Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance

I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Location Decisions of Competing Networks

Early entrants in markets with network effects usually occupy a “central location” and serve agents with “intermediate tastes,” whereas later entrants are niche players. Why would the first entrant choose to become a “general” network, given that later entrants will not have enough room for differentiation, resulting in a more intense competition for market share? In a Hotelling model with two rival networks, we show that for intermediate values of the network externality parameter the location equilibrium is indeed asymmetric: the first entrant locates at the center whereas the second entrant chooses an extreme (niche) location.     

A Modelof Competitive Limit Pricing

This paper offers a new theory of limit pricing. Incumbents from different markets or regions "compete" against one another, with each attempting to price in a manner that deflects entry into the others' markets. An entrant is imperfectly informed as to the incumbents' respective investments in cost reduction and seeks to enter markets in which incumbents have high costs. In a focal equilibrium, the entrant uses a simple "comparison strategy," in which it enters only the highest-priced markets, and incumbents engage in limit-pricing behavior. The influence on pricing of the number of markets and the scope of entry is also reported. Throughout, the central feature of the analysis is that an incumbent's price affects its investment incentives, with lower prices being complementary to greater investment.     

Entry threat,entry delay,and Internet speed: The timing of the U.S. broadband rollout

In a rapidly growing industry, potential entrants strategically choose which local markets to enter. Facing the threat of additional entrants, a potential entrant may lower its expectation of future profits and delay entry into a local market, or it may accelerate entry due to preemptive motives. Using the evolution of local market structures of broadband Internet service providers from 1999 to 2007, we find that the former effect dominates the latter after allowing for spatial correlation across markets and accounting for endogenous market structure. On average, it takes 2 years longer for threatened markets to receive their first broadband entrant. Moreover, this entry delay has long‐run negative implications for the divergence of the U.S. broadband infrastructure: 1 year of entry delay translates into an 11% decrease on average present‐day download speeds.     

Intra-industry structure and the response toward rivals

This paper is a study of the pricing behavior of airline monopolists toward potential entrant carriers from different strategic groups. The results suggest that formerly regulated carriers price lower when faced by potential entrants from the newly certified carrier group than they do when they face only potential entrants from their own group. These results are consistent with the heretofore-untested hypothesis from Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1979) that rivalry is greater across groups than within groups.     

The effect of entrant brand's ownership on national brands' positioning strategies

National brand manufacturers face the threat of new product entry from not only their traditional competitors (other national brand manufacturers) but also from their own customers (the retailer). We compare how national brands can limit the loss due to entry of these two types of entrants by positioning of their brands. Our results show that national brands position farther from one another when the new entrant is a store brand than when the entrant is another national brand. We also find that due to different positioning strategies of these two types of entrant brands—the entrant store brand positioning “in‐between” incumbent national brands whereas the entrant national brand positioning “away” from incumbent national brands—incumbent national brands may lose more from the entry of a weaker store brand than from the entry of a stronger national brand. Finally, we find that taking into consideration both pricing and product positioning decisions, consumer and social welfare are generally higher from store brand entry than from national brand entry.     

Currency unions and the incentive to reform: are market mechanisms enough?

This paper studies the incentives to join a monetary union under alternative assumptions about the extent of market reform within the union and in the candidate countries. A lack of mobility, wage/price flexibility or diversification opportunities, brings costs for both new entrants and existing union members. That holds whether the lack of reform is in the entrants or in the existing union. Countries will only want to join a union where there has been sufficient reform, and where markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their new partners as well.     

Early internet IPOs versus subsequent entrants

This paper examines whether investors in early Internet IPOs earned superior returns to those who invested in later entrants. We document three differences between early public firms in a new Internet technology and their followers: underpricing, operating characteristics at the IPO, and stock price performance after the IPO. We find that there is value in going public relatively early in a new Internet technology. Specifically, long-term returns are significantly higher for the early entrants. We also find evidence, consistent with previous studies that examine hot IPO markets, that the early public firms have better operating characteristics at the IPO than later entrants.     

Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets

Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions.     

Potential competition and quality disclosure

This study presents a model of quality disclosure in which an incumbent, through its quality and disclosure choices, influences the potential that a new entrant enters the market. In this regard, we consider a sequential framework in which the incumbent chooses its quality and decides whether to disclose it to the market; subsequently, the entrant makes the same decisions, if it enters the market. We show that the potential competition can create strategic incentives for the incumbent to choose nondisclosure, because the availability of information about the incumbent's quality promotes entry by enhancing the entrant's expected profit from the market. In addition, an analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws suggests that they can be effective in encouraging new market entrants and in improving the product quality of established firms.     

Models of Competitive Price Promotions: Some Empirical Evidence from the Coffee and Saltine Crackers Markets

I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.     

Cartel dating

The begin and end dates of cartels are often ambiguous, despite competition authorities stating them with precision. The legally established infringement period(s) from documentary evidence need not coincide with the period(s) of actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but‐for prices and an underestimation of overcharges. Total overcharges based on comparing but‐for prices to actual prices are a (weak) underestimation of the true amount overcharged, irrespective of the type and size of the misdating. The bias in antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before‐during‐and‐after method with an empirical cartel dating procedure, which infers structural breaks of unknown number and dates that mark the actual begin and end dates of the collusive effects. Empirical findings in the European Sodium Chlorate cartel corroborate our theoretical results.     

A Theoretical Analysis of Liner Shipping Conferences and Strategic Alliances

We analyze the economic impacts of industrial organizational struggles on the international liner shipping market. Operating ratios of different markets are discussed by incorporating rate, service level, and other variables into a standard microeconomic model. If two different carriers agree on a shipping conference price and/or share a strategic alliance service level, and maximize consolidated profit, a member carrier finds it easier to make its operation profitable than the individual profit optimization case; other carriers are worse off in becoming profitable. If the carriers face inelastic demand, the price continues rising until demand becomes elastic enough for the equilibrium to be relevant. The conference is expected to play a coordination role so that the market does not become unsustainable in the adjustment process to reach equilibrium.     

Animating the Pioneer versus Late Entrant Debate: An Historic Case Study

This paper examines the debate about whether early entrants/pioneers to an industry enjoy long–term advantage over their successors. While most of the research suggests that pioneers are advantaged, there are methodological problems with these studies that tend to enhance the likelihood that pioneers will be found to be more successful. Through a case study of the US animation industry, it is shown that being a late entrant was almost certainly advantageous to some of the companies concerned. The paper explores the reasons why some late entrants prevailed over others and some of the mechanisms that allowed late entrants to overcome pioneers. The factors involved in survival relative to pioneers include the limited protection of patents, complacency, the mobility of staff with expertise in a new technology (in this case cel animation), and the neglected importance of managerial and organizational factors. It is shown that the findings also have implications for the population ecology approach.     

恒生指数、B股指数和A股指数过度反应后短期行为分析

本文通过平均收益率计算方法 ,系统地比较了恒生指数、B股指数和A股指数的短期过度反应行为及其后的累积超额收益率变化特征。本文的研究认为 :由于国内股市涨跌停板制度的实施 ,其波动程度已经小于香港股市。国内A、B股市场在发生正向激烈变化后 ,次日往往存在惯性上冲 ,但在第 2到第 3天存在过度反应现象 ;第 5天到第 10天存在明显的反抽 ,即与事件日方向相同的变化。国内股市在发生大幅下跌之后 ,无论哪个市场都有惯性的下跌动量存在 ,A、B股市场的异常波动存在一定程度的“隔年现象”。本文进一步的回归模拟发现 ,在上涨期间 ,香港股市发生异常波动后的第 1天、第 5天和第 10天的累积超额收益率和异常波动的幅度相关 ,B股和A股市场的第 1天和第 5天的累积超额收益率和异常波动幅度相关。而在下跌过程中 ,三个市场都无一例外的和异常波动的幅度强相关     

Rent sharing to control noncartel supply in the German cement market

A challenge for many cartels is avoiding a destabilizing increase in noncartel supply in response to having raised price. In the case of the German cement cartel that operated over 1991–2002, the primary source of noncartel supply was imports from Eastern European cement manufacturers. Testimonies in a private enforcement case have claimed that the cartel sought to control imports by sharing rents with intermediaries in order to discourage them from sourcing foreign supply. Specifically, cartel members would allow an intermediary to issue the invoice for a transaction and charge a fee even though the output went directly from the cartel member's plant to the customer. We investigate this claim by first developing a theory of collusive pricing that takes account of the option of bribing intermediaries. The theory predicts that the cement cartel members are more likely to share rents with an intermediary when the nearest Eastern European plant is closer and there is more Eastern European capacity outside of the control of the cartel. Estimating a logit model that predicts when a cartel member sells through an intermediary, the empirical analysis supports both predictions.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

On the probability of entry in potential competition cases

This paper explores, both theoretically and empirically, the extent to which having ‘other potential entrants’ to a market injected into potential-competition cases has been a worthwhile enterprise. This two-pronged attack leads to the conclusion that (he attempt to specifically identify potential entrants probably results in our deluding ourselves as to the likelihood that entry will occur, and that unless a convincing argument can be made to the effect that any given potential entrant from a stockpile of unnamed potential entrants is ‘reasonably likely’ to elect the entry option, expanding lhat stockpile will be similarly misleading.     

Learning to bid in sequential Dutch auctions

We propose an agent-based computational model to investigate sequential Dutch auctions with particular emphasis on markets for perishable goods and we take as an example wholesale fish markets. Buyers in these markets sell the fish they purchase on a retail market. The paper provides an original model of boundedly rational behavior for wholesale buyers׳ behavior incorporating learning to improve profits, conjectures as to the bids that will be made and fictitious learning. We analyze the dynamics of the aggregate price under different market conditions in order to explain the emergence of market price patterns such as the well-known declining price paradox and the empirically observed fact that the very last transactions in the day may be at a higher price. The proposed behavioral model provides alternative explanations for market price dynamics to those which depend on standard hypotheses such as diminishing marginal profits. Furthermore, agents learn the option value of having the possibility of bidding in later rounds. When confronted with random buyers, such as occasional participants or new entrants, they learn to bid in the optimal way without being conscious of the strategies of the other buyers. When faced with other buyers who are also learning their behavior still displays some of the characteristics learned in the simpler case even though the problem is not analytically tractable.     

Calendar synchronization of gasoline price increases

In many retail gasoline markets with Edgeworth price cycles, large and regular price increases occur on the same day of the week every week, that is, they are calendar synchronized. In this article, I test whether calendar synchronization leads to higher or lower consumer expenditures on gasoline compared to a world with cycles but without calendar synchronization. On one hand, firms may attempt to trigger price increases just prior to periods of normally high demand. On the other, consumers may be better able to predict and shift purchases to low price days of the cycle. Using high‐frequency gasoline volume data and matching it to high‐frequency price data, I find that the latter effect dominates. All else equal, consumer expenditures on gasoline fall with calendar synchronization in the study markets. I also calculate intertemporal price elasticities and find them to be high.