从源头上扼制工程建设领域的腐败

腐败现象的产生缘于多方面的原因,但根源具有唯一性。私有制是腐败现象产生的唯一根源。私有制播下了腐败的种子,其他的原因提供了腐败现象滋生和蔓延的土壤和外在条件。腐败现象的彻底消灭有赖于私有制的彻底消灭。但铲除它滋生和蔓延的土壤和外在条件在当前显得相当重要。     

反腐倡廉应采取强有力的综合措施

腐败存在的形式可以有多种划分,拜金主义、享乐主义浸透下的精神腐败是一切腐败的思想根源,与市场经济转型过程中忽视意识形态建设有密切的关系,是部分人群道德堤坝溃塌的具体表现,属于思想教育和行为震慑范围。权力腐败、行政腐败、消费腐败、作风腐败是党政官员、党政机关人员在精神腐败影响下和官僚作风滋生的双重作用下产生的新的腐败现象,具有一定的隐蔽性和不易界定性,治理难度大。受贿     

行政垄断、寻租与腐败——转型经济的腐败机理分析

本文试图利用寻租经济学的方法，对中国渐进转型过程中所产生的特有的腐败形式——行政垄断的本质、成因、形式、特征进行了分析；基于现有对转型经济中腐败现象的研究，提出了转型经济中腐败现象的新的分类；并对行政垄断，主要是行业垄断的经济损失规模及租金的耗散等问题进行了初步的研究；最后，回顾了中国反垄断改革的进展，并提出了进一步改革的议程。     

广东经济发展与反腐保廉研讨会综述

最近省纪委、省府经济研究中心、省委党校和省社科联联合主办了“加快广东经济发展与反腐保廉”专题研讨会,与会者针对当前反腐败斗争的认识问题,结合广东经济发展中的实际情况,对当前我国腐败现象的特点、腐败现象产生和蔓延的根源、市场经济与反腐保廉的关系以及如何有效遏制腐败等问题,展开了广泛而又深入的讨论,并提出了一些建设性意见。本刊现发表研讨会综述。     

我国经济运行中腐败现象发生原因探析

腐败是世界各国普遍关注的问题。在我国经济运行中出现的权力干预经济、对政治领域腐败监督不力和社会物质利益合法分配形式不公是腐败现象产生与蔓延的根源,而通过市场化改革、矫正公职人员激励机制及党政体制改革,以有效解决这三方面问题是我国走出腐败高峰期的必由之路。     

关于税收腐败现象的经济分析

税收腐败现象在许多国家相当普遍,并且与其他政府腐败形式相互依存,其危害巨大.本文从税收腐败产生的原因和危害性入手,探讨税收腐败现象的若干形式,从经济学角度对税收腐败进行分析.认为,应建立以合理分权为基础的权力制约机制和赋予纳税人权利为基础的权力制约机制,以增强税收管理透明度,提高税收执法效率.     

腐败的经济学分析

文章结合经济学理论和实证考察,分析了腐败的经济后果及其原因,并对中国的腐败现象作了一些考察。可以发现,缺乏有效而独立的权力监督体制是腐败的根源,处于转轨中的中国经济体制还未完全市场化也是重要的原因。应当改变腐败的风险性、收益和成本等关系,并且从经济、政治体制上加以改革,完善现代民主政治体制,才能从根本上遏制腐败的产生。     

防范高校科研经费腐败的全过程管理

文章引入全过程管理的概念,将高校科研活动划分为立项、项目实施及结题三个阶段,对各阶段的特点,以及各阶段可能出现的腐败现象的根源、表现形式及过程监管了进行讨论分析,提出了防范高校科研经费腐败的全过程管理办法。     

腐败现象滋生蔓延的心理因素分析及对策研究

腐败现象滋生蔓延的心理因素 ,主要有以下几个方面 :一、腐败现象当事人的心理想根源。腐败的本质特征是权力腐败 ,以权谋私。而对物质利益的贪欲和个人主义则是腐败现象当事人的心理根源。一些手中握着权力的人看到有人几年甚至更短的时间就发了财 ,过着优裕的生活 ,心理便失去平衡 ,同时也意识到在市场经济条件下 ,许多东西包括权力在内都具有了使用价值 ,都适用于等价交换原则 ,于是产生了何不趁着手中有权赶紧捞一把的心理。在社会上流传的“有权不使 ,过期作废”就是这种心态的写照。因此 ,一些有钱而无权的经营者 ,与一些有权而无钱的…     

腐败的经济解释

本文在对“腐败”定义的基础上，运用“经济人行为假设”、“成本—收益”和“寻租理论”等经济理论工具，对腐败行为的产生进行剖析，探讨了中国当前存在大量腐败现象的经济和社会根源。进而得出不完善制度导致的经济运行的非效率是导致腐败行为产生的最根本源泉，并对腐败治理进行理论分析和建议。指出完善的“激励—约束机制”是遏止腐败行为的有力杠杆，但最根本的措施是推进体制的改革和民主制度的建设。     

经济转轨、集体腐败与政治改革--基于中国转轨经验的经济学分析

腐败是经济转轨国家中普遍存在的现象,中国当前的腐败问题呈现集体腐败的特征.文章主要是运用博弈理论对集体腐败行为进行解释.文章证明了在中国这样的经济转轨国家,由于缺乏一个独立的监督机构,一般都是上级官员作为其下级官员的监督者,他们非常容易合谋,形成集体腐败.随后文章对中国集体腐败问题做了实证分析,并且提出了相应的政治改革措施.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Crime and corruption in transitional economies: lessons for Cuba

Trends in aggregate crime rates across Europe reveal significant increases in crime in transitional countries. We identify causal mechanisms associated with the economic transition. Historical experience of corruption in the Soviet Union is reviewed, and connections between corruption and transition are analyzed. We apply the results to Cuba's current circumstances, examining the potential for growth in crime and corruption in Cuba and suggesting policies to ameliorate it.     

How does economic transition breed corruption?

Based on the existing literature, this paper discusses the relationship between economic transition and corruption, and argues that economic transition is one of the main roots of the spread of corruption in transitional China. It divides economic transition into four parts, and examines various channels by which economic transition breeds corruption opportunities. By applying the case statistical analysis method to analyze 594 major corruption cases, it finds the most corruption-prone areas, and provides some empirical evidence on the existence of such channels.     

奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败

中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略，国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高，但腐败现象也比较严重；同时，市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散，市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程，本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比，中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长，也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括：经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式，这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励，也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利，而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外，我们认为，市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应，一方面，市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置，这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性；另一方面．市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量，这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

民营经济发展与“腐败有效论”的检验

据"腐败有效论"的已有研究结合私营企业发展路径分析试图解释中国高腐败和民营经济高增长并存的"双高之谜"。通过1998～2006年的省级面板数据实证检验,我们发现腐败与民营经济发展呈现著正相关关系,对民营经济发展而言"腐败有效论"是成立的。并且我们证明,腐败有利于民营经济发展起作用的一个重要渠道就是可以减少政府的掠夺和干预。说明面对一个扭曲的制度安排,必然存在另一个扭曲的制度对其进行纠正。而要根除这种次优的扭曲的资源配置方式,只有根除其赖以生存的制度环境,即只有坚定不移地推动市场化改革。     

Common political culture: Evidence on regional corruption contagion

Although there are indications of common regional corruption characteristics, empirical studies of corruption have assumed that influences on corruption are country-specific. In this paper we report evidence based on a cross-section of 123 economies confirming that, with few specific exceptions, corruption is a regional phenomenon. Institutional change that reduces corruption in one country affects, therefore, neighboring countries.     

Corruption in a neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production function

In this article, we analyze the bureaucrats’ corruption problem in a simple neoclassical growth model with a non-convex production function. In this model, we consider direct relations between product (income) taxation and corruption, and between corruption and public goods provision. As the main result, we show that the optimal consumption growth path in this economy is higher in a non-corrupt environment than in a corrupt environment and the higher the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, the higher the cost of corruption to society.