Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts*

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.     

The Interdependent Use of Earnings and Dividends in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Abstract. This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au-delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices.     

The Relation between Market Values,Earnings Forecasts,and Reported Earnings*

Recently, much of the research into the relation between market values and accounting numbers has used, or at least made reference to, the residual income model (RIM). Two basic types of empirical research have developed. The “historical” type explores the relation between market values and reported accounting numbers, often using the linear dynamics in Ohlson 1995 and Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and 1996. The “forecast” type explores the relation between market value and the present value of the book value of equity, a truncated sequence of residual income forecasts, and an estimate of the terminal value at the truncation date. The analysis in this paper integrates these two approaches. We expand the Feltham and Ohlson 1996 model by including one‐ and two‐period‐ahead residual income forecasts to infer “other” information regarding future revenues from past investments and future growth opportunities. This approach results in a model in which the difference between market value and book value of equity is a function of current residual income, one‐ and two‐period‐ahead residual income, current capital investment, and start‐of‐period operating assets. The existence of both persistence in revenues from current and prior investments and growth in future positive net present value investment opportunities leads us to hypothesize a negative coefficient on the one‐period‐ahead residual income forecast and a positive coefficient on the two‐period‐ahead residual income forecast. Our empirical results strongly support our hypotheses with respect to the forecast coefficients.     

Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing*

This paper assesses how the bias and accuracy of managers' earnings forecasts in prospectuses were affected by a 1989 regulation that required the forecasts to be audited by public accountants. Theory suggests that auditors' association with the forecasts would reduce positive (optimistic) bias, by reducing moral hazard. Regulators expected that the audit requirement would also improve the accuracy of the forecasts. Both predictions were tested using management earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses of Canadian initial public offerings. The results show that audited forecasts contained significantly less positive bias than reviewed forecasts, but there was only a marginally significant improvement in accuracy.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

MD&A Quality as Measured by the SEC and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This study examines the predictive value of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) information. More specifically, this study tests the association between properties of analysts' earnings forecasts and MD&A quality, where MD&A quality is measured by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that high MD&A ratings are associated with less error and less dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts after controlling for many other expected influences on analysts' forecasts. We also find that estimated regression coefficients are consistent with MD&A information having a substantial effect on earnings forecasts. Finally, we find our results are driven by forward-looking disclosures about capital expenditures and operations, and also by historical disclosures about capital expenditures. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by many constituencies (including the SEC) that the type of information found in high quality MD&A is particularly relevant for predicting earnings.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

Earnings Forecasts and Price Efficiency after Earnings Realizations: Reduction in Information Asymmetry through Learning from Price*

When information asymmetry is a major market friction, earnings forecasts can lead to higher price efficiency even after the information in forecasts completely dissipates upon earnings realizations. We show this in an experimental market that features information asymmetry (i.e., some traders possess differential private information). Earnings forecasts reduce information asymmetry and lead to prices that reflect a greater amount of private information. Traders can learn more about others' information from prices. This information learned from past prices continues to reduce information asymmetry and improve price efficiency even after earnings realizations. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing the evidence that the learning‐from‐price effect amplifies the impact of public disclosure on price efficiency.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

Auditor Sensitivity to Earnings Management*

Abstract. Generally accepted auditing standards, auditing textbooks, and firm audit manuals indicate that, other things equal, the presence of significant monetary incentives based on financial results increases the inherent risk of material misstatement, and higher inherent risk should ordinarily cause the auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism in conducting the audit. This article addresses the following basic research question: Are auditors sensitive to management's incentives to manage earnings? Research that examines whether auditors distinguish between explanations provided by managers with different incentives is important because audit standards indicate that inquiry of management can assist the auditor in evaluating significant unexpected differences. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment explored whether management-buyout-induced incentives to make income-decreasing accruals affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. As predicted, auditors were sensitive to these incentives. The second experiment explored whether bonus-induced incentives affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. The auditors agreed that bonus plans such as the one in the experiment create incentives for management to make income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals depending on the terms of the plan. However, the auditors' judgments were unaffected by whether the unexpected difference and management's incentives were congruent. The auditors opted for potential audit effectiveness rather than potential audit efficiency by assuming that—on balance—management had incentives congruent with the unexpected overstatement. Résumé. Selon les normes de vérification généralement reconnues, les manuels de vérification et les guides de vérification des cabinets comptables, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la présence d'encouragements monétaires substantiels basés sur les résultats financiers accroît le risque inhérent d'inexactitudes importantes, et un risque inhérent supérieur doit normalement amener le vérificateur à exercer davantage de vigilance dans la réalisation de sa mission de vérification. L'auteur s'intéresse à la question fondamentale suivante: les vérificateurs sont-ils sensibles aux motivations de la direction à user d'astuces comptables aux fins de l'établissement des bénéfices? Les recherches visant à déterminer si les vérificateurs établissent une distinction entre les explications fournies par les gestionnaires dont les motivations sont différentes revêtent beaucoup d'importance, compte tenu du fait que les normes de vérification indiquent que les demandes de renseignements de la direction peuvent aider le vérificateur à évaluer les écarts inattendus appréciables. Deux expériences ont été menées. La première avait pour but de déterminer si les motivations à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de manière à réduire les bénéfices, induites par un rachat de l'entreprise par les cadres, ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs relatifs à la probabilité d'inexactitudes importantes dans les déclarations. Conformément aux prévisions, les vérificateurs se montrent sensibles à ces motivations. La seconde expérience visait à déterminer si les motivations induites par les primes ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs en ce qui a trait à la probabilité de l'existence d'inexactitudes importantes. Les vérificateurs conviennent que les systèmes de primes, comme celui de la seconde expérience, motivent la direction à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de façon à augmenter ou réduire les bénéfices, selon les conditions du système. Toutefois, les jugements des vérificateurs ne sont pas influencés par le fait que l'écart inattendu dans les bénéfices et la motivation de la direction sont reliés. Les vérificateurs optent pour l'efficacité potentielle de la vérification plutôt que pour son efficience potentielle, en supposant que, dans l'ensemble, la direction présente des motivations qui vont dans le sens des surestimations inattendues en matière de bénéfices.     

Earnings Management under Price Regulation*

Price controls¹ have a major impact on firms' earnings and cash flows. Because price control regulation is costly to firms, it is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm's accounting decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, regulatory changes that give firms relief from price controls provide incentives for earnings management. This paper examines discretionary accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations issued in 1971 and 1972. These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. Using a modified accruals mode! that adjusts for price-level movements, the paper tests discretionary accruals of two samples of manufacturing firms and one control sample of nonmanufacturing firms. The results provide evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. The control firms do not exhibit significant discretionary accruals in 1971 or 1972. Also, this paper provides evidence that failing to adjust for price-level movements in high inflationary periods could result in inferences of income decreasing discretionary accruals where none may exist.     

Customer Concentration and Public Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings and Sales Forecasts

This study examines the association between customer base concentration and corporate public disclosure policy. When the customer base is more concentrated, large customers face lower costs of accessing the supplier firm's private information, reducing customers' overall demand for the supplier's public information, suggesting a negative association between customer concentration and the amount of public disclosure. Alternatively, large customers have greater bargaining power and may demand that the supplier firm provide more public disclosures. Consistent with customer concentration facilitating private information flow from the supplier to customers, we find that the frequencies of management earnings and sales forecasts are negatively associated with customer concentration among firms with major corporate customers. These associations are stronger when the supplier and customers are engaged in more relationship-specific investments, when customers' private information acquisition costs are lower, and when it is less costly for customers to find another supplier.     

The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations*

Abstract. This study shows that financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a company (investment banker analysts) are optimistic, relative to other (noninvestment banker) analysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Returns earned by following the investment recommendations of investment banker analysts, however, are not significantly different from those of non-investment banker analysts. Given that information regarding the investment banking relationships of brokerage firms is publicly available, we find evidence that capital market participants rely relatively less on the investment banker analysts in forming their earnings expectations. Although we find a significant capital market reaction around the noninvestment banker analysts' research report dates and not around the investment banker analysts' research report dates, the difference between the two market reactions is not statistically significant. Finally, we find that investment banker analysts' earnings forecasts are, on average, as accurate as those of noninvestment banker analysts. Résumé. Les auteurs mettent en évidence le fait que les analystes financiers des maisons de courtage qui offrent des services de prise ferme aux entreprises (les analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme) sont optimistes dans leurs prévisions de bénéfices et leurs recommandations de placements, par comparaison aux autres analystes (c'est-à-dire aux analystes de courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme). Les rendements obtenus par les investisseurs qui observent les recommandations de placements des analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme ne sont cependant pas sensiblement différents de ceux qu'obtiennent les investisseurs qui se fient aux analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme. Compte tenu du fait que l'information relative aux relations qu'entretiennent les maisons de courtage en matière de prise ferme est du domaine public, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les participants au marché financier s'appuient relativement moins sur le verdict des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme dans le calcul de leur espérance de gains. Bien que les auteurs observent une réaction marquée du marché financier à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme, ce qui n'est pas le cas à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme, la différence entre ces deux réactions n'est pas statistiquement significative. Enfin, les auteurs constatent que les prévisions de bénéfices des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme sont, en moyenne, aussi exactes que celles des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme.