Is Slow Economic Growth the ‘New Normal’ for Europe?

This paper considers future European growth prospects in the light of a new productivity paradox, namely, the co-existence of a productivity slowdown and exciting new technologies. Several potential explanations are reviewed. It is argued that while some are unpersuasive it is too soon to be sure which carry the most weight. This has the implication that while the slowdown is real, it is not necessarily permanent. A key, hotly disputed issue is the future economic impact of technological progress on which forecasts differ dramatically. Supply-side reform could have a strong positive effect, but this is not likely to happen.     

Reducing China's regional disparities: Is there a growth cost?

While China's growth has been spectacular over the past 30 years, it has masked growing underlying disparities in the regional distribution of income with coastal provinces growing at a much faster rate than the rest of the country, exacerbating already marked differences in per capita income. Policy focused on addressing these growing disparities has had to face the possibility that spreading growth more evenly around the country will require a sacrifice of the national growth rate. Yet there is almost no empirical evidence that this is so and, if it is, how big the required sacrifice is. This paper contributes to filling this gap by analyzing the relationship between aggregate growth and the inequality of regional output distribution. We use a VAR model to simulate the effects over time on growth of a reduction in inequality and also the effects on inequality of an increase in growth. We find, first, that in the long run a more equal distribution can be obtained without a growth sacrifice. Second, in the short run a reduction in inequality reduces growth. Third, in the short and long runs an increase in growth actually reduces inequality.     

China's Trade Slowdown: Cyclical or Structural?

This paper analyzes whether the slowdown of China's trade in 2012–2015 was cyclical or structural, and further discusses the effects of structural factors, including trade structure, trade protectionism and global value chain participation. Using the national panel data from 2000 to 2015, based on the error correction model and import‐intensity‐adjusted demand model, our results show that the slowdown of China's trade growth in 2012–2015 was mainly a result of cyclical factors. Using 2000–2015 industry‐level data, we also find that the structure of trade goods had an inhibitory effect on the import slowdown but a positive effect on the export slowdown. Trade protectionism had an adverse effect on the trade growth slowdown. The global value chain participation marginally contributed to the slowdown in trade growth. Therefore, the impacts of structural factors on trade growth slowdown cannot be ignored, and related policies should receive greater attention from policy‐makers.     

The Collapse of the ‘New EMS’: An Interpretation

Existing theoretical models cannot explain the following features of the EMS and its crisis in 1992: its progressive hardening from 1987 onwards; the fact that credibility was shared the progressive deterioration of credibility after the first Danish referendum without changes in the economic fundamentals. This paper argues that the reason lies in the fact that the literature has not accounted for the changes in the perceived prospects of EMU. We show that an adjustable peg regime that incorporates these prospects can explain the three features listed above.     

Beauty premium in China's labor market: Is discrimination the main reason?

Based on data from the China Labor-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS), this paper analyzes the effects of the height as well as other appearance characteristics of workers on their wages. Regression results show that after controlling for social network, human capital, and other endowment characteristics, the effects of the appearance characteristics become smaller and statistically insignificant. The decomposition results of the wage-appearance differentials show that higher wages for good-looking workers are mainly attributable to differences in individual characteristics. Among them, the lower wages for shorter males and higher wages for thinner females are mainly attributable to the unexplained parts of discrimination. Males suffer more from “shortness penalty”, whereas females may earn from “pretty face”. Further results showed that height may influence blue-collar workers’ wages through the effect on physical strength. Empirical evidence also demonstrates that there are strong correlations between appearance and working ability (social network and human capital). Thus, our results confirmed the little beauty premium in the Chinese labor market and the relatively wages differentials are not mainly due to discrimination from consumers or employers, instead attributable mainly to differences of individual endowment characteristics.     

Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?

Is the Chinese growth miracle – a remarkably high growth rate sustained for over two decades – likely to persist or are the seeds of its eventual demise contained in the policies that have boosted growth? For all its presumed flaws, the particular approach to macroeconomic and structural policies that has been adopted by the Chinese government has helped to deliver high productivity and output growth, along with a reasonable degree of macroeconomic stability. There comes a point, however, when the policy distortions needed to maintain this approach could generate imbalances, impose potentially large welfare costs, and themselves become a source of instability.The traditional risks faced by emerging market economies, especially those related to having an open capital account, do not loom large in the case of China. In the process of securing protection against external risks, however, Chinese policymakers may have increased the risks of internal instability. There are a number of factors that could trigger unfavorable economic dynamics that, even if they don't rise to the level of a crisis, could have serious adverse repercussions on growth and welfare. The flexibility and potency of macroeconomic tools to deal with such negative shocks is constrained by the panoply of policies that has supported growth so far.     

Global Imbalances: Is Germany the New China? A Skeptical View

In this paper we evaluate the current account patterns of China and Germany. We point out that China’s current account surplus as a share of global GDP in recent years resembles that of Germany’s. Yet, an important difference is that the Euro block’s current account inclusive of Germany has overall been balanced, whereas emerging Asia’s current account inclusive of China has mostly been characterized by sizable surpluses. We further find that both China and Germany’s current account surpluses seem to be accounted for by common factors. However we have reasons to doubt the long run viability of these current account trends in future decades. Demographic transitions in China and Germany are projected to reduce their surpluses, and this effect is stronger for Germany. We also discuss plausible reasons to doubt the extent to which the Euro block will move towards significant surplus in the coming years.     

Is Being Stuck with a Five Percent Growth Rate a New Normal for Indonesia?

Indonesia’s economic growth over the past three years has been stuck at approximately 5% annually, despite a changing global environment and the Indonesian government’s efforts to boost growth. This paper asks whether this level of growth is a new normal for Indonesia—i.e. do government efforts and the global environment matter, or will the country’s economic growth remain at around 5% annually. If private consumption, the major component of GDP, continues to grow at its current level and inflation is controlled, this paper concludes that Indonesia might maintain its current annual growth rate of 5% for several more years. The probability of higher growth, however, is not promising. Lower growth seems more likely. To ensure the current level of economic growth will be sustained in the foreseeable future, this paper recommends stricter economic reforms to allow larger and more productive capital investments; more aggressive management of exchange rates to improve the country’s competitiveness; a more effective fiscal space to support improvements to needed infrastructure by developing innovation to increase revenue; a reduced energy subsidy; and a more flexible upper bound of deficit. Effective programs to improve the country’s human capital and innovation are crucial.     

China’s macroeconomic trends in downward pressures: the ‘micro stimulus’ effects and steady growth

This study reports China’s macroeconomic trends in downward pressures and discusses the effects of the ‘micro stimulus’ on the growth performance of Chinese economy. It appears that economic growth rebounds significantly in the short term every time ‘micro stimulus’ is applied, but the economy slows down again once the stimulus dwindles. China’s economic growth thus exhibits a pattern of significant ‘stimulus-dependence’. When facing economic downturn, China has only resorted to stimulus policy to sustain growth. Not surprisingly, our findings indicate that ‘micro stimulus’ cannot realize the strategic intent of growth stabilization and structural adjustment, and may even lead to more structural chaos. One problem that can be attributed to the near-sighted strategy is the worsening productivity performance since the financial crisis of 2008. Therefore both improvement in social security systems and social programs designed for maintaining long run growth are needed in order to improve productivity performance on the one hand and to facilitate structural adjustments on the other.     

Is the US quantitative easing more effective than China's? A second thought

We study the balance sheet of the People's Bank of China and the Federal Reserve Bank in a historical context and analyze whether the recent round of global expansionary monetary policy has been effective in achieving its desired economic effects. In particular, we focus on the roles played by excess reserves, monetary aggregates and financing to the real economy and highlight the tension between a liquid financial sector and an illiquid real sector. We show that, while both China and the US have followed reserve-driven growth strategies, the compositions and relative sizes of these quantities are quite different. In relative terms, excess reserves and lackluster corporate lending constitute a big problem for the US, whereas for China the pertinent question is how to further mobilize funds tied up in the real estate and stock market. We provide some thoughts on possible solutions to the current policy dilemma at the end.     

Explaining the Swedish ‘housewife era’ of 1930–1970: joint utility maximisation or renewed patriarchy?

This study shows that the Swedish ‘housewife era’ roughly occurred in 1930–1970. During the 1950s, the ratio of women’s worked hours to men’s worked hours reached a low point. In the early 1970s, it rose to above 50%. We argue that models of joint utility maximisation, assuming equal gender power relations unrestrained by cultural and institutional settings, cannot alone explain this era. The two principal structural mechanisms behind the rise of the breadwinner household were the decline of the farm household and the increased proportion of married women. Both weakened the bargaining position of women. Three results in our study weaken the claims of the joint utility maximisation model. Firstly, marriage was much more important than motherhood in determining the probability of women’s labour force participation, although the age of the child is then not taken into account. Secondly, the labour force participation of married women was similar across different social strata outside of the farm and top income households, indicating a prevalent capitalist patriarchal structure. Thirdly, women’s leisure was valued less than men’s, demonstrating that the preferences of the husband were prioritised over those of the wife.     

When Is the Client King? Evidence from Affiliated-Analyst Recommendations in China's Split-Share Reform

China's split-share reform of 2005 (the Reform) converts the previously restricted shares held by founding shareholders to shares tradable on the open market. Against this backdrop, we study how underwriter-affiliated analysts and firms' large shareholders interact in the event of the latter's sales of restricted shares. We document that recommendations made by affiliated analysts are significantly more optimistic when firms' large shareholders plan to sell their restricted shares. This optimism, however, is associated with negative post-sale stock returns, suggesting large shareholders profit from share sales. Furthermore, large shareholders sell more restricted shares through the affiliated brokerages for which analysts have issued more optimistic recommendations and firms under their control are more likely to appoint such brokerages as lead underwriters when they refinance in the future. The affiliated analysts also conduct more site visits to the firms after the share sales, thereby improving their earnings-forecast accuracy. Our analysis shows how conflicts of interest by financial intermediaries arise following the Reform and lead to large shareholders' extraction of rents from public investors.     

Did the communists contribute to China’s rural growth?

The communist revolution brought unprecedented changes to China. Yet there is no consensus on its role in the history of China’s modern economic growth. We investigate whether local communist party membership affected developmental outcomes from 1957–78 (the Maoist period) and 1978–85 (the reform period). Focusing on Sichuan, China’s most populous province, we use the Long March as an instrument to tease out causal effects. We find that counties with more communist members made larger strides in educational attainment, road construction, and agricultural mechanization during the Maoist period. However, these counties recorded faster output growth only after 1978. Our findings provide empirical support to field studies conducted by sociologists and historians who argue that the communists improved the organizational infrastructure in China’s countryside. Furthermore, we highlight the futility of solving collective action problems without heeding private incentives.     

Is U.S. money causing China's output?

This paper tries to answer the long-standing question of whether money causes output. Instead of focusing on domestic monetary policy and output, we analyze U.S. monetary policy and its possible effects on real output in China. Our results indicate that the main monetary instrument in the U.S., the Federal Fund Rate, Granger causes China's output. A second monetary variable, U.S. money supply, does not seem to have a significant effect on China's output. The results are supported by variance decompositions, which indicate that Federal Fund Rate shocks have an effect on China's real output. The findings have important implications for policy makers in China that focus on maintaining a high and stable economic growth.     

Towards a ‘new normal’ growth strategy: China in comparative perspective

China’s move towards a new normal has been motivated by domestic factors and accelerated by the decline in export opportunities to developed countries. This decline, combined with the knock-on effects of China’s growth adjustments, is disrupting the favourable external environment that made developing countries’ export-led development strategies viable. This paper concentrates on a rebalancing of developing countries’ growth strategies towards a greater weight of household consumption as a potential alternative and discusses three challenges – market size, domestic purchasing power and balance-of-payments constraints. Concentrating on the latter, it analyses changes in sectoral compositions of consumer demand and patterns of international trade. Results point to the risk that a shift in growth strategy causes an import surge. The paper’s findings indicate the scope and speed of required product innovation that would prevent a rebalancing of growth strategies towards a greater role of consumption from running into balance-of-payments constraints.