国有股减持的是是非非——与王国刚研究员对话

6月23日,国务院决定,除企业海外发行上市外,对国内上市公司停止执行《减持国有股筹集社会保障资金管理暂行办法》中关于利用证券市场减持国有股的规定,并不再出台具体实施办法。减持国有股政策从实施到停止,表现出了两大特点:一是时间短。从2001年6月12日国务院出台国有股减持政策,到现在停止执行,只有短短的一年。实际上,早在2001年10月22日,中国证监会就出台了暂停国有股减持的政策。现在来看这个暂停日就成了停止日,如果以此来计算,国有股减持政策实施的时间就更短。二是影响大。国有股减持与否,都会引起中国股市的轩然大波。     

Privatization And Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility Privatization

This article examines the effects on poverty of privatization, an impact to which donors have given little attention in their concern with efficiency and markets. The analysis of the distributional impact of privatization activities draws on empirical cases in the utilities sector in a wide range of developing economies, principally in Africa and Latin America. After a critical consideration of the World Bank position on privatization strategies, and the arguments presented by donors on the pro–poor effects of these economic reforms, the article turns to the negative distributional effects. It is argued that privatization has demonstrably damaged the poor, whether through loss of employment and income, or through exclusion from, or reduced access to, basic services. This is mainly because private firms are principally concerned with profits, prices and costs, and are highly selective as to sectors and types of consumer. Meanwhile, the weakness of governance and regulatory capacity in many developing countries lead to poor control of market abuses. The article concludes by proposing that donors should take more account of local variations in state–market relations, and be prepared to give consideration to alternative economic strategies where privatization is not working as intended.     

Privatization, ownership structure and transparency: how to measure the true involvement of the state

The paper proposes a methodology for evaluation of direct and indirect property distribution and transparency of the property structure in an economy. The methodology is applied to the analysis of property structure of the banking sector in the Czech Republic.     

Privatization and Development

Many of the problems of privatization in developing countries result from the lack of information about the situation of the economy and from the lack of determination on their path of privatization. This paper addresses the lack of information by presenting a theory of incomplete privatization contracts. It then turns to the lack of determination, dealing with particular problems of partially privatized firms and, finally, postulating an elaborate system of price regulation of privatized monopolies, which typically is missing in developing countries.     

Privatization of public enterprises

In this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained: The manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient; in a privatized firm the manager's effort is chosen efficiently. The reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient. In the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient. On the other hand, the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently. It is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government's multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive-compatible reward for the manager.

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Zusammenfassung Wird ein Unternehmen vom öffentlichen ins private Eigentum übergeführt, so gilt folgendes: Im öffentlichen Unternehmen sind das Ausmaß der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen sowie der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers niedriger als im Kostenminimum. Im privatisierten Unternehmen werden dagegen der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers und die Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen in kostenminimierendem Umfang gewählt. In der öffentlichen Unternehmung führt Informationsasymmetrie zu einer stärkeren Spreizung der Managerentlohnung als im privatisierten Unternehmen. In privatisierten Unternehmen ist die Managerentlohnung so niedrig, daß der Manager nur seinen Reservationsnutzen erhält.

     

Privatization of Water-Resource Development

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies from market power and return-flow externalities in private construction of a water project. The model pays special attention to increasing groundwater pumping costs, project set-up costs, limited project capacity, and return flow to the aquifer. For a given capacity, the return-flow externality causes project owners to construct the project too late when the price of groundwater is too high because the external benefit of return-flow to the aquifer is not captured. Market power exacerbates these effects since the project owner delays construction to accelerate groundwater overdraft. The return-flow externality and market power also decrease installed capacity and increase overdraft from the aquifer. Applying the model to the construction of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) for a given capacity, the estimated deadweight loss from hypothetical private construction of the project ($0.853 billion) is substantially less than the literature’s estimate of deadweight loss from actual construction by the Bureau of Reclamation ($2.603 billion). However, under the federal subsidies and insecure property rights that accompanied the CAP, private construction results in a larger estimated efficiency loss ($6.126 billion).     

Privatization and Reformation*

This paper presents a simple model of a government contemplating the pre-sale reform of a public enterprise. While the government is less efficient at such reform than the eventual owner, failure to reform may be considered an indicator of low commercial value by potential purchasers. Consequently, the government may be unable to avoid socially wasteful restructuring if it wishes to maximize its net sales revenue. The results presented in this paper provide a number of insights and policy recommendations for governments embarking on a privatization program.     

Privatization: British style

Three strong radical Conservative administrations under United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher embarked on an extensive program of privatization at the beginning of the 1980s. This article surveys that experience and ends by considering whether there are any, even limited, lessons to be drawn of relevance to the USA.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.     

International Trade and Strategic Privatization

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly‐owned firms. In order to analyze this question, we consider two countries and assume that publicly‐owned firms are less efficient than private firms. We obtain that when the marginal cost of the publicly‐owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government wants it to be the government of the other country that privatizes its publicly‐owned firm. In this case, only one government privatizes, and that government obtains lower social welfare and producer surplus than the other.     

Privatization of state-owned enterprises in Poland

The transition from centrally planned to market economies in Eastern Europe has become a field of debate in economic literature since the late 1980s. Privatization plays a very important role because it is also a sensitive political problem. Privatization is a key element of the several reform packages that are being applied in Poland. This paper examines the different ways that small- and medium-sized enterprises were privatized from 1990 to 1995 using statistical data of the Ministry of Privatization [1995]. Analyzed enterprises are presented by the following group of projects. Capital privatization, direct foreign investment, joint stock companies awaiting privatization, and other methods of privatization are connected with the special program designed for firms with bad financial standing.     

Strategic Privatization in Developing Countries

Privatization of state‐owned enterprises may have important welfare implications, in particular in less developed economies where markets are small and domestic firms are typically relatively weak, both technologically and financially. In these environments, a high‐tech foreign investor acquiring the state‐owned assets may end up dominating the local market, thereby harming local consumer and producer interests. A foreign investor, however, is likely to be both willing and able to offer a higher bid for the assets than local investors. This paper addresses the trade‐off for local governments between privatization revenues and foreign market power. The authors find that there may be an incentive to privatize “strategically” by selling the state‐owned firm to a local (less advanced) investor at a lower price in order to achieve a more competitive post‐privatization market structure.     

创业投资公司退出调查

从创业投资家的角度看,创业投资是很多年内流动性较差的长期投资,因为很多创业企业最初是不盈利的,因此从这些企业中退出是创业投资家实现投资回报的基本方式。退出有两个重要的功能:(1)它使创业投资家将对成功企业的增值服务转移给处于早期阶段的创业企业;(2)它使创业投资基金的投资者能够评价创业投资家的质量,并且能够将创业资本从不成功的创业投资家重新分配给成功的创业投资家。因此,退出对创业资本的运作至关重要。     

The Contribution of Privatization to Welfare

The primary focus of this work is on the nature of the privatization debate rather than on an attempt to explore the truth or validity of each of the many claims and counterclaims that have been made for the practice of privatization. The main objective is to discover why the issues remain controversial and whether there are prospects for reconciliation. The results obtained from the evidence examined suggest there is no well-formed theory of privatization, and no well-formed opposing theory. In the absence of a convincing theory, the authors conclude they expect the debate to continue on the lines of competition, free markets and choice versus complaints about unfulfilled promises and unexpected costs, corruption scandals and disadvantages to the poor, and suggest possible ways forward.

"深度私有化"与经济绩效 --对转型国家私有化得失的思考

转型国家私有化在宏观经济层面的得失说明私有化并非所有权的变更那么简单，Clifford Zinnes等人认为，经济绩效的提高来自于“深度私有化”，而且由于初始条件的不同，同一政策在不同国家产生的经济绩效也不尽相同，他们试图解释是哪些因素造成过去10年中转型国家的私有化在宏观经济层面的得与失，并为经济转型国家的私有化政策的制度提出题了一种修正的范式。     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

在规制和民营化之间:改革的顺序选择--以电信行业改革为例

改革顺序的选择问题是多年争论的焦点。1990年代早期，许多西方顾问从市场制度将随民营化自然确立的假设出发，极力鼓动东欧国家和前苏联迅速推进民营化。随后，人们才认识到并强调在民营化之前先行确立能促进竞争的制度框架的重要性。直到现在，对这场争论的经验性分析尚付阙如。本文试图通过电信行业改革顺序效果的检验来填补这一空缺，允其是检验了先于原垄断企业民营化之前建立监管机构这种做法的实际效果。文章从中得出了与目前流行的观点相一致的结论，即在那些先于民营化分别确立监管机构权威的国家里，电信行业的投资、安装电话的透明度、移动电话普及率等方面都有明显的增长。在比较中，作者进一步发现，投资者也更愿意把资金投向那些确立了规制权威的国家的电信企业，这种投资意愿的增长与投资者在管制规则不确定的国家中的投资需要额外的风险补偿是一致的。     

财政平衡能力与地方经济的民营化--对三市六县的调查

本文作者调查了江苏省、四川省、及山西省的三市六县经济体制改革的进程,发现改革进程的地区间差异是预算约束硬化程度的地区间差异造成的,在谈判能力较弱的地区,预算约束硬化会较早到来,其程度也更强,改革实施的就更早,进程也更快;在谈判能力较强的地区,预算约束硬化较晚到来,其程度也更轻,改革实施的就较晚,进程也更缓慢。而体制内谈判能力具有地区差异,是中国体制的鲜明特点,所以中国过去的改革进程呈现出地区不平衡的特点,这种特点还将继续下去。