Clawbacks,Holdbacks, and CEO Contracting

“Clawbacks” are much discussed in the context of senior executive compensation, yet the discussion has largely ignored the presence of holdbacks that are already in place in many firms. Holdbacks are deferred compensation that is potentially foregone in the event that the CEO leaves the firm without good reason or they are dismissed for wrong‐doing. They are explicit or written features of a CEOs employment contract. Holdbacks are already in use at 70% of S&P 500 firms and average $18.4 million each. Firms with higher CEO replacement costs, greater information asymmetry, a recent bad experience (fraud, lawsuit, or restatement), or in more certain environments are more likely to have a holdback. In contrast, clawback adoptions are mainly driven by firms' bad experiences and external pressure from shareholders. Holdbacks and incentive‐based compensation are substitutes, as termination incentives can reduce the need for incentive compensation. As managers reasonably demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, a measure of abnormal compensation is positively associated with holdbacks, but there is no significant association between clawbacks and holdbacks. These findings suggest that the holdbacks many firms already have in place could help an “ex‐post settling up” in the event of financial misconduct, or even simply misstated financials. As companies have more control over the amounts held back ex‐ante, holdbacks are potentially more efficient.     

De-politicization and innovation: Evidence from China

This study analyzes whether the loss of political connections in the Chinese listed firms affects their innovation. Using number of firm patents as a proxy for innovation, we construct a quasi-natural experiment, which focuses on independent directors with political connections were forced to resign due to CPC regulation in 2013 to explore the casual relation between political connections and firm innovation. The baseline results indicate that the innovation output has improved significantly since the promulgation of the Chinese government’s policy in 2013. In addition, we also find two possible underlying channels that firms tend to increase R&D investments and prefer to hire more senior engineers as their independent directors once they lose political ties. The results suggest that de-politicization has been conducive to promoting technological innovation and firms will compensate for their competitiveness weakened by the loss of political connection through two underlying channels in China, which are also confirmed in additional robustness and placebo tests.     

Crises, Cronyism, and Credit

This paper examines the effects of several potential explanatory factors related to the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis. We find that a crisis can improve a poorly functioning credit system by making domestic lending rates more responsive to market-based returns. We report that the responsiveness of short-term lending rates is directly related to the level of transparency in the economy. Thus, countries with greater transparency (less corruption) are more likely to make credit decisions based on market-wide forces rather than succumb to the influence of special interest groups. Nations with greater transparency also experience significantly shorter and less severe economic downturns.     

职工薪酬与会计稳健性——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

企业职工对未来可持续的高工资和管理层对未来低劳动力成本的不同期望,可能导致两者对会计稳健性需求的差异。本文以Khan et al.(2009)的C Score为会计稳健性的计量方式,分析了职工薪酬、工资刚性与会计稳健性的关系。结果显示:较高的职工薪酬与较强的会计稳健性相联系;工资的向下刚性特征与较强的会计稳健性相联系;作为工会规模代理变量的职工人数也与会计稳健性显著正相关。此外2008年实行《新劳动合同法》之后,企业的会计稳健性有了显著提高,这也可能侧面体现了职工与会计稳健性的关系。本文的研究意义在于联结了传统的职工薪酬研究和会计稳健性研究,对Watts(2003)提出的与会计稳健性相关的契约集合进行了扩展,显示了职工薪酬契约对会计稳健性的影响。     

Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China

We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process.     

XBRL and Accruals: Empirical Evidence from China

We examine whether XBRL adoption by publicly traded firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange is related to the level of total accruals that firms report in the pre‐XBRL versus post‐XBRL periods. Our results indicate that the level of total accruals in the post‐XBRL period is lower relative to the pre‐XBRL period. This finding is robust to several controls for macroeconomic conditions and firm fundamentals. Moreover, we find this main effect is most prominent for firms that are most likely to benefit from greater transparency: high‐growth firms, small firms, and firms in high‐technology industries. One interpretation of our results is that XBRL implementation decreases investor’s information acquisition costs and thereby improves their ability to detect earnings management; managers in turn reduce accruals.     

股利税与资本结构:中国的经验证据

已有研究主要考察了企业所得税对资本结构的影响,却较少有研究探讨个人所得税对资本结构的影响,基于中国的此类研究则处于空白。我国2012年颁布的股息红利差别化个人所得税政策,将投资者的股利税与持股时间相结合。基于这一税收改革,我们发现,投资者持股时间越长(短)的企业,因为在改革之后其投资者的股利税会下降(上升),这些企业债务融资的比重显著降低(提高)。此外,股利税对资本结构的影响,在股利支付力度较大的企业更为显著。进一步,股利税对不同类型债务融资比重的影响存在差异。本文的结论不仅为"税收与公司财务"这一经典的学术领域提供了来自中国的经验证据,也补充了中国在相关学术领域的缺失。     

Banking structure and industrial growth: Evidence from China

The debate on the puzzling relationship between financial development and economic growth in China has remained inconclusive because the effects of banking ownership structure and size structure are highly intertwined in the existing studies. This paper addresses this problem by specifying an empirical model to disentangle the two structural effects. The analysis uses a data set that includes the banking sector and 28 manufacturing industries across 30 Chinese provinces over the period 1999–2007. In order to identify the channel through which banking structure affects industrial growth, two interactive variables are constructed to capture the interaction of the prevailing banking structure with labor intensity and the share of non-state-owned enterprises in each industry, respectively. The regression results are robust and make the case for the ongoing banking reforms to reduce state ownership and promote small banking institutions.     

Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

Home-Purchase Limits and Housing Prices: Evidence from China

Home-purchase limits, introduced by China’s central government in April 2010 and afterward implemented by the local governments of major cities successively, were usually regarded as the most stringent policy instruments regulating over-heated Chinese housing markets over recent years. Our study attempts to investigate the effects of the home-purchase limits based on the micro data of resale housing transactions between January 2008 and December 2011 in Guangzhou city, one of the largest cities in mainland China. Our regression results show that, while the central government’s notice negatively affects housing prices, the localized home-purchase limit measures have positive effects on housing prices in Guangzhou, which deviate far from the expectations the policy makers might have. We also find that the effects of the policies are significantly stronger for the housing units of high-rise building (or with big size) relative to those without elevators (or with small size). We provide the explanation from the aspects of policy uncertainty and redevelopment option embodied in the housing.     

Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.     

Foreign VCs and venture success: Evidence from China

This paper analyzes the role of foreign VCs in driving venture success in emerging markets. We analyze a comprehensive data set of 4753 portfolio companies from China. We test whether the presence of a foreign VC increases the likelihood that a portfolio company is successfully exited. We find that the presence of a foreign VC does not per se significantly increase the likelihood of a successful exit. However, the likelihood of a successful exit increases if the foreign VC collaborates with a joint venture (JV) partner. Further, the impact of foreign VC backing depends on the nature of the VC, with foreign VCs tending to perform better when investing in late-stage companies and when they are diversified across industries. If a foreign VC successfully exits an investment, then, compared with a domestic-VC, it prefers to exit via a M&A or secondary-buyout than via an IPO, reflecting the significant lock-up periods associated with VC-backed IPOs in China, the difficulty of achieving a foreign listing, and the difficulty listing a start-up on Chinese markets.     

Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on changes of government officials in 277 Chinese cities, we examine how political turnover affects corporate investment in a transitional economy. We find that political turnover leads firms to significantly reduce corporate investment, particularly when the new official is an outsider appointed by a higher level government. The effect of political turnover on corporate investment is stronger for state-owned enterprises, capital intensive firms, and firms deemed locally important. Overall, the volatility of corporate investment increases with political turnover. Finally, the investment decline due to political turnover has significantly negative impact on the profitability of private firms, but not state-owned firms.     

Business groups and environmental violations: Evidence from China

Although, in the modern era, stakeholders put pressure on firms to engage in environmental friendly practices, yet collaborative arrangements in the shape of business group affiliations may prove a double-edged sword. Accordingly, this study examines the impact of such collaborative arrangements on firm's environmental violations. On one hand, this affiliation can better pursue environmental policies and regulations because of their higher political or social visibility and reduce environmental infractions. Conversely, higher political legitimacy may derive from engaging in environmental violations. Using a unique sample from China comprising 6860 firm-year observations over the 2010 to 2020 time period, we find that business group affiliation increases environmental violations, implying that stronger political legitimacy provides them relaxation in strictly following environmental regulations in comparison to standalone firms. We also find that this nexus is more pronounced when the affiliated firms have poor shareholder and board monitoring. These findings are helpful for policymakers/regulators concerning the initiative's evaluation regarding sustainable development and ecological protection.     

Forecasting Bull and Bear Markets: Evidence from China

This article extends previous empirical research to forecast Chinese bull and bear stock markets by using three types of binary probit time series models, which are static, autoregressive, and dynamic autoregressive models. This study shows that the dynamic auto regressive model performs the best both in- and out-of-sample. The inflation and market return variables significantly affect the market forecast. The dynamic autoregressive model has successfully forecast the bull and bear markets since 2007. The investment strategy based on this model performs better than the simple buy-and-hold strategy, especially after the Chinese government reformed the non-tradable shares in 2005.     

Rookie directors and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper examines the benefits and costs associated with rookie independent directors (RIDs) in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that RIDs attend more board meetings. Boards with more RIDs tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that RIDs are efficient monitors. However, in state-owned firms, the presence of RIDs is negatively associated with investment efficiency, suggesting a potential cost of appointing RIDs. Overall, firms with more RIDs have higher operating performance, especially when tunneling is a more common issue, when board experience is less important and when monitoring costs are relatively low.     

Performance Manipulation and Fund Flow: Evidence from China

In this paper, we assess the relation between fund flow and fund returns in China's open-ended fund industry. Analyzing quarterly data from the period January 2005-December 2012, we construct a simultaneous equation model that captures the endogeneity of current and past returns and flows and find that contemporaneous returns have a key role in determining fund flows. We then estimate the fund performance "manipulation degree" to further investigate the performance manipulation effect on fund flows. We find that manipulated funds can attract an additional flow of money and that, notably, individual rather than institutional investors are more likely to be deceived by manipulative behavior.     

Financial Structure and Income Inequality: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between financial structure and income inequality in China and explores a channel for changes of financial structure to influence income inequality. Our results suggest that, relative to total bank credit, an increase in the raised capital from the stock market reduces income inequality, whereas a rise of turnover in the stock market augments income inequality. Financial structure affects income inequality by influencing the development of medium-sized enterprises. Our evidence supports the financial structure relevancy view. To reduce income inequality, the Chinese government should help to promote equity financing and decrease excessive speculation on the stock market.     

Social Capital and Housing Affordability: Evidence from China

This article attempts to examine the problem of housing affordability in China based on a set of household-level survey data. In contrast to the previous studies, our study focuses on the important implication of social capital for households’ house-purchasing decisions in this country. Our results show that household expenditures on the relations with parents and other relatives are important determinants for homeownership in China. We also find evidence that house-purchasing decisions are significantly affected by relatives-related variables such as number of immediate relatives in the same city, distance from parents, educational years of family head’s father, and whether parents are alive. Our research helps shed new light on the high homeownership rates in urban China.     

ESG performance and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China

Corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) is vital for sustainable growth, while the motivation of corporate ESG engagement could decide whether ESG participation is green or greenwashing behavior. This paper attempts to understand the motivation of corporate ESG engagement from the firm's risk-taking perspective. Using Chinese publicly listed firm data from 2010 to 2020, we find that ESG rating significantly reduces corporate risk-taking. This finding still holds after a series of robustness tests to address potential endogeneity concerns and alternative risk-taking proxies. Furthermore, the marginal inhibitory impact of ESG on corporate risk-taking is more pronounced in firms with lower information transparency, weaker corporate governance and less external monitoring pressure. Our results shed essential insight on the trade-off between sustainable growth and corporate risk-taking behavior in a relatively weak investor protection institutional environment.