软件信息业研发投入、研发费用加计扣除与企业绩效实证研发

选取上海、深圳证券市场软件信息业171家高新技术企业2012-2015年的相关数据,针对研发投入、研发费用加计扣除与企业绩效三者间的关系进行研究。结果表明,研发费用加计扣除与研发投入和企业绩效显著正相关,加计扣除政策实施效果较好,政府应给予企业更多的加计扣除优惠;根据面板数据模型估计结果,研发投入与企业绩效存在非线性关系,研发投入对当期绩效的抑制作用不明显,对滞后一期绩效有显著抑制作用,对滞后两期绩效正向作用不明显。研发投入经济效益回收存在一定的滞后性,根据分位数回归结果,处于50%分位点的企业研发投入对企业绩效的正向作用最大;分组回归结果显示,研发费用加计扣除优惠对研发投入与企业绩效的关系具有正向调节作用。     

Heterogeneous Academic‐Industry Knowledge Linkage,Heterogeneous IPR,and Growth

Empirical evidence shows the existence of relevant spillovers from the stock of academic basic knowledge on industry. Interestingly, such spillovers are highly specific in that firms’ academic learning responds strongly to federally funded R&D in closely affiliated universities. Moreover, with the aim of enhancing such a technological transfer from academia to industry, the policy design of many OECD countries allows worthy academic ideas to be granted the same intellectual property rights (IPR) as industrial innovations. In distinguishing the stages of an R&D process within a dynamic general equilibrium model, this paper explicitly considers both industrial and government R&D efforts, with heterogeneous academic knowledge spillovers among industry lines. The results show that both the industrial R&D effort and the growth rate are spurred more by a “softer” IPR regime granted to academic ideas than by an increase in the industrial R&D subsidy.     

International Trade Policy towards Monopoly and Oligopoly*

This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous R&D in determining the optimal R&D policy, in a model where investment in cost‐reducing R&D is committed before firms compete in a differentiated‐goods third‐country export market. R&D is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. In contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be active or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a reversal in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product differentiation changes or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of R&D promotion.     

The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment: Empirical evidence from Korea

Despite the wide belief that the high social rates of returns to R&D investment justify government subsidy policy in advanced countries, there are only limited studies about whether the R&D subsidy as a means of risk-sharing stimulates R&D investment of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. This paper empirically investigates the issue, using a unique data set on government subsidy for new technology development of Korean manufacturing firms, listed and non-listed, for the period from 2000 to 2007. The paper employs the DID estimation procedure and controls for simultaneity of the subsidy for new technology development using 2SLS and two step Tobit procedure. Our empirical results show that there is no solid evidence for crowding-out effects of the government subsidy. These results suggest that government subsidies could help SMEs to overcome the barriers to risky R&D projects through sharing R&D failure risk with government and by reducing capital costs to undertake new technology development projects, and thus the subsidy policy for new technology development seems to be partly successful in promoting the R&D investment of the Korean SMEs.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

International talent inflow and R&D investment: Firm-level evidence from China

Using firm-level R&D data with regional international talent data, we find that international talent increases the R&D investment of Chinese manufacturing firms, a result that is further confirmed with patent data and under a number of robustness checks. These findings stem from two mechanisms: international talent boosts human capital accumulation and provides a diversified labor force. Further, the R&D promoting effect is stronger if firms are located in eastern China rather than in other regions, of small and medium-sized rather than large-sized, of domestic ownership rather than foreign ownership. The policy implication is, the introduction of international talent can be a new way to promoting R&D investment, especially for skilled-labor constrained countries.     

Foreign and domestic R&D investment

A considerable share of R&D investment is due to multinational firms that simultaneously operate R&D bases at home and abroad. We develop a simple model of foreign and domestic R&D investment and test the model's predictions on a sample of 146 Japanese multinational firms’ R&D investments in Japan and the United States in 1996. The empirical results confirm that the foreign to domestic R&D ratio depends on relative technological opportunities and relative demand conditions, with foreign research expenditures responding to technological opportunity and foreign development expenditures responding to demand.     

Does antidumping cause investment and R&D?: Evidence from Turkey

This article employs Turkish firm-level data and analyses the effect of antidumping protection on capital spending and Research and Development (R&D). Using matching techniques and alternative control groups and applying difference-in-difference methodology, we find that antidumping duties imposed by the Turkish government significantly increase fixed investment and R&D expenditures. We also show that antidumping duties are effective in terms of increasing the domestic sales. To our knowledge, our article represents the first attempt to analyse the effect of antidumping policy in Turkey, a very active user of temporary trade barriers, using firm-level data.     

Multistage R&D competition and patent policy

In this paper a model of multistage R&D patent policy is investigated. We study the impact of the duration of patent protection for intermediate products on R&D races when the discovery of the final product requires the accomplishment of an intermediate step. Using a multistage model where firms choose their levels of research investment at each stage, we find all subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. We also determine how competition affects a firm's level of research investment at different stages of the R&D competition.     

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.     

Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to analyze formally the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries. In the model, Northern firms invent new higher-quality products, multinational firms transfer manufacturing operations to the South and the Southern firms imitate products produced by multinational firms. It is shown that stronger IPR protection in the South (i.e., the adoption and implementation of the TRIPs agreement) leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer to the South within multinational firms, a permanent increase in R&D employment by Southern affiliates of Northern multinationals, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate.     

The role of contracts and intellectual property rights in open innovation

Our exploratory empirical study, based on interviews and a survey of firms, addresses a number of questions on the role of formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of firm-to-firm open innovation (OI). We find that firms active in OI have a very strong preference for the governance of their OI relationships with other firms through formal contracts. Also, despite the open nature of OI, firms still see IPR as highly relevant to the protection of their innovative capabilities. We find the degree of openness of firms, their formal legal attitude, and the competitive dynamics of their product market environment to be related to the preference of OI firms for IPR. Furthermore, the strength of firms’ internal R&D capabilities increases the positive relationship between openness and the preference for IPR.     

同群效应与公司研发*——来自中国的证据

本文研究了“同群公司”的研发支出对公司自身研发行为的影响。研究发现，同群公司研发支出越多，公司自身研发支出也越多。进一步研究发现，在公司与同群公司地理距离较近或同群公司分析师覆盖程度较高情况下，同群公司研发支出与公司自身研发支出的正相关关系更强。此外，同群公司研发支出会提高公司自身研发支出与未来业绩的正相关程度。研究表明，公司会学习同群公司的研发决策，进而改变其自身研发决策，呈现显著的研发支出同群效应；且公司信息解读成本较低时，研发支出同群效应更为显著。本文不仅丰富了关于研发支出影响因素的研究，还拓展了对研发溢出效应的研究。本文的研究结论对公司制定研发决策具有重要指导意义。     

A note on disease burden and pharmaceutical R&D

We examine the relationship between research and development (R&D) expenditures and the expected impact of diseases in a simple theoretical framework that allows for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection to be strong or weak. In our theoretical model, an agent forms an expectation of the impact of a disease using a publicly available statistic on the (population level) disease burden, such as disability-adjusted life year. We show that a profit-maximising firm will exert relatively more R&D effort on diseases with intermediate expected impacts. We also discuss how a weak IPR regime alters the pattern of R&D investment.     

Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Abstract.  In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D‐intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two‐stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade. JEL classification: F12, F13     

The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders

This paper presents a model to explain why industry leader firms often devote substantial resources to R&D activities and explores the welfare implications of this investment. The key new assumption is that industry leaders can improve their own products more easily than can other firms. When industry leaders have R&D cost advantages, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the R&D expenditures of all firms, subsidize the production expenditures of industry leaders, and tax the profits of new industry leaders. Without government intervention, market forces generate too much creative destruction.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North–South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection because it encourages a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology‐intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.      

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.