What do financial intermediaries do?

This paper presents evidence that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits and making loans has declined significantly in the US in recent years. There has been a switch from directly held assets to pension funds and mutual funds. However, banks have maintained their position relative to GDP by innovating and switching from their traditional business to fee-producing activities. A comparison of investor portfolios across countries shows that households in the US and UK bear considerably more risk from their investments than counterparts in Japan, France and Germany. It is argued that in these latter countries intermediaries can manage risk by holding liquid reserves and intertemporally smoothing. However, in the US and UK competition from financial markets prevents this and risk management must be accomplished using derivatives and other similar techniques. The decline in the traditional banking business and the financial innovation undertaken by banks in the US is interpreted as a response to the competition from markets and the decline of intertemporal smoothing.     

Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.     

Why do companies issue sukuk?

This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.     

Why do fund managers increase risk?

This paper examines the relationship between the increase in fund risk and subsequent cash flows. We attempt to test the hypothesis that an increase in fund risk actually increases the net flows of equity funds, which is a basic assumption of risk shifting. We find that a change in fund risk has a positive and convex relationship with the fund's net flows. The effect of risk changes on net flows is a natural consequence of its effects on inflows and outflows. This paper's empirical results are robust to return frequency, fund age, and fund size. Our findings create incentives for managers to shift risk as documented in the mutual fund literature.     

Why do traders choose dark markets?

We examine U.S. equity trader use of dark and lit markets. Marketable orders executed in the dark have lower information content and smaller fill rates. Dark orders take longer to execute, but they execute at more favorable prices. Traders are more likely to go dark when the bid-ask spread is wider and those with higher dark participation are more sophisticated. Although market regulators have expressed concern over the rise in dark trading, our results indicate that dark markets provide important benefits to traders that lit markets do not.     

Why do private firms adopt IFRS?

Do private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS? If so, why? Answers to these questions have been very limited so far, mainly due to the absence of financial data on private firms. In this paper, I exploit the German setting where the financial statements of private firms are widely available. I estimate multi-period logit regressions on the choice between national GAAP and IFRS for the consolidated financial statements of nearly 3000 German private firms with more than 14,000 firm-years in the period 1998–2010. My results suggest that the expected net benefits of IFRS adoption vary substantially across the group of private firms, depending on their financing needs, governance system, and organizational and informational complexity. Specifically, I find that private firms using IFRS have more growth opportunities, are more leveraged, are externally rated, seek to raise external capital by issuing public bonds or equity, are registered as a stock corporation, are characterized by private equity (PE) involvement, have more international sales and operations, and have a Big Five auditor. These insights should be of great interest to both preparers and regulators in the current debate about the future of financial reporting in private firms.     

Why do investors discount earnings announced late?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Holding earnings surprises constant, investors react negatively to delayed earnings announcements. One standard deviation of delay (5 days)...     

Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.     

Why do bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate risk?

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.     

Why do stock repurchases change over time?

Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.     

Why do transnational approaches to international innovation fail?

The transnational corporation paradigm is increasingly at odds with empirical findings regarding international innovation strategies. Analysing a longitudinal case study, we show that a firm's international R&D subsidiaries can be a powerful force that can shape strategy even more than headquarters. On the basis of a literature review that identifies factors and mechanisms by which the firm's subsidiaries are likely to exert this influence, we explore these factors and mechanisms by applying them to our case. Our findings show that international innovation strategies are unlikely to succeed if international R&D subsidiaries use their capabilities and market power to oppose their implementation.     

Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

Why do contagion effects vary among bank failures?

Many of the previous studies on contagion effects in the banking industry focused on the failure of a large bank to determine whether the adverse effects spread to other banks. Yet, little is known whether other publicized bank failures cause contagion effects, and why the effects may vary among bank failures. Given the changes in the banking environment over time, contagion effects could be conditioned on the characteristics of the failing bank and of the banking environment at that time. We assess 99 publicized bank failures over the 1980–1996 period, and find that contagion effects exist in general for the surviving rivals of the failed bank. The degree of contagion effects varies over time (among bank failures), and is stronger when the failed bank is a multibank holding company, when the failed bank is publicly held, when the failed bank is relatively large, when the rivals are relatively small, and when the rivals have relatively low capital levels. The contagion effects are less pronounced in the period following the passage of FIRREA. Furthermore, the total risk-shifts of surviving rival banks in response to the announcement of a failed bank are inversely related to their capital level, and total risk-shifts of rival banks are less pronounced for failures occurring just after the passage of FIRREA. The results suggest that a bank’s exposure to possible contagion effects due to a bank failure can be partially controlled by a bank’s managerial policies and by regulatory policies.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

Why do individuals not participate in the stock market?

We use a representative survey to study economic and non-economic factors that affect stock market participation. We find that many individuals suffer from inertia in the sense that they do not want to take the time and effort to invest in stocks. Inertia also explains stock market participation in addition to earlier documented factors such as actual and perceived financial literacy, trust, and the personal equity risk premium (PERP). A high percentage of non-investors (66%) assert that they will never invest in stocks. We find that inertia affects this assertion both directly and indirectly through factors such as age and gender.     

Why do firms disclose and not disclose structural intangibles?

This study conducts 22 interviews with the directors of 11 firms chosen from the top 30 listed firms by market capital on the Colombo Stock Exchange, with each firm representing an industry. The interviews explore senior executives' views about disclosing the structural intangibles in annual reports to attract financial investments. The study identifies 20 intangible resources in 10 intangible classes. It analyzes the interview data using latent thematic analysis and explores them as responses to social, political, and economic interest groups. Corroborating interview data with annual report data, this study identifies five broad reasons for disclosure and non-disclosure. Build empathy, show they are good corporate citizens, win government support, and build confidence are about disclosure, and divert attention from issues at hand is about non-disclosure. This study finds that disclosure results in managing legitimacy of the social and political interest groups, and also in managing impressions of the economic interest group. Non-disclosure results in managing impressions of the social and political interest groups. The findings contribute to building an evidence-led theoretical connection to understand the structural intangibles disclosed and not disclosed to attract financial investment to firms.     

Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.     

Why do companies delist voluntarily from the stock market?

We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange. We show that firms that delist voluntarily are likely to have come to the market to rebalance their leverage rather than to finance their growth opportunities. During their quotation life, their leverage and insider ownership remained very high, they did not raise equity capital, and their profitability, growth opportunities, and trading volume declined substantially. They also generate negative pre-event and announcement date excess returns. These results hold even after controlling for agency, asymmetric information, and liquidity effects, and suggest that firms delist voluntarily when they fail to benefit from listing. Overall, these firms destroyed shareholder value and they should not have come to the market.     

Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion.     

Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is life insurance purchased by bank holding companies (BHCs) for key employees, whose proceeds can be shared by the...