Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion

A recent experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always motivated by pecuniary motives, and several alternative motivations have been proposed. However, their relative importance in any given context is still not totally clear. This paper investigates the relevance of pure lie aversion, that is, a dislike for lies independent of their consequences. We propose a very simple design where other motives considered in the literature predict zero truth-telling, whereas pure lie aversion predicts a non-zero rate. Thus we interpret the finding that more than a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie aversion. Our design also prevents confounds with another motivation (a desire to act as others expect us to act) not frequently considered but consistent with much existing evidence. We also observe that subjects who tell the truth are more likely to believe that others will tell the truth as well.     

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result is robust to partial voter turnout and efficiency differences between public and private schools, but depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.     

Why do we adopt environmentally friendly lawn care? Evidence from do-it-yourself consumers

This study identifies the factors determining the purchase frequencies of organic/natural fertilizers (ONFs) with a focus on do-it-yourself (DIY) consumers’ perceptions and motives. The estimation results of the generalized ordered logit model provide statistical evidence that environmental perceptions are critical factors in directing DIY consumers to purchase ONFs frequently. The results imply that educational programmes, informational campaigns, or advertisements to improve their perceptions on the potential negative impacts of fertilization on the environment may increase the purchase frequencies of ONFs. In addition, the results show that DIY consumers perceive that it is worth using ONFs despite their higher prices than chemical fertilizers. Their purchase frequencies will increase if they positively perceive the values of ONFs and are willing to pay a premium for ONFs. Moreover, the purchasing behaviour of DIY consumers is associated with their perceptions of neighbourhood landscaping. If neighbours or homeowner associations encourage landscaping improvements in their community, DIY consumers may increase their purchase frequencies of ONFs accordingly.     

Why do people drink? Tests of the rational addiction model

The rational addiction (RA) model applied to alcoho consumption is tested using 1983 US Health Interview Survey data. The RA model yields refutable hypotheses concerning effects of current, past, and future prices, past and future consumption, time preference and marginal utility of wealth on addictive good consumption. The estimations provide relatively strong support for the RA model. Past and present consumption had strong positive relationship with current consumption. Coefficients on past, present, and future money prices and fines for first oflence drunk driving (as a form of price for alcohol consumption) were significant and of the predical sign.     

Why do similar firms export differently?

Eaton et al. (2011) underline that firms with similar production costs, entry costs and demand export to different countries. In this theoretical article, I provide a rationale for this feature of the data. I demonstrate that similar firms exporting differently can be explained by a baseline trade-off between attractiveness and competition that is present in any model with monopolistic competition. I then show that this trade-off also generates valuable theoretical features including distance-related mark-ups, third country effect and equivalence with random utility models.     

Why do firms use fixed-term contracts?

Portuguese Economic Journal - In this article we look at how one specific form of temporary employment - employment with fixed-term contracts - fits into employers’ hiring policies. We find...     

Why do promises affect trustworthiness,or do they?

We set out to test whether the effect of promises on trustworthiness derives from the fact that they are made (internal consistency) or that they are received (social obligation). The results of an experimental trust game appeared at first to support the former mechanism. Even when trustee messages are not delivered to trustors, trustees who make a promise are more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. However, we subsequently ran a control treatment with restricted (non-promise) communication to examine whether the correlation between promises and trustworthiness is causal. The results show that the absence of promises does not decrease average cooperation rates. This indicates that promises do not induce trustworthiness, they are just more likely to be sent by cooperators than by non-cooperators.     

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.     

Why do regulators regulate? The case of the southern California gas market

Cross-subsidies often accompany entry regulation. Because cross-subsidies may be efficient or inefficient, they make it harder to find out whether regulation is motivated by public interest or public choice considerations. This paper uses case study methods to illuminate the motives and intentions of California state regulators in a battle over bypass of state-regulated gas utilities during the 1980s. Detailed study reveals that wealth redistribution, rather than economic efficiency, dominated regulators' motives.The author would like to thank John Baden, Robert Bradley, Charles Rowley, several anonymous referees, and participants in the Center for Market Processes colloquium for helpful comments; Mike McDonald, Lisa Johnson, Gary Shiu, Bob Baldini, and Don Dempsey for research assistance; and the Center for Market Processes for financial support.     

Why do (some) ordinary Americans support tax cuts for the rich? Evidence from a randomised survey experiment

Why do (some) ordinary citizens support tax cuts for the rich? We test four prominent explanations – unenlightened self-interest, fairness considerations, prospect of upward mobility, and trickle-down beliefs – using a randomised, online information provision experiment, embedded in a representative survey of around 3000 US Americans. The results show that preferences for taxing the rich are fundamentally affected by information that shifts citizens’ core fairness beliefs, as well as information on the past trajectory of top tax rates. In contrast, we find no evidence in support of the unenlightened self-interest or prospect of upward mobility explanations. Overall, our results align with theories of tax policy preferences that emphasise the importance of fairness perceptions and reference points.