Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

The effects of vertical and horizontal incentives on local tax efforts: evidence from China

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously.     

The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy

A theoretical analysis considers the impact of a typical system of redistributive “fiscal equalization” transfers on the tax effort of local jurisdictions. More specifically, it shows that the marginal contribution rate, i.e. the rate at which an increase in the tax base reduces those transfers, might be positively associated with the local tax rate while the volume of grants received is likely to be inversely related to the tax rate. These predictions are tested in an empirical analysis of the tax policy of German municipalities. In order to identify the incentive effect the analysis exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal equalization system as well as policy changes. The empirical results support the existence of an incentive effect, suggesting that the high marginal contribution rates induce the municipalities to set significantly higher business tax rates compared with a situation without fiscal equalization.     

政府R D补贴、技术创新与中国工业转型升级——基于门槛效应的研究

利用2005—2016年省级面板数据实证分析了政府R&D补贴与技术创新、政府R&D补贴、技术创新与中国工业转型升级的关系。结果发现:政府R&D补贴对技术创新的影响存在着基于政府R&D补贴强度的双重门槛效应,其影响作用随着政府RD补贴强度的增加而减少;政府R&D补贴通过技术创新对工业转型升产生正向影响,政府R&D补贴对工业转型升级的间接影响存在着基于政府R&D补贴强度的双重门槛效应,其影响大小呈现先上升后下降的趋势。基于此,地方政府应当确定合适的政府补助强度,使政府R&D补贴强度位于合理区间内,以最大限度发挥政府R&D补贴的激励作用。     

财政可持续性与地方政府教育努力程度*

财政可持续性是影响政府教育努力程度的重要因素。本文基于2015—2019年城市面板数据测算了地方政府的财政可持续性指标，考察了财政可持续性对地方政府教育投入水平的影响。研究发现：我国大部分地级市都处于财政可持续状态，地方政府逐年上升的财政可持续性风险将降低政府教育努力程度，这一效应在东部地区和中部地区以及经济较发达城市尤为显著。     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas

The implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners. In this article, we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post. The results show that agents who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome, with a bonus for a high ecological level of the forest. When conservation measures are correlated with forest management, we show that the contractual measures involve distorted transfers. We analyse the payment mechanisms used in France and Denmark in the context of the Natura 2000 policy. These mechanisms result in overcompensation and under-performance since they do not take the problem of moral hazard and natural variability into account.     

政府间财政转移支付、激励效应与 地方税收收入体系

如何维护地方税收体系的有效性，始终是财政分权化改革的核心。本文以我国县级财政实践为基础，系统考察了政府间财政转移支付的税收激励作用及其在维护地方税收体系有效性方面的作用。研究表明，我国省级以下财政转移支付在税收激励方面并不成功，未能在促进县级地方税收收入增加、维护县级地方税收体系有效性方面发挥积极作用，2002年所得税分享改革以来东部地区表现得尤为突出。专项转移支付具有良好的激励作用，有利于县级地方税收收入特别是营业税和增值税共享收入的增加，税收返还和财力性转移支付均不利于县级地方税收收入增加。     

政府竞争、财政压力及其调节作用研究*——以地方政府财政支出偏向为视角

本文以政府间事权与支出责任划分改革为出发点，基于2009—2017年地级市层面的面板数据，运用系统GMM估计方法审视财政压力、政府竞争与地方政府民生支出偏向之间的相关关系。实证分析结果表明，相较于政府竞争而言，财政压力才是降低地方政府民生支出偏向的主要原因。财政压力对政府竞争具有调节作用，政府竞争对民生支出偏向的反向作用程度显著依赖于财政压力。具体而言，政府竞争对教育、医疗卫生、社会保障与就业支出偏向不具有直接效应，但在财政压力的调节作用下显著影响上述三项支出。本文进一步发现，经济发展水平越低，政府竞争与民生支出偏向之间的相关关系越不显著；地方政府在执行多任务导向型的中央决策时，具有较为明显的自我选择倾向。     

How large is the local fiscal multiplier? Evidence from Chinese counties

The paper estimates local fiscal multipliers using annual data for 1800 China counties. The identification exploits a peculiar feature of the allocation mechanism of China's intergovernmental transfers that triggers exogenous variations on local public spending. When aggregate central-local transfers go up at the national level, National Poor Counties can receive a disproportionate amount of transfers. We therefore construct an instrument that captures this heterogeneity in the response of local public spending to national central-local transfers. The analysis points to local fiscal multipliers of approximately 0.6, which is much lower than the estimates in most previous studies. The effects of local public spending are concentrated on non-tradable industries. Finally, we find local public spending has striking effects on stimulating in-county investment, but has negligible effects on stimulating in-county consumption.     

财政分权对地方公共支出结构的影响及对策研究

中国财政分权的实施为我国的现代化建设做出了巨大贡献,但同时许多问题也渐渐暴露。本文着眼于现阶段地方公共支出中所存在的问题和弊端,分析财政分权对其影响过程中的突出问题,提出重视民生建设合理的调整财政支出比例、全面的官员考核制度、中央与地方政府间的合理分权等相应对策,以使地方公共支出结构更为合理、有效。     

低碳经济视角下国外财税政策经验借鉴

发达国家促进低碳发展的财税政策实践表明,征收碳税有利于碳的减排并能够获得相应的财政收入,但是,征税的主要目的在于碳减排.对低碳产品的生产和消费提供财政补贴,具有显著的激励效果.对低碳技术的研发提供资助,不仅能够促进碳减排,而且能够促进低碳发展,实现双重盈利.我国实施促进低碳发展的财税政策需要考虑发展阶段、经济水平、经济形势等诸多因素.     

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local tax efforts: evidence from provinces in China

This paper explores the incentive effects of total central fiscal transfers and its components – tax rebates and equalization grants – on provincial tax efforts in China. Our theoretical model predicts negative impacts on provincial tax efforts from both total fiscal transfers and equalization grants, while the effects of tax rebates are theoretically unclear. Using Chinese provincial panel data from 1995 to 2007, our empirical study provides significant evidence on the theoretical implications.     

财政分权:促进国有企业效率提高的可置信承诺机制

中国的渐进式改革是政治集权下的财政分权改革。财政分权增强了地方政府发展地方经济的激励,导致地方政府间争夺经济资源的竞争。这种竞争提高了救助低效率国有企业的机会成本,可以作为一种承诺机制,硬化国有企业的预算约束,进而促进经济增长。     

Fiscal efficiency,redistribution and welfare

The expanding literature on fiscal decentralization (FD) emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms for FD's welfare effects. We analyze the welfare effects of FD in case of a fiscal transfer mechanism that punishes inefficiency in tax collection and compensates for local income deficiency. In addition, a portion of transfers is earmarked for investment. Given a level of FD and these rules, the representative local government chooses its tax collection effort to maximize local utility. The solution of the model reveals that the stricter the redistributive rule, the higher are steady-state fiscal efficiency and welfare. While the effectiveness of the redistributive parameters increases with centralization of the revenue pool, it decreases with the tax rate. Both welfare and income distribution, on the other hand, improve with the degree of revenue centralization and the tax rate. Besides, fiscal efficiency and redistribution decrease with investment-earmarked transfers.     

基于公共品资本化的地方财政激励制度研究*——土地财政如何影响公共品提供

本文以中国的城镇化为背景,运用公共品资本化原理,分析了地方土地财政制度,包括土地出让金收入制度与房地产相关税收制度,对地方公共品提供激励的传导机制。城市级面板数据的实证分析表明：土地财政对地方公共品提供具有结构性的激励效应,但该激励机制建立在土地和房产交易之上,地方财政努力程度被交易时点截然分割。改革土地财政制度,完善房地产税收体系,实现从交易型向保有型“土地溢价回收”制度转换,将有助于建立对称的、可持续的地方财政激励制度。     

论分税制下财政转移支付与地方财政努力差异——基于功能与地区多重分类考察的另类荷兰病分析

文章主要研究分税制下政府间转移支付与地区财政努力差异的关系.通过理论模型推导和对转移支付的实证检验发现:中国现行转移支付制度在总体上抑制了地方政府的财政努力.就区域效果而言,转移支付在促进东部发达省份财政努力的同时,抑制了中、西部落后地区的财政努力;就转移支付的功能类型而言,以税收返还为主的条件性转移支付会激励地方政府努力征税,而非条件性转移支付,包括财力性和专项转移支付将不同程度地抑制地方财政努力.这就产生了挤出效应与另类"荷兰病"的问题.     

中国财政体制演进中的路径依赖和制度创新

财政体制是处理中央和地方各级政府之间财政关系的基本制度,是政府间财政关系的具体体现。建国后我国的财政体制伴随着经济体制的变迁经历了四个阶段：统收统支财政体制阶段、财政包干体制阶段、分税制财政体制阶段、公共财政体制阶段,每一次财政体制发展阶段的调整既蕴涵着新制度的创新,又有旧制度的保留,财政体制在渐近式制度变迁的推进过程中产生了路径依赖。要破解财政体制变迁中的路径依赖问题,完善现行公共财政体制,体制创新是必由之路。其基本思路是：推进财政制度的宪政变革,建立与完善本国的宪政体制,建构＂有限＂兼＂有效＂的现代政府;因地制宜实施政府层级改革,在区分经济发达和经济不发达地区的基础上,对政府架构进行变革;＂财政职能-财政体制-财政管理＂的改革三位一体协调共进,只有三者相互协调,才能保证财政体制改革的效果更加有效。     

A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.