A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agents on the same class are ordered to be consecutive, the related exact assignment market is defined by a partitioned matrix, each block of the partition being a glove market.     

A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment

We consider a setting in which the buyer's ability to hold up a seller's investment is so severe that there is no investment in equilibrium of the static game typically analyzed. We show that there exists an equilibrium of a related dynamic game generating positive investment. The seller makes a sequence of gradually smaller investments, each repaid by the buyer under the threat of losing further seller investment. As modeled frictions converge to zero, the equilibrium outcome converges to the first best. We draw connections between our work and the growing literature on gradualism in public good contribution games and bargaining games.     

A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims

Summary. For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we consider the requirement that each agent should receive at least 1/n his claim truncated at the amount to divide, where n is the number of claimants (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004a). We identify two families of rules satisfying this bound. We then formulate the requirement that for each problem, the awards vector should be obtainable in two equivalent ways, (i) directly or (ii) in two steps, first assigning to each claimant his lower bound and then applying the rule to the appropriately revised problem. We show that there is only one rule satisfying this requirement. We name it the “ rule”, as it is obtained by a recursion. We then undertake a systematic investigation of the properties of the rule.Received: 7 September 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C79, D63, D74.William Thomson: Correspondence toWe thank Christopher Chambers, Youngsub Chun, Tarík Kara, Çağatay Kayí, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Toyotaka Sakai, and Michel Truchon for their comments. We also thank a referee for useful comments. This paper was presented at Columbia University, CORE, Bilkent University, Sabancí University, Université Laval, and Caltech, and at the Mallorca Review of Economic Design meeting. Thomson acknowledges support from the NSF under grant SES-0214691.     

我国商业银行规模经济评价方法研究

现有的关于银行规模经济评价的理论,要么基于参数法,要么专注于非参数法,很少有将二者兼顾考虑的评价方法.本文在充分考虑参数法和非参数法利弊的基础上,针对我国商业银行的特点提出了分类规模经济评价的思想.同时在利用DEA方法获得生产可能性集前沿面的基础上,建立了通过拟合生产函数获得各种规模经济评价指标的方法.