Gender Discrimination in Training: An Australian Perspective

Analysis of the Australian How Workers Get Their Training survey indicates considerable male-female differentials in the incidence and duration of training. For external training, which women can undertake without the sanction of the firm, the gender effect is that women undertake more training than men, other things being the same. However, for in-house training, which requires the sanction of the firm, the gender effect is that women undertake less training than men, other things being the same. One interpretation of this is that the gender effect reflects both the discriminatory attitudes held by firms and the greater propensity to train among women, with the relative weights varying across types of training according to the discretion that women have in determining the training outcome.     

Wage Differentials by Race and Sex: The Roles of Taste Discrimination and Labor Market Information

Using a unique dataset, this article first documents that gaps in starting wages by race and sex persist after accounting for performance on the job. Evidence suggests that simple statistical discrimination, and not just taste discrimination, is partly responsible for race differences in starting wages. But because women's average performance in the sample is higher than men's, simple statistical discrimination cannot explain the sex gap. In more complex models of statistical discrimination, worse information about a group can lower its average wage. Estimates of the quality of labor market information indicate that this may explain women's lower starting wages.     

Discrimination Against Prounion Job Applicants

This study analyzes 95 unfair labor practices involving pre-employment discrimination against union adherents. The cases were heard either by the National Labor Relations Board or U.S. Court of Appeals between 1976 and 1986. Nonsupervisory, unskilled applicants who suffer preemployment discrimination by employers that display antiunion sentiments during union organizing campaigns have a lower probability of winning their cases than to skilled applicants. Pre-employment screening of job applications with prounion backgrounds or attitudes is often part of a larger pattern of unfair labor practices by management. The Dotson administration also supported management's rejection of prounion applicants at a significantly higher rate than did other NLRB administrations.     

A Research Note on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This paper examines the hypothesis that mortgage lenders rank applications from better to worst and encourage the better ones to apply. A second ranking occurs when the application is ranked by the loan committee and funds are approved from the top of the list until exhausted. A theoretically correct procedure for analyzing the resulting multivariate ordinal data is the little known rank multiple discriminant analysis. Preliminary results have revealed that this technique produces a "best" model with fewer variables and a higher classification rate than the commonly known multiple discriminant analysis, logit, or probit.     

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

A Note on Identification of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This paper shows how reduced form estimates of discrimination in mortgage lending may be biased by race differences in loan demand. The result, which follows formally from the model of the mortgage lending process developed in the seminal paper by Maddala and Trost (1982), has important implications for the regulation of financial institutions. It also reinforces findings of Rachlis and Yezer (1993) and Yezer, Phillips and Trost (1994). A review of recent empirical evidence on race differences in loan demand suggests that this factor may help explain mortgage loan application differentials.     

Inertia and Discrimination in the California State Civil Service

Analysis of the California State Civil Service indicates that its occupational wage structure is very stable. Salaries established in 1931 continue to influence current wages, over 60 years later, even while controlling for market wages. This results from the California Civil Service's policy of maintaining the relative wage structure that was established initially in 1931 despite conflicting market wages. Because the California Civil Service explicitly lowered salaries for female-dominated jobs when it established its initial salary structure, these jobs remained underpaid by $1.6 billion from 1973 to 1993. These findings support notions of wage rigidity and fairness in efficiency wage and institutional labor market theories.     

Input Price Discrimination and Allocation Efficiency

This research examines the effects of input price discrimination on allocation efficiency and social welfare. Instead of assuming constant marginal costs, we allow downstream firms to produce under increasing marginal costs. When downstream firms operate in separate markets, even though total output remains unchanged, consumer surplus and social welfare could be greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing. Moreover, the social desirability of input price discrimination can still hold true when downstream firms compete either in Cournot or Bertrand fashion.