Maybe It’s Right,Maybe It’s Wrong: Structural and Social Determinants of Deception in Negotiation

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables—regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness—interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission, whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience fit between power and regulatory focus, whereas affect-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience misfit between these structural context variables. We conclude that regulatory focus primes different moral templates: promotion-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by moral pragmatism, whereas prevention-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by opportunism. Because each combination of power and regulatory focus was tied to a specific subcomponent of trust, we further conclude that negotiators engage in motivated information search to determine whether they should deceive their opponents.     

Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation.     

Perceptions of High Integrity Can Persist After Deception: How Implicit Beliefs Moderate Trust Erosion

Scholars have assumed that trust is fragile: difficult to build and easily broken. We demonstrate, however, that in some cases trust is surprisingly robust—even when harmful deception is revealed, some individuals maintain high levels of trust in the deceiver. In this paper, we describe how implicit theories moderate the harmful effects of revealed deception on a key component of trust: perceptions of integrity. In a negotiation context, we show that people who hold incremental theories (beliefs that negotiating abilities are malleable) reduce perceptions of their counterpart’s integrity after they learn that they were deceived, whereas people who hold entity theories (beliefs that negotiators’ characteristics and abilities are fixed) maintain their first impressions after learning that they were deceived. Implicit theories influenced how targets interpreted evidence of deception. Individuals with incremental theories encoded revealed deception as an ethical violation; individuals with entity theories did not. These findings highlight the importance of implicit beliefs in understanding how trust changes over time.     

Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy, and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative, and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns is a Professor of Management (Negotiations) at the Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on communication processes in negotiation. In her research, she has investigated how strategy sequences shape negotiation outcomes. She is extending this research to investigate how impressions and communication shape trust in negotiation. Her work on communication processes in negotiation has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Philip L. Smith is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. His primary research interest is in building quantitative models of the human visual system. He also applies his modeling expertise to analyses of communication processes in negotiation, focusing on the relationships between situational and dispositional factors, strategy sequences and negotiation outcomes. It has been published in leading management and psychology journals, including Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Authors' Note The research reported in this paper was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. We thank Ania Ratzik and Rudi Crncec for assistance with data coding. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia or via email to m.olekalns@mbs.edu     

Ethical reasoning in business‐to‐business negotiations: evidence from relationships in the chemical industry in Germany

This article explores managers’ ethical reasoning for behaviors in price negotiations using evidence from 15 in‐depth interviews conducted with sales and purchasing representatives in the chemical industry in Germany. Applying transaction cost economics, we find that negotiators in commoditized market‐like exchanges either refer to deontological norms such as not to lie, or they neglect a role for ethics, arguing that distributive negotiation is per se opportunistic. In contrast, exchanges of products with higher asset specificity lead to stronger informational integration which is supported with teleological justifications. Some negotiators use teleological justification to build business on trust rather than on economic safeguards as their firm norms would require. For negotiators, our results suggest considering institutional context and adjusting ethical reasoning to the negotiation situation. Firms need to recognize and find ways to address the potential conflicts of their internal norms with their frontline managers’ attempts to act in the firms’ best economic and ethical interests.     

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

We investigate how a key structural aspect of negotiation—power—combines with aspiration level to affect the interaction pattern of negotiators. Conflicting research findings have revealed that in most cases negotiators with anequal balance of power reach agreements of higher joint gain than negotiators with an unequal power balance, but in some instances the opposite result has been found. We suggest that it is important to consider the interaction between the negotiators to explain these varying findings. We propose that when unequal power negotiators are able to reach agreements of high joint gain it is due to the efforts of the low power party. In addition, we argue that the low power player will be most likely to drive the search for a solution of high joint gain when he or she also has high aspirations. We tested these proposals in a market negotiation with integrative potential. To examine the pattern of negotiation, all offers and counter-offers were written. The results indicated that overall, equal power dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than unequal power dyads. Under unequal power, the hypothesis that higher joint outcomes would be obtained when the low power player had high aspirations received partial support. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that in unequal power dyads low power players would be responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain.     

Formation of Procedural Justice Judgments in Legal Negotiation

Research has indicated that procedural justice—fairness of decisionmaking processes—plays an important role in bilateral legal negotiation, encouraging the acceptance of negotiated agreements. Additionally, research has suggested that procedural justice leads to opportunities for increased integrative bargaining. However, procedural justice judgments are typically measured as subjective assessments by disputants. If procedural justice plays an important role in legal dispute negotiation, it is critical to understand how individuals form judgments about fairness of process. The study presented explores antecedents of procedural justice judgments in legal negotiation. Results suggest that although all potential identified antecedent variables—voice, courtesy/respect, trust, and neutrality—play a role in judgments about procedural justice, the primary component is courtesy/respect behavior by the speaker and her partner. Parties share some agreement about the presence of courtesy/respect behavior and trust behavior, and third-party coders can identify behavior that reliably relates to the parties’ procedural justice antecedent assessments. Additionally, results indicate that appeals to potential “neutral” benchmarks such as legal authority lead to lower assessments of procedural justice. These findings suggest that courtesy and respect are the primary drivers of negotiators’ procedural justice assessments, and that such courtesy/respect behavior is not merely a subjective artifact of the participant but can be observed by a third-party coder.     

Resolving the empty core: trust as a determinant of outcomes in three-party negotiations

This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a three-party negotiation. Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution. We tested which of three components of trust—reliability, predictability and empathy—predicted negotiators’ outcomes. We distinguished between absolute and relative trust. We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The component of trust that predicted individuals’ outcomes was affected by structural power. High and low power negotiators benefited from conveying empathy (identity-based trust), whereas moderate power negotiators benefited from conveying predictability (knowledge-based trust). Low power parties also benefited from appearing unreliable (low calculus-based trust). The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2002 International Association of Conflict Management Conference, Park City, Utah.     

The effects of reciprocation wariness on negotiation behavior and outcomes

This study examined the influence of reciprocation wariness, a general fear of exploitation in interpersonal relationships, on negotiators’ motivational orientation, direct information sharing and negotiation outcomes. We predicted that low-wary negotiators are more likely to be prosocial and to engage in direct information sharing, and low-wary negotiators will perceive their opponents more positively after the negotiation. We asked 150 graduate students of business administration to formed 75 dyads to participate in a simulated business negotiation, each taking the role of a buyer or a seller. The results showed that reciprocation wariness had a significant effect on negotiators’ motivational orientation and the amount of information sharing. Negotiating dyads with low–low reciprocation wariness got higher joint gains than those with high–high reciprocation wariness, and information sharing fully mediated the relationship. After the negotiation, low-wary negotiators evaluated the other party more positively and were more willing to interact with their opponents in the future. Contributions and limitations are discussed.     

Mediation with Incomplete Information: Approaches to Suggest Potential Agreements

In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case of complete information. In this context, since the negotiators know the value functions of both parties, it is not difficult to calculate the Pareto efficient solutions for the negotiation. Thus rational negotiators can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these approaches are not applied in practice when complete information is not available. The research question of our work is “It is possible to help negotiators achieving an efficient solution in the absence of complete information regarding the different parameters of the model?”. We propose to derive incomplete information about the preferences of negotiators from the statements they make and the offers they exchange during the negotiation process. We present and discuss three approaches that use this information in order to help a mediator proposing a better solution than the compromise the negotiators have reached or are close to reach.     

The ethical profile of global marketing negotiators

As international trade and business opportunities grow globally, insight into trading partners’ strategies is essential. One of the major strategies that impact trading partners’ relationships is negotiation strategy employed by each partner. These strategies assume even greater importance when these strategies have ethical content. This study examines the effects of marketing executives’ preferred ethical ideologies (relativism and idealism), opportunism and Machiavellianism on their perceived appropriateness of unethical negotiation tactics. Utilizing a sample of 995 marketing executives from six countries, cluster analysis and multivariate analysis of variance revealed two types of marketing negotiators: principled and corrupt negotiators. Corrupt negotiators tend to be more Machiavellian, more relativist, more opportunistic and less idealistic than their principled counterparts. Principled negotiators tend to perceive unethical negotiation tactics less favorably than their corrupt counterparts. Implications of these results for practitioners and directions for future research are discussed.     

Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations

This study examined the role of trust via contingency model in a multi-issue multi-party negotiation setting and how it relates to outcomes. Results of a laboratory experiment with 288 undergraduate students confirmed both a main effect of Social Value Orientations (SVO), such that cooperative negotiators achieved higher joint gains than pro-self negotiators, and a main effect of Motivational Orientations (MO), such that pro-social negotiators attained higher joint gains than egoistic-oriented negotiators. Furthermore, the predicted interaction effect between SVO and MO, such that negotiators with a pro-self SVO attained higher joint gains in a pro-social, in contrast to an egoistic MO, condition was confirmed. This effect was fully mediated by trust. The dimension of trust that explained the SVO and MO interaction was that of concern for fellow negotiators as rated by oneself, as well as by an objective third-party observer. Implications for the strategic use of social motives and trust on effective information exchange and negotiated outcomes are discussed.     

Deception Performance in Online Group Negotiation and Decision Making: The Effects of Deception Experience and Deception Skill

Deception in computer-mediated group Negotiation and decision making presents a variety of risks. Gaining a better understanding of online deception has important implications for both individuals and organizations. Despite the rapidly increasing number of online deception cases reported in recent years, extant deception research has not considered the context beyond individuals or small groups. Additionally, there has been a mismatch between the important role of individual characteristics of the deceiver in theory and the lack of empirical investigation of their impact in research. This study aims to assess deception performance in mid-sized online groups by building a model of individual differences in deception experience and deception skill. We conceptualize deception performance in terms of deception success and two other new constructs, namely survivability and productivity. The model has been tested with a dataset collected from a real-world online community. The results show that deception skill has a positive effect on deception success, but deception experience has a negative effect. Although deception experience and deception skill are found to have opposite effects on the success of deceivers, both contribute positively to the survivability of deceivers. The findings of this study have significant implications for future deception research in online group communication and negotiation.     

Good Grief! Anxiety Sours the Economic Benefits of First Offers

Two studies tested whether making first offers influences negotiators’ feelings of anxiety and their sense of satisfaction. The results of Study 1 show that the strategy of making the first offer led to decreased levels of satisfaction with the negotiation process and outcomes. This effect was mediated by perceived feelings of anxiety. Study 2 discerned that anxiety about making the first offer derived from self-perception concerns, represented as anxiety about being taken advantage of by the opposing party. In both studies, anxiety led negotiators who made the first offer to be relatively less satisfied with the negotiation, than negotiators who did not make the first offer, despite the increased economic gains associated with making the first offer.     

Dancing on the Slippery Slope: The Effects of Appropriate Versus Inappropriate Competitive Tactics on Negotiation Process and Outcome

As negotiation is critical to all forms of organizational decision-making, researchers have shown an interest in understanding how the flow of information (valid and otherwise) influences this process. Often, competitive, questionable, and unethical tactics have been treated as interchangeable in these studies, despite presumed differences in appropriateness. The purpose of this study was to examine the similarities and differences in negotiators’ use and efficacy of appropriate competitive tactics (e.g., exaggerated offers) versus inappropriate competitive tactics (e.g., factual misrepresentations), primarily through a negotiation simulation. The study found that although these two categories of tactics were correlated in terms of overall use, appropriate competitive behaviors were used more frequently, especially early in negotiations, and these behaviors often resulted in comparable responses from counterparts. While ultimately increasing the likelihood of a negotiation impasse, the use of appropriate competitive tactics improved an individual’s substantive outcome where agreements could be reached. Inappropriate competitive tactics were likely to increase in number the sooner they were first employed in negotiations, with a response of inappropriate competitive tactics to the first use of competitive tactics increasing the likelihood of subsequent use of inappropriate tactics. The implications of these and other findings for both practitioners and future research are discussed.     

An empirical study of an interactive,session-oriented computerized Negotiation Support System (NSS)

Negotiating is one of the four major decisional roles played by managers. In fact, resolving conflict is said to occupy 20% of a manager's working hours. This growing frequency of negotiation scenarios coupled with the increasing complexity of the issues which need to be resolved in a negotiation make the possibility of computer enhancement for negotiation very appealing. Implementations of computerized Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) in the business world, international affairs, labor law, and environmental and safety disputes have demonstrated their potential for making negotiation problems more manageable and comprehensible for negotiators. Still, pioneers in NSS research have expressed their dismay at the lack of rigorous empirical research and evaluation of NSS. In particular, research is needed which will determine how and under what circumstances negotiation processes can be enhanced by NSS support.This article describes empirical research on the effects of a highly structured, interactive NSS on the outcome of face-to-face issues resolution and the attitudes of negotiators in both low- and high-conflict situations. In a laboratory experiment, bargaining dyads played the roles of manufacturers negotiating a four-issue, three-year purchase agreement for an engine subcomponent in conditions of high and low conflict of interest. The results of the study showed that NSS support did help bargainers achieve higher joint outcomes and more balanced contracts, but that the NSS support increased negotiation time. Satisfaction was greater for NSS dyads in both conflict levels, and perceived negative climate was reduced in low conflict.One primary implication of the results of this study is that NSS developers should keep in mind the importance of providing users with a system with interactive qualities which not only enhance the decision-making process but also provide them with a sense of participation in reaching the solution, as was done in this study.     

Deceitful when insecure: The effect of self-efficacy beliefs on the use of deception in negotiations

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship.     

Getting the Floor: Motive-Consistent Strategy and Individual Outcomes in Multi-Party Negotiations

Social motives influence negotiators actions and reactions. In this study we proposed that social motives moderate the relationship between persistence in the use of integrative or distributive negotiation strategy and individual outcomes in 33 four-person mixed-motive negotiations. Cooperative negotiators who persisted in using integrative strategy achieved higher outcomes than those who did not persist. Persistence in the use of integrative strategy did not pay off for individualistic negotiators in this multi-party setting. We theorized that this pattern of results was due to cooperative and individualistic negotiators using strategy differently. We found that cooperative negotiators used more motive-consistent integrative strategy and less motive-inconsistent distributive strategy than individualistic negotiators, whose pattern of strategy use was consistent with their self-interested motives, providing evidence for our motive consistency theory.     

Negotiating with the Chinese: Are They More Likely to Use Unethical Strategies?

It is always a challenge to deal with ethical dilemmas in negotiations and it is even more difficult when the other party is from a different culture. Understanding the differences between what is ethically appropriate and what is not in an international context has thus become important for a better understanding of different negotiation practices across the globe. This study explores the likelihood of Chinese negotiators’ using unethical strategies in negotiations by examining Chinese managerial employees’ perceived appropriateness of five categories of ethically questionable strategies. The results show that, in comparison with their counterparts from the USA, Chinese managers are more likely to consider it appropriate to use ethically questionable negotiation strategies in all five categories except the traditional bargaining strategies. In addition, contrary to the West where women tend to maintain higher ethical standards, no gender difference is found in China in the perceived appropriateness of using these strategies in all but one category. Implications for negotiation practitioners and international managers that often participate in international negotiations with the Chinese are then discussed, along with potential future research directions.     

Hot Versus Cool Behavioural Styles in Electronic Negotiations: The Impact of Communication Mode

In this paper, we study the effects of synchronous and asynchronous communication mode on electronic negotiations. By applying content analysis, we compare the negotiation processes of two e-negotiation simulations conducted in a synchronous and an asynchronous setting. Our results show significant differences in communication behaviour of subjects. Synchronous negotiation mode leads to less friendly, more affective, and more competitive negotiation behaviour. In the asynchronous communication mode, negotiators exchange more private and task-oriented information and are friendlier. These results suggest that negotiators in the asynchronous mode, who have more time to reflect, cool down and control emotions better while negotiators, who communicate synchronously engage more in emotional and competitive “hot” debates. In addition, negotiators in the asynchronous mode are more satisfied with the process and outcome of the negotiation. We conclude that de-individuation and escalating effects might be caused by communication mode rather than by the ability of the media to transmit social cues.