A methodology for constructing a financial systemic stress index: An application to Greece

The paper develops a financial systemic stress index (FSSI) for Greece. We present a novel methodology for constructing and evaluating a systemic stress index which i) adopts the suggestion of Hollo et al. (2012) [“CISS — A ‘Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress’ in the Financial System” ECB working paper] to incorporate time-varying correlations between different market segments, but uses a multivariate GARCH approach which is able to capture abrupt changes in correlations, shown to be a prerequisite for correctly identifying financial crises, ii) utilizes both market and balance sheet data which is a novel feature for systemic stress indicators and iii) evaluates the FSSI utilizing the results of a survey, conducted among financial experts, in order to construct a benchmark chronology of financial crises for Greece, which in turn is used to investigate whether changes in the FSSI are good leading indicators for financial crises. The results show that the FSSI is able to provide a precise periodization of crises. Our findings suggest that accurate depiction of the systematic nature of stress is pivotal in order to provide proper policy guidance with respect to financial crisis identification.     

What impact do differences in financial structure have on the macro effects of bank capital requirements in the United States and Australia?

We investigate the influence of jurisdictional differences in financial structure on the economic consequences of bank capital regulation. We use two disaggregated financial computable general equilibrium models to compare the impacts of identical increases in bank capital adequacy ratios in the U.S. and Australia. In both models, this raises bank equity financing shares, and lowers banks’ risk-weighted asset holdings. Thereafter however, differences in financial structure drive contrasting outcomes: in the U.S., average costs of capital fall, stimulating real investment, while we find the opposite outcome for Australia. We attribute this to differences in the structure of bank assets (U.S. banks hold more risk-free assets) and the importance of banks as intermediaries (bank finance is more important to capital formation in Australia). This may explain why capital regulations encompass non-banks in the U.S. but not Australia.     

The relationship between insurance and economic growth in Europe: a theoretical and empirical analysis

The role of insurance companies, although growing in importance in financial intermediation, has received less attention than bank and stock markets and if so, mainly as a provider of risk transfer in single country or very heterogeneous samples. We investigate both the impact of insurance investment and premiums on GDP growth in Europe. We conduct a cross-country panel data analysis from 1992 to 2005 for 29 European countries. We find a positive impact of life insurance on GDP growth in the EU-15 countries, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. For the New EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, we find a larger impact for liability insurance. Furthermore our findings emphasise the impact of the real interest rate and the level of economic development on the insurance-growth nexus. We argue that the insurance sector needs to be paid more attention in financial sector analysis and macroeconomic policy.

The welfare cost of banking regulation

The Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking sector's stability. Unfortunately, this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive, risky investment projects toward less productive but safer projects. This paper introduces banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a banking crisis is initiated by an aggregated shock (in the risky sector) in a banking system with implicit bailout, and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximal share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off, inherent in this type of regulation, between ensuring banking stability and fostering economic growth. The model implies an optimal level of regulation that prevents crises but at the same time is detrimental to growth. We find that the overall effect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when productivity shocks are sufficiently high (for example, in the subprime banking crisis episode) and economic agents are sufficiently risk-averse. Finally, we find that there is a trade-off between regulating the economy upfront (i.e. before the shock) and facing the challenge of making a huge bailout after the crisis.     

Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications

This study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves.     

Does financial liberalization improve the allocation of investment?: Micro-evidence from developing countries

Using firm level panel data from 12 developing countries we explore whether financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence of a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization.     

What broad banks do, and markets don’t: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.     

Institutions and financial dollarization: Indirect effects based on a policy experiment

We provide evidence that institutional improvements lead to lower levels of financial dollarization through previously unidentified channels. These indirect channels operate in addition to the direct impact identified in the literature and further illustrate the importance of institutions for the extent of banking dollarization.     

基于资本形成机制的林业金融支持体系构建研究

现阶段我国林业发展面临严峻的资本形成不足、资金短缺的困境,林业金融正是为弥补严重资金缺口而出现的一种创新制度安排,其基本职能在于实现对林业资本的动员和配置,林业投资风险规避与防范,以保证林业资本的顺畅循环、周转和有效流动,满足林业发展日益增强的资金需求。通过金融改进与金融创新,林业金融支持理应成为推进我国林业可持续发展的战略性机制和基本途径。本文基于金融战略视角,从林业资本形成、投资效率、金融运行三个维度进行分析,通过林业资本形成缺口模型梳理林业产业发展进程中金融支持的内生逻辑,为林业金融支持框架构建提供了理论依据,提出通过构建林业融资支持体系、林业金融工具创新体系、林业风险防范管理体系和林业收益保障四大体系解决林业资本形成不足的困境。