Privatization Policy and Enterprise Performance: the case of Ireland

Abstract Compared to other industrialized economies Ireland has been slow to privatize state‐owed enterprises. The first divestitures in 1991 failed to trigger a systematic programme of sell‐offs due to fears of job losses in an economy characterized by low rates of growth and high levels of unemployment. Where subsequent sales occurred they took place on a pragmatic and case‐by‐case basis with the reasons for privatization varying across companies. Some of the earlier sales took place because the enterprises were financially unviable whereas more recent sales can be attributed to the influence of EU policy on competition and restrictions on state aids. Since the privatization of the state telecommunications company in 1999 there has been a significant increase in privatization activity and most of the remaining public enterprises are candidates for divestiture. By 2001 total revenues amounted to €8.1 bn (9 per cent of GNP for 2001). A consistent justification for privatization has been that a change in ownership will lead to improved performance. The analysis in this paper fails to support this argument. At this early stage of the programe the experience has been for cost‐cutting measures to lead to improved performance prior to privatization with little evidence of continued improvements after divestiture .     

机构投资者持股和会计盈余质量

本文从会计盈余质量的角度来研究机构投资者(’在公司治理中的作用。我们从盈余管理程度、盈余信息含量和盈余稳健性等三个方面来衡量会计盈余的质量。三方面的研究结果显示,机构投资者持股有助于改善会计盈余的质量:机构投资者持股公司的会计盈余质量显著高于其他公司,并且会计盈余的质量随着机构投资者持股比例的增加而增加。进一步研究发现,机构投资者还能够缓解大股东对会计盈余信息含量的恶化,起到一定的制衡作用。本文的研究表明,机构投资者能够在一定程度上改善上市公司的盈余质量,其快速成长有助于公司治理结构的改善,也有助于资本市场信息披露环境的良性发展。     

Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu telecommunications

Abstract ** :  In many countries infrastructure liberalization proceeded faster than the privatization of former state monopolies. Regulatory agencies, established to oversee the transition and safeguard the preconditions for competition, therefore monitor state‐owned firms in addition to privately owned firms. The research on public‐private firms has generated heterogeneous findings, with some pointing to the advantages and other to the disadvantages of this arrangement. Government regulation of mixed public‐private firms raises additional complicated issues, of which the paper studies two using the example of European telecommunications between 2000 and 2004. It examines, first, whether the dual role of the state as owner and regulator could be abused to disadvantage private competitors. Second, it probes whether, conversely, the combination of government ownership and regulation might help overcome some of the shortcomings of the regulation of private firms. We find weak evidence that public and mixed regulated firms were subject to more favourable regulation of interconnection prices. However, this effect weakened as more independent regulation was established. In the area of universal service provision, there is no clear evidence that public and mixed telecommunication service providers were more likely than private ones to be utilized in pursuit of social output goals without explicit compensation. Overall, it seems that the presence of independent regulation, appeals processes, and competition review is a safeguard against capture of the regulator, by public and mixed firms .     

Constitutional Design and Investment in Cooperatives and Investor‐Owned Enterprises

Abstract This paper studies the role of the corporate governance system in cooperatives and in investor‐owned enterprises. We abstract from all possible differences between the two systems except the type of majority needed to take decisions: this is one‐head‐one‐vote for cooperatives and proportional to capital invested in investor‐owned firms. We show that the institutional form chosen matters for the initial investment decision of the agents: in particular we find that members of a cooperative invest less than they would in an investor‐owned enterprise.     

Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry

Alternative governance mechanisms can be expected to resultin differences in enterprise performance. This research analyzesthe prices charged by U.S. electric utilities using a comprehensivepricing model and a large and detailed dataset that controlsfor enterprise costs and subsidies. It finds that public ownershipis associated with significantly lower prices than with privatelyowned utilities, most likely because the latter are subjectto regulation. Also associated with lower prices are electedcommissioners (rather than those appointed by state governors),commissions with fewer members, and utilities whose governingbodies hold open meetings–all characteristics that implymore direct consumer influence on the price-determination process.Among customer groups, residential users are the biggest beneficiariesof public ownership, while industrial users appear to have moreinfluence with elected state regulatory commissions. These findingsare reconciled with theory and help explain the sometimes ambiguousresults of previous studies.     

Expense ratios of North American mutual funds

Abstract The average expense ratio paid by Canadian mutual fund investors is 50% higher than that paid in the United States. This discrepancy is commonly thought to exist because Canadian funds do not take advantage of economies of scale and have less competition. A monopolistic competition framework is used to develop a model for the mutual fund industry. By allowing each fund to have different attributes, the model permits funds to charge different expense ratios in equilibrium and is found to strongly fit the North American mutual fund market. Empirical analysis indicates that these two common explanations and measurable fund attributes account for 24% of the discrepancy. JEL Classification: L11, L13 and G15
Les ratios de dépenses des fonds mutuels nord‐américains Le taux moyen de dépenses payées par les investisseurs canadiens dans les fonds mutuels sont de 50% plus élevées que celles qu'on paie aux Etats‐Unis. Cet écart est attribué d'habitude au fait que les fonds canadiens ne tirent pas profit des économies d'échelle et qu'il y a moins de concurrence au Canada. On utilise un modèle de concurrence monopolistique pour analyser l'industrie des fonds mutuels. En permettant à chaque fond d'avoir certains attributs, le modèle permet aux fonds de charger des taux de dépenses différents en équilibre. Il semble que cela corresponde aux caractéristiques du marché des fonds mutuels américains. Une analyse empirique montre que les deux explications usuelles et les attributs mesurables des fonds expliquent 24% de l'écart.     

Estimating Quality‐adjusted Price Changes: Method and Application to VCRs

This paper uses scanner data to generate estimates of quality‐adjusted price changes for video‐recorders. We use hedonic regressions to derive estimates of the changing worth of each quality component. These are then applied to weighted changes in the mix of quality attributes of products to derive estimates of quality‐adjusted price (QAP) changes. The data source used is electronic‐point‐of‐sale (EPOS) scanner data that are available for a wide range of goods. This study provides an example of how such methods can be more widely applied. The estimates of QAP changes correspond to constant‐utility, (hedonic) cost‐of‐living indexes defined in economic theory as the ratio of expenditure functions at constant utility allowing for changing prices and characteristics of goods. This method is proposed as an improvement on the existing direct method , which takes its estimates directly from the coefficients associated with 'time dummies' in a hedonic regression. We finally undertake a matching process, akin to that used by statistical offices, and compare the results. Direct comparisons with RPI estimates and these hedonic approaches are not easy since the approaches use quite different data sets. Our replication of a procedure akin to that used for the RPI on the scanner data set provides insights into sources of potential bias.     

正确认识利益相关论者的企业产权和社会责任观

"利益相关者"理论描述了企业同其他社会主体的联系,却没有看清各种不同关系的实质,以它作为诉求企业所有权的根据,混淆了不同的产权主体和产权客体,颠倒了所有权与契约关系的地位和作用,分不清不同经济关系的处理原则,在产权理论上产生一系列错误.另一方面,它指出企业不可能离开社会的支持,必须处理好同其他社会主体,特别是企业职工的关系,为改善企业的经营管理,树立企业的社会责任感,构建正常的市场关系,作出有益的启示.但是,社会主义公有制内部的利益关系已经大大超越了在资本主义土壤产生的"利益相关者"理论所涉及的内容.只有它才是构建社会主义和谐社会的可靠基础.以社会主义关系及其形成的思维去论证"利益相关者"理论,或者以这种理论去解释和处理社会主义公有制的内部关系,都是不可取的.     

A constitutional theory of public enterprise

This article rationalizes public enterprise by analyzing the constitutional choice between private and public ownership of production arrangements. Arguing that results depend on who does the choosing, the article compares choices by self-governing citizens with choices by self-directed governmental officials. The resulting institutional theory identifies four conditions that cause citizens to favor public over private ownership. None of the conditions refers to the standard concept of economic efficiency, which guides most economic comparisons of public and private enterprise.     

Imperfect price discrimination, market structure, and efficiency

Abstract.  We introduce a flexible third‐degree price discrimination framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We show that the free‐entry equilibrium number of firms exhibits a U‐shape as a function of the quality of information. This implies that imperfect price discrimination generates the most efficient free‐entry outcome. JEL classification: D43, L11, L43     

Rebates as incentives to exclusivity

Abstract.  We show how rebates (or fidelity discounts) that take the form of lump‐sum payments made to retailers can be used by an incumbent manufacturer to achieve exclusivity and to deter the entry of a more efficient rival. The results, which hold whatever the degree of differentiation between retailers and whatever the cost advantage of the entrant, are found, despite minimizing asymmetries that may favour the incumbent. As such, there is no need to introduce buyers' disorganization, discriminatory offers, economies of scale, non‐coincident markets, or liquidated damages to find that exclusivity can lead to anti‐competitive effects. JEL classification: L12, L42     

Public capital, asymmetric information, and economic growth

Abstract.  We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self‐selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth, we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross‐country data. JEL classification: D82, H21, O41     

OWNERSHIP VERSUS TIMING OF THE GAME

This study examines the impact of timing of the game on the welfare gains of privatisation in the presence of strategic trade policy. We argue that only if the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player will it generate an additional distortion that could outweigh the distortion caused by the oligopolistic behaviour of private firms. But with a first-mover advantage it can serve as an effective regulatory device comparable with a production subsidy. We further show that, in the presence of strategic trade policy, Cournot assumptions are inconsistent with the firms' preferences over the timing of the game. As public Stackelberg leadership is a subgame Nash equilibrium of the extended game with endogenous order of moves, we conclude that it is the timing of the game rather than firms' ownership structure which is responsible for the inefficiency of an international mixed market found by earlier studies.     

Estimating Coaching Efficiency in Professional Team Sports: Evidence from English Association Football

This study provides a review of the literature on sporting production functions with an emphasis on different input‐output specifications and alternative estimation procedures. Empirical evidence is reported for English association football on the robustness of estimates of coaching efficiency to changes in estimation methods and the definition of team performance and playing talent inputs. A measure of player quality based on predicted start‐of‐season transfer values is developed. It is found that the estimation of coaching efficiency is sensitive to the choice of time‐invariant efficiency models versus time‐varying and inefficiency effects models. It is also found that the results are little affected by different measures of team performance but are highly sensitive to the use of an ex post financial expenditure input measure. Ex ante input measures based on start‐of‐season player characteristics or predicted transfer values are recommended as more appropriate on both theoretical and empirical grounds.     

学区房的溢价究竟有多大：利用“租买不同权”和配对回归的实证估计

中国城市居民只有在学区中买房(而非租房)才能享有学区内小学的入学权。本文借助"租买不同权"的入学制度,以及学区房与相邻非学区房的配对回归,更好地处理特征价格模型中的遗漏变量,精确测度优质教育资源的隐含价格。结果表明,2011年北京重点小学学区房的溢价约为8.1%。将基础教育资源与住房租买形式挂钩的制度安排,是中国城市居民过度偏好住房自有的重要原因之一,会扭曲居民住房选择和资源配置,造成优势区位房价过高。     

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.     

Long‐term Performance of New Equity Issuers, Venture Capital and Reputation of Investment Bankers

This study investigates the potential effects of investment‐banking reputation and venture capital on the long‐term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) simultaneously. Our findings do not support the view that IPOs perform differently compared with other firms, with the only exception of venture‐backed IPOs. We show that venture‐backed IPOs are associated with long‐term gains when we account for investment bankers' reputation, size and book‐to‐market effects. Zero investment portfolios, based on combinations of underwriter's reputation and venture capital involvement's in IPOs, provide additional evidence in support of the view that venture‐backed IPOs, regardless of the reputation of underwriters, are associated with significant post‐issue gains. Our results also indicate that the reputation of investment bankers matters only in the absence of venture capital .     

Skills associated with employment positions in SMEs and favourable attitudes toward self-employment: Longitudinal evidence from students who participated in the shell technology enterprise programme

Successive British governments have encouraged young people to accumulate skills and attributes that would enable them to obtain jobs in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as develop careers in enterprise. This article evaluates the contribution of the 1994 Shell Technology Enterprise Programme (STEP) that subsidised the placement of students in SMEs. In 1997, responses were gathered from STEP students as well as a control group of non-STEP students. The human capital profiles of students reporting full-time employment positions in smaller private firms as well as those reporting a favourable attitude towards self-employment or business ownership were ascertained. Participation in the programme was not found to be significantly associated with the selected outcomes. Skills and attributes honed by the programme were, however, significantly associated with the selected outcomes. Policy-makers need to appreciate that the skills and attributes reported by students associated with the propensity to obtain employment positions in smaller private firms are not the same as those associated with the propensity to report a favourable attitude towards self-employment or business ownership.     

共同机构所有权与企业创新：协同治理与信息共享视角

共同机构所有权能够强化行业联系，推动信息、技术和经验跨边界整合共享，实现外部性内部化，促进生产要素向企业集聚。以2007—2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为例，考察共同机构所有权对企业创新的影响。结果发现，共同机构所有权能够促进企业创新，其联结程度和持股比例越高，越有利于企业创新，且经过倾向得分匹配法、Heckman二阶段回归等内生性检验和敏感性测试后，结论依然成立。进一步研究发现，共同机构所有权通过发挥协同治理效应和信息共享效应推动企业创新发展，并且共同机构所有权对企业创新的促进作用在市场化进程较低、行业竞争程度较高的样本中更为显著。结论可进一步提升对共同机构所有权这一新兴市场现象的认知，同时为决策部门制定政策方案提供参考。