Convertible Securities,Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity

We provide a method for calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital in the presence of convertible securities and employee stock options. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied if a company already has issued convertible claims or if it is considering doing so for the first time. We provide several numerical examples illustrating the significance of errors in estimating the cost of capital that can result when (1) employee stock options are ignored or (2) the observable stock price is used as a proxy for the unobservable underlying asset.     

The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Analysis

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options' payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil's [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30     

Employee Stock Options and Investment

Exercises of employee stock options generate substantial cash inflows to the firm. These cash inflows substitute for costly external finance in those states of the world in which the demand for investment is high. Using the fact that the proceeds from option exercises exhibit a distinct nonlinearity around the point where options fall out of the money, we estimate that firms increase investment by $0.34 for each dollar received from the exercise of stock options. Firms that face higher external financing costs allocate more of the proceeds from option exercises to investment.     

Valuation of a Repriceable Executive Stock Option

We introduce a path-dependent executive stock option. The exercise price might be reduced when both the firm’s stock price and a stock market index fall greatly. The repriceable executive stock option has a simple payoff that may be used for realistic executive rewards. We show the valuation formula, and compute the probability of the repriceable executive stock option expiring in-the-money. Both price and probability are important pieces of quantitative information when choosing an executive compensation package.     

Nonrecurring Accounting Transactions and Stock Option Grants

Abstract:  We examine the effect of nonrecurring accounting transactions on stock option grants for a sample of US companies. After controlling for both the economic and corporate governance-related determinants of option grants, we find that the aggregate value of stock option grants is more positively related to nonrecurring gains than to nonrecurring losses. We also examine whether the asymmetric treatment of nonrecurring gains and losses arises because (1) information contained in the nonrecurring transactions is related to firms' long-term prospects, (2) weak corporate governance fails to curb more favorable executive pay arrangements, (3) executives possess superior bargaining power in the labor marketplace, and (4) firms have significant growth opportunities. While we find no support for the first explanation and some support for the third, we find more consistent support for the growth explanation and two factors related to the corporate governance explanation: director-executive duality and the frequency of board meetings.     

Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options

We introduce a model that captures the main properties thatcharacterize employee stock options (ESO). We discuss the likelihoodof early voluntary ESO exercise, and the obligation to exerciseimmediately if the employee leaves the firm, except if thishappens before options are vested, in which case the optionsare forfeited. We derive an analytic formula for the price ofthe ESO and in a case study compare it to alternative methods.     

Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy

We find that employee stock option deductions lead to large aggregate tax savings for Nasdaq 100 and S&P 100 firms and also affect corporate marginal tax rates. For Nasdaq firms, including the effect of options reduces the estimated median marginal tax rate from 31% to 5%. For S&P firms, in contrast, option deductions do not affect marginal tax rates to a large degree. Our evidence suggests that option deductions are important nondebt tax shields and that option deductions substitute for interest deductions in corporate capital structure decisions, explaining in part why some firms use so little debt.     

Employee Stock Option Exercise and Firm Cost

We develop an empirical model of employee stock option exercise that is suitable for valuation and allows for behavioral channels. We estimate exercise rates as functions of option, stock, and employee characteristics using all employee exercises at 88 public firms, 27 of them in the S&P 500. Increasing vesting frequency from annual to monthly reduces option value by 11% to 16%. Men exercise faster, reducing value by 2% to 4%, while top employees exercise slower, increasing value by 2% to 7%. Finally, we develop an analytic valuation approximation that is more accurate than methods used in practice.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.     

Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.     

Executive Stock Option Exercise and Seasoned Equity Offerings

We examine executive stock option exercises around a sample of 1,268 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1996 to 2004 focusing on a subset of exercises we identify as potentially informed. Consistent with the theory that firms issue equity when stock is overvalued, we document a surge in informed exercise in the months surrounding the SEO. From six months prior to the announcement date to six months after issuance, an average 1.76% of the total market capitalization for issuing firms is exercised and sold. Interestingly, we find a positive association between informed option exercises and long-run performance. Overall, our collective evidence indicates that insiders are not particularly good at timing exercises around SEOs.     

The Valuation of Stock Purchase Rights as Call Options

The predictability of rights valuation models is tested, viewing the rights as call options. The results show that rights valuation models, on average, overprice the rights. The bias in the model prices of rights found in this paper is opposite to that predicted by Merton. Among several factors considered, possible volatility changes associated with raising capital through a rights offering account for some of the observed pricing deviation. A further regression analysis shows that while the pricing deviation is positively related to both the degree that the rights are in the money and the allocation ratio, it is negatively related to the time to expiration and the daily trading volume of the rights.     

Stock Return Characteristics, Skew Laws, and the Differential Pricing of Individual Equity Options

This article provides several new insights into the economicsources of skewness. First, we document the differential pricingof individual equity options versus the market index and relateit to variations in return skewness. Second, we show how riskaversion introduces skewness in the risk-neutral density. Third,we derive laws that decompose individual return skewness intoa systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Empiricalanalysis of OEX options and 30 stocks demonstrates that individualrisk-neutral distributions differ from that of the market indexby being far less negatively skewed. This article explains thepresence and evolution of risk-neutral skewness over time andin the cross section of individual stocks.     

员工期权对公司股权价值评估的影响

在高新技术创业公司中,很多公司发行了内部的员工股票期权.本文着重分析员工股票期权对公司股权价值评估的影响,并以国外公司的数据资料为题材介绍如何处理评估中遇到的这个新出现的实际问题.     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

The Valuation of Executive Stock Options in an Intensity-Based Framework

This paper presents a general intensity-based framework to value executive stock options (ESOs). It builds upon the recent advances in the credit risk modeling arena. The early exercise or forfeiture due to voluntary or involuntary employment termination and the early exercise due to the executive's desire for liquidity or diversification are modeled as an exogenous point process with random intensity dependent on the stock price.Two analytically tractable specifications are given where the ESO value, expected time of exercise or forfeiture, and the expected stock price at the time of exercise or forfeiture are calculated in closed-form.