Dissecting Earnings Recognition Timeliness

We dissect the portion of stock price change of the fiscal year that is recognized in reported accounting earnings of the year. We call this portion earnings recognition timeliness (ERT). The emphasis in our dissection is on empirical identification of two fundamental precepts of financial accounting: (1) the matching principle, which is manifested in the recognition of expenses in the same period as the related benefits (i.e., sales revenue) accrue; and (2) recognition of expenses in the current period due to changes in expectations regarding earnings of future periods (we refer to these expenses as the expectations element of expenses). Although the expectations element has implicitly been at the core of much of the recent empirical literature on asymmetry in the earnings/return relation, it has not been explicitly identified. This recent literature is based on the premise that bad news about the future leads to more recognition of expenses in the current period (such as write‐downs) whereas good news about the future tends to have a much lesser effect on expenses of the current period; asymmetry in the expenses/return relation is captured implicitly via the observation of asymmetry in the earnings/return relation (i.e., asymmetry in ERT). Since the ERT reflects the relation between sales revenue and returns, matched expenses and returns, as well as the relation between the expectations element of expenses and returns, a focus on the expectations element may lead to sharper inferences. Our straightforward empirical procedure permits a focus on this element.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

Timeliness of Reporting and Earnings Information Transfers

This study examines earnings timeliness and its effect on earnings information transfers. Empirical analyses focus on a sample of approximately fifteen hundred earnings reports and nearly four thousand information transfers. The principal findings are: (1) earlier earnings releases yield negative information transfers, (2) earnings releases yield negative (nominal) information transfers to firms that previously (subsequently) release their earnings reports, and (3) earlier earnings releases yield negative information transfers to firms that have not yet disclosed earnings. These findings show that the timing of earnings reports has significant and far-reaching economic consequences.     

Robust Measures of Earnings Surprises

Event studies of market efficiency measure earnings surprises using the consensus error (CE), given as actual earnings minus the average professional forecast. If a subset of forecasts can be biased, the ideal but difficult to estimate parameter‐dependent alternative to CE is a nonlinear filter of individual errors that adjusts for bias. We show that CE is a poor parameter‐free approximation of this ideal measure. The fraction of misses on the same side (FOM), which discards the magnitude of misses, offers a far better approximation. FOM performs particularly well against CE in predicting the returns of U.S. stocks, where bias is potentially large.     

The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of Earnings Management

This paper examines the implications of using the absolute value of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management. First, we analytically develop the mean and variance of the distribution of absolute discretionary accruals, and show that the expected value is an increasing function of the variance in the underlying error term from the first‐stage discretionary accrual estimation model. Second, we highlight several firm characteristics that are related to the error variance in discretionary accrual estimation models. Using simulations, we show that correlation between the earnings management partitioning variable and these firm characteristics leads to an overrejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Third, we provide research design suggestions to help researchers mitigate the potential bias arising from the use of unsigned measures of earnings management. Using these suggestions, we replicate a recent study, and demonstrate that the inferences change after controlling for operating volatility.     

Dealers' Adverse Selection Costs and the Evaluation of Alternative Measures of the Earnings Release Signal

This study investigates the relationship between over-the-counter dealers' adverse selection costs and alternative measures of the earnings release signal to evaluate the quality of the signal. The measure of the earnings release signal most associated with dealers' adverse selection costs is suggested as being the least noisy measure of the information impounded in security prices during earnings release periods. The results suggest that the seasonal Box-Jenkins earnings expectation model known as the Brown-Rozeff “premier” model generates the signal most consistent with the information impounded in security prices during earnings release periods.     

The Usefulness of Measures of Consistency of Discretionary Components of Accruals in the Detection of Earnings Management

Abstract:  Prior research has shown the prevalence of measurement error in models used to estimate aggregate discretionary accruals. In these models, the incremental information content of the various components of accruals is ignored. Limited prior research and data gathered from firms under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation indicate that managers use either one or more than one component of accruals simultaneously, in a consistent way to manipulate bottom-line earnings in a given direction. I propose two measures that capture the consistency between the discretionary components of accruals and test their significance in earnings management (EM) detection in firms that have artificially added accrual manipulation and firms that were targeted by the SEC for accrual manipulation. There is evidence that this information is incrementally useful in detecting EM. This finding paves the way for improvements in the discretionary accruals measure by including consistency information from the components of aggregate accruals.     

Earnings Persistence, Losses and the Estimation of Earnings Response Coefficients

One of the major themes of capital markets accounting research concerns mapping the relation between accounting earnings and security returns. There is still not agreement on the functional form of this relation. The models analysed here are those where: the level of earnings alone, the change in earnings alone, or both, scaled by price, are used as explanatory variables for returns. This article demonstrates that if earnings are either completely permanent or entirely transitory, the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) estimated by levels and changes models should coincide. However, if earnings comprise a mixed process of permanent and transitory components, the ERC estimated by the levels will differ from that estimated by the changes model. Using losses to identify transitory components in earnings, empirical evidence consistent with these predictions is provided.
A combined model using both the level of, and change in, earnings is justified as a weighted average of an earnings and a book value valuation model (e.g., Ohlson, 1989). An alternative rationalization concerns the mitigation of an errors-in-variables problem associated with the estimation of unexpected earnings (Ali and Zarowin, 1992). The results for the combined model are more consistent with the latter. In this context, some previous empirical studies perceive the levels variable as a useful addition to the changes variable when there are transitory components in earnings. However, the evidence reported here suggests that the level of earnings, scaled by price, appears to be the fundamental earnings explanatory variable for returns (Ohlson, 1991, p. 1). The changes variable can, when the errors-in-variables problem is not mitigated by other methods, be a useful addition to the levels variable.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

Sustained Earnings and Revenue Growth,Earnings Quality,and Earnings Response Coefficients

We show that firms reporting sustained increases in both earnings and revenues have (1) higher quality earnings and (2) larger earnings response coefficients (ERCs) in comparison to firms reporting sustained increases in earnings alone. With respect to earnings quality, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have more persistent earnings, exhibit less susceptibility to earnings management, and have higher future operating performance. With respect to response coefficients, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have both higher ERCs and lower book value response coefficients, consistent with the implications of the Ohlson (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research 12, 661–687) model.JEL Classification: G12, M41     

Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefficient and Accounting Conservatism

A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise‐linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market‐to‐book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives.     

Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals: Earnings Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance

We examine market reactions to contemporaneous announcements of current earnings and future earnings guidance for evidence on how investors trade off relevance and reliability. Current earnings are more reliable than future earnings guidance, but future earnings guidance may be more relevant for predicting future performance. We find that current earnings are more strongly associated with announcement-period returns than concurrently disclosed future earnings guidance, consistent with investors’ relative preference for reliability. We find similar return reactions to stand-alone earnings and to earnings released with guidance. In contrast, return reactions are lower for guidance announced simultaneously with current earnings than for stand-alone guidance.     

Earnings beta

Review of Accounting Studies - The literature on cash flow or earnings beta is theoretically well-motivated in its use of fundamentals, instead of returns, to measure systematic risk. However,...     

Analysts Earnings Forecasts and the Roles of Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation

This study examines the effect of the degree of association between current earnings and expected future earnings on the relative importance of earnings and book value for explaining equity price. Consensus analysts forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings are used to proxy for expected future earnings and are compared to reported current earnings to measure the degree of the association. We find that the value-relevance of current earnings negatively correlates with the extent to which consensus analysts forecasts deviate from current earnings. We also find that the incremental explanatory power of book value for equity price positively correlates with this measure. These results remain robust after controlling for factors known to be affecting the value-relevance of earnings such as negative earnings and the earnings-to-book ratio. Our results also show that this analysts' forecast-based measure of `earnings persistence' dominates historical earnings variance in explaining cross-sectional variations in the value-relevance of earnings and book value.     

The Variability of Earnings and Non-Earnings Information and Earnings Prediction

This paper examines the performance of a 'composite' model of earnings prediction that integrates current earnings and current price as predictors of next year's earnings. The results show that current earnings (current price) play a key role in predicting future earnings when the ratio of earnings variance to price variance is low (high). The composite model is superior to univariate time-series models in out-of-sample predictive accuracy for the overall sample, and is substantially so for the group of firms with a high ratio of earnings variance to price variance.     

Permanent and Transitory Earnings,Accounting Recording Lag,and the Earnings Coefficient

In this paper, (1) wedefine precisely the terms permanent and transitory earnings;(2) we delineate the effects of the degree of permanence andof accounting recording lag on estimates of the slope coefficientfrom a returns-earnings regression and (3) we examine the relationbetween the estimates of the earnings coefficient and observablevariables that may indicate (i) the extent to which earningsare more or less permanent, and (ii) the extent to which valuerelevant events are recorded in accounting earnings in a timelyfashion. Our main point is that attributing differences in thereturns-earnings relation to one of these effects without controllingfor the other may lead to erroneous conclusions.