Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

The Timeliness of Accounting Write‐Downs by U.S. Financial Institutions During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008

I examine the timeliness of write‐downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The timeliness of write‐downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write‐down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by exposure‐specific credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that the accounting write‐downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross‐sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write‐downs, I document that corporate governance quality, regulatory investigations, and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write‐downs, whereas the write‐downs by firms with higher financial leverage, tighter regulatory constraints, and more complex exposures are less timely. I control for numerous exposure‐specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, I find that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write‐downs.     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from the 2007–2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis

This paper examines the short selling activities around financial firms’ announcements of asset write‐downs during the 2007–2008 subprime mortgage crisis. We find that short sellers accumulate short positions prior to write‐down announcements, and that stocks experience significantly negative returns around such announcements. These results suggest that the return predictability of short interests is due to short sellers’ informational advantage. Furthermore, we show that short sellers increase their positions significantly in the announcement month and keep increasing their positions afterward, suggesting the feedback effect of the disclosed write‐downs on financial firms’ existing exposures. The valuable information contained in the short interest should encourage regulators to mandate stock exchanges disclose short selling activities more frequently.     

Asset Write‐offs in Private Firms – The Case of German SMEs

This paper finds that private firms make the decision to write off, and write off more in terms of total amount, if they are: (i) more profitable, (ii) have more financial debt, and (iii) pay dividends. Our findings are contrary to expectations based on accounting standards and the existing revaluation literature. They are, however, consistent with the codified, high book‐tax alignment economic setting in which sample private firms operate. This includes agency problems faced by private firms’ stakeholders. We use a comprehensive sample of German SMEs reporting in local GAAP, based on the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch) in 2003–2006. We view write‐offs as corrections of departures of book values from their underlying economic values, in contrast to upward asset revaluations. This governs our choice of estimation – the tobit regression.     

Write‐Down Timeliness, Line‐of‐Business Disclosures and Investors' Interpretations of Segment Divestiture Announcements

Abstract:   This paper examines investors' anticipation and subsequent interpretations of asset write‐downs accompanying segment divestitures. Examining long‐window returns cumulated over the two years preceding the year of divestiture, we hypothesize and find that investors anticipate write‐downs of segment operating assets before divestiture and recognition occurs, with anticipation conditional on the timeliness of the write‐down and prior disclosure of the segments' operating results under segment reporting rules. Short‐window returns cumulated over the three days surrounding the announcement of the divestiture confirm that investor interpretations of asset write‐downs are similarly contingent on write‐down timeliness and prior disclosure.     

Pricing Model Performance and the Two‐Pass Cross‐Sectional Regression Methodology

Over the years, many asset pricing studies have employed the sample cross‐sectional regression (CSR) R² as a measure of model performance. We derive the asymptotic distribution of this statistic and develop associated model comparison tests, taking into account the impact of model misspecification on the variability of the CSR estimates. We encounter several examples of large R² differences that are not statistically significant. A version of the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (CAPM) exhibits the best overall performance, followed by the Fama–French three‐factor model. Interestingly, the performance of prominent consumption CAPMs is sensitive to variations in experimental design.     

What Do FAS 157 “Fair Values” Really Measure: Value Or Risk?

FAS 157, the U.S. accounting standard that prescribes how fair values of assets and liabilities are to be measured when other U.S. GAAP standards require fair valuation, stipulates that fair values be measured as the exit values of assets and liabilities—the proceeds for assets hypothetically sold on the date of the financial report, and, correspondingly, the amount required to settle liabilities on the date of the financial report. This conceptual article argues that exit values do not reflect the value of the net assets of the firm to shareholders, which is best reflected by discounted cash flows to maturity. Moreover, exit values—biasing fair values downward when markets are illiquid—have a pernicious, systemic risk effect; specifically, they give rise to write‐downs that in turn cause contagion: prices of equities and other financial instruments of peers react negatively, leading to further write‐downs by those peers. This may have aggravated the recent financial crisis. However, while exit values are not proper measures of value to shareholders, they are useful measures of downside risk when prospects turn sour for a firm. Thus, both exit values and discounted cash flows should be presented in financial statements.     

Exchange Rates and the Conversion of Currency‐Specific Risk Premia

How do the risk factors that drive asset prices influence exchange rates? Are the parameters of asset price processes relevant for specifying exchange rate processes? Most international asset pricing models focus on the analysis of asset returns given exchange rate processes. Little work has been done on the analysis of exchange rates dependent on asset returns. This paper uses an international stochastic discount factor (SDF) framework to analyse the interplay between asset prices and exchange rates. So far, this approach has only been implemented in international term structure models. We find that exchange rates serve to convert currency‐specific discount factors and currency‐specific prices of risk – a result linked to the international arbitrage pricing theory (IAPT). Our empirical investigation of exchange rates and stock markets of four countries presents evidence for the conversion of currency‐specific risk premia by exchange rates.     

The Cost of Capital of Cross‐listed Firms

This paper analyses the cost of capital of firms with foreign equity listings. Our purpose is to shed light on the question whether international and domestic asset pricing models yield a different estimate of the cost of capital for cross‐listed stocks. We distinguish between (i) the multifactor ICAPM of Solnik (1979) and Sercu (1980) including both the global market portfolio and exchange rate risk premia and (ii) the single factor domestic CAPM. We test for the significance of the cost of capital differential in a sample of 336 cross‐listed stocks from nine countries in the period 1980–99. Our hypothesis is that the cost of capital differential is substantial for firms with international listings, as these are often large multinationals with a strong international orientation. We find that the asset pricing models yield a significantly different estimate of the cost of capital for only 12% of the cross‐listed companies. The size of the cost of capital differential is around 50 basis points for the US, 80 basis points for the UK and 100 basis points for France.     

The Dependency of the Banks' Assets and Liabilities: Evidence from Germany

Two decades of developments in risk‐transfer instruments may have fundamentally changed the extent to which banks practice on‐balance sheet term and liquidity transformation. These changes should be deliberated in on‐balance sheet asset‐liability dependencies. By using correlation analyses, we investigate asset‐liability dependency for all three sectors of German universal banks from 1994 to 2007 and find that it declined over our sample period. We also investigate whether asset‐liability dependency varies systematically with a bank's affinity for using risk‐transfer instruments, regulatory capital, and profitability and document several differences between the three sectors of German universal banks.     

Limits‐to‐arbitrage,investment frictions,and the investment effect: New evidence

This study comprehensively reexamines the debate over behavioral and rational explanations for the investment effect in an updated sample. We closely follow the previous literature and provide several differences. Our tests include five prominent measures of corporate investment and corporate profitability in q‐theory and recent investment‐based asset pricing models. Both classical and Bayesian inferences show that limits‐to‐arbitrage tend to be supported by more evidence than investment frictions for all investment measures. When idiosyncratic volatility and cash flow volatility are used in measuring investment frictions, the inference is more favorable for the rational explanation.     

“Non‐Financial” Is a Misnomer,but Doesn't Have to Be a Missed Opportunity

With enterprise values now representing increasing multiples of companies' net book assets, investors are clearly looking beyond financial reporting for enhanced insights and understanding of when and how companies are adding value. This shift includes growing attention to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. Although ESG data presents its own unique challenges, dismissing it as “non‐financial” can be misleading. When explicitly linked to a company's long‐term value creation strategy, ESG information can serve as a valuable input to more farsighted financial analysis. Market‐driven initiatives, notably that of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), aim to standardize a subset of business‐critical, industry‐specific sustainability data for investors. Research indicates such approaches can generate positive outcomes not only for providers of financial capital, but for their portfolio companies and markets in general. In illustrating these concepts, the authors explore ESG impacts in three sectors and industries, while examining how access to consistent, comparable, reliable sustainability information in those sectors can augment an analysis of traditional business fundamentals. One example focuses on water management in the Oil & Gas Exploration & Production industry, a major environmental issue where geographic considerations can shed light on company‐specific exposures to cost increases, production disruptions, increased CapEx and R&D spending, as well as the potential for asset write‐downs. In the Food & Beverage sector, health and nutrition concerns are shown to be changing consumer preferences, triggering regulatory action, and reshaping companies' product portfolios—with significant implications for the companies' brand values and ability to compete for market share. Finally, in Aerospace & Defense, lapses in business ethics such as bribery of government officials present a governance challenge that comes with the risk of value‐destroying fines and penalties and, even more significant, associated reductions in revenues.     

Risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market effect

This paper proposes a risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market (B/M) effect. I decompose B/M into net operating asset‐to‐market (NOA/M) and net financing asset‐to‐market (NFA/M) components. Portfolio analysis shows that (i) positive B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M are positively related to future returns and (ii) negative B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M are negatively related to future returns. To the extent that positive B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M act as measures of asset risk and negative B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M act as inverse measures of borrowing risk, the nonlinear relations between B/M, NOA/M and NFA/M and future returns provide some evidence to support the risk‐based explanation for the book‐to‐market effect in stock returns.     

Agency and Institutional Investment

In this paper we summarise and extend the agency‐based model of asset pricing of Brennan (1993) to show that the implied agency effects on asset pricing are too small to be empirically detectable: empirical tests confirm this and we show that the positive findings of Gomez and Zapatero (2003) are due to their choice of sample. We also derive new empirical implications for the composition of institutional investment portfolios and empirically confirm the major result, that institutional portfolios will be short the minimum variance portfolio.     

Accounting Students’ Planning,Writing, and Performance on a Time‐Constrained Case Analysis: Effects of Self‐Talk and Prior Achievement

When writing a case analysis, most students first allocate time to plan the content and structure of their response, and then proceed to write with differing degrees of urgency, the outcomes of which are case responses of differing quality. This study examines the extent to which planning time influences writing urgency and, ultimately, the quality of case responses in a time‐constrained setting. It also investigates whether these behaviors and outcomes depend on students’ frame of mind, by experimentally inducing differing types of pre‐examination self‐talk. Analyses show that planning time was negatively associated with writing urgency; students who spent more time planning subsequently wrote with less urgency. Writing urgency was positively associated with case response quality and, after controlling for differences in writing urgency, planning time was positively associated with response quality. Results indicate that different planning and writing behaviors can be induced by different forms of self‐talk prior to the writing task. Relative to interrogative self‐talk (“Will I …?”), exclamatory self‐talk (“I will …!”) caused higher‐achieving students to spend more time planning, but then write with less urgency and subsequently produce lower‐quality case responses. Conversely, after engaging in exclamatory rather than interrogative self‐talk, lower‐achieving students spent less time planning but then wrote with greater urgency and produced higher‐quality responses. These results indicate that (i) planning significantly affects writing and performance, (ii) students can influence their own planning behavior through pre‐task self‐talk, but (iii) pre‐task self‐talk can be beneficial or detrimental depending on students’ prior achievement.     

NONNESTED PROCEDURES IN ECONOMETRIC TESTS OF ASSET PRICING THEORIES

In this paper nonnested tests are used to contrast the performance of the capital asset pricing (CAPM) and consumption capital asset pricing (CCAPM) theories in describing the U.S. stock market. The procedures employed include the N‐test, the NT‐test, the W‐test, the J‐test, and the Encompassing test. The tests are carried out using data on firms as well as portfolios based on beta, capitalization, and Standard Industrial Classification codes. The findings indicate that although during 1973–82 the CAPM dominates the CCAPM, during 1978–87 the results are mixed, and during 1983–92 the CCAPM dominates. The finding in favor of the CCAPM in 1983–92 conflicts with much of the existing literature, which favors the CAPM.     

Investor Attention and Time‐varying Comovements

This paper analyses the effect of an increase in market‐wide uncertainty on information flow and asset price comovements. We use the daily realised volatility of the 30‐year treasury bond futures to assess macroeconomic shocks that affect market‐wide uncertainty. We use the ratio of a stock's idiosyncratic realised volatility with respect to the S&P500 futures relative to its total realised volatility to capture the asset price comovement with the market. We find that market volatility and the comovement of individual stocks with the market increase contemporaneously with the arrival of market‐wide macroeconomic shocks, but decrease significantly in the following five trading days. This pattern supports the hypothesis that investors shift their (limited) attention to processing market‐level information following an increase in market‐wide uncertainty and then subsequently divert their attention back to asset‐specific information.     

Long‐Run Stockholder Consumption Risk and Asset Returns

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.     

The Effect of Fiduciary Standards on Institutions' Preference for Dividend‐Paying Stocks

Many researchers apparently believe that some institutional investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks because they are subject to the “prudent man” (PM) standard of fiduciary responsibility, under which dividend payments provide prima facie evidence that an investment is prudent. Although this was once accurate for many institutions, during the 1990s most states replaced the PM standard with the less‐stringent “prudent investor” (PI) rule, which evaluates the appropriateness of each investment in a portfolio context. Controlling for the general decline in dividend‐paying stocks, we find that institutions reduced their holdings of dividend‐paying stocks by 2% to 3% as the PI standard spread during the 1990s. Studies of asset pricing and corporate governance should no longer consider dividend payments when evaluating the actions of institutional investors.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.