假冒伪劣与市场结构

本文在理论结构上不同于 Akerlof 的"柠檬市场"理论。我们在理论上与经验上的贡献在于三点:第一,只要产品质量与价格的决定不限于它们之间的相互决定过程,只要价格还取决于产品质量以外的产量、市场与非市场因素,那么,高价(高利)会诱发假冒伪劣的行为;第二,假冒伪劣率对市场需求(进而对企业收入与行业收入)所产生的负面作用,在中国是存在的,但是,这种作用被高价、高利对假冒伪劣的正向推波助澜作用占优了;第三,本文的统计结果也证实了,垄断程度与生产集中度的提高,有利于降低假冒伪劣率,中国的问题不在于这种与质量、信誉相联系的有效率的垄断,而在于那种人为的、无效率的行政垄断所导致的不合理的高价、高利机会,这才导致低劣的产品。     

假冒伪劣与市场结构

本在理论结构上不同于Akerlof的“柠檬市场”理论。我们在理论上与经验上的贡献在于三点：第一，只要产品质量与价格的决定不限于它们之间的相互决定过程，只要价格还取决于产品质量以外的产量、市场与非市场因素，那么，高价（高利）会诱发假冒伪劣的行为；第二，假冒伪劣率对市场需求（进而对企业收入与行业收入）所产生的负面作用，在中国是存在的，但是，这种作用被高价、高利对假冒伪劣的正向推波助澜作用占优了；第三，本的统计结果与证实了，垄断程度与生产集中度的提高，有利于降低假冒伪劣率，中国的问题不在于这种与质量、信誉相联系的有效率的垄断，而在于那种人为的、无效率的行政垄断所导致的不合理的高价、高利机会，这才导致低劣的产品。     

论我国经济转型期假冒伪劣的生成机制及其治理

我国每年都有全国性的打击假冒伪劣行动 ,可是假冒伪劣仍然持续猖獗。其深层原因在于价格无法反映质量 ,只要价格还取决于产品质量以外的市场与非市场因素 ,高价会诱发假冒伪劣行为。假冒伪劣会减少市场需求 ,但由于信息不对称、产权缺陷、地方保护主义等 ,这种效应被高利对假冒伪劣的促进作用抵消了。治理假冒伪劣必须从健全规则、稳定预期、调整结构、规范企业行为与规范政府行为等方面综合整治。     

价格垄断问题的行为经济学分析

价格是市场的基本信号,对资源配置起着基础性作用. 价格垄断会导致市场功能陷入瘫痪,对经济的破坏难以估量,因此必须对价格垄断行为予以关注. 分析近年来价格垄断问题的几种具体行为表现,运用传统经济学的"市场失灵"论、"利润最大化"假说以及"市场结构"论对价格垄断行为进行解释,发现这些解释均存在缺陷,缺乏对企业价格垄断行为心理活动过程的分析. 因而运用行为经济学的预期理论、心理账户理论、"自我约束问题"和信息不对称等理论对价格垄断行为产生原因加以阐释,并进一步提出利用行为经济学规制价格垄断行为的对策.     

市场高价规制的法律研究

从经济学角度讲,市场高价指具有垄断地位的经营者面临自身产品的需求曲线下降的情况下,为实现利润的最大化而有意识地减少产量,在边际成本等于边际收益时所收取的市场价格。由于这一价格高于边际成本与市场需求曲线相交时的竞争价格,同时也高于垄断者收取垄断价格时的产品的边际成本,因而又称之为垄断高价。     

上游垄断与中国企业产品质量升级

本文首先构建理论模型阐述了上游垄断影响企业产品质量选择的作用渠道,并澄清了其阻碍产品质量升级的条件。在此基础上,克服了以"价格法"衡量产品质量的局限性,结合《中国海关贸易数据库》和《中国工业企业数据库》,采用"回归反推方法"对中国企业的产品质量进行了测算。研究发现,上游垄断对产品质量升级的作用取决于垄断的成因以及下游的竞争程度:由政府保护所形成的垄断明显不利于产品质量升级;由企业自身的高效率所导致的垄断对下游产品质量升级的作用与下游竞争程度有关,下游竞争程度越高,则其正面作用越小。随着下游行业竞争的放开,其负面作用正在逐步凸显。     

民航拥堵的经济学解释

中国民航市场寡头垄断的市场格局导致价格刚性的存在,使价格不能成为调整市场供需失衡的基本工具,同时,价格也不能成为航空公司争夺市场份额的竞争手段。为此,航空公司把到站时间作为竞争的基本手段。但是,在价格刚性情况下,航空公司的最优产品定位策略是尽可能地缩小与其他公司之间的差异,导致黄金时点多个航空公司航班到港,造成民航拥堵。因此,治理民航拥堵的根本对策在于引入竞争,打破寡头垄断的市场格局,充分发挥价格调整供需失衡的作用。     

内生无效制度——对进入壁垒和贸易保护的思考

本文构建一个模型来考察为什么垄断、进入壁垒和贸易保护在许多国家长期存在。政治精英对中间产品索取高价的偏好导致了支持垄断和贸易保护的无效经济制度和政治制度。价格操纵机制表明,政治精英偏好于通过提高中间产品价格来增加垄断利润。提高税率虽然会增加政治精英的税收收入,但会降低对中间产品的需求,从而减少垄断利润。因此,价格操纵情况下的最优税率低于收入摄取情况下的最优税率,这与Acemoglu(2006)的结论相反。     

中国大陆型经济:障碍及其解决

大陆型经济是中国经济未来的发展方向。中国已具备建立大陆型经济的条件和基础,主要障碍在于收入差距过大和市场分割。这些障碍本质上是制度问题,根源在于行政公权下的各种垄断,进而导致较高的交易成本。解决之道在于规范和减少垄断和特权,降低交易成本,建立公平、统一的大市场,为大陆型经济扫平道路。     

市场超垄断特性与房地产企业经营绩效——基于中国省——基于中国省(市)面板数据的分析

本文提出并论证了中国房地产市场具有超垄断特性的理论假说,在此基础上研究了房地产市场超垄断特性等因素对中国房地产企业经营绩效的影响。基于中国省(市)2005-2012年房地产业面板数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国房地产市场具有超垄断特性,房产品既是缺乏需求价格弹性的必需品,又是富有需求收入弹性的奢侈品;(2)虽然中国房地产市场具有超垄断特性,但房产品价格和居民人均收入的提高,不会提高房地产企业总资产收益率,市场对房产品过度投资或者投机引起的房地产企业生产和管理成本的上升可能构成抵消企业因上述因素而获益的影响因素。     

Choke Price Bias in Choice Experiments

This paper reports on the results from a split sample choice experiment, where the effect of changing the maximum level of the cost attribute is investigated. The hypothesis was that changing the maximum price level would either give rise to an income effect or have no effect on consumers’ preferences. This was tested in the framework of a valuation study of different quality characteristics of minced pork. The data was analysed using a mixed logit error component model, which accounts for correlation in the unobserved part of the utility. Results suggest that the size of the maximum price level does matter, and that changing the maximum price level has a statistically significant effect on both the general preferences structure and the WTP estimates. Hence, researchers should be very careful when defining not only the range of the price attribute but also the maximum level of the price attribute.     

PRICE FLOORS AND QUALITY CHOICE

This paper studies effects of price floors in a simple model of vertical product differentiation. We find that even non‐binding price floor (i.e., minimum price set below the lowest Nash equilibrium price in the baseline model) can increase quality on the market, if the cost of quality is sufficiently low. Where a binding price floor does not increase the equilibrium quality, it makes consumers worse off. There is also a possibility of over‐investment into quality as a result of the binding minimum price.     

A model of trust in quality and North–South trade

Why do some countries produce higher quality goods than other countries? This paper suggests that one reason is self-perpetuating reputations, modelling the idea with a Klein–Leffler reputation model embedded in a general equilibrium model of trade. Reputation differences are particularly interesting because reputation is a form of “social capital”. Like product differentiation, it can explain why countries might trade even if their technologies and endowments are identical, why firms could profit from exports even if the foreign price is no higher than the domestic one, and why governments like to have “high-value” sectors. Ideally, a developing country would shift its own producers to a high-quality equilibrium; if that is not possible, the next best thing is to import experience goods and substitute to home production of goods for which reputation is not important.     

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

This paper studies how firms choose their product differentiation levels when they engage in third‐degree price discrimination in the following product market competition in a location‐price model. We show that firms will not choose to locate at the two endpoints if different consumer groups have similar sizes. Hence, the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold, resulting in a more intense product market price competition. Only if the size of one group of consumers is sufficiently larger than that of the other group, would firms make their products as differentiated as possible by choosing the two endpoints as their locations.     

THE IMPACT OF TAX PRICE CHANGES ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEEDY

Eliminating or reducing the federal charitable deduction can have serious impacts on the level of charitable donations. Tax price elasticity estimates from a multivariate sample selection model indicate that changing the deduction to a 12% tax credit would have reduced individual donations in 2012 by 18.9% if applied to itemizing taxpayers and by 10.5% if extended to nonitemizers. Elimination of the deduction would have led to a 35% reduction in individual charitable donations. Even if coupled with cuts in marginal tax rates, eliminating the charitable deduction will still likely result in substantial reductions given the inelastic income elasticities of charitable donations. The estimates justify the ardent opposition of many in the nonprofit sector to the more radical proposals for changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions. (JEL D34, C34)     

企业差异化战略对价格和质量竞争博弈均衡解的影响研究

消费者在购买商品时不仅考虑商品价格而且还要考虑商品质量水平的需求市场,如果存在两寡头企业提供某商品,必然会导致价格和质量的竞争博弈。本文研究表明:为了达到纳什均衡状态,两企业必须采取一定的差异化策略。而且在均衡状态下,如果市场是价格敏感市场,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者都越有利;如果市场是质量敏感市场,当敏感程度相对很低时,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者也都越有利;当敏感程度一般时企业可选择适当的差异化程度使得企业和消费者同时达到最大的均衡利润;但当敏感度非常高,企业差异化程度越高对企业的均衡利润越大,可对消费者的均衡利润却越小。     

The model and empirical estimation of the optimal flexibility of RMB exchange-rate regime: A study based on the price-stabilization

Under the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (M-F-D) framework, the paper develops a stochastic model to study the optimal choice of RMB exchange rate regime based on two objectives, namely the exchange rate stabilization and price stabilization. The paper finds that different policy objectives will lead to different optimal choices of RMB exchange-rate regime. If the central bank aims to stabilize the price level, the optimal choice would be a certain type of intermediate regime, or the optimal choice would be a fixed one if it aims to stabilize the RMB exchange rate. Based on the model, the paper empirically estimates China’s open economy parameters and uses them to estimate the optimal flexibility of RMB exchange rate regime. The paper points out that China should allow more exchange rate changes to absorb its foreign exchange market pressure in order to stabilize the general price level, which indicates that China should move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime.     

Persuasion and economic efficiency. The cost-benefit analysis of banning abortion

A simple cost-benefit approach to the abortion debate is unlikely to be persuasive if efficiency arguments conflict with widely held concepts of justice or rely on improbable notions of consent. Illustrative of the limitations of economic analyses are the models proposed by Meeks and Posner to make a case against abortion on demand. Meeks posits a tradeoff between the consumer surplus women gain from access to abortion and the expected loss of earnings that would have accrued to the aborted conceptuses. From here, Meeks derives the critical price elasticity that equates welfare gains and losses and argues that a ban on abortion represents a Kaldor-Hicks improvement in welfare if the price elasticity of demand falls above the critical level. Basic to his model are several questionable assumptions: an independence of ability to pay for an abortion and income, all women who select abortion have the same linear demand for the procedure, an abortion ban would eliminate the practice of abortion, economic efficiency generally requires slavery, and the morally relevant population includes the unborn. Posner, on the other hand, argues that an abortion ban would be efficient if the average surplus lost by a woman who chooses not to break the law is less than half the average value of the fetus saved. He assumes that it takes 1.83 abortions avoided to increase the population by 1 individual and favors reducing the current abortion rate by 30% rather than banning the procedure. Although Posner's model does not require specification of any particular value for the fetus, it neglects the increased health risk for pregnant women of illegal abortion. Moreover, Posner assumes that all women obey the law if it is in their economic interest to do so. Detrimental to both models is an assumption that sound normative judgments can be made on the basis of average values for observable data and the goal of maximizing wealth is logically prior to the specification of individual rights. It is concluded that economic arguments can be persuasive on the abortion issue only if there is agreement that cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate basis for decision making.     

Quality competition,welfare, and regulation

In this paper, we study the supply of quality in imperfectly competitive markets, and explore the role of regulation in markets where firms may use both quality and price to compete for customers. In a model where firms first choose qualities and then prices, we find that quality decisions have strategic effects: firms react to quality disadvantages by price reductions. Because of this strategic effect, firms do not have the correct incentive to set socially efficient quality levels. Price and quality competition results in a socially suboptimal quality level. Efficiency can be restored by lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies. Simple price regulation may result in lower price and higher quality.We thank Nicholas Economides, Randall Ellis, Thomas McGuire, Michael Riordan, and Monika Schnitzer for discussing various issues in this research with us. We are also grateful to a referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The first author acknowledges support from the Management Science Group, Department of Veterans Affairs at Bedford, Massachusetts. The ideas here do not represent those of the Department of Veterans Affairs.