Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.     

Are small firms less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers?

We show an inverted-U relation between targetiveness (probability of being targeted) and firm size. However, this pattern describes stock offers and is more pronounced during hot markets characterized by higher stock valuations. For cash offers we find a negative and monotonic relation. These contrasting patterns suggest that small firms (in the bottom NYSE size quartile) are less vulnerable to overpriced stock offers. In addition, we find that the stock acquirers of small targets are less overvalued than those of large targets, and that the announcement returns are less negative for stock acquirers of small targets than for those of large targets.     

Market opportunities and owner identity: Are family firms different?

We test the hypothesis that ownership of a firm does not affect the firm's ability to seize market opportunities once decisions about productive structure are taken into account. By grouping firms in size clusters having a similar distance between the actual and the optimal size, we assess how the sensitivity of a firm's sales to market demand changes in response to differences in the owner's identity. We use data from a panel of 4696 continental western European firms over the period 1995–2010 and Eurostat 3-digit sectoral data on firm size distribution. Empirical evidence rejects the hypothesis of ownership irrelevance: family firms are less sensitive to market demand than other firms, in particular when the actual size of the firm is larger than optimal and in the case of both founder- and heir-run family firms.     

Are firms accessing venture funding more financially constrained? New evidence from capital structure adjustments

We analyze whether firms that receive venture capital (VC) at a later date face more financial constraints than a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not receive VC funding (control group). The aim is to check whether their financial flexibility explains why they decide to seek external equity funding. In contrast with other papers, which focus on the sensitivity of investments to cash flow, we study this issue by applying a dynamic model to analyze the speed of adjustment to their target debt levels prior to receiving the first VC investment. We analyze a representative sample of 237 Spanish unlisted firms that received VC between 1995 and 2007 and its corresponding control group. We find that firms that receive VC funding show a significantly lower speed of adjustment than their matched peers before the initial VC round. It seems that the former are more concerned about funding the required investments than about adjusting the firm's debt ratio to a target level. Our results confirm the role of VC in filling the equity gap in constrained unlisted firms. From a capital structure perspective, VC may become a tool for these companies to balance their capital structure in a growth process.     

Are good-news firms riskier than bad-news firms?

This paper examines the relative risk of good-news firms, i.e., those with high standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and bad-news (low SUE) firms using a stochastic discount factor approach. We find that a stochastic discount factor constructed from a set of basis assets helps explain post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). The risk exposures on the pricing kernel increase monotonically from the lowest to highest SUE sorted portfolios. Specifically, good-news firms always have higher risk exposures than bad-news firms in both 10 SUE sorted portfolios and 25 size and SUE sorted portfolios. However, the estimated expected risk premium is too small to explain the observed magnitude of returns on the PEAD strategy. Our risk adjustment can explain only about one-fourth of the total magnitude of the average realized return to the PEAD strategy. As a result, the average risk-adjusted returns of earnings momentum strategies are mostly positive and significant. Overall, our results support the view that at least some portion of the returns to the earnings momentum strategies examined represent compensation for bearing increased risk.     

Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This paper investigates the optimality of stock option grants to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) by examining a set of S&P 500 companies around the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). I find that stock option grants to non-founding-family CEOs decreased dramatically after the passage of SOX. In addition, non-family firms granted significantly more stock options than family firms before the SOX, but not after its passage. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that CEOs use stock option grants as tools to extract rents from shareholders. This interpretation is further supported by evidence that the large decrease in stock option grants after the SOX was passed is not detrimental to firm performance, and by evidence from a test of the trade-off between option and non-option compensation.     

Do environmentally sustainable practices lead to financially less constrained firms? International evidence

In this study, we utilise a comprehensive dataset from 41 countries spanning 2002–2013 and show that environmentally sustainable practices (ESP) are negatively associated with financial constraints of firms. We refine ESP into three components: emission reduction, product innovation and resource reduction, and show that firms which are more innovative and efficient in reducing wastage of resources are most benefited by ESP. The findings are even stronger for firms operating in countries with high institutional qualities, in high emission and highly competitive industries. These results are important to lending institutions for making financing decisions. Policymakers and investors could also utilise ESP as a key distinguishing factor for firms to benefit from lower financial constraints. Appropriate support and initiatives from local and national regulators could motivate firms to be more environmentally friendly.     

Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?

This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency.     

Are firms from developed markets more international than firms from emerging markets?

Regionalist supporters’ claim that most of the world's largest firms are regional rather than global and that managers should be encouraged to ‘think regional, act local and forget global’ (Rugman and Moore, 2004, p. 67). We apply the matrix of multinationality proposed by Aggarwal et al. (2011) to a sample of the world's 500 largest corporations, the Fortune Global 500. We show that these firms range from purely domestic to regional, trans-regional and entirely global with most lying in the trans-regional and global categories. Our results imply that global strategies are essential to international trade and management in today's business environment. We compare multinationality results by market type (developed versus emerging market), industry, size and age. We find that firms from more advanced economies tend to be older, larger and more multinational than firms from emerging markets. We find no relationship between multinationality and age or multinationality and size, and conclude that developed market firms are not more multinational as a result of size, age or industrial structure.     

Good deeds earn chits? Evidence from philanthropic family controlled firms

This study examines whether charitable family controlled firms have lower default risk. Using Taiwan data that provide clear information about firms’ benevolent intention and avoid endogeneity issue of risk and charitable activities, we show that charitable family controlled firms have lower default risk, which is proxied by value-at-risk and expected shortfall measures. Our finding shows that charitable activities bring benefits of lower risk to shareholders. This study also provides various channels that can lower default risk for the charitable firms. That is, these firms appear to have higher credit ratings, engage less in earnings management, and have higher worker productivity. This study argues that the benevolent mindset of decision makers at firms help lower default risk.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

How and why do small firms manage interest rate risk?

Although small firms are particularly sensitive to interest rates and other shocks, empirical work on corporate risk management has focused instead on large public companies. This paper studies fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans to see how small firms manage their exposure to interest rate risk. Credit-constrained firms are found to match significantly more often with fixed-rate loans, consistent with prior research that shows the supply of credit shrinks during periods of rising interest rates. Banks originate a higher share of adjustable-rate loans than other lenders, ameliorating maturity mismatch and exposure to the lending channel of monetary policy. Time-series patterns in the fixed-rate share are consistent with recent evidence on debt market timing.     

Are family allowances and fertility-related pensions perfect substitutes?

This paper discusses alternative ways to deal with the positive externalities of having children in a pay-as-you-go pension system. Family allowances are compared to introducing a fertility-related component into the pension formula. In an endogenous labor supply setting, both instruments are shown to be equivalent if general pensions are related to previous contributions. In contrast, if general pensions are of the flat-rate type, making pensions contingent on the number of children is generally preferable to family allowances because the latter creates a larger tax load on labor supply.      

How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms?

Despite recent evidence on the importance of chief executive officer (CEO) successions in family firms, we still know little about the differences in corporate strategies entailed by family and professional managers around transition. We investigate the consequences of managerial successions for the financial policies of Italian family firms. Our findings indicate that the appointment of non-family professional CEOs leads to a significant increase in the use of debt, primarily driven by short-term maturities. We document substantial heterogeneity in the impact of professional successions on debt financing: the increase in debt is particularly pronounced for young firms, firms with a high level of investment, and firms in which the controlling family maintains a dominant representation on the board of directors. Examining the importance of financial flexibility, we find that the increase in debt occurs primarily when firms are cash-poor, and when incoming CEOs can exploit spare borrowing capacity.     

Are founding families less willing to bear risk? Evidence from the currency exposure and internationalization strategy of family firms

Although theory predicts that family firms should be less willing to bear risk than nonfamily firms, prior empirical papers have not found support for this prediction. In this paper, we focus on conditional currency risk because founding families can relatively easily influence their firms’ currency exposure. We find that family firms have relatively lower conditional currency exposure. This result holds for both descendant-led and nonfamily-led family firms. Consistent with purposeful actions of founding families, we find that exposure decreases with control-enhancing mechanisms, such as excess voting rights. The findings also support a wealth-preservation motive, evidenced by a finding that exposure declines with the number of family beneficiaries. Additional analysis suggests that family firms achieve the relatively lower risk by reducing internationalization depth and limiting exposure to riskier currencies.     

Who wins and who loses from bank geographic deregulation? Analysis of financially constrained and unconstrained firms

A key issue in the finance-growth nexus literature is endogeneity – economic growth may drive finance as well as finance driving growth. Some research addresses endogeneity using relatively exogenous shocks from U.S. bank geographic deregulation, often documenting favorable economic effects. We connect deregulation shocks for the first time to individual firm growth in a model that differentiates sources of external financing – short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Our results suggest that deregulation increases firm growth overall and this growth is fueled by all three external funding sources. However, benefits accrue only to relatively financially unconstrained firms, while relatively constrained firms lose.     

Are U.S. firms using more short-term debt?

We show that, despite the sharp but temporary decline around the financial crisis of 2007–08, corporate debt maturity has risen significantly in the last two decades, erasing much of the secular decline from the 1980–90s documented in the literature. The reversal in debt maturity trend is driven by the rise in the use of intermediate-term debt among medium and large-sized firms. The low interest rates observed in the last two decades and the decline in the demand for long-term corporate bonds partly explains the rise in intermediate-term debt.     

Is there a symmetric nonlinear causal relationship between large and small firms?

This paper uses both linear and nonlinear causality tests to reexamine the causal relationship between the returns on large and small firms. Consistent with previous results, we find that large firms linearly lead small firms. We also find a significant linear causality in the direction from small firms to large firms, particularly in the more recent time period where the impact from small firms to large firms is greater than from large to small. More important, in contrast to the received literature, we find significant nonlinear causality that is bi-directional and of the same duration in either direction. Using the BEKK asymmetric GARCH model we are able to capture most of the detected nonlinear relationship. This indicates that volatility spillovers are largely responsible for the observed nonlinear Granger causality.     

Did family firms perform better during the financial crisis? New insights from the S&P 500 firms

This paper provides new evidence on whether family firms performed better during the global financial crisis (2008–2010). Using the dataset of the S&P 500 nonfinancial firms during the period 2006–2010, we find that family firms outperformed nonfamily firms during the crisis. Among family firms, the ones that contributed to the outperformance were those where the founder was still present. We also find that during the global financial crisis, founder firms invested significantly less and had better access to the credit market than nonfamily firms. Our analysis suggests that the superior performance of founder firms is largely caused by their having less incentive to overinvest in order to boost short-term earnings during the crisis.     

Are boards' risk management committees associated with firms’ environmental performance?

We examine the relationship between board of director committees tasked with risk management and environmental performance, based on a sample of 1466 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2015. We find that the presence of board committees dedicated only to risk management is associated with better environmental performance. The human capital of risk committees (measured by board tenure, committee tenure, experience, and qualifications) is also positively related to environmental performance. Our findings suggest that the benefits of risk management committees extend to non-financial matters, such as environmental performance. Our findings further suggest that environmental performance is now managed through the regular governance mechanisms within firms. This supports the notion that environmental performance is managed for economic reasons and for the benefit of investors, rather than for the aggrandisement of individual managers. Our findings should be of interest to boards, CEOs, and CFOs who are interested in risk management, as well as to investors, lenders, and auditors who are interested in assessing risk.