Political Influences in Changes to Setting Australian Accounting Standards

The process of establishing regulatory arrangements for setting accounting standards in most Western countries has frequently exposed conflict between private-sector bodies, professional accounting organisations, and government bodies, each attempting to dominate the process in order to gain favoured outcomes. Recent changes by the Australian Federal Government in the structure of setting accounting standards show a substantial shift in power from the two professional accounting bodies (ICAA and ASCPA) to the government. The groups who believe they will gain more influence in the new structure have supported the changes and there has been little opposition from groups losing power for fear of ending up with even less. The initial proposal to adopt IASC accounting standards was effectively discarded in the reforming legislation, showing the government’s sensitivity to corporate reactions and reluctance to relinquish power to an international body. Although some activities in the period preceding the change can be categorised within the corporatism and inter-organisational domain conflict models of regulatory processes, the actions of the government in initiating change do not fit with the role of dispassionate arbiter in neo-corporatism and the muted reaction of the professional accounting bodies is inconsistent with predictions of domain defence.     

The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics

We investigate the influence of political and financial factors on the decision to privatize government‐owned firms. The results show that profitable firms and firms with a lower wage bill are likely to be privatized early. We find that the government delays privatization in regions where the governing party faces more competition from opposition parties. The results also suggest that political patronage is important as no firm located in the home state of the minister in charge is ever privatized. Using political variables as an instrument for the privatization decision, we find that privatization has a positive impact on firm performance.     

The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities

Although financial development is good for long-term growth, not all countries pursue policies that render full financial development. This paper builds on an extensive political economy literature to construct a theoretical model showing that the intensity of opposition to financial development by incumbents depends on both their degree of credit dependency and the role of governments in credit markets. Empirical evidence for this claim is provided, and the results suggest that lower opposition to financial development leads to an effective increase in credit markets’ development only in those countries that have high government capabilities. Moreover, improvements in government capabilities have a significant impact on credit market development only in those countries where credit dependency is high (thus, opposition is low). This paper therefore contributes to this rich literature by providing a unified account of credit market development that includes two of its main determinants, traditionally considered in isolation.     

Political Connection,Ownership, and Post-Crisis Industrial Upgrading Investment: Evidence from China

This article investigates the effect of political connections, along with government ownership and family control, on the intensity of investment in industrial upgrading, including the intensity of R&D, facility upgrading, and marketing, in the context of post-crisis recovery through industrial upgrading in emerging economies. Based on empirical evidence in China, the article finds that political connections of top executives are positively associated with investment in upgrading. The effects of political connections on the intensity of investment in R&D and marketing are negatively moderated by both government ownership and family control, whereas the relationship between political connections and the intensity of investment in facilities upgrading is positively moderated by government ownership and negatively moderated by family control.     

Strengthening Political Leadership in UK Local Government

Many councillors and officers in local government have begun to question long-established approaches to local authority leadership and management. This article shows that there is growing interest in developing new ways of revitalizing local democracy and projecting the value of local government. It examines some of the models of local authority management found in other countries, including the directly elected mayor. The article argues that the responsibilities of the executive need to be separated from those of the council. Legal barriers which prevent UK local authorities from reshaping their organizations to meet new challenges need to be removed.     

The Political Economy of Government-Issued Longevity Bonds

This article explores the trade‐offs associated with government issuance of longevity bonds as a way of stimulating private annuity supply in the presence of aggregate mortality risk. We provide new calculations suggesting a 5 percent chance that aggregate mortality risk could ex post raise annuity costs for private insurers by as much as 5–10 percentage points, with the most likely effect based on historical patterns toward the lower end of that range. While we suspect that aggregate mortality risk does exert some upward pressure on annuity prices, evidence from private market pricing suggests that, to the extent that private insurers are accurately pricing this risk, the effect is less than 5 percentage points. We discuss ways that the private market can spread this risk, while emphasizing that the government has the unique ability to spread aggregate risk across generations. We note factors that might hamper such an efficient allocation of risk, including potential political incentives for the government to shift more than the optimal amount of risk onto future generations, and the possibility that government fiscal policy might allocate risk less efficiently within each generation than would private markets. We also discuss how large‐scale longevity bond issuance might affect government borrowing costs, as well as political economy aspects of how the proceeds from such a bond issuance might be used.     

Political institutions and government spending behavior: theory and evidence from Iran

This study examines how the quality of political institutions affects the distribution of the government budget in Iran. We first introduce a mechanism through which democracy can shift government expenditure from national defense (military) to productivity-enhancing public spending (e.g., education). Using impulse response functions and a variance decomposition analysis on the basis of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, our results imply that the response of military spending to an improvement (a deterioration) of democratic institutions is negative (positive) and statistically significant, whereas that of education spending is positive (negative) and significant. Our results are robust to other indicators of political institutions, different orderings of variables in the VAR, and alternative specifications of government spending categories.     

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM?

The recent wave of democratization in developing countries andin formerly communist ones has sparked renewed interest in therelation between politics and economic adjustment. Adjustmentprograms, however well designed in a technical economic sense,are often politically difficult to launch and, once launched,to keep afloat. Success in implementing an adjustment programmay depend on a government's skill in generating political supportand holding off the opposition. This article explores the politicsof economic reform, drawing on country studies by politicalscientists and country specialists, the growing theoreticalliterature by economists, and the findings of a World Bank researchproject on the political economy of adjustment in new democracies.The article examines three broad clusters of variables: institutionalcharacteristics of the political system, aspects of the internaland external economy, and the design of the reform program.It also considers the relevance of political analysis for policymakersand for international financial institutions.      

Australia's ASRB. A Case Study of Political Activity and Regulatory ‘Capture’

The establishment of an Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) in Australia followed proposals for greater government and community involvement in the development of accounting rules, and concern about the low level of compliance with the accountancy profession's standards. The profession had opposed proposals for a review board. The Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities overrode these objections, yet avoided giving any formal authority to the ASRB. In this environment the way was left open for renewed opposition to arrangements which had reduced the profession's capacity to control the standard-setting process. The newly-formed ASRB was vulnerable if it was unproductive—and it encountered delays and difficulties in receiving and processing submissions from the profession. The Board lacked the authority (and the will) to enforce its priorities. After two years the Board abandoned earlier efforts to secure wider community participation in its activities, and announced ‘fast track’ procedures which were to be applied only to those standards which the profession chose to submit for review.

This history suggests that the ASRB had been ‘captured’ by interest groups that it had been established to regulate. The history also casts doubts on claims that the political processes adopted in Australia for the development of accounting rules are consistent with notions of ‘pluralism’; rather, those arrangements seem closer to the form of interest-group politics labelled ‘neo-corporatism’.     

Political connections of newly privatized firms

We investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized firms. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2002, we find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Politically-connected firms are generally incorporated in major cities, are highly leveraged, and operate in regulated sectors. The likelihood of observing political connections in these firms is positively related to government residual ownership, and negatively related to foreign ownership. Political fractionalization and tenure, as well as judicial independence are also key explanatory variables. Finally, politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts.     

Political images of the future: The Dutch case

The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy is responsible for supplying, for use in deciding government policy, scientifically sound information on developments which may affect society in the long term. It also draws attention to anticipated anomalies and bottlenecks, defines major policy problems, and indicates alternatives. This article describes the Council's future survey and its use of various normative perceptions discernible in the political system. Six characteristic sociopolitical orientations are identified and the likely consequences of each are depicted, with the goal of stimulating future-oriented policies. Finally, the Dutch approach is compared with the approaches in other surveys of the future.     

The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization

Two of the major policy problems facing governments of developingcountries in the 1980s have been unsustainable external andinternal disequilibria, and implementation of politically feasiblestabilization cum liberalization programs which become necessaryto correct these imbalances. This article discusses these "crises"and subsequent policy reform. The analysis suggests that balanceof payments and fiscal deficits are frequently the result ofuse of an incorrect accounting system in a fixed exchange rateeconomy, and of public sector expansion beyond its economicallyfeasible size; that governments usually seek to liberalize theireconomies during a crisis to regain control when the growthof the "transfer State" has led to generalized tax resistance,avoidance, or evasion; that reduction of the government rolewill be required to alleviate these crises; that sharp departuresfrom past policies rather than gradual reform may be politicallynecessary; and that, contrary to the current technocratic opinionon this matter, the sequencing of a consistent and crediblepackage of reforms which will most effectively reduce the costsof adjustment is initial liberalization of domestic capitalmarkets simultaneous with cuts in the fiscal deficit, followedby floating the exchange rate and then commodity market liberalization.     

Political Influence and Coexistence of a Uniform Accounting System and Accounting Standards: Recent Developments in China

This article investigates the role of political influence, as well as accounting tradition and the equity market, in China's recent changes in accounting regulation. We find that the Chinese government, in part self-motivated and in part under external pressure, has been active in developing accounting standards in harmony with international accounting standards. However, it has retained a uniform accounting system in the Enterprise Accounting System issued in 2000 to accommodate the special circumstances of a transforming government, strong state-ownership, a weak accounting profession, a weak and imperfect equity market, and the inertial effect of accounting tradition and cultural factors. This article also contributes to existing models of accounting system classification by illustrating the need for considering political influence as a factor that affects the rate of transition towards full implementation of international accounting standards.     

Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed‐out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.     

Major Issues Associated With the Reporting of Government Net Worth

Modern governments are increasingly making legislative commitments to adopt responsible fiscal policies and, as part of those commitments, undertaking to maintain their net worth and to report against that undertaking. With recent developments in public-sector accounting, reporting of government net worth and change of net worth has become possible. This paper examines some major issues relating to the reporting of government net worth. As attempts to provide for the measurement of assets and liabilities (the components of net worth) on a current value basis have met significant opposition in the private sector, some implications for the public sector are considered.     

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.      

The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the...     

Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate how the promotion incentive of politicians affects the pay gap between executives and employees in local firms. We find that the promotion incentive of local politicians significantly reduces the within-firm pay gap. This effect is more pronounced for large firms, firms in regions subject to more government intervention, state-owned-enterprises, private firms with political connections, and firms with more geographically concentrated operations. Our findings are robust to the use of the loss of top-rank political connections and economics loss due to earthquakes as instrumental variables for the promotion incentive. Furthermore, a reduction in pay gap is mainly driven by an increase in employee pay, instead of a decrease in executive pay. Overall, this study sheds light on the determinants of within-firm pay gaps from the perspective of the career concerns of local politicians.     

政治关联与我国民营上市企业的多元化投资

本文以2010年我国沪深民营上市企业为研究对象,研究民营上市企业的政治关联对民营企业多元化投资的影响.研究发现:1.民营上市企业的政治关联对其多元化程度的影响是显著为正的,当民营上市企业的政治关联划分为代表委员类政治关联、前政府官员类政治关联和政府行业协会类政治关联之后,只有代表委员类政治关联对民营上市企业多元化程度有...     

The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature

This article reviews the recent literature on the politicaleconomy of growth, focusing on the research that has developedat the intersection of the endogenous growth literature andthe new political economy. It explores the relationships amongfour key variables: economic growth and capital accumulation,political instability, political freedom and democratic institutions,and income inequality.