美国金融危机和亚洲金融危机起因的比较

<正>2008年下半年,由美国次贷危机引发的金融危机席卷全球,至今尚未见底。1997年7月2日,泰国宣布放弃固定汇率制,实行浮动汇率制,引发了一场遍及东南亚的金融风暴,1999年才结束,这就是亚洲金融危机。两次金融危机爆发前后相距11年。本文探讨了前后两次金融危机的起因,以期对我国金融业有所警示。     

The Asian Crisis, the IMF and Dr Mahathir

While in the literature concerning the Asian crisis extensive coverage has been given to the course of events in the countries implementing IMF-supported programmes, scant attention has been paid to other countries that also suffered from the crisis. Potential alternatives to the IMF way of handling the crisis are thus in danger of being neglected. The project on which this paper is based was funded by the Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in Development (IDPAD) in collaboration with the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR).     

Trade Causes of the Asian Crisis: The Malaysian Experience

Prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis there was a deterioration in the external trade position of most countries that were affected by the Asian currency crisis. However, little is known about why this occurred. This paper aims to identify the causes of a slowdown in export growth in Malaysia. While misaligned exchange rates have been widely cited as a cause of the slowdown in East Asia; in the Malaysian context at least a vulnerability to the downturn in the electronic cycle could also be a major factor leading to poor export performance. Using the US/yen dollar rate as a proxy for exchange rate misalignment and US total new orders for electronics as a proxy for global electronics demand, cointegration analysis was used to establish the likely causes of a slowdown in Malaysia's export performance. The empirical evidence suggests that the coincidence of exchange rate misalignment with a downturn in the global electronics demand cycle was responsible for the sharp deterioration in export performance.     

FDI,Growth and the Asian Financial Crisis: The Experience of Selected Asian Countries

This paper studies the trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into selected South‐East Asian and East Asian economies after the Asian crisis. Empirical evidence indicates that South‐East and East Asian economies are recovering from the Asian crisis with strong output growth driven largely by export growth. However, output growth in the post‐crisis period is also accompanied by rising unemployment rates, growing government deficits, and declining FDI inflows into the South‐East Asian region. The declining FDI inflows into South‐East Asia after the crisis is of concern, as our empirical results show that FDI is important for output growth in the region. Our results also suggest that there might have been structural changes in the regional economies that could have led to a downward shift in the output growth of Asian economies in the post‐crisis period. This raises the issue of the sustainability of their output growth in the post‐crisis period.     

亚洲基础设施投资银行在全球卫生危机修复中的作用

全球性新冠疫情的爆发,成员国相关基础设施融资的紧迫性和资金需求激增,政府财政压力增大,迫使AIIB贷款增速快于原计划。对此,作为新建的发展融资机构AIIB积极高效应对,在全球抗疫事业中发挥着重要作用。它及时提供捐赠,改革贷款工具,简化审批流程,与国际同行机构充分合作。新冠疫情爆发后,AIIB加大了对医疗卫生相关项目的资金支持,在融资领域和资金额度上对国际发展融资体系的补充作用进一步凸显。与此同时,新冠疫情的发生和发展反过来也促进了AIIB的自身建设。一方面,在抗疫工作中的快速反应代表AIIB在一定程度上实现了成长;另一方面,抗疫工作也使AIIB进一步意识到,为持续在国际发展领域中扮演重要角色,作为成长中的机构未来有必要深入开展多渠道的国际合作,持续加强投资组合管理,并提升对私人资本的催化作用。     

韩国缘何最先走出金融危机阴影?

亚洲金融危机的冲击,使韩国经济受到重创,1998年国内生产总值就锐减6.7%.但四年来,韩国政府并没有停止改革的步伐,反而对经济进行大规模的改革和结构调整.如今,韩国经济再度雄起,今年第一季度该国经济增长达5.7%.韩国生产的电话、汽车和电影正风靡全球.     

东亚金融危机:典型事实与成因逻辑

东亚金融危机是多重因素共同作用的结果,既有根植于东亚各国发展模式的内生因素,又有来源于全球宏观经济发展环境的外生因素。外债负担过重、银行风险集聚、金融自由化无序、金融和政治腐败等是东亚金融危机的主要原因。具体说来,一是东亚各国高投资的"同质性"增长模式导致债务规模和不合理的债务结构,特别是大量基于投机和套利的短期资本涌入,使其暴露于巨大的风险当中。二是在"盲目"的投资冲动下,东亚各国的银行资产负债表不断恶化,风险迅速向银行体系集聚,连锁式的信用恐慌加剧了危机的深度和广度。三是东亚各国资本项目过早开放、利率管制过于放松以及金融监管长期滞后,表明金融自由化与本国经济金融的发展程度严重不匹配,无法有效防范和控制危机。四是金融和政治严重腐败,而制度发展水平、政府纪律及管理能力又比较低。     

Four Things to Know About the Trade Recovery

Today＇s trade data showed a continued strong recovery for China and the world. Both export and import growth exceeded market expectations, at 45.7% and 44.7% y/y, respectively, in nominal terms. This is positive for risk sentiment generally, since it suggests that the global recovery, as well as China＇s, is still on track, and it is bullish for the commodity currencies. Here are four key things to know about the recent data.     

Vulnerability to a Currency Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Experience

Are currency crises caused by manias and panics in financial markets, or by unsustainable deteriorations in domestic macroeconomic conditions? This question is explored in the context of the recent Asian currency crisis. The theoretical concept of vulnerability is used to identify three early‐warning indicators of susceptibility to a currency crisis: rapid accumulation of mobile capital; domestic lending booms; and overvalued exchange rates. It is shown that the crisis and noncrisis countries of Asia may be distinguished empirically, using these indicators, over the decade preceding the crisis. This exercise provides convincing evidence that the crisis emanated largely from domestic macroeconomic conditions.     

Relationship-Based Lending and Its Contribution to the East Asian Economic Crisis

Abstract

Since 1997, efforts to explain the East Asian economic crisis have proliferated with most analyses focusing on government profligacy, weak monetary policy, inadequate regulation of the region's financial services industry, too much speculative borrowing, unsustainable trade imbalances financed with easily withdrawn short-term financing, and both private sector and government corruption. Unfortunately, what has proven especially difficult for analysts and government officials, even with all of the research that has taken place, is reaching some consensus on which features of the crisis were symptoms and which were causes (Economist, 1998). One reason for this is that the explanations offered to date have been almost entirely western in perspective and, predictably, based strictly on application of the kind of economic models Krugman (1998) has described. Furthermore, most of the research has had a clear government and public policy focus rather than a strategic and managerial focus. Employing a behavioral finance/economics paradigm, this study explores the premise that the East Asian crisis was at least a partial function of a time-honored practice that has remained largely hidden from the Occidental eye and unmeasured by conventional economic modeling: the practice of Asian-style relationship-based lending.     

The Potential for Tourism in Post-crisis Recovery: Lessons from Malaysia's Experience of the Asian Financial Crisis

The impact of crises on a national economy can be severe and it is essential that recovery is rapid and complete. This article argues that tourism may be an ideal focus for the recovery effort, as it is resilient and has many links into other sectors. Based on data collected from interviews with senior policy makers in Malaysia, the performance of tourism in four key areas is explored in the context of the Malaysian response to the Asian financial crisis. It is concluded that on balance, tourism is worthy of special consideration as a vehicle for post-crisis recovery.     

The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and the Volatility of Exchange Rates after the Asian Crisis: A Counterfactual Analysis

The objective of this paper is to carry out a counterfactual analysis of the impact of alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the bilateral rate against the US dollar for nine East Asian countries after the Asian financial crisis. Our hypothetical regimes include a unilateral basket peg (UBP), a common basket peg (CBP) and a hard peg against the dollar. We find that a UBP would minimise effective exchange rate volatility for all countries and provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. Although the gains for a CBP are always less than those for a UBP, the absolute differences between the two regimes appear to be small. In terms of the bilateral relationship against the dollar, the gains from a UBP or CBP could be quite significant for the non‐dollar peggers since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability.     

The International Economic Crisis and the Crisis of Economics

The objective of this paper is to explore the correlation between the recent economic crisis and economic science and demystify the dogmatic conflict surrounding them. The paper starts by summarising the various arguments against economic science and economists, considered by many to be responsible for the crisis. Following that, an attempt is made, subject to space constraints, to objectively evaluate the individual arguments. Particular reference is made to the role of both policy and the markets in the crisis and the prospects for replacing the neoclassicist school, dominant until now, with the Keynesian. The analysis concludes that economic science did not cause the crisis; however, many of its theories did offer an intellectual background or some sort of academic legitimacy to both policy and the markets, and, in the case of the recent crisis, there was not only a failure of the dominant form of economic thought but, above all, of those two. The analysis shows that there is a problem of selective use of economic theories when it comes to practical economics and that, in order to be useful, economics ought to utilise knowledge from other disciplines and take more account of interdependencies between political and social phenomena.     

流行文化对品牌的作用

<正>在市场经济环境下,企业的竞争就是品牌的竞争,品牌是企业成功的驱动力,一个成功的企业必伴有成功的品牌,这一点已形成共识。成功的品牌必有文化价值,因为文化价值是品牌的内涵,是社会物质形态和精神形态的统一,是现代社会的消费心理和文化价值,企业在设计     

经济增长与经济波动的关系——基于亚洲“四小虎”面板数据的实证研究

文章突破传统宏观经济学把经济增长与经济波动分开研究的两分法,利用面板数据的分析框架实证研究了亚洲"四小虎"经济增长与经济波动的关系.实证的结论支持了经济增长与经济波动的负相关关系,否定了Black假说.同时以亚洲金融危机为临界点,发现经济增长与经济波动的负相关关系在各个区间上具有稳健性,这是各国采取违背本国比较优势的赶超战略的后果.因此各国应从本国具有比较优势的产业出发,增加经济结构的内在稳定性,防止经济波动.