The Timeliness of Accounting Write‐Downs by U.S. Financial Institutions During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008

I examine the timeliness of write‐downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The timeliness of write‐downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write‐down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by exposure‐specific credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that the accounting write‐downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross‐sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write‐downs, I document that corporate governance quality, regulatory investigations, and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write‐downs, whereas the write‐downs by firms with higher financial leverage, tighter regulatory constraints, and more complex exposures are less timely. I control for numerous exposure‐specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, I find that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write‐downs.     

Short‐Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 2007–09 Crisis

Most regulators around the world reacted to the 2007–09 crisis by imposing bans on short selling. These were imposed and lifted at different dates in different countries, often targeted different sets of stocks, and featured varying degrees of stringency. We exploit this variation in short‐sales regimes to identify their effects on liquidity, price discovery, and stock prices. Using panel and matching techniques, we find that bans (i) were detrimental for liquidity, especially for stocks with small capitalization and no listed options; (ii) slowed price discovery, especially in bear markets, and (iii) failed to support prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks.     

Household Wealth and Macroeconomic Activity: 2008–2013

This paper provides estimates of the effects of the fall in financial and housing wealth in 2008–09 on overall macroeconomic activity. When the wealth losses are run through a structural macroeconometric model, it is estimated that the fall in wealth contributed about 2.1 percentage points to the rise in the unemployment rate in 2009 and about 3.3 points in 2010. The contribution to the fall in real GDP was 4.5% and 5.4% in the 2 years. These estimates account for most—but not all—of the recessionary increase in unemployment. The remaining increase in unemployment may have resulted more directly from financial stresses, but little evidence is found for this in this study.     

Risk Preferences Heterogeneity: Evidence from Asset Markets

Using asset market data, as well as theoretical relations between investors' preferences,option-implied, risk-neutral, probability distribution functions (PDFs,) and index-implied,actual, PDFs, this paper extracts a time-series of investors' relative risk aversion (RRA)functions. Based on results recently derived by Benninga and Mayshar (2000), thesefunctions are used to recover the evolution of risk preferences heterogeneity. Applyingnon-parametric estimation on European call options written on the S & P500 index, wefind that: (i) the RRA functions are decreasing; and (ii) the constructed risk preferencesheterogeneity series is positively correlated in a static, as well as a dynamic, setup witha prevalent proxy for investors heterogeneity, namely, the spread between auction- andmarket-yields of Treasury bills.