Gender Discrimination in Training: a Note

Existing research evidence generally leads to the conclusion that females are disadvantaged in terms of access to job-related training. This paper reconsiders the evidence for Australia using data collected as part of the 1993 Survey of Training and Education. The findings indicate that, while men could be expected to receive more training as a result of their labour market endowments, this is more than compensated for by a gender effect in favour of women. Comparison with results from an analysis of similar data for 1989 suggests a marked change in the pattern of training in favour of women.     

Gender Discrimination in Training: An Australian Perspective

Analysis of the Australian How Workers Get Their Training survey indicates considerable male-female differentials in the incidence and duration of training. For external training, which women can undertake without the sanction of the firm, the gender effect is that women undertake more training than men, other things being the same. However, for in-house training, which requires the sanction of the firm, the gender effect is that women undertake less training than men, other things being the same. One interpretation of this is that the gender effect reflects both the discriminatory attitudes held by firms and the greater propensity to train among women, with the relative weights varying across types of training according to the discretion that women have in determining the training outcome.     

Wage Discrimination, Segregation, and Sex Differences in Wages and Productivity Within and Between Plants

We use panel data on Israeli manufacturing plants to test two explanations of lower wages and lower productivity in plants with a higher percentage of females: (1) within plants women are paid less and are less productive, consistent with no discrimination, and (2) women are segregated into lower-wage and lower-productivity plants. Although the variation in productivity across plants appears to stem from differences in productivity between men and women, the estimates suggest no within-plant wage differential between men and women.     

Wage Differentials by Race and Sex: The Roles of Taste Discrimination and Labor Market Information

Using a unique dataset, this article first documents that gaps in starting wages by race and sex persist after accounting for performance on the job. Evidence suggests that simple statistical discrimination, and not just taste discrimination, is partly responsible for race differences in starting wages. But because women's average performance in the sample is higher than men's, simple statistical discrimination cannot explain the sex gap. In more complex models of statistical discrimination, worse information about a group can lower its average wage. Estimates of the quality of labor market information indicate that this may explain women's lower starting wages.     

Self-Selection and Discrimination in Credit Markets

In this article we make two contributions toward a better understanding of the causes and consequences of discrimination in credit markets. First, we develop an explicit theoretical model of loan underwriting in which lenders use a simple Bayesian updating process to evaluate applicant creditworthiness. Using a signal correlated with an applicant's true creditworthiness and their prior beliefs about the distribution of credit risk in the applicant pool, lenders are able to evaluate an applicant's expected or "inferred" creditworthiness to determine which loans to approve and which to deny. Second, we explicitly model the self-selection behavior of individuals. Because these decisions shape lenders' prior beliefs about the distribution of credit risk, they also affect the Bayesian posterior from which lenders compute an applicant's inferred creditworthiness, implying that statistical discrimination can arise endogenously. As an example, we show that in a market in which only some lenders have Beckerian tastes for discrimination there are conditions under which lenders without racial animus will also discriminate. Our model's flexibility makes it ideal for analyzing a wide variety of empirical and policy questions.     

心中的性感--2004春夏家用纺织品发布会亮相上海

由孚日家纺有限公司和著名时装设计师张肇达联合推出的“心中的性感”2004春夏家用纺织品发布会于近日在上海召开,这是国内家纺企业与服装设计名师的首次合作。     

Price Discrimination with Demarketing

We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.     

Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing

We study the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more efficient over time. We consider a sequential procurement design problem in which local and global firms compete for public good provision. Both firms benefit from learning-by-doing if they provide the public good in the previous period, but global firms only may be able to transfer learning-by-doing from different markets. We show that the optimal procurement has to be biased in favor of the local firm even when all firms are symmetric with respect to their initial cost distribution.     

Discrimination Against Prounion Job Applicants

This study analyzes 95 unfair labor practices involving pre-employment discrimination against union adherents. The cases were heard either by the National Labor Relations Board or U.S. Court of Appeals between 1976 and 1986. Nonsupervisory, unskilled applicants who suffer preemployment discrimination by employers that display antiunion sentiments during union organizing campaigns have a lower probability of winning their cases than to skilled applicants. Pre-employment screening of job applications with prounion backgrounds or attitudes is often part of a larger pattern of unfair labor practices by management. The Dotson administration also supported management's rejection of prounion applicants at a significantly higher rate than did other NLRB administrations.     

Race Discrimination and Union Voice

This work reports patterns of complaints about racial discrimination that appear consistent with the social mechanism of "voice." Black union members are subject to less racial discrimination but are no less likely to identify themselves as victims of discrimination than black nonunion members. Indeed, black women members are more likely to claim discrimination than their nonunion counterparts. White union members are much more likely to identify themselves as victims of discrimination than non-members even controlling for the erosion of typical racial wage differentials. These findings remain robust across a variety of specifications and suggest that there is something unique about the union setting that encourages complaints.     

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

A Research Note on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This paper examines the hypothesis that mortgage lenders rank applications from better to worst and encourage the better ones to apply. A second ranking occurs when the application is ranked by the loan committee and funds are approved from the top of the list until exhausted. A theoretically correct procedure for analyzing the resulting multivariate ordinal data is the little known rank multiple discriminant analysis. Preliminary results have revealed that this technique produces a "best" model with fewer variables and a higher classification rate than the commonly known multiple discriminant analysis, logit, or probit.