论公司慈善捐赠的信息披露——制度构建的必要性与可行性研究

公司慈善捐赠信息披露问题在国内外存在很大争议。是否要求公司强制披露慈善捐赠信息要考虑公司慈善捐赠对理性投资者的影响以及公司保护自身商业秘密的需求,而公司慈善捐赠信息披露对伦理投资者的投资选择也有重大影响。公司具有自愿披露慈善捐赠信息的动机,但在我国建立以强制性信息披露为主的慈善捐赠信息披露制度。是为了保护公司利益相关者的知情权、规制公司经营者在慈善捐赠中可能出现的自利行为和不负责行为。当前我国公司慈善捐赠信息披露还存在很大的随意性和不一致性,我国《公司法》、《征券法l-》应明确规定公司慈善捐赠信息披露的形式、内容,要求公司强制披露重大慈善捐赠的决策主体、决议程序、捐赠数额、捐赠对象、受赠人与公司经营层的关系等信息,并建立信息披露豁免配套制度。     

Optimal Income Tax Enforcement under Prospect Theory

Prospect theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to expected utility theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are nonincreasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT.     

Effects of tax benefits on the price elasticity of charitable contributions in South Korea

Using South Korean panel data from 2008 to 2019 and censored quantile regression method, this study calculates the effects of different tax incentives on charitable contributions. We observe price elasticity under two different tax-benefit systems in South Korea and find that, first, taxpayers tend to be more sensitive to tax incentives under a tax deduction system than a tax credit system. The price elasticity gap between a tax deduction and tax credit is approximately −2.3 to −1.0. Second, we show the existence of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ behaviour: the price elasticity of charitable contributions exhibits a convex shape, where more significant donors have lesser reactions to tax incentives. We further show that socioeconomic contexts, such as income, gender, marital status, and education, affect people's attitudes. In sum, the results are as expected: tax deductions work more efficiently than tax credits.     

企业避税与年报可读性

避税活动加剧了企业的信息不对称，管理层在信息披露中是否会采用晦涩的文本信息掩盖避税行为？本文利用2008—2017年中国A股上市公司数据，考察企业避税对年报可读性的影响及其机制。结果发现，避税活动越多，企业年报采用的复杂词汇就越多，年报可读性就越差。在运用工具变量弱化内生性问题、更替年报可读性指标与企业避税指标、考虑递延所得税信息披露和税收政策影响等一系列稳健性检验后，避税行为降低企业年报可读性的结论依然成立。机制分析发现会计信息质量在避税行为对年报可读性的影响中发挥了部分中介作用，避税活动通过降低会计信息质量削弱了年报可读性，信息披露中文本信息与数字信息相配合的观点从企业避税视角得到了验证。此外，在无税收优惠、递延所得税负债较多和外部治理环境较差的企业中，避税降低年报可读性的现象更为明显。因此，规范企业税收制度能够减少企业避税、限制管理层寻租行为，促进税收透明化，从而提高企业的信息披露质量。     

Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.     

Who participates in tax avoidance? Evidence from Swedish microdata

This article empirically examines why not all individuals participate in tax avoidance. We use rich Swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers, with a link between corporate and individual tax returns and document that few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities. Our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation. In addition to monetary benefits from tax avoidance (incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance (access), as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are important factors for the individual’s tax avoidance decision. We further show that tax avoidance spreads within communities. The impact of the local network is stronger for non-commuters who live and work in the same municipality.     

Progressive Taxation, Tax Exemption, and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty

We analyze the impact of progressive taxation on irreversible investment under uncertainty. We show that if tax exemption is lower than sunk cost, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption exceeds sunk cost, three different regimes arise. For “small” volatilities the optimal investment threshold is a positive function of volatility, but independent of tax rate. For “medium” volatilities it is independent of both tax rate and volatility. Finally, for “high” volatilities the optimal investment threshold depends positively on volatility, but negatively on tax rate so that we have “tax paradox”.     

Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion

This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.We wish to thank Johann K. Brunner and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior

The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results. The information includes “official” information disseminated by the tax authority, and “unofficial”, or informal, communications among taxpayers. Our results indicate that the effect of the type of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well informed of the audit rate prior to filing. We find that the tax authority would be served by pre-announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort.     

Public policy for reducing tax evasion: implications of the Yule–Simpson paradox

The current study exhibits a new implication of the Yule–Simpson paradox with public policy repercussions. We construct Laffer curves of local property tax collection based on aggregated data and group division to residential land uses in Jerusalem. Results indicate that based on aggregated (dis-aggregated) data, the location of owner-occupiers and renters who pay a relatively high rate tariff will be on the upward-sloping (downward-sloping) part of the Laffer curve. Consequently, statistical test outcomes support Laffer’s controversial claim that for the few upper-brackets taxpayers, an efficient collection is associated with tax reduction rather than tax increase.     

TAXES,INCOME, AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS: DIFFERENCES BY PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INCOME

This article examines the determinants of and benefits from saving for retirement in tax‐preferred accounts by permanent and transitory income levels. We find that higher incomes (both permanent and transitory) are associated with a greater probability to contribute and larger contributions. We also find that tax benefits for retirement savings increase strongly with income, although the increase is slightly smaller when taxpayers are ranked by their permanent (rather than current) income. In addition, we find that a large portion of the benefits from the Saver's Credit go to taxpayers who would not be eligible based on their permanent income. Finally, we find that recent tax changes (including the introduction of the Saver's Credit) significantly increased contributions among low‐income households, although the effect was centered among those with only transitorily low income. (JEL H24, H31, E21)     

纳税信用评级结果披露与研发投入

以纳税信用评级披露作为一个天然外生冲击,并基于2013—2016年1214家A股上市公司的微观数据构造准自然实验,使用双重差分法系统评估纳税信用评级结果披露对上市公司研发投入的影响。结果发现:纳税信用评级结果披露显著增加了上市公司的研发投入。基于PSM-DID方法的估计结果与上述结论无明显差异。稳健性检验也表明上述结论的正确性。机制检验表明,纳税信用评级结果披露通过降低企业的融资约束,进而促进企业增加研发投入。此外,分样本回归发现纳税信用评级结果披露只能对中小型企业和民营企业的研发投入产生促进作用。     

Distributive justice in taxation

A classical criterion for apportioning taxes is that all should sacrifice equally in loss of utility. Suppose that a method of apportioning taxes is continuous and has the following four properties: (i) the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable incomes; (ii) an increase in the tax total implies that everyone pays more; (iii) every incremental increase in tax is apportioned according to taxpayers' current after-tax incomes; (iv) the ordering of taxpayers by pre-tax income and after-tax income is the same. Then there exists a utility function relative to which all sacrifice equally.     

The Efficiency of State Taxes on Mobile Labour Income

We model a federation where States levy a tax on the wage income of mobile citizens who shop between States for their preferred tax and public policy package. It is shown that competition between States results in efficient State spending but that the taxes on wage income are inefficient in the sense that mobile taxpayers are allocated inefficiently across States. The implication is that if States tax the wage income of mobile workers, there may be benefits from policy competition (a more competitive federal system) but also costs associated with the inefficiency. The central government can correct for the inefficiency, but this requires a complex system of inter-State transfers that are difficult to implement in practice.     

Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias: Behavioral Responses to Tax Labels

This article studies behavioral responses to taxes in financial markets. It is motivated by recent puzzling empirical evidence of taxable municipal bond yields significantly exceeding the level expected relative to tax exempt bonds. A behavioral explanation is a tax aversion bias, the phenomenon that people perceive an additional burden associated with tax payments. We conduct market experiments on the trading of differently taxed and labeled securities. The data show an initial overvaluation of tax payments that diminishes when subjects gain experience. The tax deduction of expenses is valued more than an equivalent tax exemption of earnings. We find that the persistence of the tax aversion bias critically depends on the quality of feedback. This suggests that tax aversion predominantly occurs in one-time, unfamiliar financial decisions and to a lesser extent in repetitive choices.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

Are Tax Expenditures of Individuals Only a Tool of Tax Optimisation?

The paper focuses on tax expenditures of individuals, which are one of the fiscal tools of the state. In the Czech Republic they are primarily aimed at housing policy, pension policy, and philanthropy, and the question is the extent to which tax expenditures can influence the preferences of tax payers. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of tax expenditures of individuals in the form of tax deductions for social policy, housing support and retirement savings. We also evaluate whether these tax deductions fulfill the fiscal functions for which they were introduced and the extent to which taxpayers use them. Methodically, the research is based on the analysis of secondary statistical data of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic and results from aggregated tax returns filed for the period 2005–2015. The effect of tax deductions was decreased by abolition of the progressive rate of personal income taxes and by introduction of a uniform tax rate of 15%. Tax deductions for retirement savings do not have a sufficiently strong motivational impact and do not affect taxpayers in the context of public policy. Deductions for mortgage interest can be regarded as a form of major housing support, but are related to taxpayer income and favor those with higher incomes.     

财政收入最大化与地方政府地价竞争

本文借鉴制度经济学研究方法,将中央政府的若干治理手段嵌入到地方政府地价决定函数中,对财政收入最大化与地方政府地价竞争的治理策略做比较制度分析。本文认为,地方政府在地价决定中具有产业间边际财政总收入均等化的动机,适度提高农地征收价格以及服务业税负,有助于压缩地方政府的恶性竞争空间。产业性税收优惠政策可能只对那些租赁而不是持有地产的经营者才有效,可以考虑适度增加住宅所有者的税负来实现“增税降费”的财政收入结构调整,同时继续维持对营业场所以租赁为主的知识密集型服务业的税收优惠。     

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of sellers' information.This article analyzes two questions regarding disclosure: (i)Why wouldn't sellers voluntarily disclose their information?and (ii) Who gains and who loses with mandatory disclosure?Previous analyses assume that all customers are knowledgeableenough to understand a seller's disclosure, and a key resultis that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntarydisclosure is forthcoming, or if it is not, no one prefers mandatorydisclosure. We generalize the standard model by consideringthe case in which not all customers understand a seller's disclosure.We show that if the fraction of customers who can understanda disclosure is too low, voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming.If so, mandatory disclosure benefits informed customers, isneutral for uninformed customers, and harms the seller. Ourresults suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure inmarkets where product information is relatively difficult tounderstand.