Bribery,consent and prima facie duty: A rejoinder to Carson

Responding to my paper Bribery Tom Carson argues that bribe takers violate promisory obligations in a wider range of cases than I acknowledge and insists that bribe taking is prima facie wrong in all contexts. I argue that he is wrong on both counts. Michael Philips is a Professor of Philosophy at Portland State University. Recent papers by him have appeared in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophical Studies, Nous, Law and Philosophy, The Journal of Business Ethics, and several other journals. He is currently at work an a book in moral theory.     

Are business ethics and engineering ethics members of the same family?

The thesis of the paper is that there are no important differences between problems in business ethics and problems in engineering ethics. The problems are both of the same logical type. What keeps this contention from being obvious is that many view engineers as professionals and business persons as nonprofessionals. If you accept the traditional definition of professional neither engineering nor business qualify. If you adopt the attitudinal definition of a profession which I propose, both practitioners could be professionals. This thesis is then tested by applying it to six specific issues in business and/or engineering ethics. Norman E. Bowie is Director at the Center for the Study of Values and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. Previously, he was Executive Secretary at the American Philosophical Association and received the Phi Beta Kappa Award. Important publications: Ethical Theory and Business, co-editor with Tom Beauchamp, Prentice Hall, 1979, Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, co-editor with Fred Elliston, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982, Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century, editor, Hackett Publishing, 1983, and Making Ethical Decisions, editor, McGraw-Hill (forthcoming). He has also written numerous articles in professional journals.An earlier version of this paper was read at a conference on applied ethics as part of an NEH sponsored project, National Project on Philosophy and Engineering Ethics, University of Florida, January 13–15, 1982.     

When two ‘wrongs’ make a right: An essay on business ethics

Sometimes two wrongs do make a right. That is, others' violations of moral rules may make it permissible for one to also violate these rules, to avoid being unfairly disadvantaged. This claim, originally advanced by Hobbes, is applied to three cases in business. It is suggested that the claim is one source of scepticism concerning business ethics. I argue, however, that the conditions under which business competitors' violations of moral rules would render one's own violations permissible are quite restricted. Hence, the observation that two wrongs may make a right does not give people a broad warrant for ignoring moral standards in their business activities. Gregory S. Kavka is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He was awarded a NEH Fellowship for Independent Study and Research, 1982–83. His most important publication is: Some Paradoxes of Deterrence, Journal of Philosophy (June 1978).My work on this paper was partly supported by a University of California, Irvine Summer Faculty Research Fellowship. I am grateful to the University of Virginia for use of its library facilities, and to Mike W. Martin, Rick O'Neil, a referee for the Journal of Business Ethics, and participants at the Society for Business Ethics meeting at the Pacific Division APA convention in March 1982, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Polestar refined: Business ethics and political economy

Although Friedman's The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits is widely read, the central argument is rarely identified. Stone's discussion of Friedman in Where the Law Ends, is often used as a companion piece. Stone claims that the most important argument in Friedman is the Polestar argument but never succeeds in explaining what it is. This paper shows that Friedman's position must be read in the context of his theory of political economy, and that at least four distinct utilitarian arguments are required to account for his views. Specifically, Friedman relies upon what I describe as Realistic Rule Utilitarianism in which utility is understood in terms of actual preferences. The weaknesses of this theory are then explained. John R. Danley is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophical Studies at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. Danley has published pieces on Rawls and Nozick in Mind and Philosophical Studies and in applied ethics in The Journal of Business Ethics and The Journal of Business and Professional Ethics.     

The individual investor in securities markets: An ethical analysis

In this paper we consider whether one type of individual investor, which we call at risk investors, should be denied access to securities markets to prevent them from suffering serious financial harm. We consider one kind of paternalistic justification for prohibiting at risk investors from participating in securities markets, and argue that it is not successful. We then argue that restricting access to markets is justified in some circumstances to protect the rights of at risk investors. We conclude with some suggestions about how this might be done.Robert E. Frederick is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bentley College and Assistant Director of the Center for Business Ethics. Before coming to Bentley College he worked at a large financial institution for nine years, where he was Vice President for Administrative Services. Dr. Frederick has authored or co-authored over fifteen articles and has co-edited four books. He has consulted on business ethics for several major corporations. W. Michael Hoffman is the founding Director of the Center for Business Ethics, and Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Bentley College, Waltham, MA. He was President of the Society for Business Ethics in 1989. He has authored or edited ten books, including Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality (McGraw-Hill, 1984; 1990) and published over thirty articles. He has consulted on business ethics for many major corporations and institutions of higher learning, and he serves on the board of several journals.     

Social contracts and corporations: A reply to Hodapp

In this reply to Professor Hodapp's criticism of my social contract theory, I focus on the misinterpretations I believe Professor Hodapp makes of the social contract tradition as well as my version of the contract. By misinterpreting the underlying purpose of social contract theory, he neglects the contract's heuristic or functional dimension, something that leads him to downplay the importance of the contract as a conceptual catalyst. And by adopting an overly narrow notion of rationality, he imagines circularity where none exists. Later, Professor Hodapp questions the effect of the contract upon individual liberties, and in doing so broaches a critical issue. But I attempt to show that his concerns are eliminated by close attention to the theory itself. Thomas Donaldson is the John A. Largay Scholar, and Professor, at the School of Business, Georgetown University, where he also holds the positions of Adjunct Professor, at the Department of Philosophy, and Senior Research Fellow, at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics. His most recent book is Ethics in International Business (Oxford University Press, 1989).     

Drug testing and corporate responsibility: The “ought implies can” argument

Most of the debate about drug testing in the workplace has focused on the right to privacy. Proponents of testing have had to tackle difficult questions concerning the nature, extent, and weight of the privacy rights of employees. This paper examines a different kind of argument — the claim that because corporations are responsible for harms committed by employees while under the influence of drugs, they are entitled to test for drug use. This argument has considerable intuitive appeal, because it seems, at least at first glance, to bypass the issue of privacy rights altogether. The argument turns, not on rights, but on the nature and conditions of responsibility. We may therefore call it an ought implies can argument.In spite of its initial appeal, however, the argument does not succeed in circumventing the claims of privacy rights. Even responsibility for the actions of others does not entitle us to do anything at all to control their behavior; we must look to rights, among other things, to determine what sorts of controls are morally permissible. In addition, the argument rests on unjustified assumptions about the connection between drug testing and the prevention of drug-related harm. Jennifer Moore is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. She does teaching and research in business ethics and business law and is co-editor of the anthology, Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, published by McGraw-Hill.     

Ethics and the organizational person: Revisiting DeGeorge

In this paper I review the dispute over DeGeorge's analysis of the issue of the ethical responsibilities of engineers in large organizations. I argue that this issue is no different than the question of the ethical responsibilities of any other relevantly situated employee because engineers have no special duty to hold paramount the safety of the public distinct from that of others. I demonstrate how critics like Mankin, James, and Curd and May have misread and misinterpreted DeGeorge's position and his argument. I then identify a serious logical problem in DeGeorge, unnoticed by critics, but conclude by defending the spirit of DeGeorge's approach. That spirit recognizes the limitations of attempting to provide necessary and sufficient conditions in response to many questions in applied philosophy. John R. Danley is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophical Studies at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. His Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities, has recently appeared in Philosophy & Public Affairs (1991). Polestar Refined: Business Ethics and Political Economy has recently appeared in Journal of Business Ethics (1991). Other articles have appeared in the following journals: Mind, Philosophical Studies, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Business and Professional Ethics, Journal of Negro Education, and Journal of Business Ethics. Articles have also appeared in Action Theory and The Ethics of Organizational Transformation, and elsewhere.     

In defense of sharks moral issues in hostile liquidating takeovers

In this essay we defend the view that from a purely rule-utilitarian perspective there is no sound argument favoring the immorality of hostile liquidating buyouts. All arguments favoring such a view are seriously flawed. Moreover, there are some good argument favoring the view that such buyouts may be morally obligatory from the rule-utilitarian perspective. We also defend the view that most of the shark repellents in the market are immoral. If we are right in our arguments there is no justification, moral or otherwise, for any form of legislation that would constrain the practice of hostile liquidating buyouts. Robert Almeder earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, is co-editor of Business Ethics (Prometheus Press, 1987), is on the Editorial Board of Journal of Business Ethics, and teaches at Georgia State University.David Carey earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Pittsburg. He has written extensively on Business Ethics and is currently teaching philosophy at Whitman College in Walla Walla, Washington.     

Meeting needs and business obligations: An argument for the libertarian skeptic

In this paper I argue that if we are to have any defensible property rights at all, we must recognize a fundamental commitment to helping those in need. The argument has significant implications for all who claim defensible property rights. In this paper I concentrate on some of the implications this argument has for redefining business obligations. In particular, I show why those who typically would be quite resistant to the idea that businesses have any obligations to assist others in need must acknowledge this fundamental obligation. I also suggest how this argument contributes to our understanding of the normative basis of Stakeholder Theory. Gillian Brock is a Lecturer at the University of Auckland, New Zealand where she teaches courses in Business Ethics (amongst other courses). She completed her Ph.D. in Philosophy. Her dissertation, On the Moral Importance of Needs, explores the role human needs can play in moral and political theory. Some of her other articles have appeared (or are forthcoming) in journals such as Ethics, Analysis and Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review.     

Moral fictions and scientific management

This paper examines Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in After Virtue that corporate managers do not have the rational expertise in social control which they have used to justify their position in modern society. In particular, it is claimed that managerial science by taking an emotivist view, putting ends and values beyond the reach of sound rational judgment, has made human relationships matters of manipulation and undermined its own moral legitimacy. The question is advanced as to whether managers must operate from emotivist premises or whether they can truly understand and thus truly manage human affairs by rational reflection about human purpose, value, and intention. Paul C. Santilli is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y. His previous publication is: The Informative and Persuasive Functions of Advertising: A Moral Appraisal, Journal of Business Ethics 2 (1983), 27–33.Paper presented at the 16th Conference on Value Inquiry, entitled: Ethics and the Market Place: An Exercise in Bridge-Building or On the Slopes of the Interface.     

Should collective bargaining and labor relations be less adversarial?

In this paper I argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations. Using the poker game analogy is imprudent, its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business, and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor-management negotiations. I propose and defend a model of ideal family decision-making as a superior model to the poker game. Norman E. Bowie is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He presently holds a post as Director of the Center for the Study of Values. He previously was Executive Secretary of the American Philosophical Association. Norman E. Bowie's most important publications are: Business Ethics, Prentice-Hall, 1982 (author); Ethics, Public Policy and Criminal Justice, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, 1982 (co-editor); Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century, Hackett Publishing, 1983 (editor); Ethical Theory and Business, 1st ed., 1979, 2nd ed., 1983, Prentice-Hall (co-editor); The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, Prentice-Hall, 1977 (co-author); Towards a New Theory of Distributive Justice, University of Massachusetts Press, 1971 (author). He published numerous articles in Business and Applied Ethics.     

Ethics in business education: Working toward a meaningful reciprocity

This paper outlines and argues against some criticisms of business ethics education. It maintains that these criticisms have been put forward due to a misunderstanding of the nature of business and/or ethics. Business ethics seeks a meaningful reciprocity among economic, social and moral concerns. This demands that business organizations autonomously develop ethical goals from within, which in turn demands a reciprocity between ethical theory and practical experience. Working toward such a reciprocity, the ultimate goal of business ethics education is a moral business point of view through which one can live with integrity and fulfillment.To everyone who proposes to have a good career, moral philosophy is indispensible. Cicero, De Officiis, 44BC W. Michael Hoffman is Chair and Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Director at the Center for Business Ethics, Bentley College, Waltham, MA. He has received the following Grants: Council for Philosophical Studies, NEH Fellow, NDEA Fellow, Matchette. His most important publications are: Kant's Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry (UPA, 1979); Proceedings of the National Conferences on Business Ethics, 5 volumes (1977–1984); Business Ethics (McGraw-Hill, 1984) and articles in Journal of Business Ethics, Idealistic Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Journal of Thought, The Journal for Critical Analysis, and The Southern Journal of Philosophy.Paper presented at the 16th Conference on Value Inquiry, entitled: Ethics and the Market Place: An Exercise in Bridge-Building or On the Slopes of the Interface.     

Dismemberment,divorce and hostile takeovers: A comment on corporate moral personhood

We can explain our intuitions about corporate takeover cases by appeal to Peter French's picture of the corporation as a moral person. He argues that corporations are persons in much the same sense as you and I, and are entitled to the same rights as humans. On this analysis, takeovers are murders, attempted murders, attempts to enslave, etc. I want to explore the consequences of this view for corporate takeovers. I shall argue that, though French can explain why our moral intuitions seem to arise in response to some concern about the corporations themselves, his analysis commits us to the wrong intuitions in some cases. I shall then offer an account of these intuitions which focuses on the character of corporations.Rita C. Manning is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University. She has published widely — on Artificial Intelligence, Ancient Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social and Political Philosophy, and Informal Logic, in addition to Business Ethics. She is currently working on a Feminist critique of Moral Philosophy.     

Management-think

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the philosophical foundations of business management. The need for such a review is established. Emphasis is placed upon the role of management ethos in such a philosophy. Philosophical concepts (such as the concept of an intention) which are widely applied in management, but not explored in the management literature, are examined. While the emphasis is on philosophical concepts, the material presented is applicable in the practice of management. Mark Pastin is Director of the Center for Private and Public Sector Ethics and Professor of Management at the Arizona State University. He received the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, and was a Research Fellow of the Center for Metropolitan Research of John Hopkins University. His most important publications are Strategic Planning for Science The Research System in the 1980s, ed. by John Logsdon (Franklin Institute Press, 1982), Ethics and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Business Horizons (December 1980), The Multi-Perspectival Theory of Knowledge, Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Volume V (University of Minnesota Press, 1980), and Meaning and Perception, Journal of Philosophy (October 1976).     

Bribery and implicit agreements: A reply to Philips

The author has elsewhere defended the view that accepting a bribe involves the violation of an implicit or explicit promise or understanding associated with an office or position that one occupies and that therefore it is prima facie wrong to accept a bribe. Michael Philips has criticized this position in a recent paper. He argues that (a) there are cases in which accepting a bribe violates no promises or agreements, and (b) there are cases in which there is no prima facie duty to refuse an offer of a bribe. The author offers replies to both of these objections.Thomas L. Carson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. He was awarded the NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. He is the author of The Status of Morality (D. Reidel, Philosophical Studies Series, 1984), and he has written numerous articles concerning both ethical theory and applied ethics.     

Political consequences of ethical investing: The case of South Africa

This paper discusses the economic impact and political consequences of ethical investing, with particular attention to the case of South Africa. The origins of ethical investing are examined, along with the institutions and strategies by which ethical investing operates today. Of immediate relevance to managers is a recent judicial decision upholding Baltimore's divestment ordinance. The discussion concludes with an assessment of the likely consequences of ethical investing for U.S. multinationals in Southern Africa. Dr. Paul is an Associate Professor of Management at the Rochester Institute of Technology. She took her Ph.D. from Emory University in 1974. She has published and presented widely on the subject of Business Ethics and Business and Public Policy. Her current research interest in business and South Africa has taken her to South Africa on a Fulbright Fellowship. Dr. Paul has also been named a Radcliffe Peace Fellow for 1987–88. She has just edited Business Environment and Business Ethics: The Social, Moral, and Political Dimensions of Management (1987) for Ballinger Press.Mr. Aquila has been a full time Lecturer at the Rochester Institute of Technology since 1984. He took his M.B.A. degree from New York University in 1980 and is just finishing his Ph.D. at the University of Rochester in American History. Mr. Aquila was awarded the David Parker Memorial Prize in History from the University of Rochester in 1986.     

Regulation,deregulation, self-regulation: The case of engineers in Ontario

Against a wider background of rationales for deregulation within a modern economy, and as an exercise of subjecting a theory to the hard discipline of a particular case, a detailed analysis is given of a recent proposal for a form of deregulation (the industrial exemption) for engineering in Ontario. The proposal of the Staff Study of the Professional Organizations Committee set up by the Ontario Government is analyzed in terms of its Posnerian foundations, and is critized theoretically, empirically and normatively. Attention is drawn to two wider issues: the protection by self-regulating professionals of third parties against negative externalities, and the adverse effects of the proletarianization of professionals in large organizations. J. T. Stevenson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto where he teaches Ethics and Engineering and he is co-chairman of the Occupational Ethics Group. An important publication is Standards and Support Stystems for Whistle-Blowers, Engineering Dimensions, 1982.An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference, Economics, Philosophy and Justice, at University of Waterloo, May 1983. I am indebted to Lawrence Haworth, University of Waterloo, for helpful criticisms. A shorter version was presented to a conference sponsored by the Society for Business Ethics at de Paul University, Chicago, July 1983. I thank Conrad Brunk, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo for further helpful comments. The paper draws primarily on two documents: (a) Micheal J. Treblicock, Carolyn J. Tuohy and Alan D. Wolfson, Professional Regulation: A Staff Study of Accountancy, Architecture, Engineering and Law, prepared for The Professional Organizations Committee, Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 1979. (Hereafter referred to as POC Staff); (b) H. Allen Leal, J. Alex Corry, J. Stefan Dupré, The Report of the Professional Organizations Committee, Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 1980. (Hereafter referred to as POC Report). The first work brings together material form sixteen staff working papers, to which I have had access through the courtesy of Professor John Swan, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I have also made use of The Professions and Public Policy ed. by Philip Slayton and Michael J. Treblicock, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978 and, for American perspectives, Regulating the Professions, ed. by Roger D. Blair and Stephen Rubin, Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980.     

Corporate democracy and the rights of shareholders

Some have argued that because of weaknesses in corporate democracy, there is widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. I describe a number of horror stories that shareholders might tell to support this claim. Then I argue that despite appearances to the contrary, there is not widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. This is because (i) corporations, when doing things that look abusive, are generally violating neither the legal rights nor the charter rights of shareholders and (ii) shareholders — in their role as shareholders — have no other rights than these. William B. Irvine is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wright State University. He is the author of The Ethics of Investing, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 6, no. 3.     

A validation and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale

Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) proposed and refined a multidimensional ethics scale. This study replicates and extends their work by examining the generalizability of the scale beyond marketing to accounting, and to subjects from across the United States and other countries. Results indicate that, in general, the scale holds for this different sample and context. However, an additional utilitarian construct emerged in the current study as important for accounting academics in their ethical decision-making. We also found that when we refined Reidenbach and Robin's measure of intention to make a particular choice, a social desirability bias or halo effect was identified. Methodological implications for business ethics research are also presented.Jeffrey R. Cohen is Associate Professor of Accounting at Boston College. He is a C.M.A. and a KPMG Peat Marwick Faculty Fellow. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Accounting Research, Decision Sciences andThe Organizational Behavior Teaching Review. His work on Ethics has appeared inJournal of Business Ethics, Issues in Accounting Education, Management Accounting, andThe CPA Journal.Laurie W. Pant is Associate Professor of Accounting at Suffolk University. She holds an M.B.A. and a D.B.A. and an M.Ed. She serves on the editorial board ofIssues in Accounting Education. Her articles on Ethics have appeared inJournal of Business Ethics, Issues in Accounting Education, Management Accounting andThe Organizational Behavior Teaching Review.David Sharp is Assistant Professor of Accounting at University of Western Ontario. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.Sc. He serves on the editorial board of theJournal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation. His articles have appeared inThe Midland Corporate Finance Journal andSloan Management Review.