Abstracts/Résumés

This paper examines whether credit analysts utilize the information contained in the difference between book and taxable income in analyzing a firm’s credit risk. Increased book–tax differences may be informative for credit rating agencies as they may signal decreased earnings quality or changes in the firm’s off–balance sheet financing. Results suggest a significant negative association between positive changes in book–tax differences and ratings changes. This evidence is consistent with large positive changes in book–tax differences signaling decreased earnings quality and/or increased off–balance sheet financing. We also find that large negative changes in book–tax differences result in less favorable rating changes, consistent with these changes signaling decreased earnings quality. In additional analyses, we find that the association between changes in book–tax differences and rating changes is attenuated for high–tax‐planning firms (e.g., where book–tax differences more likely reflect tax planning than decreased earnings quality).     

Abstracts/Résumés

We investigate how private information and monitoring affect the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment–cash flow sensitivity. We argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing constraints. Our results suggest that, for financially constrained firms, banks’ access to private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the importance of accounting quality. Our results suggest that, when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, the importance of accounting quality is mitigated if outside capital suppliers have access to private information and is eliminated if they impose contractual restrictions on investment. We also provide evidence that banks’ access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment–cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by measurement error of the investment opportunity set.