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1.
Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection,
in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including
some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an
outside option of positive value.
Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997 相似文献
2.
Niels Anthonisen 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):143-169
Summary. The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs,
where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point
rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these
conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what
is predicted by rationalizability.
Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
3.
Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index,
defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces
the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 相似文献
4.
Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
5.
Summary. By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable
utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players.
It is well-known that balancedness is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non-transferable
utility game. In this paper we consider non-transferable utility games in which for any coalition the set of payoffs depends
on a permutation or ordering upon any partition of the coalition into subcoalitions. We call such a game a cooperative game
in permutational structure or shortly permutational game. Doing so we extend the scope of the standard cooperative game theory
in dealing with economic or political problems. Next we define the concept of core for such games. By introducing balancedness
for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced non-transferable utility permutational
game. Moreover we show that the core of a permutational game coincides with the core of an induced game in coalitional structure,
but that balancedness of the permutational game need not imply balancedness of the corresponding coalitional game. This leads
to a weakening of the conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a game in coalitional structure, induced by a game
in permutational structure. Furthermore, we refine the concept of core for the class of permutational games. We call this
refinement the balanced-core of the game and show that the balanced-core of a balanced permutational game is a nonempty subset
of the core. The proof of the nonemptiness of the core of a permutational game is based on a new intersection theorem on the
unit simplex, which generalizes the well-known intersection theorem of Shapley.
Received: October 31, 1995; revised version: February 5, 1997 相似文献
6.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):221-227
Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave.
Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997 相似文献
7.
John Wooders 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):215-224
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
8.
Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle
when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare
ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space
the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering
must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility
theorem is obtained.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996 相似文献
9.
Robert Wilson 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):433-440
Summary. The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal
distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If
the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior
distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations.
A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the
predictions derived from the model.
Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997 相似文献
10.
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):563-584
Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We
prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where
we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary
short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations
equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive
compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all
its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996 相似文献
11.
Akira Okada 《Games and Economic Behavior》2011,73(1):227-235
We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. 相似文献
12.
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation
after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities
is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements.
Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations,
in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability
that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist.
In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early. 相似文献
13.
Summary. We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
14.
Diana Richards 《Economic Theory》1997,10(1):185-193
Summary. This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most
well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas
from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation
of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.
Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996 相似文献
15.
Keith Waehrer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):171-181
Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original
purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies
that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary
good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary
good is determined through sequential bargaining.
Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997 相似文献
16.
Benyamin Shitovitz 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):559-563
Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function,
given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of
economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions
yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically,
and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers.
Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996 相似文献
17.
Summary. We show that when bankruptcy, subject to penalties, is allowed, it is possible to prove the existence of equilibrium in a model with a continuum of states without imposing any assumptions on ex-post endowments.Received: November 20, 1995; revised version: September 16, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
18.
Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto
optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call
the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the
only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are
indifferent among all the allocations in it.
Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997 相似文献
19.
In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are “absolutely powerful” while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion. 相似文献
20.
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning
to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a
sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献