Earnings Volatility,Post–Earnings Announcement Drift,and Trading Frictions

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.     

Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift: Bounds on Profitability for the Marginal Investor

The persistence of the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) leads many to believe that trading barriers prevent investors from eliminating it. We examine two factors that have not been adequately addressed by the literature: the exact timing of earnings announcements and liquidity costs. Under a wide range of timing and cost assumptions, our results leave little doubt that over our sample period the PEAD was highly profitable after trading costs. An additional incremental investor could have earned hedged‐portfolio returns of at least 14% per year after trading costs. Over our sample period, investors did indeed leave money on the table.     

Underreaction to Industry‐Wide Earnings and the Post‐Forecast Revision Drift

We test whether the post‐forecast revision drift is mainly attributable to investors’ underreaction to industry‐wide earnings news conveyed by analysts’ forecast revisions. We find a large drift associated with industry‐wide earnings news but no drift associated with firm‐specific earnings news. Consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, we provide evidence that the post‐forecast revision drift is driven by investors’ underreaction to the higher persistence of industry‐wide earnings. Although prior research has focused on differential persistence of earnings components stemming from managerial reporting discretion, we provide evidence suggesting that investors do not fully understand the differential earnings persistence attributable to industry fundamentals.     

Conservatism and Cross-Sectional Variation in the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

Accounting conservatism allows me to identify a previously undocumented source of predictable cross‐sectional variation in Standardized Unexpected Earnings' autocorrelations viz. the sign of the most recent earnings realization and present evidence that the market ignores this variation (“loss effect”). It is possible to earn returns higher than from the Bernard and Thomas (1990) strategy by incorporating this feature. Additionally, the paper shows that the “loss effect” is different from the “cross quarter” effect shown by Rangan and Sloan (1998) and it is possible to combine the two effects to earn returns higher than either strategy alone. Thus, the paper corroborates the Bernard and Thomas finding that stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which quarterly earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk and extends it by showing that the market systematically underestimates time‐series properties resulting from accounting conservatism.     

Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.     

The Pre‐FOMC Announcement Drift

We document large average excess returns on U.S. equities in anticipation of monetary policy decisions made at scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the past few decades. These pre‐FOMC returns have increased over time and account for sizable fractions of total annual realized stock returns. While other major international equity indices experienced similar pre‐FOMC returns, we find no such effect in U.S. Treasury securities and money market futures. Other major U.S. macroeconomic news announcements also do not give rise to preannouncement excess equity returns. We discuss challenges in explaining these returns with standard asset pricing theory.     

Comparing the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift for Surprises Calculated from Analyst and Time Series Forecasts

Post–earnings announcement drift is the tendency for a stock's cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement. We show that the drift is significantly larger when defining the earnings surprise using analysts' forecasts and actual earnings from I/B/E/S than when using a time series model based on Compustat earnings data. Neither Compustat's policy of restating earnings nor the inclusion of “special items” in reported earnings contribute significantly to the disparity in drift magnitudes. Rather, our results suggest that this disparity is attributable to differences between analyst forecasts and those of time‐series models—or at least to factors correlated with these differences. Further, we document that analyst forecasts lead to return patterns around future earnings announcements that differ from those observed when using time‐series models, suggesting that the two types of surprises may capture somewhat different forms of mispricing.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Volume, Opinion Divergence, and Returns: A Study of Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the relationship between post–earnings announcement returns and different measures of volume at the earnings date. We find that post‐event returns are strictly increasing in the component of volume that is unexplained by prior trading activity. We interpret unexplained volume as an indicator of opinion divergence among investors and conclude that post‐event returns are increasing in ex ante opinion divergence. Our evidence is consistent with Varian [1985] , who suggests that opinion divergence may be treated as an additional risk factor affecting asset prices.     

The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management

This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate 'normal' accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.     

Earnings management and earnings quality

Viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close relative, earnings quality. The works of Ball and Shivakumar [2008. Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, in press.] and Teoh et al. [1998. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974.] are used to illustrate the application of seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research.     

Earnings co-movements and earnings manipulation

This study develops a theory that predicts the lower the degree to which firms’ earnings are correlated with the industry the greater the probability a firm will issue a biased signal of firm performance. The theory provides for causal predictions in our empirical tests in which we examine the probability a firm will be subject to an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The empirical findings provide support for the theory, even after controlling for various predictive variables from the literature, indicating the degree of earnings co-movements with the industry is in fact a causal factor in managers decisions to bias earnings reports. We further illustrate that low co-movement firms are less conservative than high co-movement firms, which provides an application of our theory to a broader setting. Overall, we provide both a theory and an empirical validation of the theory helping to discipline the thinking about earnings management and allowing for causal relations to be uncovered.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.     

Earnings quality and the heterogeneous relation between earnings and stock returns

We adopt a heterogeneous regime switching method to examine the informativeness of accounting earnings for stock returns. We identify two distinct time-series regimes in terms of the relation between earnings and returns. In the low volatility regime (typical of bull markets), earnings are moderately informative for stock returns. But in high volatility market conditions (typical of financial crisis), earnings are strongly related to returns. Our evidence suggests that earnings are more informative to investors when uncertainty and risk is high which is consistent with the idea that during market downturns investors rely more on fundamental information about the firm. Next, we identify groups of firms that follow similar regime dynamics. We find that the importance of accounting earnings for returns in each of the market regimes varies across firms: certain firms spend more time in a regime where their earnings are highly relevant to returns, and other firms spend more time in a regime where earnings are moderately relevant to returns. We also show that firms with poorer accrual quality have a greater probability of belonging to the high volatility regime.     

Accruals, Cash Flows and the Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift

Abstract:   Several prior studies have shown that cash flows have significantly greater impact on stock prices than accruals. We examine the implications of these findings for the post‐earnings‐announcement‐drift anomaly. We argue that, if investors under‐react to earnings news, then the larger price impact of cash flows causes the cash flow component of earnings news to predict future returns better than the accruals component. Consistent with this argument, we show that unexpected cash flows are more positively related to future returns, than are unexpected accruals. Also, unexpected cash flows are found to predict future returns above and beyond that predicted by earnings surprises. Finally, we show that a strategy that decomposes earnings news into its components significantly outperforms strategies based on earnings news alone. The results support under‐reaction explanations for the drift.     

Chief Financial Officers’ Short‐ and Long‐term Incentive‐based Compensation and Earnings Management

This study examines the association between chief financial officers’ (CFOs) short‐ and long‐term compensation and discretionary current and non‐current accruals. The CFO's cash bonus is used as a measure of short‐term incentives and shares plus options is used as a measure of long‐term incentives. The results show a significant and positive association between CFOs’ short‐term compensation and the absolute value of discretionary current accruals. The results also show a significant and positive association between CFOs’ long‐term compensation and the absolute value of discretionary non‐current accruals. STUDY provides evidence that the earnings management behaviour of CFOs is associated with type of CFO compensation.     

机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告的信息含量

本文以我国2001—2004年机构投资者持股的上市公司为样本，从机构投资者对上市公司信息利用状况的视角出发，分析了机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告信息含量的关系，研究结果发现：机构投资者能够相对较早地解读会计盈余信息，其持股比例越高，盈余宣告后的市场反应越小．会计盈余宣告的信息含量越低。在会计盈余宣告前，机构投资者的持股比例高低与市场的累计超额回报正相关；而在盈余宣告后，机构投资者待股公司的市场累计超额回报出现反转。     

Detecting Target‐Driven Earnings Management Based on the Distribution of Digits

We present a novel research design to detect target‐driven earnings management in accounting data. As a particular concern in this line of research, information about the exact earnings target value of a given firm is often not available. We therefore develop an empirical strategy that does not require such information. To this end, we rely on the concept of the distribution of digits rather than the distribution of the earnings metric itself. We then theoretically derive that the mean of the distribution of digits, in particular, exhibits a specific pattern around the earnings target that can be exploited to investigate target‐driven earnings management. This pattern arises regardless of the distribution of digits that obtains in unmanaged data. We extensively test our theoretical predictions using both simulated and archival data.     

Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts (MEFs) help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements (EAs) in Chinese A-share markets. We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1% around MEFs. Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs. MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns, volume and volatility around EAs. The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs. The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’ tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.