巨灾债券对再保险自留额的影响

近几十年来,巨大的自然灾害频繁发生,给全球经济造成了前所未有的损失。旧金山大地震、Andrew飓风、9.11事件、印度洋海啸,这些字眼使得整个世界为之动容。许多保险公司,特别是再保险公司面对巨额的保险赔付,陷入资本和现金的危机。连著名的英国劳合社再保险市场也不例外。再保险公司越来越不愿承保巨灾风险,导致了巨灾再保险价格的一再升高,这却给巨灾风险证券化提供了发展机遇。面对高昂的巨灾再保险成本,巨灾风险证券化产品以其成本小风险分散的优势,逐渐在巨灾风险领域初露锋芒。巨灾风险证券化产品其实是一种场外交易的债券衍生物,是保险、再保险公司通过直接发行公司债券,利用债券市场来分散巨灾风险的一种形式。承保巨灾损失的保险、再保险公司利用这种债券,将自身的巨灾损失风险转移给了市场投资者,投资者的收益完全取决于巨灾损失是否发生。在巨灾风险证券化的几种工具中,巨灾债券(Cat bonds)发行的数额是最大的。Cat bonds实际上是一个债券合同,购买此债券的投资者在持有期间,如果合同约定的巨灾事件不发生,则会在到期时连本带息获得收入;如果合同约定的巨灾事件发生,则会损失部分或全部的本金,用来弥补发行者的巨灾损失。可见,Cat b...     

巨灾风险证券化及我国地震巨灾债券的初步设计

巨灾风险证券化作为一种金融创新产品,能够有效地转移和分散巨灾风险。本文首先阐释了传统风险管理技术——再保险的微观运作机制,并指出其在面对巨灾风险时具有明显的局限性,进而推演出引入巨灾保险风险证券化的必要性。本文以1978～2010年间中国发生的214起地震灾害事故为样本,根据地震损失分布特点并利用资本资产定价模型(CAPM)和债券定价原理推算了地震巨灾债券的收益率及价格,从而对我国地震巨灾债券进行了初步设计。最后结合我国保险业和资本市场的发展现状提出了相应的建议。     

我国农业巨灾债券的模式研究

我国是自然灾害多发的国家,而农业巨灾保险与再保险承保能力的不足制约着农业现代化发展。农业巨灾债券作为一种创新金融工具,为风险转移提供了新的思路。论文通过对农业巨灾债券的市场需求分析与可行性分析,认为农业巨灾债券在我国发展具有巨大潜力,并提出有益于发展我国农业巨灾债券模式的合理建议。     

基于资产负债管理的我国巨灾再保险定价研究

我国是自然灾害种类多、频率高、损失大的国家。对巨灾保险需求很大,但是由于巨灾的特性,给保险公司带来的风险极大,因此对巨灾再保险有很大需求。通过建立资产、负债和利率模型,根据我国洪水、暴雨损失程度和频率拟合关系式,采用蒙特卡罗模拟分别计算有无违约风险和发行巨灾债券的巨灾再保险费率。通过计算结果看出,发行巨灾债券能够降低违约风险,提高巨灾再保险费率,增加巨灾再保险合同的价值。同时,还考虑了资产负债比、免赔额、债券价值与负债占比对巨灾再保险费率的影响并得到合理结果。本文根据我国洪水、暴雨实际发生情况,从资产负债管理视角研究巨灾再保险定价问题,对于开展适合中国国情的巨灾再保险具有理论指导意义。     

巨灾风险与中国保险公司的选择

由于保险公司承保巨灾风险的必要性,传统分散巨灾保险的手段再保险的功能缺陷和总准备金积累的规模限制,使得运用保险衍生产品成为我们必然的选择.目前适合我国实际的巨灾风险证券化工具是巨灾债券,并且着重分析了其运作机制和健康发展的条件.     

巨灾风险与我国保险公司的选择策略

由于保险公司承保巨灾风险的必要性,传统分散巨灾保险风险的手段———再保险的功能缺陷和总准备金积累的规模限制,使得运用保险衍生产品成为必然的选择。笔者认为,目前适合我国实际的巨灾风险证券化工具是巨灾债券,并且着重分析了其运作机制和健康发展的条件。     

巨灾债券

巨灾债券（Catastrophe Bond，CATBond），是为预防诸如地震、飓风等巨灾筹集资金而发行的债券，是目前保险风险证券化最为普遍的方法。巨灾债券将债券本金与利息的偿还与否，直接和巨灾风险的发生与否相关联，在未发生巨灾风险时，它是一种高收益债券，类似于公司债券或政府债券，     

巨灾风险管理工具创新之“边挂车”业务述评

"边挂车"是兴起于百慕大地区、流行于美国的一种创新型巨灾风险管理工具,针对巨灾风险分保具有很强的适应性。本文简要述评了"边挂车"业务的发展状况、基本原理和主要特点,比较了"边挂车"与普通巨灾再保险、巨灾债券以及行业损失担保等巨灾金融工具之间的异同,并结合现状对该业务在中国的未来发展做了展望。     

农业保险巨灾风险化解策略探讨

农业保险风险主要是巨灾风险引发的巨额赔款，令保险公司承受不起。农业保险巨灾风险已经成为制约中国农业保险发展的瓶颈。鉴于中国现行的农业保险经营环境，应构建同业分层保险制度、发行农业保险巨灾风险债券、建立农业保险再保险机制和设立农业保险风险保障基金，以分散农业保险巨灾风险。     

巨灾债券的运作原理及在我国的应用

随着保险公司承担越来越多的风险,巨灾债券逐渐发展成为其分散风险的又一种工具。本文将巨灾债券的运作过程分为三个阶段,对其运作原理进行了分析,并介绍了巨灾债券的定价模型,为巨灾债券的定价提供一种方案：一种金融产品能否顺利发行取决于其发展的前景。本文最后分析了我国发行巨灾债券的必要性和可行性,并提出构建我国巨灾债券的相关建议。     

Financial Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk

Like the preceding article, this article argues that the high costs of reinsurance present the opportunity for hedging instruments to be offered to primary insurers that are both competitive with current reinsurance and that offer investors high rates of return. But the combination of high reinsurance premiums and the vast capacity of the capital market for diversification is not sufficient to ensure the success of these new instruments. If new instruments such as catastrophe options and catastrophelinked bonds are to compete successfully with reinsurance, they must provide a cost-effective means of resolving incentive conflicts between the primary insurer and the ultimate risk bearer that are known as "moral hazard." Without an effective solution of this moral hazard problem, the use of past insurance loss data to estimate the potential returns for purchasers of catastrophe bonds and other such instruments will be misleading and unreliable.
As the author demonstrates, both traditional reinsurance and each of the new catastrophe hedging instruments presents insurance companies and other hedgers with the challenge of managing a different combination of moral hazard, credit risk, and basis risk. For example, traditional catastrophe reinsurance is subject to significant credit risk and moral hazard, but little if any basis risk. By contrast, both catastrophe options and bonds can be designed in ways that reduce moral hazard and credit risk, but at the cost of taking on some basis risk. The risk manager's task in such circumstances is to design an instrument that embodies the optimal, or cost-minimizing, trade-off among these three sources of risk.     

Catastrophe Bonds,Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer

Catastrophe bonds feature full collateralization of the underlying risk transfer and thus abandon the reinsurance principle of economizing on collateral through diversification of risk transfer. Our analysis demonstrates that this feature places limits on catastrophe bond penetration, even if the structure possesses frictional cost advantages over reinsurance. However, we also show that catastrophe bonds have important uses when buyers and reinsurers cannot contract over the division of assets in the event of insolvency and, more generally, cannot write contracts with a full menu of state‐contingent payments. In this environment, segregation of collateral—in the form of multiple reinsurance companies, as well as catastrophe bond vehicles—can ameliorate inefficiencies due to reinsurance contracting constraints by improving welfare for those exposed to default risk. Numerical simulation illustrates how catastrophe bonds improve efficiency in market niches with correlated risks, or with uneven exposure of buyers to reinsurer default.     

The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Insurance Securitization: Preliminary Evidence from the Catastrophe Bond Market

Insurance securitization has long been hailed as an important tool to increase the underwriting capacity for companies exposed to catastrophe-related risks. However, global volumes of insurance securitization have remained surprisingly low to date which raises questions over its benefits. In this paper, we examine changes in the market value of insurance and reinsurance firms which announce their engagement in insurance securitization by issuing catastrophe (Cat) bonds. Consistent with the hitherto underwhelming contribution of Cat bonds to global catastrophe coverage, we do not find evidence that Cat bonds lead to strong wealth gains for shareholders in the issuing firm. More importantly, we report large variations in the distribution of wealth effects in response to the issue announcement. We show that the wealth effects for shareholders in firms which issue Cat bonds appear to be driven by explanations according to which Cat bonds offer cost savings relative to other forms of catastrophe risk management (and less by the potential of Cat bonds to hedge catastrophe risk). Thus, abnormal returns are particularly large for issues by firms which face low levels of loss uncertainty (which reduces the information acquisition costs in financial markets) as well as for issues during periods when prices for catastrophe coverage (including Cat bonds) are low.     

The Optimal Write-Down Coefficients in a Percentage for a Catastrophe Bond

Catastrophe bonds, also known as CAT bonds, are insurance-linked securities that help to transfer catastrophe risks from insurance industry to bond holders. When the aggregate catastrophe loss exceeds a specified amount by the maturity, the CAT bond is triggered and the future bond payments are reduced. This article first presents a general pricing formula for a CAT bond with coupon payments, which can be adapted to various assumptions for a catastrophe loss process. Next, it gives formulas for the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage, implemented by Monte Carlo simulations, which maximize two measurements of risk reduction, hedge effectiveness rate (HER) and hedge effectiveness (HE), respectively, and examines how the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage help reinsurance or insurance companies to mitigate extreme catastrophe losses. Last, it demonstrates how the number of coupon payments, loss share, retention level, strike price, maturity, frequency, and severity parameters of the catastrophe loss process and different interest rate models affect the optimal write-down coefficients in a percentage with numerical examples for illustrations.     

我国巨灾保险不足的原因与对策

我国巨灾频发,巨灾保险潜在需求巨大,但由于成本过高、缺乏技术和相关法律制度等原因,巨灾保险供给严重不足。为扩大巨灾保险供给,应借鉴国际成功经验,结合我国国情,走政策性支持的商业化巨灾保险道路。通过建立强制性巨灾保险基金、发展再保险市场、完善相关立法和提高公众风险防范意识等分散巨灾风险。     

Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance: The Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers

We identify a new benefit of index or parametric triggers. Asymmetric information between reinsurers on an insurer's risk affects competition in the reinsurance market: reinsurers are subject to adverse selection, since only high-risk insurers may find it optimal to change reinsurers. The result is high reinsurance premiums and cross-subsidization of high-risk insurers by low-risk insurers. A contract with a parametric or index trigger (such as a catastrophe bond) is insensitive to information asymmetry and therefore alters the equilibrium in the reinsurance market. Provided that basis risk is not too high, the introduction of contracts with parametric or index triggers provides low-risk insurers with an alternative to reinsurance contracts, and therefore leads to less cross-subsidization in the reinsurance market.     

Catastrophe Risk Bonds

Abstract

This article examines the pricing of catastrophe risk bonds. Catastrophe risk cannot be hedged by traditional securities. Therefore, the pricing of catastrophe risk bonds requires an incomplete markets setting, and this creates special difficulties in the pricing methodology. The authors briefly discuss the theory of equilibrium pricing and its relationship to the standard arbitrage-free valuation framework. Equilibrium pricing theory is used to develop a pricing method based on a model of the term structure of interest rates and a probability structure for the catastrophe risk. This pricing methodology can be used to assess the default spread on catastrophe risk bonds relative to traditional defaultable securities.     

建立我国巨灾保险制度的思考

自然灾害的频繁发生所造成的损失逐年攀升.对于巨灾损失我国政府已习惯于采取财政的手段来应对一个个非预期的巨额窟窿,这在一定程度上影响了我国经济的健康可持续发展、社会稳定和国家安全.鉴于世界其他国家应对巨灾采取的再保险措施,我国政府可根据我国政治体制和法律完善程度来建立再保险市场,利用市场来分散巨灾风险,而非利用财政与自然...     

巨灾风险厚尾分布：POT模型及其应用

针对Gamma,LognormM和Weibull等传统厚尾分布拟合巨灾风险的不足,本文一方面从理论上分析探讨了POT模型及其拟合巨灾厚尾风险的相对优势,另一方面应用POT模型和GPD分布,对我国1952年～2008年间地震直接经济损失数据进行拟合,发现了POT模型拟合巨灾风险厚尾部分的效果比Gamma、LognormM...     

WHERE'S THE CAT GOING? SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CATASTROPHE BONDS

This article provides an assessment of the current state of the market for catastrophe (or "Cat") bonds. Given the changes in insurance markets since September 11th, the demand for Cat bonds is likely to increase. For issuers, Cat bonds have the effect of transferring risks to the capital markets that would normally be underwritten by insurance or reinsurance companies. And as a substitute for insurance, Cat bonds have the potential to help issuers address problems such as lack of capacity and real risk transfer, cyclicality, and credit risk that are commonly associated with insurance and reinsurance markets. Investors value Cat bonds in part because of their low correlations with stocks and conventional bonds. Notable trends in the structuring of the products involve higher levels of risk transfer, longer-term contracts, and linkage to a portfolio of catastrophic risks.