Understanding credit ratings quality: Evidence from UK debt market participants

This study seeks to identify: (i) the demand for corporate bond ratings provided by credit ratings agencies (CRAs); (ii) how issuers select CRAs; and (iii) to better understand ratings quality, a term widely used by commentators, politicians and regulators, but under-explored in the academic literature. Interviews identify the principal source of demand for rating information is to reduce agency conflicts between issuers and investors. Issuers typically engage between one and three credit ratings agencies to rate their debt, implying a heterogeneous demand for ratings services, and different levels of ratings quality. However, ratings quality extends beyond competence and independence to include factors relating to professional judgment, communication, transparency, and the quality and continuity of analytic staff. Findings were discussed in the light of the ongoing international policy debate concerning CRAs.     

Credit ratings and disclosure channels

We study the relation between analysts’ ratings of firms’ credit worthiness and ratings of the quality of firms’ (1) annual report disclosures, (2) quarterly and other disclosures, and (3) manager-analyst communications. We find that credit ratings are better for firms with higher rated annual report disclosures. We also find that marked increases in analyst ratings of annual report quality are accompanied by improvements in credit ratings. We find no relation between credit ratings and analysts’ ratings of either quarterly report disclosures or management-analyst communications. Overall, the results suggest that a commitment to better annual report disclosure is related to a lower cost of credit capital.     

CDOs and the financial crisis: Credit ratings and fair premia

We study risk and return characteristics of CDOs using the market standard models. We find that fair spreads on CDO tranches are much higher than fair spreads on similarly-rated corporate bonds. Our results imply that credit ratings are not sufficient for pricing, which is surprising given their central role in structured finance markets. This illustrates limitations of the rating methodologies that are solely based on real-world default probabilities or expected losses and do not capture risk premia. We also demonstrate that CDO tranches have large exposure to systematic risk and thus their ratings and prices are likely to decline substantially when credit conditions deteriorate.     

Credit ratings and the cross-section of stock returns

Low credit risk firms realize higher returns than high credit risk firms. This is puzzling because investors seem to pay a premium for bearing credit risk. The credit risk effect manifests itself due to the poor performance of low-rated stocks (which account for 4.2% of total market capitalization) during periods of financial distress. Around rating downgrades, low-rated firms experience considerable negative returns amid strong institutional selling, whereas returns do not differ across credit risk groups in stable or improving credit conditions. The evidence for the credit risk effect points towards mispricing generated by retail investors and sustained by illiquidity and short sell constraints.     

Market Segmentation Effects in Corporate Credit Rating Changes: The Case of Emerging Markets

We examine stock market reactions to corporate credit rating changes in 26 emerging market countries included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Index. We hypothesize and test the notion that emerging market firms in the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) markets are more likely to purchase ratings from the Big Two (Moody’s and S&P), and that they react more strongly to the announcements of corporate rating changes by Moody’s or S&P than to those of raters in local markets. We compare the effect of credit rating changes of the Big Two in two emerging stock markets: local markets (local currencies) and ADR markets (U.S. dollars). We find significant price reactions in the ADR markets, and insignificant reactions in local markets, and conclude that there is capital market segmentation in ADR markets for credit rating changes of emerging market firms. We find evidence that investors react more strongly in the ADR markets than local markets because they require higher costs of capital for firms cross-listed both in the ADR markets and local markets due to greater expected bankruptcy costs and foreign exchange risks of those firms. We also report that stock markets react significantly, not only to rating downgrades, but also to upgrades in the ADR markets.

Combining accounting data and a structural model for predicting credit ratings: Empirical evidence from European listed firms

Ratings issued by credit rating agencies (CRAs) play an important role in the global financial environment. Among other issues, past studies have explored the potential for predicting these ratings using a variety of explanatory factors and modeling approaches. This paper describes a multi-criteria classification approach that combines accounting data with a structural default prediction model in order to obtain improved predictions and test the incremental information that a structural model provides in this context. Empirical results are presented for a panel data set of European listed firms during the period 2002–2012. The analysis indicates that a distance-to-default measure obtained from a structural model adds significant information compared to popular financial ratios. Nevertheless, its power is considerably weakened when market capitalization is also considered. The robustness of the results is examined over time and under different rating category specifications.     

Credit agency regulation and the impact of credit ratings in the international bond market

The use of credit ratings in financial and other legal documents — both in the USA and Europe —, has led to a situation in which the major rating agencies have become (largely unwilling) participants in the legislative process. This situation has become partly formalized in the US (and is being repeated elsewhere in the European Union, Eastern Europe and Latin America) through the creation of officially ‘recognized’ agencies whose ratings now carry the imprimatur of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the necessity for formal legal status to be sustained in the market for bond credit ratings. In this context, the criteria for a credible rating agency are examined and evidence is provided on one element of the criteria which is under-researched: namely, the impact of the ratings in the market place. The influence of rating agencies in international capital markets is assessed through an analysis of the impact of ratings on the yields of bonds, represented by a comprehensive sample of actively traded debt. The sample contains analysis of ratings introductions on both new and seasoned debt and also examines the impact of ratings revisions. It is concluded that official recognition has no market-based role and it is argued that ratings are used by regulators because of the success of the major agencies in performing their market function.     

Intensified Competition and The Impact on Credit Ratings in the RMBS market

In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of intensified competition on rating quality in the credit rating market for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the period 2017–2020. We provide evidence that competition between large credit rating agencies (CRAs) (Moody's and Standard & Poor's) and newer smaller ones (Dominion Bond Rating Service Morningstar and Kroll Bond Rating Agency) creates credit rating inconsistencies in the RMBS market. While a credit rating should solely represent the underlying credit risk of a RMBS, irrespective of the competition in the market, our results show that this is not the case. When competitive pressure is higher, both large and small CRAs tend to adjust their rating standards (smaller CRAs react to large CRAs and vice versa).     

Tightening credit standards: the role of accounting quality

Over the latest 20 years, the average credit rating of U.S. corporations has trended down. Blume et al. (1998, Journal of Finance, 53, 1389–1413.) attribute this trend to a tightening of credit standards by agencies. We reexamine the observed decreases in credit ratings in several ways. First, we show that this downward trend does not apply to speculative-grade issuers. Second, our analysis of investment-grade issuers suggests that the apparent tightening of standards can be attributed primarily to changes in accounting quality over time. After incorporating changing accounting quality, we find no evidence that rating agencies have tightened their credit standards.

Sovereign credit ratings and bank funding cost: Evidence from Africa

This paper aims to examine the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and funding costs of banks and also the relationship between sovereign credit ratings. Using over 300 banks operating in Africa from 2006 to 2012, the study investigates sovereign ratings’ impact on funding cost. The long term domestic sovereign ratings announced by Fitch and Standard & Poor’s during the period under study were used. The panel made use of Generalized Method of Moments estimation strategy for funding cost. The findings of the study indicate that sovereign ratings upgrades have an inverse and statistically significant relationship with funding costs. The findings suggest that sovereign rating upgrades makes it easier for banks to access funds from the capital and global market at a cheaper cost compared to rating downgrades. The study recommends and encourages emerging economies to use the services provided by credit rating agencies since these agencies may help improve accessibility of funds in the international markets by banks. It is recommended that sovereign rating should be considered as a supplement and not a substitute to our own perceived judgement and research.     

CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings

In this paper we investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and long-term credit ratings. We provide evidence that firms with a higher level of inside debt holdings enjoy better credit ratings. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We employ instrumental variable–based two-stage least squares regression and instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In addition, we employ propensity-matched sample and entropy balancing estimates to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in firms with a poor information environment, a weak monitoring mechanism, and powerful CEOs. Overall, findings from our study suggest that credit rating agencies evaluate CEO insider debt holdings positively in assessing the creditworthiness of a firm.     

The Information Content of Ratings: An Analysis of Australian Credit Default Swap Spreads

We examine the information content of Australian credit rating announcements by measuring the abnormal changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. CDS spreads provide a direct view of credit quality and thus should impound information quickly when investors receive new credit risk related information via a rating event. Using an event study methodology, we show that watch downs and rating upgrades contain valuable information even after controlling for sources of contamination. We find that watch downs elicit statistically significant market reactions, while subsequent downgrades are anticipated. Upgrades are associated with a significant but small abnormal reduction in CDS spreads, whereas watch ups appear to contain no new information.     

Credit ratings and IPO pricing

We examine the effects of credit ratings on IPO pricing. The evidence from U.S. common share IPOs during 1986–2004 shows that when firms go public, those with credit ratings are underpriced significantly less than firms without credit ratings. Credit rating levels, however, do not have a significant effect on IPO underpricing. The existence of credit rating reduces uncertainty about firm value. It is the value certainty that matters, not the value per se. Credit ratings also reduce the degree of price revision during the bookbuilding process and the aftermarket volatility in the post-IPO period. The evidence suggests that credit ratings convey useful information in reducing value uncertainty of the issuing firms as well as information asymmetry in the IPO markets.     

Credit rating dynamics and competition

I analyze the market for credit ratings with competition between more than two rating agencies. How can honest rating behavior be achieved, and under which conditions can a new honest rating agency successfully invade a market with inflating incumbents? My model predicts cyclic dynamics if sophisticated investors have a high impact on agencies’ reputation. In contrast, if trusting investors have the main impact, then the dynamics exhibits a saddle point rather than cycles. In this case, regulatory support for honest rating agencies is only needed for a limited time, but the effect is sustainable in the long run.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.     

The information content of credit ratings: evidence from European convertible bond markets

Prior research has investigated the information content of credit ratings for standard financing instruments such as stocks and corporate bonds, while this question has been neglected for convertible bonds (CBs) so far. CBs are simultaneously determined by the bond floor and the conversion value, which makes it more difficult to assess price effects following rating announcements. In this context, we compare price effects of CBs with those of stocks and corporate bonds of the same issuer using robust event study methods. Our findings indicate that rating changes convey new information for investors in European CBs. In terms of the direction of the expected price reaction, we find CBs to react in a more debt-like manner to the announcement of a rating change. Moreover, our results provide evidence that the magnitude of price reactions differs among different types of securities.     

The Effect of Business and Financial Market Cycles on Credit Ratings: Evidence from the Last Two Decades

We analyze the effect of business and financial market cycles on credit ratings using a sample of firms from the Russell 3000 index that are rated by Standard and Poor's over the period 1986–2012. We also examine investor reaction to credit rating actions in different stages of business and financial market cycles. We document that credit rating agencies are influenced by business and financial market cycles; they assign lower credit ratings during downturns of business and financial market cycles and higher ratings during upturns. Our study is the first to find strong evidence of pro‐cyclicality in credit ratings using a long window. We also document stronger investor reaction to negative credit rating actions during downturns. Our results confirm theoretical predictions and inform regulators.     

Fiscal-audit separation and government disclosure quality

We show that the separation of the fiscal and audit offices of China’s province-level governments leads to high fiscal disclosure quality, an effect that is more pronounced when the political rank of the official in charge of auditing is higher than that of the official in charge of fiscal matters. Dynamically, disclosure quality decreases when fiscal office and audit office go from being separated to being integrated and improves when they go from being integrated to being separated. Finally, fiscal disclosure quality reduces the cost of debt and improves credit ratings of municipal investment and development bonds. We demonstrate an aspect of China’s governance that, even without adequate monitoring from the oppositions or the media, local governments can improve efficiency via horizontal separations of fiscal and audit offices.     

国际信用评级机构的功能扭曲与改革前景

从理论上看,以标普、穆迪和惠誉为代表的国际信用评级机构的存在可以起到降低社会经济成本和优化资源配置的作用。然而,目前国际信用评级机构仍然存在着一些功能扭曲的表现,如“三大”评级机构反应的迟钝,使其可信性遭到市场广泛质疑;“三大”评级机构反应的过度,加剧了金融市场调整;“三大”评级模式隐含的利益倾向,违背了信用评级的独立与公正。整顿和规制国际评级机构,必须改革现行的评级模式和模拟评级程序,实现评级市场的竞争化与评级主体的多元化。