from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics, University of New South Wales.     

Measuring and Explaining Changes in REIT Liquidity: Moving Beyond the Bid–Ask Spread

This paper investigates changes in REIT liquidity since the REIT boom of 1993. We use trade-by-trade data for REITs traded on the major U.S. exchanges to estimate and compare Kyle's (1985) measure of inverse liquidity for the 1993 and 1996 time periods. For our full sample of equity REITs, there is a significant increase in REIT liquidity in terms of the median price impact of trades. The increasing importance of the self-advised, self-managed organizational structure is found to be a major factor driving increased REIT liquidity. Our results imply a decline in the asymmetric information faced by market-makers. Our investigation of the changes in the size distribution and resulting price impacts of REIT trades over the 1993–1996 period yields evidence of increased importance of informed traders to REIT price dynamics. Our findings of increased liquidity indicate that the increase in adverse-selection costs due to the presence of more informed traders is more than offset by the increase in market thickness as a result of an increase in the number of uninformed (liquidity) traders.     

Price dispersion in a market with advance-purchases

This paper examines price discrimination in a market where consumers learn their preferences over time. The products are perfect substitutesex ante, but there is horizontal differentiationex post. Air travel provides one example of such a market. In equilibrium, there is more price discrimination under duopoly than under monopoly, which is consistent with recent empirical evidence from the U.S. airline industry.I am grateful to Tom Holmes for many discussions on related topics.     

They Would If They Could: Assessing the Bindingness of the Property Holding Constraints for REITs

This study examines the bindingness of the property holding constraints which Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) face on their portfolios (the dealer rule), and illustrates how these constraints hinder REITs from exploiting opportunities to time the property market. I first simulate a set of filter‐based market timing strategies, which outperform a buy‐and‐hold strategy out of sample, and show that imposing a four‐year (or even the newer two‐year) holding constraint significantly reduces the excess returns the strategies generate. I then analyze actual holding periods of properties in REIT portfolios and find that there seems to exist a large degree of demand for short property holding periods and that the trades generated by the filter strategy generally resemble actual REIT trading activity, validating the relevance of the simulation results. A direct test for the constraint reveals that REITs' propensity to hold a property beyond the minimum period increases, the higher the profit from the transaction, consistent with the asymmetric nature in which the rule is enforced. By contrast, this effect is insignificant for Umbrella‐Partnership REITs (UPREITs), which are not as affected by the constraint. I further show that UPREITs overall achieve significantly better ex‐post market timing performance than non‐UPREITs. I thus find that overall REITs are limited by the dealer rule.     

The Long-Run Performance of REIT Stock Repurchases

This study investigates the long-horizon performance of open-market stock repurchases for real estate investment trusts (REITs). We develop a new methodology to model the autocorrelation of monthly returns into long-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal return estimators. Serial correlation can introduce bias (autocorrelation bias) because the bid-ask bounce may affect monthly returns for sample firms and non-sample firms in a different fashion. Previous long-horizon event studies have overlooked this source of bias. There is compelling evidence that the market underreacts to the stock repurchase announcements. The evidence holds for different measures of the variance and the effects of cross-correlation of abnormal returns. Results are also robust to the traditional buy-and-hold abnormal return and the wealth relative estimators. We investigate the nature of the underreaction and find strong support for the undervaluation hypothesis.     

Competition and Managerial Incentives: Board Independence,Information and Predation

We show that the choice of an independent board serves as a commitment by management that it will abstain from ex post decisions that are not in shareholder interests. However, an independent board, relying on product market information to make or approve strategic decisions, also makes the firm more vulnerable to predatory information manipulation by its industry rivals. The optimal board type trades off the cost of the agency problem with that from predation. We show that only for weaker firms is an independent board the better choice, and for such firms, increased competition makes board independence even more beneficial.     

Unions and Profits: A Meta‐Regression Analysis1

The effect of unions on profits continues to be an unresolved theoretical and empirical issue. In this paper, clustered data analysis and hierarchical linear meta‐regression models are applied to the population of forty‐five econometric studies that report 532 estimates of the direct effect of unions on profits. Unions have a significant negative effect on profits in the United States, and this effect is larger when market‐based measures of profits are used. Separate meta‐regression analyses are used to identify the effects of market power and long‐lived assets on profits, as well as the sources of union‐profit effects. The accumulated evidence rejects market power as a source of union‐profit effects. While the case is not yet proven, there is some evidence in support of the appropriation of quasi‐rent hypothesis. There is a clear need for further American and non‐American primary research in this area.     

REIT Capital Budgeting and Equity Marginal q

Equity marginal  q  is the change in the market value of a company's equity in response to a one-unit unexpected change in its asset base. Hence, it is a profitability index that evaluates a firm's capital budgeting decisions at the margin. We estimate the equity marginal  q  for real estate–managing public corporations, namely, real estate investment trusts (REITs), in an attempt to understand how the various costs and benefits of being a public corporation play a role in managing this important asset class. Using the universe of equity REITs for the period from 1993 to 2005, we find that REITs with greater idiosyncratic volatility, higher stock turnover and smaller bid-ask spread have a higher equity marginal  q . In addition, both the holdings of institutional investors and their investment horizons are respectively positively related to equity marginal  q.  With these firm characteristics taken into account, firm size is found to be negatively related to equity marginal  q . Our findings are economically important as well, because the equity marginal  q  ratio alone accounts for approximately one-third of the total REIT shareholder wealth change during the study period.     

Surviving the gales of creative destruction: the determinants of product turnover

Innovative industries are often characterized by rapid product turnover. Product longevity may be driven by both a product's position within a market as well as its position within a firm's larger product portfolio. However, we have little understanding of the relative importance of these factors in determining product turnover and how they interact as an industry evolves. Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing firm survival and turnover, there are far fewer studies of the determinants of product survival and turnover. We use hazard rate models and count regression models to describe the behavior of firms and their products with a new and detailed database on the laser printer industry. We show, first, that competition and market structure variables have a large impact on both speeding product exit and delaying product entry. Second, there is some evidence that firms that have maintained a high market share for a number of years keep their products on the market longer than those with lower market share. Finally, firms with high innovative capacity tend to enter markets frequently, but withdraw their products at average rates. Firms with strong brands tend to introduce few products and withdraw their products slowly. With these findings, the paper links product entry and exit decisions to the broader literature on firm strategic and product management. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling the Korean Chonsei Lease Contract

Chonsei is a unique Korean lease contract in which the tenant pays an up–front deposit, typically about 40 to 80% of the value of the property, with no requirement for periodic rent payments. At the contract maturation, the landlord then returns the nominal value of the deposit. Since there is no legal obligation on the part of the landlord to deposit the money in an escrow account, the principal default risk associated with the chonsei contract falls on the tenant. We discuss the development and popularity of this contractual agreement in the context of the public policy initiatives, historical and institutional settings surrounding the Korean housing and housing finance market. We develop a contingent–claims model that recognizes the compound options embedded in the chonsei contract. Theoretical predictions are confirmed by an empirical analysis using monthly data from 1986 to 2000. Our analysis shows that the chonsei contract is an indigenous market response to economic conditions prevalent in Korea.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

Mergers,coordinated effects and efficiency in the Portuguese non-life insurance industry

We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firm-level data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms' demand curves are not very elastic. Firms' technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores. We find that, for the period following the mergers, there is no evidence of: (i) an increase in market power through coordinated behavior, or (ii) changes in cost efficiency levels. In addition, social welfare increased.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

Competitive advantage and performance: the impact of value creation and costliness of imitation

We create an industrial organization type model to relate resources to the spread between product market demand and marginal cost. We define competitive advantage as the cross‐sectional differential in this spread, and performance as the longitudinal differential between what a firm appropriates in the product market and what it paid in the factor market. With factor markets imposing different costs on the innovator and potential imitator(s), competitive advantage, performance, and high resource value do not necessarily coincide. Also, the interaction between resource value and the cost of imitation is complex and affected by the number of firms in the industry. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mergers with future rivals can boost prices,bar entry,and intensify market concentration

It is theoretically shown that mergers between incumbents and future rivals can boost prices and harm consumers. But in the absence of empirical evidence, no merger has been litigated on this basis. To offer empirical insights, I study the acquisition case of a promising future rival by a large incumbent pharmaceutical firm. First, there is strong and causal evidence that the merger has enabled higher prices for the incumbent. Mergers with future rivals are practically unregulated and, if wisely exploited, they can circumvent antitrust enforcement and serve as entry barriers. Second, in contrast to the mainstream prediction that mergers with future rivals do not alter market concentration, I report a large post-merger increase in the market concentration. I introduce advertisement expenditure as a possible channel of effect between the merger and market concentration. Third, I document spillover effect of the merger on the incumbent's immediate rivals without affecting its distant rivals.     

Strategic Investment under Open Access: Theory and Evidence

We examine the incentives of access‐regulated firms to invest in infrastructure facilities they must share with competitors. We show that investment incentives can be decomposed into a non‐strategic and a strategic part. The non‐strategic part implies that investment depends positively on market size. The strategic incentives imply that investment also depends on market composition, namely, the market shares of the facility owner and its competitors. Using a dataset of regulated electric utilities in the United States, we find evidence that transmission investments are indeed made strategically. Ceteris paribus, utilities are less likely to invest, and investment levels are lower, when competitors occupy a larger share of the market.