Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Relevance of Differences between Net Income based on IFRS and Domestic Standards for European Firms

Net income adjustments resulting from mandatory 2005 IFRS adoption in Europe are value relevant for financial and non‐financial firms. Differences in relevance of the aggregate adjustment and adjustments related to several IFRS standards, for financial and non‐financial firms and across country groups, suggest differences in domestic standards and institutions affect investors’ assessment of the relevance of IFRS accounting amounts. Despite these differences, except for French/German non‐financial firms, investors view net income measured using IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement as more relevant than that measured using domestic standards, which is notable because IAS 39 was highly controversial in Europe.     

Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting? Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits

Class action lawsuits can be detrimental to debtholders because they deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower these firms’ value. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ litigation risk in debt contracting. We find that banks charge 19% higher interest spreads on loans to lawsuit firms after litigation. In addition, banks monitor lawsuit firms more closely by using tighter non‐price terms. The results are robust after correcting for possible endogeneity issues using the propensity score matching approach. We further find that the effects of lawsuit filing are more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. Following a lawsuit in the industry, banks also perceive an increased likelihood of litigation for industry peer firms and adjust price and non‐price terms accordingly. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the lawsuit filing effect is greater for firms with lower ex‐ante litigation risk. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that banks, as informed stakeholders, perceive litigation risk to be detrimental and price this risk in debt contracting.     

Analyst forecast,accounting conservatism and the related valuation implications

This study investigates whether financial analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and whether it is more difficult for them to forecast earnings for less conservative firms, and then examines the impact of the findings on the return predictability of the value‐to‐price (V/P) ratio. After controlling for the other factors affecting forecast accuracy, such as earnings predictability and information uncertainty, I find that analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and that forecasting earnings is more difficult for less conservative firms. Consequently, the return predictability of the V/P ratio is stronger for more conservative firms, and previously reported return predictability of the V/P ratio is an average across firms with differing levels of conservatism.     

Twenty‐five years of the Taffler z‐score model: Does it really have predictive ability?

Although copious statistical failure prediction models are described in the literature, appropriate tests of whether such methodologies really work in practice are lacking. Validation exercises typically use small samples of non‐failed firms and are not true tests of ex ante predictive ability, the key issue of relevance to model users. This paper provides the operating characteristics of the well‐known Taffler (1983) UK‐based z‐score model for the first time and evaluates its performance over the 25‐year period since it was originally developed. The model is shown to have clear predictive ability over this extended time period and dominates more naïve prediction approaches. This study also illustrates the economic value to a bank of using such methodologies for default risk assessment purposes. Prima facie, such results also demonstrate the predictive ability of the published accounting numbers and associated financial ratios used in the z‐score model calculation.     

Use of Derivatives and Analysts’ Forecasts: New Evidence from Non‐financial Brazilian Companies

This study investigates whether market analysts’ forecasts are influenced by the presence of derivative financial instruments in listed firms. From a sample of firms comprising 1173 derivative users and 7797 non‐users for the 2006–14 period, the results indicate the existence of less error behaviour (bias) on earnings per share forecasts for derivative user firms compared to non‐user firms. This finding suggests that these instruments may be used to protect businesses and provide greater stability in the results of companies that use them. The presence of derivative financial instruments is increasing among listed firms, and management can use them for hedging or speculation (thus mitigating or increasing risk). The literature contains few studies on this issue, and the general understanding relies on the assumption that derivative financial instruments provide relevant information for decision making.     

The Use of Performance‐based Remuneration: High versus Low‐growth Firms

This study analyses the CEO remuneration structure and level for 100 Australian‐listed entities. Consistent with expectations, it finds that high‐growth firms pay their CEOs a greater proportion of performance‐based pay, when equity‐based rewards only are considered. High‐growth firms also place greater reliance on market and/or non‐financial performance standards for the award of performance‐based pay. The extent to which performance‐based remuneration is used as a component of CEO pay is positively associated with firm size and growth options. Other potential determinants of performance‐based pay, such as financial performance, are not significantly associated with the use of performance‐based remuneration.     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Has Adoption of IFRS Increased Non–North American Institutional Investment in the Canadian Stock Markets?

We investigate whether non–North American (non‐NA) institutional investment in firms listed on the Canadian stock markets increased between the pre‐ and post‐IFRS adoption periods relative to such investment in firms listed on the U.S. stock markets. Prior to IFRS adoption, Canada had high‐quality financial reporting standards that were similar to the U.S. standards. As consequences of IFRS adoption, Canadian financial statements became more comparable with European and other IFRS country financial statements and less comparable with neighboring U.S. financial statements. Thus, a question of interest is whether the enhanced comparability with non‐NA companies was beneficial in terms of attracting non‐NA investment to Canadian companies versus U.S. companies. We find that there was no significant change in non‐NA institutional investment in Canadian firms relative to U.S. firms for the very largest (fifth quintile) and for smaller (first, second, and third quintiles) Canadian companies. However, intermediate‐sized Canadian companies in the fourth size quintile lost non‐NA institutional investment relative to their U.S. peer companies, suggesting that non‐NA investors cared more about comparability with U.S. peer companies than non‐NA peer companies for companies in this size quintile.     

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Using country‐level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country‐level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004 ), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance‐related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak.     

Material weakness disclosures and restatement announcements: The joint and order effects

We examine differences in stock price, option volatility, and litigation reactions to restatement announcements that are associated with a material weakness (MW) disclosure. Contrasted with restatements that are not associated with any MW disclosure, our analyses reveal that firms that announce both a restatement and an associated MW experience significantly more negative market returns, greater implied volatility, and higher likelihood of class action lawsuits. Separating the restatements into timely reporters, where the MW precedes the restatement, and non‐timely reporters, where the MW is concurrent with or follows the restatement, we find that timely reporters experience more negative returns at the time of the restatement, relative to non‐timely reporters, suggesting that investors perceive the early MW disclosure to signal more pervasive control‐related problems. Interestingly, we find that timely and non‐timely reporters are equally likely to be sued, consistent with the argument that wrongdoing (through either a timely or non‐timely MW disclosure) provides stronger grounds for establishing scienter. However, timely reporters appear to secure more favorable litigation outcomes: they face higher likelihood of lawsuit dismissals and pay much lower settlements, compared to non‐timely reporters. Overall, our evidence provides new insights into how market participants incorporate information about internal control weaknesses into their perceptions regarding the economic implications of financial restatements, and financial reporting quality.     

Do Family Owners Use Firm Hedging Policy to Hedge Personal Undiversified Wealth Risk?

We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensions of firms’ hedging policies. We show that family firms’ market valuations are higher than those of non‐family firms, consistent with the view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long‐term perspectives and ability to monitor managers. In addition, while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non‐family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that the founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

Does news play an important role in the correction process of the accrual anomaly?

We examine whether the financial press plays an important role in the correction of the accruals anomaly. Using 83,016 Wall Street Journal news articles published during 1993–2006, we find that a significant fraction of abnormal returns associated with the accruals trading strategy is concentrated on news days. The clustering of returns on news announcements is consistent with the financial press revealing information valuable for the correction of accruals mispricing. Further, we find that earnings‐related news is more influential in the correction process than non‐earnings‐related news. Collectively, the results suggest that the financial press provides useful information to capital market participants.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

Financial Distress in the Great Depression

We use firm‐level data to study corporate performance during the Great Depression era for all industrial firms on the NYSE. Our goal is to identify the factors that contribute to business insolvency and valuation changes during the period 1928‐1938. We find that firms with more debt and lower bond ratings in 1928 became financially distressed more frequently during the Depression, consistent with the trade‐off theory of leverage and the information production role of credit rating agencies. We also document for the first time that firms responded to tax incentives to use debt during the Depression era but that the extra debt used in response to this tax‐driven “debt bias” did not contribute significantly to the occurrence of distress. Finally, we conduct an out‐of‐sample test during the recent 2008‐2009 Recession and find that higher leverage and lower bond ratings also increased the occurrence of financial distress during this period.     

Corporate Bankruptcy in Korea: Only the Strong Survive?

We analyze whether the build‐up of financial vulnerabilities led listed Korean companies to bankruptcy. We find that pre‐crisis leverage is systematically high for both poor performing/slow growing firms and for profitable/fast‐growing firms. Pre‐crisis leverage raises the probability of bankruptcy, which is lower for firms: (1) relying more on (renegotiable) bank credit; (2) with less inter‐firm debt; and (3) having higher interest coverage ratios. Finally, none of these liquidity variables help predict bankruptcies for chaebol‐firms, suggesting that liquidity constraints are more stringent for non‐chaebol. Thus, in a systemic crisis it is not only the strong/healthy that survive.