Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy

In the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan, the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. Although there are hints of reductions in the propensity to pay dividends in most of the sample countries over the 1994–2002 period, they are driven by a failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends when expected to do so. Dividend abandonment and the failure to initiate by existing nonpayers are economically unimportant except in Japan. Moreover, in each country, aggregate dividends have not declined and are concentrated among the largest, most profitable firms. Finally, outside of the US there is little evidence of a systematic positive relation between relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, these findings cast doubt on signaling, clientele, and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based lifecycle theories.     

The market valuation of cash dividends: The citizens utilities case reconsidered

This paper re-examines the case of Citizens Utilities, a firm with one class of common stock which pays stock dividends and one which pays taxable cash dividends. John Long's (1978) study of the two shares' relative prices suggests that investors may prefer cash dividends to equal-sized stock dividends. This paper finds that the cash dividend share's ex-day price decline is less than their dividend payment. Stock dividend shares fall by nearly their full dividend. The disparity between ex-day dividend valuation and the observed prices of the two shares is inconsistent with some explanations of the demand for cash dividends.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

US corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of US multinational cash holdings are, in part, a consequence of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. In addition, less financially constrained firms and those that are more technology intensive exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.     

Why do companies include warrants in seasoned equity offerings?

We analyze the reasons why companies issue units when they raise additional capital. We find that, in contrast to previous evidence, units are not offered to mitigate the agency conflicts or to signal security mispricing as they are predominantly issued during cold periods, in public rather than in rights offerings, and when the issue is underwritten. In addition, the results indicate that companies choose to offer units to increase their offer price flexibility and to underprice their seasoned equity offering so as to minimize the issue cost and the risk of failure of the issue. These results provide support for the net proceeds maximization hypothesis.     

Why inexperienced investors do not learn: They do not know their past portfolio performance

Recently, researchers have gone a step further from just documenting biases of individual investors. More and more studies analyze how experience affects decisions and whether biases are eliminated by trading experience and learning. A necessary condition to learn is that investors actually know what happened in the past and that the views of the past are not biased. We contribute to the above mentioned literature by showing why learning and experience go hand in hand. Inexperienced investors are not able to give a reasonable self-assessment of their own past realized stock portfolio performance which impedes investors' learning ability. Based on the answers of 215 online broker investors to an Internet questionnaire, we analyze whether investors are able to correctly estimate their own realized stock portfolio performance. We show that investors are hardly able to give a correct estimate of their own past realized stock portfolio performance and that experienced investors are better able to do so. In general, we can conclude that we find evidence that investor experience lessens the simple mathematical error of estimating portfolio returns, but seems not to influence their “behavioral” mistakes pertaining to how good (in absolute sense or relative to other investors) they are.     

Why do companies transfer the trading compartment of their common stocks

We analyze the motives and determinants of voluntarily stock exchange section switching on the NYSE Euronext. By strategically deciding trading-section transfer when it is beneficial, managers expect to reduce their liquidity and invisibility costs, cost of capital, or their listing costs. We show that managers decide to change the trading compartment of their common stocks based on various factors including firm's size, liquidity level, debt ratio, and expected growth opportunities. Firms that move voluntarily from a less or non regulated compartments to a more regulated one are likely to have transferred to increase their credibility, improve their stocks’ liquidity, re-balance their leverage, and to finance their growth opportunities. Whereas those that move their common stocks toward a less-regulated compartments do it mainly for costs saving reasons.     

Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.     

Why do Japanese giant trading companies prefer foreign currency to Japanese yen?

This article examines invoicing strategies in the presence of forward exchange markets. The choice of invoice currency is shown to depend upon the monopoly power traders possess. If the exporter has greater market power to determine the use of invoice currency, invoicing in the currency of the importing country will be preferred. But if the importer has power to determine what currency to use, the converse is true. Moreover, the levels of trade and employment are proven to be invariant to invoicing strategies chosen.     

Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are cash shells that try to buy private operating firms to which they confer a public-listing status. Private operating firms tend to use SPACs as an alternative way to get listed, particularly in years with weak IPO activity and volatile markets, such as 2008 and 2009. In these two years, approximately 31% of firms went public through a SPAC acquisition rather than through an IPO. Our results from the analysis of 127 SPAC acquisitions and 1128 IPOs during the wave of “new-generation” SPACs starting in 2003 lend support to the conjecture that particular small and levered firms with low growth opportunities tend to use this vehicle. SPAC acquisitions also may be fueled by the cash-out motives of existing shareholders. Venture capitalists and private equity investors tend to refrain from using SPAC acquisitions as an exit route. Tracking long-term abnormal returns, we find that SPAC firms are associated with severe underperformance in comparison to the market, the industry and (comparable) IPO firms.     

Mutual holding companies: Evidence of conflicts of interest through disparate dividends

The mutual holding company (MHC) structure establishes a dual-class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor–owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends. We show that MHCs are priced higher than comparable non-MHCs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation. We also show that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non-MHC thrifts and that an Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends. These results have policy implications of special significance given that the OTS reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the MHC structure in the financial service industry.     

Why do Japanese giant trading companies prefer foreign currency to Japanese yen?: A supplementary note

This note extends the Chen and Chiang (1992) analysis to examine the possibility that trades may be denominated in the currency of the third country. Two main conclusions are found in this note. First, the quantities of trade and employment are still invariant to invoicing strategies chosen. Second, the currency of the trading partner may not be chosen by the monopolistic trader.     

Signaling with dividends and share repurchases: a choice between deterministic and stochastic cash disbursements

We study firms signaling with cash disbursements and show thatthe choice of a deterministic or a stochastic disbursement dependson a property of the firm's production function that is analogousto absolute risk aversion for a utility function. With decreasing(increasing) absolute risk aversion, the high-quality firm prefersto distinguish itself from the low-quality firm with a stochastic(deterministic) outlay. We then study in detail two common formsof corporate cash distributions: dividends, a deterministicdisbursement, and share repurchases, a stochastic disbursement.     

Trading restrictions and firm dividends: The share lockup expiration experience in China

Chinese firms experienced a substantial reduction in nontradable shares following the Split-Share Structure Reform that began in 2005. The decrease in nontradable shares, or increase in share tradability, is associated with a decline in the firms’ cash dividend payouts. The positive association is attenuated in firms with fewer financial constraints, only weakly affected by firm governance, and not affected by investment opportunities or controlling shareholder type. The results highlight the fact that firms disgorge cash to compensate shareholders for trading restrictions and conclude that dividends persist when firms have easier access to external financing. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of nontradable shares, after controlling for firm fixed effects and omitted changing firm characteristics.     

Board faultlines and the value of cash holdings: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers, which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings. Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016, we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings. The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value. This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes. Furthermore, the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs. As an important governance mechanism, management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings. Overall, we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value. We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.     

Taxes and dividends: The UK evidence

This paper provides empirical evidence on the simultaneous effects of both corporation and personal income taxes on dividend payment adjustments and on the behaviour of share prices on the ex-dividend dates. The results show that companies set their dividend policies to minimise their tax liability and to maximise the after-tax return of their shareholders. In particular, firms that are unable to deduct the advanced corporation tax from their tax liability are found to pay low dividends. In addition, consistent with the tax hypothesis, we find that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains results in a decrease in ex-day share prices by significantly less than the amount of the dividend. There is no evidence of a tax-induced dividend clientele.     

Perils of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure: The Korean experience

In 2013, Korea adopted a mandatory pay disclosure rule applicable only to board members paid above a certain threshold (KRW 500 million, roughly equal to USD 5 million). In this study, we find evidence of Korean executives avoiding disclosure through director deregistration, that is, stepping down from the board, but retaining a non-registered executive position in the same company. This tendency is stronger when deregistration cost is low (in case of family executives), and benefit is high (in case of high executive-to-worker pay ratios). We also find that family executives choose pay cuts over deregistration as means of avoidance when their income loss from pay cuts is relatively low. Last, we find that disclosure avoidance prompts negative share price reactions, leads to higher dividend payouts (in case of large pay cuts) and results in smaller board sizes (in case of family deregistration).     

Free cash flow productivity among Chinese listed companies: A comparative study of SOEs and non-SOEs

This paper investigates the free cash flow productivity of SOEs compared with non-SOEs and examines its possible determinants. We find that SOEs have slightly weak free cash flow productivity but significantly stronger than non-SOEs. Similar performance exists among commercial class I and II SOEs and public-benefit SOEs. Further analyses suggest that firm size, age, sales growth, ownership concentration, government subsidies, and industry monopoly factors cannot explain this phenomenon. The common driver for all types of SOEs to generate stronger free cash flows than non-SOEs is their stronger expense control capability.     

The determinants of cash flow sensitivity of cash: The family ownership effect

This paper investigates firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) in a European setting. We examine the differing effects of financial constraints and income and substitution effects on CFSC in the context of the family ownership structure. When examining the shareholders’ behavior within the ownership structure of family firms, we find a positive CFSC level for our full sample. Our results show a significant connection between the family ownership structure and CFSC’s determinant factors: the higher (lower) sensitivity for the firms with more (less) financial constraints suggests that family firms are financially less constrained than non-family firms. Additionally, contrary to prior literature, we find income and substitution effects have a nonnegative effect on CFCS. We explain this finding from a productivity shocks perspective related to the financial crisis, which occurs during our analysis period.     

Distinguishing closely held companies for taxation purposes: The Australian experience 1930-1972

Early in the life of Australia's income tax, the government, sensitive to loss of taxation revenue through artificial arrangements to divert taxable profits from individuals to companies where they would be taxed more lightly, saw fit to provide a special taxation regime for closely held companies. From the first attempts by the government to distinguish closely held companies for tax purposes in 1930, until the final legislative changes in 1972, there arose a highly unsatisfactory situation in which taxpayers sought, through increasingly artificial means, to subvert the legislative purpose with the aim of tax avoidance. The government's response throughout was inadequate in a number of respects, and fuelled the fires of tax avoidance through inept drafting of the relevant legislation and delayed treatment of perceived abuses by taxpayers.