业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

盈余管理的“度”

马靖昊：企业内部会计文化的缺失也助长了财务造假的风气目前盈余管理已成为众多上市公司为实现利益最大化所惯用的操作手法。虽然它的存在具有一定的合理性,但对众多上市公司而言,盈余管理质变后所带来的后果同样不可小觑。＂如果操作不当,质变后的盈余管理就是财务造假。＂畅捷通信息技术股份有限公司首席会计专家、中央财经大学研究生客座导师马靖昊在接受《新理财》专访时表示。操纵利润是企业盈余管理的普遍现象。在马靖昊看来,企业利润可以分为五种。     

Real Earnings Management in Sales

We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash‐flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey‐based research on REM throughout the paper.     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

Directors' Recommendations on Takeover Bids and the Management of Earnings: Evidence from Australian Takeovers

This article investigates whether Australian companies manage their earnings during takeover bids in a manner consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that directors who reject a bid use accrual accounting to increase current earnings, supporting their claim that the bid, relative to earnings, is inadequate. Likewise, directors who accept a bid are predicted to use accrual accounting to decrease current earnings. Overall, the results are not consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. However, some components of unexpected accruals (our proxy for managed earnings) change in the direction predicted by the earnings-management hypothesis, although these changes are not statistically significant. Using industry adjusted performance measures the conclusion is that unexpected accruals are primarily a manifestation of poor financial performance of target firms in the period leading up to the takeover bid.     

盈余管理本质探析

本文从报表“真实性”的相对性、盈余管理的合法性、盈余管理对公司价值的影响、盈余管理下的财富转移的合理性和盈余管理的增值性等五个方面对盈余管理的本质进行了讨论。     

盈余管理策略

虽然盈余管理在西方国家已产生多年,但是对于盈余管理的定义,一直以来都没有一个统一的说法,威廉姆·R·斯科特认为,盈余管理就是在会计准则的许可权限之内,利用不同的会计政策,最大的实现企业的社会利益和经济利益;凯瑟琳？雪柏则认为,所谓的盈余管理指的就是企业的经营者对外界有选择性的公布企业信息,以达到企业利益的最大化。以笔者的观点来看,盈余管理就是在不违反相关的会计法规下,管理者的对会计收益报告进行操控。     

杠杆操纵:不为盈余的盈余管理动机

本文以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了杠杆操纵与盈余管理之间的关系.研究发现,企业杠杆操纵压力越大(或曰杠杆操纵动机越强),其有利于控制账面杠杆率的盈余管理程度越大,且这一效应在非国有企业中更强,表明杠杆操纵动机确实是企业盈余管理的一种特殊动机.本文的研究不仅丰富和拓展了盈余管理动机方面的研究文献,从资产负债表信息出发研究盈余管理动机,揭示了出于杠杆操纵目的进行盈余管理的这种特殊动机;而且提示公司内外部治理主体尤其是投资者关注资产负债表信息质量,尽力甄别可能存在的杠杆操纵,准确认识企业债务风险水平和收益质量.     

Dividend payout determinants for Australian Multinational and Domestic Corporations

I investigate the determinants of dividend payments for Australian Multinational Corporations (MCs) and Domestic Corporations (DCs). Six measures of dividend payout ratios are investigated, and five international factors are employed in addition to traditional factors. I find: MCs pay significantly less regular cash, special cash, total dividends and net dividends relative to DCs; the degree of foreign involvement is important in determining special cash and net dividend payments; MCs are more active than DCs in dividend increasing activities; and MCs are significantly less likely to be a dividend payer relative to DCs due to tax disadvantages coupled with unfavourable foreign risk exposures.     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of Earnings Management

This paper examines the implications of using the absolute value of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management. First, we analytically develop the mean and variance of the distribution of absolute discretionary accruals, and show that the expected value is an increasing function of the variance in the underlying error term from the first‐stage discretionary accrual estimation model. Second, we highlight several firm characteristics that are related to the error variance in discretionary accrual estimation models. Using simulations, we show that correlation between the earnings management partitioning variable and these firm characteristics leads to an overrejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Third, we provide research design suggestions to help researchers mitigate the potential bias arising from the use of unsigned measures of earnings management. Using these suggestions, we replicate a recent study, and demonstrate that the inferences change after controlling for operating volatility.     

资产减值与盈余管理——论《资产减值》准则的政策涵义

2006年2月15日我国颁布了《资产减值》准则,规定已确认的资产减值不得转回。本文研究了上市公司的资产减值与盈余管理之间的关系,发现减值前亏损的公司存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为, 一方面是为了避免亏损,另一方面是为了进行大洗澡(big bath);同时有较弱的证据说明减值前盈利的公司也存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为,一方面是为了利润平滑化,另一方面是为了达到盈余增长。     

Insider Trading and Earnings Management

Abstract:  This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.     

盈余管理与会计域秩序

盈余管理是目前会计学研究的核心问题之一。本文首先对已有盈余管理研究进行评述,在此基础上,认为已有研究仅仅局限于已有会计规则的框架下来研究会计规则执行过程中的盈余管理,而会计规则的执行在很大程度上决定于会计规则的制定。本文认为,会计规则的制定与执行是两个相互影响的环节,会计域秩序是会计信息质量的基本评价标准;盈余管理研究的目的之一是为会计规则的制定提供依据,它除了关注会计规则的执行行为以外,还应将会计规则的制定作为一个重要的变量,即研究在采用不同原则、方式和程序所制定而成的会计规则下的不同盈余管理行为。     

盈余管理真相

盈余管理是公司管理层实施战略管理的重要工具之一,合格的CF0并不一定必须去做盈余管理,但盈余管理却是CFO工作的重要组成部分。如果把盈余管理当作粉饰报表的工具,那就危险了。     

中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究

随着业绩预告制度的实施和演进,我国资本市场上逐步出现了越来越多的上市公司自愿业绩预告,这对于缓解管理层与投资者、机构投资者与中小投资者之间的信息不对称具有重要意义。那么,是什么因素激励上市公司管理层自愿披露业绩预告?通过借鉴西方的自愿信息披露理论,并结合我国转轨经济的制度背景,本文提出了我国上市公司自愿业绩预告的三类动机:资本市场交易、管理层股票收益和管理层能力信号传递,并以2001-2008年我国上市公司业绩预告数据为研究样本对此进行了检验。研究结果显示,融资需求高、管理者利益协同程度高、会计业绩好的上市公司更有动机自愿披露业绩预告,并且国有相对于非国有上市公司自愿披露动机更弱。     

Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self‐selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.