国家已下达我省优化资本结构试点城市企业兼并破产和职工再就业工作计划

国家下达我省执行的企业兼并破产和职工再就业工作计划,共安排13家企业破产、39家企业被兼并、22家企业实行减员增效。共需冲销银行呆坏账10.47亿元,97年度限定核销7.95亿元。具体情况为:     

斩断“政绩工程”的资金链

前两天,中国建设银行公开宣布,从现在起,“形象工程”、“政绩工程”等六大类房地产开发项目别再指望从该行得到贷款支持。 对建行而言,此项禁贷令依据的是国家产业政策调整方向和相关政策导向,目的是防范本银行系统的金融风险。凭经验判断,不论是出于自愿或是非自愿,整个建行系统估计已经积累有一定数量(比例)的支持“政绩工程”所生成的“呆坏账”。防范由此所生的金融风险怕已不仅仅是“防”的问题,而是同时面临处置”呆坏账”与防范出现新的“呆坏账”的双重任务的问题。     

坏账攀升考验中国经济

中国银行的呆坏账率从年初一路上扬,至今已连续12个季度增高,引起业界和外媒关注。经济学家分析,受累于经济增长放缓、产能过剩及房地产继续下滑预期,银行呆坏账问题将在未来一段时间内持续困扰中国。     

海外欠款拖住中国出口企业

近年来,呆坏账日渐成 为中国出口企业的新隐忧。 据报道,目前中国在海外的 呆坏账正以每年150亿美元 的速度增加,中国如口企业 的海外应收账款至少超过 1000亿美元。     

试论国有商业银行不良资产与财政风险

一、我国国有商业银行不良资产的特点 1．不良资产规模大。不良资产占我国银行系统全部贷款的25％以上，基本匕相当于一年GDP的40％，中国的呆坏账按GDP比率来看是世界上最高的国家之一。     

一个民间放贷人“天花板”下的生存

济南市历城区港沟镇一个不起眼的农民。自1992年开始民间借贷，贷出第一笔钱后，至今竟无一笔呆坏账。而根据《商务周刊》得到的一份内部资料显示，与其一镇之内的港沟镇信用社，从1990年代初到2005年，呆滞贷款共计100多笔，涉及贷款金额超过900万元。奇迹是怎样发生的?现如今，“12年无一笔呆坏账”的民间借贷神话，因为信用环境的混乱无序。被卡死在增长的“天花板”下，这到底是怎么回事?《商务周刊》记者商思林济南采访报道。     

华一银行：万花丛中一点绿

在总资产6亿美金,贷放额度4亿美金的情况下,我们成立7的来呆坏账为零,华一银行常务副董事长兼行长江天锡一语惊四座.     

宽松的货币政策应该平稳退出

我国目前实施的信贷规模管理政策，虽然效果明显而直接，但是，它与市场化的管理要求相去甚远，从长期看，可能导致商业银行产生呆坏账的风险。     

八闽传真

从今年起,我省将加快企业破产制度改革。经初步决定,在福州、厦门、南平、三明4个试点城市中,5万名富余职工向社会分流,24家亏损国有企业实现破产。 今年,福建省将重点解决工业企业的破产项目、流通企业的兼并项目、骨干企业的同行兼并项目。4个试点城市中,被兼并企业81户,减员增效20户,力争冲销呆坏账10亿元。同时,力求在建立职工养老、医疗保险金的补充机制上有新突破。     

"有载体的破产":国有企业破产重组的新模式

今年年初,国务院通过了国资委关于国有企业关闭破产的4年规划,2008年底之后,国有企业只能走依法破产之路,国有企业退出市场时将不再享受职工安置、破产财产处置、银行呆坏账核销等方面的特殊政策,政策环境的变化为特困企业实施破产设定了最后时限.     

Were Information Intermediaries Sensitive to the Financial Statement‐Based Leading Indicators of Bank Distress Prior to the Financial Crisis?

In this paper, we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks’ financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress? We find a significant cross‐sectional association between banks’ 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008–2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance. The mean abnormal short interest in our sample of banks increased from 0.66 percent in March 2005 to 2.4 percent in March 2007 and the association between short interest and leading financial statement indicators also increased. In contrast, we observe neither a meaningful change in analysts’ recommendations, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and audit fees nor an increased sensitivity of these actions to financial indicators of bank distress over this time period. Our results suggest that actions of short sellers likely provided an early warning of the banks’ upcoming distress prior to the 2008 financial crisis.     

Crisis in the Russian mortgage market through the lens of financial accelerator theory

This paper analyzes the influence of the economic crisis on the Russian mortgage market from the position of the financial accelerator theory. It shows that the level of financial stability of banks and borrowers on the eve of the crisis was determining the dynamics of their development and solvency during the crisis. The “flight to quality” effect, which is inextricably connected to the financial accelerator mechanism, showed that the largest domestic banks and credit organizations that were controlled by nonresident companies and mainly specialized in mortgages were in the most advantageous position in the mortgage market. In regions, this effect manifested itself through a reduction in mortgage lending for borrowers registered in other regions and an increase in the number of credit provided by Moscow banks.     

泡沫经济破灭前后日本银企信用风险管理制度及其功效分析

战后,日本金融体系效仿欧美国家建立起一系列信用风险管理制度。同时,根据市场主导型金融市场的特点,逐步建立起具有自身特点的信用风险管理制度。日本银企信用风险管理制度包括商业银行的内部控制制度、银行风险防御及挽救制度、商业银行外部监管制度。通过对日本银企信用风险管理制度的功效进行剖析,可以看出这一制度存在局限性并与日本的泡沫经济、金融危机、金融效率存在内在关系。     

三大全能银行内控与监管体系无效性分析

全球著名三大全能银行,美国花旗集团在次贷危机受重创,成为重灾区,英国汇丰集团和德国的德意志银行皆受到严重冲击,损失较大,这一切皆与他们的监管系统无效性有着密切的关系,三家全能银行内监管体系没有发挥任何监控作用导致次贷危机的全面爆发。     

银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验及启示——以成都市为例

本文立足银行信贷视角,结合全球金融危机以及成都市西部金融中心建设背景,分析成都市中小企业面临的金融环境;然后总结成都市银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验;最后,本文从政策性银行作用的发挥、信贷风险控制、金融机构市场定位、银行业发展战略等四方面提出了启示。     

浅析金融危机下我国出口企业对信用证欺诈的防范

金融危机下进口商的信用和支付能力普遍下降,信用证对出口商收汇安全的优越性凸显出来。但任何一种结算方式都不能完全防止欺诈的发生。如何防范信用证欺诈,充分发挥信用证的优越性已成为众多出口企业和银行关注的话题。本文介绍了我国出口贸易中常见的信用证欺诈方式,提出了一些防范信用证欺诈的有效措施。     

Performance of Domestic and Foreign Banks: The Case of Korea and the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract

This paper examines the performance of banks, domestic and foreign, in Korea before and after the Asian financial crisis, examining how the profitability of those banks differed and identifying factors that explain why those differences existed. The performance of Korean banks deteriorated dramatically in 1998 with most banks recovering somewhat in 1999. Foreign banks did not experience the same negative effect on their performance as a rule. Overall, the domestic Korean banks suffered more severely from the Asian financial crisis than foreign banks. Several possible explanations exist. First, foreign banks, unlike domestic Korean banks, were not subject to credit allocation directives from the Korean government to selected, favoured industries. Second, foreign banks, since they relied for governance on the mother bank in the home country, achieved higher efficiency and better asset and liability management. Finally, foreign banks rely more heavily on fee-for-service income rather than loan revenue.     

Lessons from the great recession for developing countries

Many lessons can be taken from the Great Recession and the Euro crisis with respect to both pre‐crisis and post‐crisis policies. Appropriate measures can reduce the risk of crisis in individual countries, the severity of crises, and the magnitude of needed adjustments. These include an appropriate exchange rate policy (flexibility is highly desirable), ensuring the soundness of the financial system, not allowing expansion of credit at too high a rate, adopting structural fiscal budgeting policies, and avoiding dangerous sovereign debt build‐up. On the crisis resolution side, the lesson that stands out is the desirability of decisive and credible action to address the causes of the crisis. The issues that arise when the banking and financial system is weakened in the run‐up to crisis are extremely difficult, especially when sovereign debt is unsustainable. Therefore, while the important lesson is to avoid overly expansive credit build‐up during good times, in the event of a crisis, it is important that the health of the banks be restored as quickly as possible and that a viable supervision and resolution framework be put in place.     

Responding to financial crisis: Bank credit expansion with Chinese characteristics

China has sustained a high rate of economic growth even after the outbreak of global financial crisis around 2008 and 2009. Much of the growth stemmed from consistently high levels of lending after this period. Using a unique large dataset from all banking institutions in 90 counties across 14 provinces of China from 2005 to 2013, this paper examines the patterns of credit expansion by Chinese banks. Our study results reveal a clear pattern of counter-cyclical credit expansion by Chinese banks in response to the outbreak of global financial crisis. We find that ownership structure and bank governance do impact on bank lending: the large state-owned banks have responded more to political pressure to lend while the joint-stock banks and city commercial banks have been more profit oriented. The latter had increased their lending more to increase their presence at the county markets. Overall, compared with county-based small banks, cross-regional banks have expanded their lending much more aggressively. Differences in liquidity and deposit growth, risk management strategies, or legal enforcement cannot explain these results.     

THE EFFECT OF STRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING SECTOR

The credit crisis resulted in increases in credit, market and operational risk, but it may also have precipitated a surge in systemic risk. Measuring systemic risk as the price of insurance against distressed losses in the South African banking sector, this article attempts to determine whether the financial crisis has in fact resulted in an increase in systemic risk. Using probabilities of default and asset return correlations as systemic risk indicators, it is found that the financial crisis has indeed increased systemic risk in South Africa. The impact was, however, less severe than that experienced in other large international banks.