司法会计鉴定的注意事项

司法会计鉴定是指在诉讼活动中鉴定人运用科学技术或者专门知识对诉讼所涉及的会计专门性问题进行鉴别和判断并提供鉴定意见的活动。从司法会计鉴定的定义及其他相关规定可知,司法会计鉴定执行鉴定人名册制度,主体为进入鉴定人名册的个人及机构,即会计师事务所及执业注册会计师(以下简称"鉴定人")。选择鉴定人     

浅谈鉴定人民事责任

鉴定人的民事责任是中外各国一直探讨的问题。然而,对鉴定人应对什么承担怎样的责任,学界一直没有定论。笔者通过借鉴国内外鉴定人责任制度,并结合我国鉴定人责任现状,对鉴定人应承担的责任进行了一些探讨,以期能使鉴定人的民事责任更合理,从而使我国鉴定制度更加完善。     

试论司法会计鉴定体系的完善

目前我国司法会计鉴定机构主体缺乏规范,没有统一的司法会计技术标准,鉴定结论的采信缺乏统一的规范,鉴定人员责任缺乏规范.应结合我国国情及客观实际,规范鉴定人和鉴定主体资格,建立统一的司法会计鉴定技术标准,限制鉴定权限,建立司法会计鉴定中心,建立追究制度,以保证我国司法会计鉴定健康、有序发展.     

SD商务大厦资产评估项目

为加强资产评估行业的自律管理,规范资产评估机构和注册资产评估师的执业行为,合理界定执业责任,维护资产评估执业机构、注册资产评估师和相关方的合法权益,中国资产评估协会于2006年成立中评协执业责任鉴定委员会,主要负责对资产评估机构及人员的执业行为、评估报告是否违反执业准则及规范进行鉴定,并提供鉴定意见。中评协执业责任鉴定委员会成立后,重点受理了中纪委、最高人民检察院、有关法院及地方资产评估协会委托的案件。为了让广大读者了解涉及评估问题案件的专业鉴定和论证工作并有所启发,     

规范司法会计鉴定体系初探

本文从司法会计鉴定人资格、鉴定机构主体缺乏规范、没有统一的司法会计技术标准、鉴定结论的采信缺乏统一的规范以及鉴定人员责任缺乏规范等五个方面分析当前司法会计鉴定无序混乱的现状及其产生原因,并结合我国国情及客观实际,提出在现有司法会计鉴定体系的基础上,采取规范鉴定人的资格,规范鉴定主体资格,建立统一的司法会计鉴定技术标准,限制鉴定权限,建立司法会计鉴定中心（小组）,以及建立错鉴追究制度等方法以解决司法会计鉴定无序混乱的问题,从而使我国司法会计鉴定工作健康、有序地发展。     

中外司法会计鉴定管理体制及评析

<正>司法会计鉴定的管理体制是指对司法会计鉴定机构的设置、司法会计鉴定人的素质要求和准入制度以及管理机构的规定和管理方法等规范的总称。司法会计鉴定管理体制可分为两部分:司法会计鉴定管理模式和司法会计鉴定主体的规范。     

中国注册会计师协会关于印发《中国注册会计师执业责任鉴定委员会暂行规则》及委员会组成人员名单的通知

会协[2007]101号各省、自治区、直辖市注册会计师协会:为维护社会公众利益,保护注册会计师的合法权益,正确界定注册会计师的执业责任,根据有关法律法规和《中国注册会计师协会章程》等规定,中国注册会计师协会发起设立执业责任鉴定委员会。《中国注册会计师执业责任鉴定委员会暂行规则》和委员会组成人员名单已经中国注册会计师协会第     

关于司法会计鉴定程序中风险防范探讨

在办案过程中,会计专业人员从科学的角度确认证据、认定案件事实,能够弥补司法人员和当事人知识、经验的不足,进一步提高办案效率和办案质量.司法会计鉴定是司法鉴定的一种形式,在鉴定过程中,超业务范围受理、技术能力受限、鉴定思路或方式不对而导致不能达到鉴定要求、鉴定人在执业过程中未能保持职业操守等,会导致一系列的执业风险.审慎受理案件、提升专业能力、持续保持职业操守、鉴定过程中转换鉴定思路等,是防范鉴定程序中所存在相关风险的重要方法.     

中评协在京召开执业责任鉴定委员会会议

为进一步做好资产评估执业责任鉴定工作,2009年2月17日,中评协在京组织召开了执业责任鉴定委员会会议.会议由中评协副秘书长、中评协执业责任鉴定委员会(以下称委员会)主任委员杨松堂主持,副主任委员中国人民大学法学院副院长龙翼飞、副主任委员中国证监会助理巡视员曾长虹及其它各位委员参加了本次会议.     

注册会计师执业责任鉴定若干疑难问题研究

鉴于注册会计师执业行为的高度专业性和证据的复杂性,司法机关查处和审理有关注册会计师执业责任的经济案件时,客观上需要一支独立的力量站在第三者的立场,对注册会计师的执业责任进行鉴定,从而使涉及注册会计师的民事诉讼(包括行政诉讼和民事调解)的审理更为客观公正和有效。注册会计师执业责任鉴定具有专业性、中立性和主客观性相结合的特征,是一种法律服务活动,可以由当事人申请经法院同意后启动或由法院依职权启动。     

Distressed Properties: Valuation Bias and Accuracy

Using New Orleans foreclosure data, where each property has three appraisals (borrower, lender, and referee), we are able to investigate the factors affecting appraisal bias and accuracy for distressed properties. Unconditional analysis shows that on average lender appraisals are higher than referee appraisals, while borrower appraisals are lower than referee appraisals. Much of the bias could be explained by various client and appraiser characteristics. The relation between the client and the appraiser affects valuation bias. Customer employed appraisers tend to give more client friendly valuations than their court appointed counterparts. However, experienced and licensed appraisers render less biased valuations. The appraisal bias does not appear to depend on neighborhood and demographic characteristics. In addition, experienced and licensed appraisers provide materially more accurate valuations. Unlicensed, inexperienced appraisers have an error rate approximately four times worse than licensed, experienced appraisers.     

Regulatory Misconceptions in Pricing Thrift Conversions: A Closer Look at the Appraisal Process

This paper offers a critical evaluation of the appraisal equations used to estimate the value of a thrift, converting from a mutual to stock charter. The paper shows that these regulatory appraisal equations are fundamentally flawed and cause appraisers to use fictitious numbers in their analyses. The consequence of this is quite serious, because the appraisal industry used these flawed equations and appraised the value of 1600 converting thrift institutions to be $16 billion for conversions completed during the 1975–1994 period. The paper calls for a close congressional and regulatory scrutiny of the appraisal process in thrift conversions.     

Reliability of Asset Revaluations: The Impact of Appraiser Independence

In this paper we examine whether there are differences in the reliability of asset revaluations made by boards of directors versus independent (external) appraisers. We use a sample of recognized Australian asset revaluations. As a first step we examine the determinants of the choice between director-based revaluations and those undertaken by independent appraisers. We find that independent appraisers are more likely to be used for revaluations of land and buildings and directors are more likely for investments, plant and equipment and identifiable intangibles. We interpret this as evidence of firms harnessing directors' knowledge of asset specificities. We also find that firms with less independent boards are more likely to use independent appraisers. We interpret this as evidence of substitutability between governance mechanisms.As for differences in reliability, we find that revaluations of plant and equipment that are made by independent appraisers are more reliable than those by directors. However, we are unable to detect a difference for other classes of non-current assets. We define reliability in terms of ex-post adjustments of recognized value increases. Reliability is determined by an examination of the extent to which upward revaluations are subsequently reversed.     

External Monitoring of Property Appraisal Estimates and Information Asymmetry

Finance theory proposes that firms' cost of capital increases when market makers set wider spreads due to perceived higher information asymmetry across traders. Using a sample of UK investment property firms and controlling for firms' non-random selection of external monitors, we find evidence that market makers perceive information asymmetry across traders to be lower for firms employing external appraisers versus those employing internal appraisers. This evidence is consistent with liquidity-motivated traders being unable to overcome such reliability differences using asset value information from sources other than accounting. We fail to find a similar difference for firms employing Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors. Our findings contribute to the debate over the recognition of fair value estimates for long-lived tangible assets by documenting that reliability differences attributable to differential monitoring by appraisers can affect information asymmetry, and therefore firms' cost of capital.     

司法会计鉴定风险控制研究

司法会计鉴定与审计不同,会计师事务所在从事司法会计鉴定业务时应掌握两者之间的区别,防止产生鉴定风险.鉴定受理时应保证程序合法,量力而行;鉴定过程中确保鉴定材料充足、真实合法,恰当运用引用技术标准,缜密推理、慎做结论;依照有关条件和要求出具鉴定书;庭审时应尽量使用通俗易懂的语言,恰当运用证明技巧,促使法官采信正确的鉴定结论.     

Information Producers and Valuation: Evidence from Real Estate Markets

This paper examines valuation and its relation to information production by licensed appraisers across real estate markets. The testable implications are discussed for either a peer monitoring or a crowding out effect in the data. The empirical model is estimated with data for all 50 US states and DC covering the sample period from 1999 to 2008. While analysis is primarily cross-sectional and not causal, the evidence is consistent with theory stating that the minimum quality associated with residential licensure standards may be too low. In contrast, the evidence suggests certified residential standards afford information producers the opportunity to signal or information consumers the ability to screen based on quality.     

按市场原则构建风险管理机制与管理理念--澳大利亚联邦银行风险管理机制与文化考察及启示

解决我国国有商业银行存在的巨额不良资产问题,必须严控增量风险,同时切断继续累加存量风险的渠道.为此,借鉴澳大利亚联邦银行风险管理的经验,国有商业银行要按"一放、一垂直、一集中"的思路调整信贷链中相关部门的职责和管理架构,实现政策制定和执行相分离、独立性的风险集中评价及对风险放大客户的信用恢复等;此外,建立"垂直领导、集中管理、派驻监督"的稽核体制,并以"零容忍"维护制度执行;在考核上要以风险揭示、风险处理和结果反映等指标相互配合,使风险考核覆盖资产运行全过程;同时,将风险管理理念作为一种企业文化融入各项经营之中.     

综合收益列报、估值判断和盈余管理识别的实验研究——基于评估师认知视角

估值判断会因综合收益列报模式的不同而有差异,因此利用实验设计检验了列报模式对评估师估值判断的影响,及其识别盈余管理的能力。调查和分析表明不同的综合收益列报模式对评估判断的影响不存在显著差异,符合中国评估行业现状;评估师能够识别盈余管理,但综合收益和它的组成部分的详细披露并没有显著增强公司盈余管理的透明度。     

The Association Between Qualified Opinions and Auditor Switches

The question of whether auditors who qualify their opinions are more likely to face dismissal is investigated. The evidence presented in respect of Australian practice is consistent with managers ‘switching auditors more frequently following qualification, with ‘new’ auditors giving unqualified opinions, and with the likelihood of an unqualified opinion being independent of the type of qualification and whether the new’ auditor was Big Eight or non Big Eight.