Private Debt and Timely Loss Recognition

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether private debt contracting provides incentives for borrowers to recognize economic losses earlier in accounting earnings. Focusing on the window around firms' issuances of private loans, we document that timely loss recognition significantly increases following an issuance. This effect is significantly stronger for debt contracts that include performance covenants acting as trip-wires when firm performance deteriorates. We also find that timely loss recognition is particularly used when writing debt contracts is hampered by uncertainty about a firm's future development. These findings are consistent with timely loss recognition being used to increase contract efficiency by facilitating state-contingent control allocation based on a borrower's performance over the loan term.     

财务契约理论文献综述

本文回顾了财务契约理论的演变过程,重点分析了财务约束、重新协商、控制权配置和索取权多样化等主要模型。认为保护投资者权益的根本机制是财务约束,即投资者要求企业给以足够的投资回报,否则就夺取企业的控制权从而使当前的控制人失去控制权利益。债务在公司治理中的作用一是迫使管理者支出自由现金,减少在职消费和低效投资;二是作为一种控制权转移机制,在股东和债权人之间转移企业的控制权,以实现最高经济效率。     

中小企业合同风险的防范

在企业的经营过程中,双方为了达到某种经济目的,明确权利与义务,签订经济合同往往是一个重要的保障措施。因此,合同风险的防范在企业的管理中就有着重要的意义。我国的法律体系经过近年来的发展已经越来越完善,但从企业的角度出发,仍然存在着一定的法律风险。无论从哪种角度来讲,合同风险的防范问题对于企业来说,都是值得深入挖掘与思考的。     

金融资产配置、金融杠杆与现金流风险

金融资产会计安排是企业执行金融工具准则的重要环节,具有显著的经济后果。基于实体企业金融化现象,研究金融资产配置与现金流风险关系,分析金融杠杆的调节功能,探讨非效率资本配置的传导作用,研究发现：金融资产配置与现金流风险之间存在U型关系;金融杠杆能够调节金融资产配置与现金流风险的关系,使关系曲线拐点右移与扁平化。区分金融资产配置类型后发现：交易类金融资产与现金流风险呈U型关系;委托贷款等新兴金融资产负向影响现金流风险;投资性房地产和长期金融股权投资未显著影响现金流风险。考虑企业生命周期后发现,成长期与衰退期企业金融资产配置与现金流风险呈U型关系,成熟期企业金融资产配置负向影响现金流风险;按照产权性质分组检验发现,金融资产配置与现金流风险的关系以及金融杠杆的调节效应在非国有企业中更显著;机制检验发现,非效率资本配置在金融资产配置影响现金流风险的过程中发挥中介作用。     

Water Rights Markets: Social and Legal Considerations

A bstract . Complete reliance on water rights markets for an efficient allocation fails to recognize the impact of currently existing social externalities and legal uncertainties. Specifically, it is possible that water may have a "community value" which may not be captured in the market price of a water right , there by precluding an efficient market solution. Also, there are uncertainties related to the legal/institutional process currently governing the use of western water which have the same implications for the standard notion of economic efficiency. These result primarily from inconsistencies in the application of certain legal principles , and the incomplete definition and assignment of ownership rights to the use of water.     

金融发展、金融市场化与实体经济资本配置效率

在对Wurgler的资本配置效率估算模型进行修正的基础上,实证检验了我国金融发展和金融市场化水平对实体经济资本配置效率的影响,研究表明：金融市场化显著优化了我国实体经济资本的配置,而我国以银行信贷为主体的金融体系的发展虽然促进了实体经济资本配置效率的提高,但效果不明显。研究还发现：在所引入的控制变量中,经济发展水平对资本配置效率的影响显著较大。进一步分区域回归结果显示,经济越发达的地区,金融市场化程度越高,其优化作用越显著,但随着地区经济发展,经济发展水平自身对资本配置的优化作用在减弱。     

The right to the city

The right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it. We need to be sure we can live with our own creations. But the right to remake ourselves by creating a qualitatively different kind of urban sociality is one of the most precious of all human rights. We have been made and re‐made without knowing exactly why, how, and to what end. How then, can we better exercise this right to the city? But whose rights and whose city? Could we not construct a socially just city? But what is social justice? Is justice simply whatever the ruling class wants it to be? We live in a society in which the inalienable rights to private property and the profit rate trump any other conception of inalienable rights. Our society is dominated by the accumulation of capital through market exchange. To live under capitalism is to accept or submit to that bundle of rights necessary for endless capital accumulation. Free markets are not necessarily fair. Worse still, markets require scarcity to function. The inalienable rights of private property and the profit rate lead to worlds of inequality, alienation and injustice. The endless accumulation of capital and the conception of rights embedded threin must be opposed and a different right to the city must be asserted politically. Derivative rights (like the right to be treated with dignity) should become fundamental and fundamental rights (of private property and the profit rate) should become derivative. But new rights can also be defined: like the right to the city which is not merely a right of access to what the property speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different, to shape it more in accord with our heart's desire, and to re‐make ourselves thereby in a different image.     

企业集团管理控制模式选择的经济后果检验——以租值耗散理论为研究视角

企业集团如何进行管理控制模式选择的问题一直备受关注。本文基于租值耗散理论,从剩余索取权和剩余控制权匹配的要求出发,分析租值耗散理论视角下企业集团管理控制模式选择对资源配置的作用机理,并检验基于租值耗散理论进行管理控制模式选择的经济后果。结果显示,在租值耗散理论视角下依托控股比例进行企业集团管理控制模式选择,能够影响内部控制质量,产生提升资源配置效率的效果;这种提升效果在融资约束较高时更为明显。     

基于共同治理模式下的公司业绩评价指标体系探索

现代企业理论认为,企业是一系列合约的组合,其中最重要的是企业所有权合约,提高企业所有权安排效率的出路是资本所有者拥有剩余索取权与剩余控制权。在这种理论的基础上产生了“股东至上”理论,公司治理采用“股东至上模式”,与此相适应产生了相关的业绩评价体系。但是这种治理模式和业绩评价体系都存在着缺陷,为适应现代公司经营环境的变化,笔者认为,应该采用“共同治理模式”代替“股东至上模式”,并建立与之相适应的业绩评价体系。     

Determinants of property rights institutions: survey of literature and new evidence

Why do some countries have better institutions than others? More specifically, what accounts for variation in the quality of property rights institutions in different countries? In this paper, I empirically assess four different theories relating to the determinants of property rights institutions: (1) the economic approach, which maintains that property rights institutions are created when the benefits of their creation exceed their costs; (2) the cultural approach, which stipulates that institutional variation reflects the differences in the beliefs of political leaders about what institutions create benefits for society; (3) the historical approach, which contends that cross-country differences in property rights institutions are the by-product of historical accidents; and (4) the political approach, which defends the premise that institutions are voluntarily chosen by the individuals who control political power, and these individuals choose institutions with the objective to maximize their personal payoffs rather than the benefits of the society as a whole. In order to test the veracity of these theories, I undertake a cross-sectional analysis of 142 countries (including 116 developing and 26 developed countries) over the period 1970–2005. The results of this analysis provide several interesting insights. Firstly, they indicate that the political approach appears to be the most relevant explanation for cross-country variation in property rights institutions: not only is this approach the most statistically robust, it also provides the best fit with the property rights index. The results of non-nested hypothesis test à la Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) confirm this analysis. Secondly, regardless of econometric specification and country sample, democracy is positively and significantly linked to property rights institutions. Thirdly, the data also reveal that while legal origin does significantly affect property rights institutions in developing countries, it appears to have no effect in developed countries. Fourthly, my analysis demonstrates that, in contrast to the full sample case, an increase in GDP per capita does not significantly contribute to the improvement in the quality of property rights institutions in Africa.     

Debt,equity, and information

Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial contracts, and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts. By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.     

Measuring potential gains from reallocation of resources

In this work we consider the case when efficient operation of individual economic units does not necessarily imply efficiency for a group of these units. Merging theoretical findings of Li and Ng (Int Adv Econ Res, 1995, 1, 377.) and Färe and Zelenyuk (Eur J Oper Res, 2003, 146, 615), we develop new group-wise efficiency indexes that measure the extent to which the performance of a group of economic units can be enhanced, even if all these units are individually efficient. The existence of such potential improvement is attributed to non-optimal allocation of inputs across the individual economic units from the point of view of a group of these units.     

On the determinant of bank loan contracts: The roles of borrowers’ ownership and board structures

Given the worldwide economic importance of bank loan financing, we empirically investigate the roles of borrowers’ ownership and board structure in bank loan terms through a comprehensive dataset, which includes the complete history of individual bank loan contracts for firms publicly listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). We find that firms with smaller deviation in shareholder voting and cash flow rights, larger non-retail shareholding, fewer shares pledged by the board of directors, independent directors, and firms without dual boards are more likely to borrow from banks at lower spread. In addition, good governance practices are also associated with larger loan size or longer loan period, suggesting that banks take into account borrowers’ governance practices when designing loan contracts. This fact is consistent with the agency cost and information risk explanations of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). Furthermore, this study uncovers that the beneficial effect of good governance practices on bank loan contracting is more pronounced in borrowers with high leverage and poor rating, which implies that the monitoring role of governance is more crucial in risky firms. Our findings are robust to the various characteristics of firms and loans.     

Contingent work in the UK and Sweden: evidence from the construction industry

This article explores the use of contingent forms of employment in two diverse country contexts—the UK and Sweden—and investigates the influence of changing regulatory and economic conditions over a period that covers the current economic downturn. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data for the construction sector, the article addresses three questions. How do employers balance their flexibility preferences in the context of regulatory constraints? How has the global recession influenced employer behaviour? And to what extent can the Swedish experience be explained by convergence on other country models? While the UK employment model encourages employers to externalise the risk of unpredictable market conditions through the use of contingent contracts, the more supportive welfare regime in Sweden underpins a resilient preference of employers for open‐ended employment contracts. Ongoing changes in labour market regulation pose challenges to the strongly regulated Swedish model, yet we find only a shared direction of travel with the UK rather than convergence in the use of contingent employment.     

企业集团财权配置的契约结构分析

财权配置的契约安排是对企业集团初始（财务）契约的不完备性所进行的修正。财权配置的契约结构不仅决定企业集团与市场的边界，也决定企业集团内部代理成本的结构。而代理成本和财务协同效应均衡，可以实现企业集团财权配置契约结构的优化，即财权契约安排的制度净收益最大化。     

我国农地流转风险因素分析

农村土地承包经营权的高效流转,是实现土地资源优化配置的有效手段,也是解决"三农"问题的关键。当前我国农村土地流转市场存在制度缺陷、经济波动、政治干预、社会问题等外源性风险因素和流转客体条件不优、流转主体组织结构不健全等内源性风险因素,可能引发阻碍农村土地流转的风险事件的发生。本文深入分析了这些风险因素,并提出从宏观和微观层面防范风险发生的措施,以保障农村土地承包经营权的顺畅流转。     

Entrepreneurial talent and economic development in China

In this paper, we argue that the economic miracle of China in the past three decades can be attributed to the reallocation of entrepreneurial talent from the government/state and agricultural sectors to business activities. This change is unprecedented in the past two thousand years of Chinese history. When entrepreneurial talent was moved more to business activities, it created wealth, and the economy boomed. Three dominant groups of entrepreneurs are identified: (1) Peasants-turned entrepreneurs, (2) officials-turned entrepreneurs, and (3) overseas-returned, and engineers-turned, entrepreneurs. They have emerged sequentially, and successively led three decades of economic growth. The success of the Chinese economy arises from a gradual replacement of position-based rights with property-based rights that has triggered this reallocation of entrepreneurial talent. We also argue that when position-based and property-based rights coexist, value-creating and rent-seeking can be complementary. Therefore, one should not be puzzled by the coexistence of rapid economic growth and pervasive corruption in China. In order to improve the efficiency of allocation of entrepreneurial talent and efforts, it is important to further reduce the domain of position-based rights, and build a better-defined and more effectively-protected property rights system.     

Venture Capital Exit Rights

We investigate when and how venture capital contracts use exit rights such as drag‐along and tag‐along rights. Utilizing a data set of venture capital contracts from Germany, we find that almost all contracts allocate exit rights to the venture capitalist (VC) rather than to the entrepreneur. In our data set, the vast majority of exit rights deal with the sale of the entire company to a strategic investors rather than with initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that venture capital contracts include exit rights to mitigate potential hold‐up problems of the VC in the case of exit.     

The Nomad,The Squatter and the State: Roma Racialization and Spatial Politics in Italy

What happens when Roma people move from the space of an informal settlement to that of a squat of a housing rights movement? In this article, which is based on the analysis of housing squats involving Roma people in the Italian capital city of Rome, I argue that this move is more than a housing solution: it is a new form of contentious and aesthetic politics. In Rome approximately 7,000 Roma face extreme housing deprivation and segregation, in both official and makeshift camps. While different associations have for many years advocated Roma housing inclusion through a minority and human‐rights framework, in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 economic crisis an increasing number of Roma have moved to squats set up by social movement activists. The aim of the article is threefold. First, it illustrates the collective action repertoire of Roma‐squatting. Secondly, it considers its aesthetic politics, which through spatial dislocation unsettles the racializing discourse endorsed by policymakers that underpins the segregation of the Roma. Finally, this article unpacks the process of politicization of Roma‐squatting and discusses the urban frames and material resources that consolidate this transformation through a comparison of four housing squats that Roma people joined.